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Aristotle’s active intellect has been a subject of much interpretive controversy over the centuries. 
Some have said it is the divine mind, others a god-like power of the human soul. Most begin by 
asking what the active intellect is; instead, I first ask what it does. Upon a close reading of de Anima 
III.5, I conclude that the active intellect activates or actualizes potentially intelligible objects, making 
them to be actually or actively intelligible for thinking. Accordingly, on my view, the active intellect 
is not responsible for initiating particular episodes of thinking for an individual, nor is it responsible 
for the intelligibility of the world in general. Rather, as I go on to argue, the active intellect plays a 
distinctive role in learning and discovery by making intelligible objects available for individual 
knowers. To understand this role more precisely, I consider Aristotle’s idea that we learn by doing: 
not only do we become builders by building and brave by doing brave things, but we also get 
knowledge of triangles by thinking about triangles. In my investigation into his account of 
intellectual learning I draw on the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics. I conclude that Aristotle 
distinguishes two sorts of intellectual activity when students are learning about triangles: they think 
about specific proofs in order to gradually grasp them, but they can also manipulate diagrams to 
discover proofs not yet considered, perhaps by drawing parallel lines or bisecting angles. This latter 
activity, by which students search for and uncover intelligible content in perceptual particulars, is the 
distinctive function of the active intellect. It is productive, then, like light, which does not create the 
color of things but rather reveals colored things as they already are. In doing so, however, the active 
intellect does not act as some intellectual spotlight, but rather as the familiar capacity to explore and 
move about one’s world, a capacity to inquire that is shared by the toddler and the scientist alike. 
The active intellect therefore directs our perceptual engagement in inquiry, so that we may hunt 
down, discover, and consider the correct intelligible forms in the images. 
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PREFACE 
A student’s debt to his teachers resembles a child’s to his parents, and so can never be truly repaid. 
Nevertheless, I endeavor to thank them here in the best way I can muster, by indicating some 
question each encouraged me to ask. While each has influenced the present study in important ways, 
I am of course responsible for any misstatements or misappropriations of their thought. 
 First, I should like to thank my first philosophy teachers and mentors at the University of 
Notre Dame (for the beginning is more than half the whole). In our year-long reading of Plato’s 
corpus, Prof. Jeffrey Langan first encouraged me to explore a Platonic conception of education in the 
Republic, one which includes both habituation (and perhaps even indoctrination) as well as a more 
reflective and dialectical program. Prof. David O’Connor first suggested to me that Metaphysics Θ 
might be a singularly important key to understanding Aristotle’s contributions quite generally, since 
distinctions between potentiality, being-at-an-end (ἐντελέχεια), and being-at-work (ἐνέργεια) are 
exploited in interesting and indispensable ways across his thought. Finally, Prof. John O’Callaghan 
first suggested the merits of an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of mind in view of more recent 
alternatives. He also first encouraged me to explore abstractionism and concept acquisition in 
Aquinas, Geach and McDowell. His own scholarly work perhaps most of all led me to—and indeed 
prepared me for—studies at the University of Pittsburgh. 
 At Pitt I have worked with many fine and brilliant philosophers, among the first are my two 
co-advisors. Prof. John McDowell first suggested to me both the perils and the appeal of the Myth 
of the Given (for as Chesterton says, he who has no sympathy with myths has no sympathy with 
men). His distinctive characterization of the problem—that capacities proper to our rational nature 
must already be operative in our getting what is gotten from perception—lies in the background of 
my argument in Chapter 3. Prof. James Lennox first encouraged me—also in view of his own 
work—to challenge interpretive views that have grown dominant concerning the Posterior Analytics, 
suggesting that scientific discovery for Aristotle results from a methodical and intellectually-driven 
inquiry, an idea which informs my Chapter 4. I am grateful to them both for their support, their 
engaging conversation, and their insight. Studying with them has been an honor and a delight. 
 xi 
 I am also grateful for many fruitful and engaging conversations with Prof. James Allen who, 
early in my time at Pitt, led a seminar on the Posterior Analytics that was formative for my thinking 
about many of these issues. Similarly I have learned a great deal in seminars with Prof. Kristen Inglis 
on Aristotle’s moral psychology. Also deserving of mention is Prof. Mae Smethurst, whose Greek 
seminar on the Poetics first invited me to consider the active intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός) as poetic, a 
thought lying in the background of Chapter 5. (I shall also never forget our reading the entire 
Oresteia together in another seminar: my Greek has not been stronger since!) Moreover, I always look 
forward to conversations with my outside reader, Prof. Sean Kelsey, on whom I depend to raise 
truly novel questions and approaches, both about my work and about philosophy generally. Finally, I 
thank Prof. Jessica Gelber, for her invaluable support in my final years of graduate school. 
 I also thank many other peers and colleagues—far too many to mention—both at Pitt and at 
other institutions, who have given comments and raised questions about my work. One deserves 
special mention, however: my friend and fellow graduate student at Pitt, Thomas Marré. In many 
ways and for many reasons I might not have made it without his friendship and tireless skepticism. 
In the often isolated and isolating enterprise of philosophy, it is helpful to have fellow travelers. In 
Tom I have found, in more ways than one, not only a fellow traveler but a fellow citizen and friend. 
I am also grateful in a special way to my wife, Caitlyn. Just as fellow travelers are needed to 
accompany one along the way, so too are those to whom one can “come home.” Caitlyn reminds 
me of the importance of living out the complete human life that we Aristotelians so often emphasize 
in our scholarly work, and helps me to do so. As Aristotle says, those who purport to do philosophy 
by taking refuge in theory alone will never become well in soul, being like patients who only want to 
hear about—but not follow!—a prescribed course of treatment. Without Caitlyn and the family we 
have together I would be at grave risk for pursuing such a dangerous course of philosophy. 
 I am above all thankful for the instruction I received from my parents. Our home was always 
a place for discussion, debate, inquiry, and argument. My mother would often ask, usually in a 
literary context, “What is the unifying theme?” This, paired with my father’s usual question, “But 
what if things had been different?” made me intellectually inquisitive from my earliest years. I might 
even suggest that my mother’s question urged me to intellectually consider a form in the images, 
while my father’s question invited me to manipulate the images themselves, and go on to consider 
the results. As will become clear, it is my view that both activities and both questions are 
indispensable to learning and discovery for Aristotle. For these and countless other reasons, I 






To my mother, from whom I first gained a conviction about the facts, 




μὴ λανθανέτω δ’ ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι 
καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, 
πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ 
σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν 
γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ’ 
ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. 




We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
    Little Gidding V 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND PRÉCIS 
ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο.1 
 
καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, 
ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν ὡς ἕξις τις οἷον το φῶς.2 
 
This dissertation begins in both puzzlement and wonder, at two passages from Aristotle in 
particular. The first comes toward the end of Aristotle’s discussion of the acquisition of the 
immediate first principles of knowledge in Posterior Analytics B.19. There he concludes that, “the soul 
is so constituted so as to be capable of this process,”3 that is to say, the soul is such that it can 
accomplish the intellectual activity and achieve the intellectual state described in that passage. This 
intellectual activity, as he goes on to tell us, is or substantially involves induction (ἐπαγωγή), and the 
intellectual state that results from the sort of induction described is nous, understood here as an 
intellectual virtue by which we grasp the first principles.4 This passage has been the occasion for 
much commentary, since it appears that Aristotle saves the most difficult question until the end of 
the treatise and, having finally arrived at the end, he treats the question very briefly. For 
demonstrative knowledge to be possible, by Aristotle’s lights, some undemonstrated and 
                                               
1 APo. B.19 100a13-4. 
2 De An. III.5 430a14-16. 
3 APo. B.19 100a13-4 (tr. Mure): ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο. 
4 Some have thought that nous in B.19 refers to a capacity for getting the first principles and not to 
the acquired state constituting the grasp of first principles. Part of the aim of this dissertation is to 
sort out the psychological relationship between nous-as-capacity (and if there are several, what they 
are) and nous-as-state, and how the two distinct but related notions are at work in difficult 
epistemological texts like APo. B.19. Cf. e.g. J.H. Lesher, “The Meaning of Nous in the Posterior 
Analytics,” Phronesis 18 (1973): 44-68. 
 2 
indemonstrable gnōsis5 must also be possible.6 And yet Aristotle also insists (against innatism) that 
this gnōsis is acquired, though, to be sure, not by means of demonstration.7 For the treatise to 
amount to more than a mere epistemological hypothesis, Aristotle must give some plausible 
indication both that and how this prior gnōsis of first principles itself comes to be. It is at this 
climactic moment of the treatise’s final and most important argument that he almost curtly says: “the 
soul is so constituted so as to be capable of this process.”8 
In making this claim, Aristotle points us to his psychology, in particular his account of the 
intellectual faculties in de Anima III (for surely those creatures with merely sensitive or even nutritive 
souls are not capable of achieving an intellectual grasp of first principles). But there we encounter a 
second passage which I have found independently puzzling, Aristotle’s claim that just as there are 
causal and material principles, or active and passive principles (ποιητικὰ καὶ παθητικά), in nature, so 
too do we find this distinction in the soul. Accordingly, Aristotle posits not only a receptive intellect 
analogous to our perceptual capacities, but also an active or productive intellect that “makes all 
things,” being “like light.”9 Determining precisely in what sense this second intellect counts as active 
or productive, and what it activates or produces, is no small matter: the verb poiein has a range of 
meaning that covers any number of concepts in English, including poetry, agency, action, 
                                               
5 I shall use gnōsis transliterated throughout this dissertation. I avoid translating the term because I 
wish to set aside related but separable discussions of whether gnōsis is a success notion for Aristotle, 
best translated as “knowledge” (of a generic sort wider than scientific knowledge), or not a success 
term, best translated rather as “cognition.” 
6 Cf. APo. A.3 passim, but especially 72b18-25: “But we say neither that all scientific knowledge is 
demonstrative, but that scientific knowledge of the immediates is undemonstrated (and that this is 
necessary is clear, for if it is necessary, on the one hand, to know scientifically the earlier premises 
from which the demonstration proceeds, and if on the other hand it is necessary that the immediates 
stop at some time, it is necessary that they be undemonstrated)—so on that point we speak in this 
way; we also say not only that scientific knowledge is something, but also the principle of scientific 
knowledge, by which we come to know the definitions.” Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην 
ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον (καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ 
γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἵσταται δὲ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ' 
ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι)—ταῦτά τ' οὖν οὕτω λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναί τινά φαμεν, ᾗ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν. 
7 Cf. APo. B.19 99b20-32. 
8 I repeat Mure’s translation here not because of its particularly accurate rendering of the Greek, but 
because of its elegant English. 
9 Cf. de An. III.5 430a15-16. 
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performance and production. Moreover, one can make (ποιεῖ) something without qualification, or 
one can make it to be something or to have some feature. And indeed, given the long and varied 
history of epistemological inquiry from times before Aristotle up to the present day, we should like 
very much to know precisely in what sense this intellect “makes all things.”10  
1.1 AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAME 
This passage from de Anima III.5 is fraught with interpretive difficulties and joins Posterior Analytics 
B.19 among the most disputed lines from the entire Aristotelian corpus. Indeed, to reach for de Anima 
III.5 in order to understand Posterior Analytics B.19 is something like leaping out of the frying pan 
and into the fire. And yet, such a move may be inescapable for those of us who have already braved 
the skillet. The broad motivation for this dissertation, therefore, is epistemological: “How must our 
souls be constituted so that we are capable of achieving knowledge of the highest sort?” I am 
ultimately interested in questions about how Aristotle must conceive of intellectual capacities in his 
psychology (especially in the de Anima) so that he can say the things that he does about intellectual 
states and activities in his epistemology (especially in the Posterior Analytics). Although this is the 
ultimate motivating principle and broader interpretive frame, the narrower argument of the 
dissertation itself proceeds in the reverse direction. The main question of the dissertation is rather: 
“What is the distinctive function of the active intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός) and what role does it play 
more generally in Aristotle’s thought?” As we shall see, my interpretation is informed by 
epistemological concerns, so that for the purposes of this dissertation, at any rate, Aristotle’s 
psychological account of intellect takes center stage, and his epistemology plays the supporting role. 
But, as I hope to show in the course of this investigation, these questions are inextricably linked, so 
that any interpretation of Aristotle in either context must be both constrained by and adequate to 
the other. 
                                               
10 Without putting too fine a point on it, classical debates between rationalists and empiricists could 
be framed around how to understand this claim. Indeed, it has been noted that Aristotle often pulls 
us in both directions, and often in very close textual proximity. One way of understanding my 
project at the outset is determining precisely in what sense Aristotle is an empiricist, though I do not 
choose to set up the narrative of the dissertation in these terms.  
 4 
So, from the outset I admit and indeed insist that my investigation is narrowly circumscribed 
by a determinate argumentative narrative. An account of the long and varied history of 
interpretation of the active intellect would already be too broad a topic for a single doctoral 
dissertation or monograph. Accordingly, in treating the history of this and related arguments, I must 
bring otherwise different interpretations under a handful of argumentative genera, in virtue of some 
broader similarity between them that is relevant for my peculiar purposes. Furthermore, there are 
several important interpretive considerations that I must treat briefly or even set aside entirely, since 
they do not bear in a significant way on the present study. A chief example would be the issue of the 
immortality or incorruptibility of individual intellectual souls, an issue that interpreters in every age 
have found important when considering Aristotle’s account of intellect. While I readily and happily 
concede the importance of the topic, I nevertheless wish to investigate a different issue in relation to 
Aristotle’s account of the intellect: I am concerned not with the metaphysics of personal identity, 
but rather with the epistemology of learning and inquiry. My concern is with what activity the active 
intellect accomplishes and what role it plays in his epistemology, not with what kind of substance the 
active intellect is. Notwithstanding such a disclaimer, my hope is that, having done this 
epistemological work focusing on the active intellect’s function, we shall be in a better position to 
resolve perennial debates about its precise nature, which perhaps belong more to the province of first 
philosophy. But that work lies outside of the scope of this dissertation. Given the distinctively 
epistemological character of my investigation, then, much of the preceding commentary on 
Aristotle’s active intellect must be set aside as not proximately relevant. 
1.2 CHAPTER TWO: ARISTOTLE’S INTELLECTS 
I begin in the second chapter with an interpretation of the active intellect of de Anima III.5 in relative 
isolation from other passages and concerns. The principal aim of this chapter is to specify the active 
intellect’s distinctive role on the basis of local evidence alone. To be sure, Aristotle gives several 
descriptions of the active intellect in the chapter on the basis of which many have made claims about 
the active intellect’s character; my interest, however, is what the two analogies of the chapter (i.e. with 
craft and with light) tell us about the active intellect’s characteristic activity. Accordingly, these two 
analogies receive the most attention in the second chapter, and the more abstract descriptions of the 
active intellect are subordinated to this analysis. In short, I am less concerned with what the active 
 5 
intellect is and more concerned with what it does: this function-first and activity-first analysis I take to 
be consistent with Aristotle’s general method in the de Anima.11 
Of the two analogies, I take the comparison with light to be more illuminating. In fact, I 
suggest at the beginning of my analysis that a tension between the two analogies has been the source 
of much of the interpretive trouble, with most authors choosing to begin with an interpretation of 
the craft analogy and allow their reading of the light analogy to be constrained by it. I take the 
opposite approach, beginning with the light analogy and reading backwards to the craft analogy. The 
key argumentative move of this chapter of the dissertation is to reject a Contemporary Consensus to 
the effect that the passive and perishable intellect (παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός) at the end of III.5 is 
the same as the receptive or potential intellect (δεκτικὸς νοῦς, νοῦς δυνάμει) of the preceding 
chapter, III.4. I give two arguments against this identification. First, the general descriptions of the 
intellects do not match, so that the receptive intellect of III.4 is never said to be passive (παθητικός), 
nor should we expect that it be perishable (φθαρτός). Although this is the weaker of the two 
arguments, it nevertheless counts in a general way against the contemporary view that the passive 
intellect just is the receptive intellect described in III.4. Importantly, this was a sufficient argument 
against the identification for many centuries, making it a view peculiar to recent interpreters.12  
The present weakness of this first style of argument, however, introduces the need for a new 
kind of argument. In view of this need, my second argument sets up an inconsistent triad, showing 
that the light analogy suggests that light activates potential colors and not the visual faculty of a 
sighted animal. We might say that light activates visible objects qua visible, so that they can then go 
on to move and inform the receptive visual faculty of some animal. Analogously, then, the light 
analogy suggests that the active intellect activates potentially intelligible objects making them to be 
actually intelligible, so that those objects can go on to move and inform the receptive intellectual 
faculty. In this way, the active intellect’s correlative patient is not, according to this analogy, the 
receptive intellectual faculty analogous to the faculty of sight. My argument gains further support 
from the fact that Aristotle does not mention vision in the light analogy at all, but rather the action 
                                               
11 Cf. de An. I.1 402b9-403a2. See also his own dual method at work in de An. II.1-2. For the most 
explicit endorsement of the objects and functions-first approach, see de An. II.4 415a14-22. 
12 I shall go into more detail in chapter two. For now, I note that despite their many differences, 
Averroes, Avicenna, and Aquinas all agree that the passive and receptive intellects are distinct. For a 
discussion of this issue, see Franz Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle, trans. Rolf George (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977). 
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of light on potential colors. Accordingly, I distinguish two active-passive pairs, (1) light acting on 
potential colors and (2) colors—now activated—acting on the visual faculty. So, the argument goes, 
the active intellect acts on potentially intelligible objects and not on our receptive intellectual faculty.  
Furthermore, given that active and passive principles are correlated in Aristotle’s account, it 
follows that what is called “passive intellect” in III.5 should stand as patient in this intellectually 
illuminating activity. The receptive intellect of III.4 is analogous to our visual faculty, while the 
passive principle in III.5 is analogous to potential colors (in a way yet to be further articulated). The 
light analogy, as I have interpreted it at any rate, makes clear that the active intellect’s proper patient 
is not the receptive intellect, while the terminology of active and passive principles suggests that its 
proper patient is the passive intellect. The passive intellect, then, cannot be the same as the receptive 
intellect, against the Contemporary Consensus. The active intellect activates potentially intelligible 
objects for the receptive intellect, but like light it does not activate the receptive faculty directly: that 
constitutes a second and posterior relation between the receptive faculty and the object that has 
already been illuminated or activated for it, by light or by the active intellect respectively. 
So, the active intellect activates potentially intelligible objects just as light activates potential 
colors (i.e. potentially visible objects). Despite its level of abstraction, we can still rule out most 
contemporary interpretations of the active intellect as a result of this chapter’s interpretive work. But 
two questions still remain unresolved in view of this abstract analysis of de Anima III.5 and of the 
active intellect’s distinctive role. First: what is the relationship between the “passive intellect” and 
these “potentially intelligible objects”? Second: what activity does “activating potentially intelligible 
objects” describe? 
I end the second chapter by giving two hypotheses in answer to these questions, hypotheses 
that begin this dissertation’s epistemological turn. In reply to the first question, I suspect that 
potentially intelligible objects are images or perceptual gnōseis of some sort, and this thought is 
motivated by three considerations. First, Aristotle says at the end of III.4 that material objects are 
only potentially intelligible, suggesting that our perceptual gnōseis of particulars, insofar as they are 
particular and enmattered, would have potentially intelligible content. Second, Aristotle says later in 
de Anima III.7 that “for the intellectual soul phantasmata serve as perceptible objects (αἰσθήματα)”13 
and in III.8 “for the phantasmata are just as perceptible objects (αἰσθήματα), except without the 
                                               
13 De An. III.7 431a14-15. 
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matter.”14 These passages suggest that phantasmata are playing an analogous role as perceptible 
objects, such as colors, in the intellectual case. Finally, Aristotle insists in III.7 and III.8, as well as in 
the de Memoria and elsewhere, that there is no thinking without an image, that images are a necessary 
condition for all properly intellectual activity, for humans at any rate. Given these points, I begin my 
epistemological investigation with the hypothesis that the illuminanda, the objects to be acted upon 
by the active intellect, are images or perceptual gnōseis of particulars. On this hypothesis in reply to 
the first question, then, the “passive intellect” turns out to be phantasia or the perceptual faculty 
taken generally when it bears a certain relationship to intellectual activity, being that faculty in virtue 
of which intellect is supplied with its yet-to-be-intellectually-illumined objects. Phantasmata, the 
perceptual gnōseis supplied by phantasia, are those cognitive items within which the intellect 
contemplates the universal forms.15 This is proposed simply as a hypothesis moving forward. 
But even this provisional answer stands in need of further explanation in view of the second 
question: what does it mean for the active intellect to act on and, as it were, illuminate these images? 
What does it mean to activate the potential intelligibility of these perceptual gnōseis, especially if qua 
images they are already said to be “without matter”?16 This is where the epistemological turn is most 
pronounced, and where the epistemological program of the remaining chapters of my dissertation is 
most decisively determined. My hypothesis is that this activity, “activating potentially intelligible 
objects,” or “making the potentially intelligible to be intelligible in activity,” describes neither the 
immediate triggering of particular episodes of thought nor making the world intelligible in general, 
but rather some activity in between these. My hypothesis is that this activity—the distinctive activity 
and function of the active intellect—makes intelligible objects available for particular knowers, and 
so plays some role in the process of teaching, learning, and discovery. While the first hypothesis 
regarding phantasia remains in the background, the ensuing investigation is mostly informed by this 
second thought, that two distinct intellectual activities may be found in Aristotle’s account of 
learning, inquiry, and discovery, one receptive and another active or productive. 
 
                                               
14 De An. III.8 432a9-10. 
15 Cf. de An. III.7 431b3: “So, the intellectual faculty intellects the forms in the images.” τὰ μὲν οὖν 
εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ. 
16 Cf. de An. III.8 432a9-10, ut supra. 
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1.3 CHAPTER THREE: LEARNING BY DOING 
In view of this second hypothesis, in the third chapter I consider Aristotle’s account of learning in 
general, the acquisition of both ethical (or habituated) and intellectual virtues. I work to reconcile 
two claims that are commonly attributed to Aristotle. In the first place is (what I am calling) 
Aristotle’s Learning Principle, the idea that we always learn by doing the very thing we are learning 
to do. We come to be house-builders by building houses, lyre-players by playing the lyre, temperate 
by doing temperate things, courageous by doing courageous things, and indeed, knowledgeable by 
doing knowledgeable things. This last point is perhaps the most controversial, so I spend some time 
substantiating the idea that, for Aristotle, even in the case of dianoetic or intellectual virtues like 
epistēmē we come to possess knowledge of geometry or grammar by performing the intellectual acts 
of the geometer or the grammarian. Though, indeed, in all of these cases the student does not 
engage in these prior activities in the same way as the expert: to insist on this would be 
straightforwardly incoherent. Rather, for Aristotle, all learning is a process resulting in a settled state 
or hexis of a capacity, rather than a new capacity altogether. 
And here we encounter the second claim commonly attributed to Aristotle: before one 
learns one is at first potentiality, at which stage one is merely capable of acquiring an actual capability 
to φ, but not yet capable of φ-ing in any respect. First potentiality, as it is typically described, is a 
capacity for acquiring a further capacity, being merely a “raw capacity” or a potentiality whose only 
actualization is in the acquisition of an actual capability, coming to have a capacity in the true sense. 
On this model—what I am calling the Standard View—only after one learns has one become 
capable of engaging in the relevant activity, now for the first time. But this conflicts with Aristotle’s 
explicit commitment to the Learning Principle described above. My suggestion is that we should 
understand first potentiality not only as a capacity for development, but also as a capacity for 
engaging in the appropriate unrefined activity. The apprentice house-builder at first potentiality must 
already be capable of house building in an unrefined way, otherwise he would not be able to learn to 
build houses by building houses. The capacity to learn, then, must already be a capacity to engage in the 
very activity one is learning to do, although as yet in an unrefined way. 
But this raises questions about who or what is responsible for successful learning: although 
prior activity on the part of the student is absolutely necessary for the student to learn anything at 
all, it does not seem to be a sufficient condition for successful learning. Indeed, one worry coming 
out of this third chapter is that Aristotle, when defending his Learning Principle, also insists upon 
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the necessity of chance or another’s instruction to guide the student’s prior activity.17 And even 
when Plato insists upon a similar point, with Socrates’ remark that education is not like putting sight 
into blind eyes, the point is made within an educational context.18 That is, although both Aristotle 
and Plato insist that the student must already be capable of intellectual activity of an unrefined sort 
in order to be capable of learning at all, this point is not made in order to rule out the teacher’s role 
but rather to specify and determine the teacher’s role in more precise terms. The teacher’s activity 
gives shape to the student’s own prior intellectual activity, making it to have the right sort of 
character. The apprentice who is learning his master’s art is not a mere tool of the master whose 
activity is entirely derivative of him. No, on my view, when a master “uses” an apprentice to build a 
house, one of the chief aims is for the apprentice to come to share in his master’s art. Similarly, the 
student who is learning from a teacher must himself be engaged in the relevant sort of theoretical 
activity: the teacher guides and shapes the student’s activity so that he eventually achieves a 
theoretical grasp for himself. 
The upshot of this chapter’s argument is generic and applies to all acquired states and every 
case of learning: the so-called Triple Scheme of actuality and potentiality should not imply that first 
potentiality is incapable of actualization in activity until it has been perfected at the stage of first 
actuality. If we were to insist upon this, Aristotle would not have the resources to defend his 
Learning Principle. But if we understand first potentiality in a more nuanced way, taking it to be 
directed toward both unrefined activity and its own development as a capacity, Aristotle would then 
have the resources to defend his Learning Principle: the paradox generated by his insistence that we 
learn by doing is dissolved if learning is understood as getting better at what we can already do. After 
all, the so-called acquired capacities are all states or hexeis by Aristotle’s lights, and not new capacities 
(δυνάμεις) without qualification. 
1.4 CHAPTER FOUR: TYPES OF PRIOR INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY 
The third chapter has a more determinate upshot for our purposes, however; although I maintain 
that the preceding lesson about first potentiality holds for all acquired states and virtues, and thus 
                                               
17 Cf. EN II.4 1105a22-26. 
18 Cf. Rep. VII 518b-c. 
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for every case of learning, I am here most interested in the acquisition of intellectual states and 
virtues, which, Aristotle says elsewhere, always comes about from a preexisting gnōsis.19 If the 
requirement of prior activity holds generically of all learning, the need for preexisting gnōsis holds 
specifically of intellectual or dianoetic learning.20 It is to this more specific set of concerns that I turn 
in the fourth chapter. We might capture the upshot of the preceding chapter for the intellectual case 
in the following terms: even before one learns, one must already be capable of engaging in the 
relevant intellectual activity, which is perhaps a kind of receptive intellectual consideration of some 
universal intelligible form. Even before one comes to grasp the nature of triangles, eclipses, or frogs, 
one must already be capable of contemplating or intellectually considering (θεωρεῖν) triangles, 
eclipses, or frogs. After all, it is only by and through intellectually considering triangles, eclipses, or 
frogs that we can ever learn about triangles, eclipses, or frogs: for, as I have argued in the third 
chapter, we learn by doing the very things we are learning to do. So, the student must be already 
capable of performing this receptive intellectual activity before he learns, though indeed not yet in 
the settled, deliberate, or refined way of the expert. 
Moreover, we should characterize the teacher’s role in the process of teaching and dianoetic 
learning as guiding and giving shape to this receptive intellectual activity on the part of the student. 
Whereas in cases of mere habituation teachers give shape to the student’s bodily motions or even to 
his desires by the use of pleasure and pain, in those cases the teacher does not (as such) give shape 
to any intellectual activity. What is sought in the case of dianoetic learning is the acquisition of a 
dianoetic or intellectual virtue, an excellent and stable disposition of the intellectual faculty, which 
Aristotle agrees is, in a sense, “a place of forms (τόπον εἰδῶν).”21 But how does a teacher guide and 
shape such a faculty’s activity on the part of the student? And how is this related to the principle that 
all dianoetic learning and teaching proceeds from a preexisting gnōsis? 
                                               
19 Cf. APo. A.1 71a1-2: “All teaching and all dianoetic learning comes to be from a preexisting 
gnōsis.” Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. 
20 It is my view, introduced here in the fourth chapter and defended at length elsewhere, that the 
modifier “dianoetic” in the opening sentence of the Posterior Analytics specifies the acquisition of any 
of the five genera of dianoetic or intellectual virtue named in APo. A.33 and EN VI. That is, 
“dianoetic learning” in APo. A.1, on my view, does not refer exclusively to the acquisition of 
theoretical or speculative virtues of intellect, but also to the acquisition of technē and of phronēsis.  
21 Cf. de An. 429a27-29. The definite article is not used here, despite the usual translation “the place 
of forms.” This is interesting given the Platonic background, though I must set this interesting issue 
aside for the present study. 
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In order to answer these pressing questions, I propose a detailed study of the acquisition of 
one genus of intellectual virtue in particular, nous or the grasp of first principles, the topic of 
discussion in Posterior Analytics B.19. While I am confident that my account can apply in interesting 
ways to the acquisition of the other genera of intellectual virtues (that is, to arts, sciences, and 
perhaps even to sophia and phronēsis), I choose to focus on the acquisition of nous because of its 
intimate connection with perception and the perceptual faculty.22 Indeed, the acquisition of nous 
creates a special problem for Aristotle since he does not regard the first principles as innately 
possessed, either explicitly or implicitly. Rather, he takes it that these first principles must be 
acquired. Here is the difficulty: since they are first, there can be no higher gnōsis from which they 
proceed, deductively or otherwise. But since they are acquired, they must proceed from some 
preexisting gnōsis. Put differently, from what further gnosis can these gnōseis proceed, if they are to be 
first and highest? This is, of course, the subject matter of one of the two puzzling chapters with 
which this dissertation begins, Posterior Analytics B.19. The soul is so constituted to be capable of 
grasping the first principles—of achieving the highest gnōsis —from lower-level perceptual gnōseis. 
So, in the first place I propose a new interpretation of B.19 according to which perceptual 
gnōseis and memories without qualification are capable of producing logoi without qualification. That 
is to say, empeiria, on my view, is not necessary to arrive at a universal account in general. Rather, 
throughout the process of inquiry, logoi are arrived at inductively on the basis of perceptual gnōseis 
and refined gradually until one finally achieves the orthos logos. They are not refined in isolation from 
perceptual engagement, however: for logoi to have content they must be refined on the basis of more 
extensive and finer grained perceptual gnōseis, and this perceptual process terminates in empeiria. That 
is to say, on my view empeiria is that excellent perceptual state from which a knower can induce the 
orthos logos, the first principles of a given domain. Accordingly, the orthos logos constituting the grasp 
of first principles in a way proceeds both from empeiria and from some penultimate logos—we can 
                                               
22 I consider these to be genera of intellectual virtues because there are many arts, many sciences, 
and many first principles or sets of first principles to correspond to them. While sophia and phronēsis 
are themselves virtues, they are also sui generis in an interesting way; I only mean to suggest here that 
nous is not a single virtue like sophia, but rather a class or kind of virtue like technē or epistēmē. The first 
principles of astronomy are possessed by someone with the nous of astronomy, just as astronomical 
demonstrations are possessed by someone with the epistēmē of astronomy (cf. APr. A.30 46a17-28). 
Similarly also with the various technai. Although this dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the 
acquisition of noetic virtues (those belonging to the genus of intellectual virtue called “nous”), I hope 
to show in future work how my account of dianoetic learning would apply to the practical and 
productive domains as well. 
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trace two progressions to the orthos logos, one that is entirely at the level of logoi that come to be more 
and more determinate and refined, and one at the level of perception which terminates in empeiria. 
The orthos logos can rightly be said to follow from both cognitive progressions but in a different way, 
explaining Aristotle’s remark that the orthos logos proceeds “from empeiria or from the whole 
universal having come to rest in the soul.”23  
The most basic piece of evidence for this interpretation is the possibility of logoi that issue 
from inexperienced perceptual gnōseis. Because Aristotle is explicitly committed to the idea that logoi and 
their attendant intellectual activity (θεωρεῖν) are possible even at the early and inexperienced stages 
of inquiry, it becomes clear how his account must allow for a progression and development at the 
level of logoi which mirrors inductively one’s development at the level of perception. Interestingly, 
empeiria seems to itself be a product of an intellectually driven process, although it is as such an 
excellent state of the perceptual (and not of the intellectual) faculty. This has further implications for 
some difficult passages, in particular Prior Analytics B.21 and Physics I.1, both of which in their own 
way suggest a progression from universal logoi to logoi that are specific, proper, or particular. 
With this new reading of Posterior Analytics B.19 in place, we can fruitfully reflect upon the 
two questions of this chapter. How does a teacher guide and shape the intellectual faculty’s activity? 
And how is that teaching activity related to the principle that all dianoetic learning proceeds from a 
preexisting gnōsis? On my reading, the teacher produces for the student a privileged perceptual gnōsis 
in and from which the student can intellectually grasp the relevant intelligible form. As in Plato’s 
Meno, the teacher manipulates images and makes certain features perceptually available for the 
student, and thereupon directs the student’s intellectual attention to these features with appropriate 
questions and suggestions. The goal—consistent with the results of the third chapter—is for the 
student to perform this receptive and theoretical intellectual activity himself; the teacher’s 
contribution is to facilitate and give proper shape to this activity, not to supply it directly for the 
student. The teacher, then, makes use of the prior perceptual gnōseis in order to facilitate this process, 
making it so that the right sorts of features are perceptually available and clear, and thereby also 
intellectually available and clear for properly intellectual consideration (θεωρεῖν). The latter activity is 
accomplished by asking suitable questions about perceptual particulars from a suitable perspective. 
                                               
23 APo. B.19 100a6-7. There will, of course, be much argumentation needed to justify this move, and 
there will be several important qualifications on the view. Here I am simply giving a sketch by way 
of introduction.  
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So we find that there are two distinct activities in the learning process, a more receptive 
activity whereby the student intellectually considers some universal form in and from a particular 
perceptual gnōsis, and a more productive activity whereby the teacher makes the right perceptual 
gnōsis to be available for the student in the right sort of way. The teacher first and most directly 
shapes this perceptual gnōsis for the student and thereupon, through questions and suggestions, can 
be said to occasion the student’s intellectual grasp of the correct universal in the particular rightly 
conceived, thinking the correct form in the image seen in the right way. 
1.5 CHAPTER FIVE: ACTIVITIES IN INQUIRY AND DISCOVERY 
The fifth chapter begins with a more detailed consideration of the distinction with which the fourth 
chapter ended. There, we were left with an intuitive distinction between the student’s intellectual 
contribution to the learning process, a kind of receptive activity, and the teacher’s contribution, a 
kind of productive or active activity. How these activities relate in cases of discovery is yet unclear, 
however, since presumably the person who is actively inquiring without the guidance of a teacher 
must achieve the same perceptual states that the teacher facilitates in cases of guided learning, and 
their very perceptual development must be driven by intellectual questions and concerns, at least in 
the paradigmatic cases of inquiry and discovery that proceed according to an ordered method. This 
raises questions about the concept of inquiry in Aristotle, that process which produces increasingly 
promising perceptual gnōseis, and, by induction, increasingly precise logoi. On my view, the eventual 
achievement of the excellent perceptual gnōsis of empeiria is not merely a perceptual process, 
especially in cases where there is no teacher to help things along, although empeiria as such seems to 
be a perceptual product of such a complex process. 
Indeed, one of the difficulties of interpretation in B.19 is how induction alone could achieve 
the highest intellectual states.24 In view of these questions and considerations, I propose the 
                                               
24 For example, both the epexegetical reading (cf. e.g. Ross (1964)) and corrective reading (cf. e.g. 
Charles (2002)) of the infamous “or” in B.19 suggest that the first principles proceed from the 
“whole logos having come to rest in the soul.” For the epexegetical interpretation, this whole logos just 
is empeiria, while for the corrective interpretation, this whole logos is some further intellectual state 
beyond empeiria. Both views maintain that the first principles proceed from something logically 
universal, making it puzzling why Aristotle should say quite explicitly that the first principles are 
gotten by induction, an inference which proceeds from something logically particular. Although 
Aristotle does speak of induction at different levels of analysis among things that are all logically 
 14 
following: there is a distinction between two kinds of induction which runs parallel to Aristotle’s 
distinction between deduction (συλλογισμός) without qualification and demonstration or 
demonstrative deduction (ἀπόδειξις). Both are formally deductions, but only demonstrations are 
productive or expressive of scientific knowledge, of the relevant orthos logos. In the deductive case, 
the difference between a merely formally valid deduction and a robustly demonstrative deduction is 
material: Aristotle describes early in Posterior Analytics A the several characteristics premises must have 
in order for a deduction issuing from them to be demonstrative, that is, for it to produce or express 
scientific knowledge.25 I propose that there is a similar formal/material distinction in the inductive 
case without correspondingly explicit terminology. I suggest that there are merely formal inductions 
which are simply universal generalizations on the basis of some particular gnōsis, and there are those 
inductions which are productive of the orthos logos due to the adequate character of the logical inputs. 
Just as in the deductive case what makes a given deduction to be demonstrative is the character of 
the premises, and not some additional formal step, so too in the inductive case what makes a given 
induction to be productive or expressive of first principles is the special character of the particulars 
from which it proceeds. 
So on my reading, “induction” is always and everywhere in Aristotle a move from particulars 
to universals, either producing or expressing a universal form within a particular image. Sometimes, 
however, “induction” means something more robust, resulting not in just any universal logos on the 
basis of just any gnōsis of particulars, but rather the correct logos, the orthos logos constituting the 
intellectual grasp of first principles. It is this sense of “induction” that we see in Posterior Analytics 
B.19. Accordingly, unlike most other readings of B.19, I do not see the need for some further 
intellectual activity or logical step that follows upon induction properly so-called, leading us to grasp 
the principles as principles, for example.26 Rather, on my view the hard intellectual work precedes this 
final and correct induction by the intellectual activity driving perceptual engagement, producing the 
excellent perceptual gnōsis from which this final induction can proceed, namely empeiria. But how 
                                                                                                                                                       
universal (e.g. different triangles to triangle as such), it is clear that the inductive inputs here ought to 
be logically particular, given the perceptual gnōsis from which these inductions ultimately proceed. 
25 Cf. APo. A.2 passim. 
26 See, for one early example, Kosman “Understanding, Explanation and Insight in the Posterior 
Analytics,” Phronesis Supp. Vol. I: Exegesis and Argument (1973): 374-92, especially 383–85. 
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ought we to characterize, in general terms, this robustly intellectual process that produces this 
excellent perceptual state, perhaps most of all in cases of discovery?27 
When considering cases of discovery in Metaphysics Θ.9, cases in which the unique 
achievement of inquiry is most clearly seen, Aristotle says that a given geometrical proof would be 
clear if the necessary parallel line had already been drawn. That is to say, if the diagram had already 
been sufficiently manipulated and appropriately divided, the correct universal form would already be 
available to consider in the concrete diagram. Such a case might obtain with a teacher’s help, to be 
sure. But the interesting case for discovery, Aristotle suggests, is one in which the diagram has not 
yet been manipulated or divided, so that the student himself must come to discover the best way to 
divide the diagram. Aristotle finds this interesting for metaphysical reasons, since in the case of 
discovery one seems to bootstrap oneself, as it were, from potential knowledge to actual knowledge, 
a possible counterexample to the general priority of energeia to dynamis.28 The geometrical case, 
because of its relative simplicity, helps to isolate these conceptually distinct intellectual activities: 
first, the achievement of the correct perceptual grasp of the diagram, then the achievement of the 
correct intellectual grasp of the proof. The second activity is straightforward contemplation 
(θεωρεῖν), the receptive intellectual activity we have been considering all along; but the first activity 
is something different, being productive in a way that makes available something to be contemplated 
or intellectually considered that was not previously so available. 
At this juncture, readers may be suspicious that I have biased my exposition of the 
epistemological upshot in Θ.9 to favor the psychological hypothesis with which I began. I have 
located two activities in the learning process, one receptive and another productive, and this is 
precisely what I was hoping to find. But it is not entirely without reason that I should make this 
move: as I show in chapter five, Aristotle uses the very same language in Metaphysics Θ.9 to describe 
this productive intellectual activity in drawing the parallel line as he uses to describe the active 
intellect in de Anima III.5. I conclude that the active intellect’s activity is to work on and, indeed, 
produce images so that the right universal form can be contemplated in the particulars rightly 
conceived. This productive activity is to make something available for intellectual consideration 
without as such initiating particular episodes of receptive theoretical consideration. The active 
                                               
27 I say “in general terms” because each domain will have peculiarities of method appropriate to it, 
and these peculiarities are not the focus of this dissertation. I hope in future work, however, to 
explore the implications of my general view for particular domains of inquiry. 
28 Establishing this general principle was the purpose of the preceding chapter, Meta. Θ.8 passim. 
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intellect, then, is our ever-active state of inquiry, of constantly searching for a universal explanation 
between and among particular images, searching among appearances for that privileged perspective 
in which the reality can be most clearly and adequately grasped and considered. 
I end with a consideration of a few remaining issues of interpretation which follow upon this 
view. First, there are questions about the interplay between the three intellects involved in this 
process, including how to read the craft analogy of III.5 on my account. Second, there are questions 
about the role of Aristotle’s god and whether this active intellect could still be the divine substance, 
given the results of the epistemological investigation. Finally, there are questions about the 
intermittence of human thought given the purported non-intermittence of the active intellect’s 
distinctive activity. 
1.6 LET THE INQUIRY BEGIN 
But now we must return to and begin at the beginning, with an investigation into the text of de 
Anima III.5 itself. Although the more determinate question of the dissertation concerns Aristotle’s 
philosophical psychology—in particular the precise function of the active intellect—it is important 
to remember the project’s distinctively epistemological focus even in the second chapter. Perhaps, 
having begun in wonder at the claims and conclusions of de Anima III.5, by the end of this 
dissertation and its epistemological inquiry, we might return to where we started and know the place 
for the first time. 
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2. WHAT DOES ACTIVE NOUS ACTIVATE?                                                                   
TOWARD AN INTERPRETATION OF DE ANIMA III.5 
Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι 
αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ 
ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται, τά τε χρώματα 
ἔσται ἀόρατα. 
--- Τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου; 
Ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, φῶς. 
--- Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 
Οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις τῶν 
ἄλλων συζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς.29  
 
The argument of this chapter is somewhat abstract, insofar as I propose to consider, in a general 
way, the several intellects that Aristotle discusses in de Anima III—the several things there called 
nous—without presently considering all of the details of the objects and operations of these 
intellectual powers. I shall consider various views about how to understand the so-called “active and 
passive intellects,” arguing against several prominent proposals on the basis of the functional 
descriptions and analogies Aristotle gives, especially the Light Analogy of de Anima III.5. What 
results is, in the first place, a certain shape of Aristotle’s intellectual account and a general orientation 
according to which one intellectual power is posited as relating to another in certain predictable 
Aristotelian ways, that is, as form to matter or as agent to patient. Thus, the purpose of this chapter 
is simply to propose and defend a general picture, with various details left to be discussed as the 
dissertation unfolds; the program of the balance of the dissertation will be determined by questions 
that remain at the end of this preliminary discussion. 
                                               
29 Rep. VI 507d11-508a2. 
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More precisely, I begin this interpretive project by raising the question “what does active 
intellect activate?” or perhaps “what is the active intellect’s distinctive activity or proper function?”30 
These questions immediately arise upon reading the infamously difficult fifth chapter of de Anima 
III, though perhaps not specified precisely in these terms. To be sure, every reader and every 
interpreter of the chapter seeks to explain the role belonging to that “nous in virtue of its making all 
things.”31 What is distinctive to the approach I am proposing, however, is that I begin with an 
investigation into its distinctive function rather than with Aristotle’s more abstract descriptions of 
the active intellect’s character and peculiar nature. While others also address its function, they do so 
only after making interpretive decisions about the active intellect’s character; I give interpretive 
priority to the functional question.32 So, as will become clear, my analysis focuses on Aristotle’s 
technical vocabulary of active and passive principles (ποιητικόν and παθητικόν) and in particular 
how these are at work in the analogy with light, revealing the active intellect’s distinctive activity.  
Against the background of Aristotle’s speculative philosophy quite generally, these 
correlative terms bear a precise meaning: active and passive principles come together in some 
activity or motion appropriate to them.33 That which can cut and that which can be cut come 
together in the jointly unified process of cutting-and-being-cut. That which can heat and that which 
can be heated come together in a single process of heating-and-being-heated, a single activity that is 
one in number but different in form, differing from the agent’s or patient’s perspective.34 Similarly 
also that which can see and that which can be seen come together in the joint and unified activity of 
seeing and being seen.35 So, when Aristotle introduces an active, agent, or poetic principle (ποιητικόν) 
in the intellectual case—that nous in virtue of its making all things—it is appropriate to frame our 
puzzlement and to conduct our further investigation in response to the following question: what 
does this active nous activate? What is its distinctive productive activity (ποιεῖν)? What is its 
                                               
30 While distinct, given Aristotle’s method of analysis they will be answered in turn. Identifying the 
correlative object of the active intellect’s activity is bound up with specifying that activity as such. 
31 Cf. de An. III.5 430a14-15. 
32 Kosman (2003) is a nice exception to this trend in his “What Does Maker Mind Make?” Although 
I disagree with his conclusions, we share a similar interpretive method. 
33 Cf. Phys. III.1-3, especially at 202b5-22. 
34 Cf. Meta. Δ.15 passim. 
35 Cf. de An. III.2 425b26-426a26. 
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correlative passive intellectual principle (παθητικὸς νοῦς)? And what is their single, unified 
intellectual activity (ἐνέργεια)? 
My approach differs, therefore, from much recent commentary in that I am giving priority to 
a question about the active intellect’s distinctive activity. Neither my initial nor my eventual aim is to 
settle questions about whether the active intellect is the divine intellect or the human intellect, nor 
again whether it is one aspect of a single human intellect or a distinct intellectual principle within the 
human soul.36 Accordingly, I am even less concerned, at least at the outset, with how the active 
intellect bears on questions of the (in)corruptibility of the human soul in Aristotle’s view, nor how 
the active intellect has been exploited throughout the ages with respect to this issue.37 Although my 
“activity-first” analysis will have implications for these questions, I choose to begin with questions 
about the active intellect’s distinctive activity and the nature of its activation or production (ποίησις), 
and further what it is that it activates or produces. I choose this method in part because it is 
oftentimes Aristotle’s own: we come to know psychic faculties by first studying their activities and 
the objects of these activities.38 This method is also recommended due to the difficulty of the topic 
and the intractability of the debate: by giving priority to questions of this sort—what does active nous 
                                               
36 These points notwithstanding, it may be that I have something to say briefly and in outline about 
these questions at the end of this dissertation. 
37 It is common to suggest that, for Aristotle, if the human soul is incorruptible it is in virtue of the 
active intellect. This view is sometimes attributed to medieval Christian interpretations of Aristotle, 
like Aquinas, although I think this is an incorrect attribution. For example, see Shields (2016c), in his 
supplement to “Aristotle’s Psychology” on the active intellect of III.5: “Christian exegetes tend to 
see it as a vindication of the compatibility of personal immortality and soul-body hylomorphism,” on 
which point he cites Aquinas, and by my lights mistakenly so. I set this issue aside when considering 
the active intellect because I am much more sympathetic with the idea that for Aristotle (and for 
interpreters like Aquinas) the incorruptibility of the human soul has more to do with the potential or 
receptive intellect discussed in III.4, where Aristotle gives arguments about its organ-less nature and 
activitiy. On this question see Cohoe (2013). To keep with our example of a “Christian exegete,” all 
of the arguments Aquinas gives about the incorruptibility of the human soul concern the 
impassibility and incorruptibility of the potential or receptive intellect, discussed by Aristotle in de 
An. III.4. So even if it turned out that the active intellect were the divine intellect, this would have 
no bearing on arguments for personal immortality, by Aquinas’ lights (cf. e.g. Commentary on Aristotle’s 
de Anima §677-685). I mention this only to set aside the issue of intellectual incorruptibility for the 
present dissertation, in which I confine myself for the most part to de An. III.5 and the proper 
function of each intellectual faculty. If Aquinas is right, and on this point I think he is, then the 
interpretation of the active intellect’s nature need not have any decisive consequences for the 
incorruptibility of the human soul. 
38 Cf. de An. I.1 402a23-403a2, II.1 passim, II.2 413a11-16, II.4 514a14-22. 
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activate?—I can easily set aside some of the more controversial aspects of the debate, side-stepping 
issues such as incorruptibility of the human soul and the relationship between the divine intellect 
and ordinary acts of human thinking. So, even if I concede that my method is otherwise on par with 
the method of those who have preceded me, given the intractability of the debate any viable 
methodological alternative is worth, at least, exploring.39 
Finally, the “activity-first” method I propose is preferable because of the character of the 
evidence in the text itself: what Aristotle says about what this intellect is in itself is underdetermined 
and can be read in multiple ways, as the passage’s varied interpretive history attests; in contrast, he 
describes what it does in slightly more detail, although still veiled in metaphorical terms. On that 
count, it is true that even the two main pieces of evidence for answering this functional question are 
difficult because they are metaphorical, which has also contributed to the diversity of interpretations. 
Nevertheless, the analogies with craft and with light are more determinate and more accessible to us 
than the abstract descriptions of the active intellect’s character (e.g. “separable,” “impassible,” 
“unmixed,” “essentially an/in activity40”) that Aristotle also gives. These analogies are principally 
directed at explaining the active intellect’s productive activity (ποιεῖν) and its correlative patient 
(παθητικόν), rather than describing it in separation, as it were, from this distinctive activity.  
Accordingly, I begin this dissertation with, and frame this chapter by, focusing on a reading 
of these functional descriptions to help understand the distinctive role of the active intellect. My aim 
is for this interpretation to constrain how we should understand the more abstract descriptions of 
the active intellect. The present chapter will achieve a provisional and abstract description of the 
active intellect’s distinctive activity and of its correlative patient. The view that I develop stands in 
opposition to an interpretive consensus that has arisen in recent years, so that already the abstract 
account helps to move the debate forward. This abstract description, however, while it is true to the 
discussion in de Anima III.5 and helps drive the interpretive debate forward, nevertheless leaves us 
                                               
39 After all, we might think that Aristotle himself is ambivalent about these two approaches, whether 
to begin with a “top down” and general account of a thing’s nature or with a “bottom up” account 
from a thing’s objects and distinctive function. See, again, de An. I.1 402a23-3a2, especially in view 
of the dual method he employs in de An. II.1-2. 
40 Different manuscripts put ἐνέργεια in the nominative or dative case at 430a18. Although I prefer 
reading it in the dative for other reasons, with manuscripts ELCX (following Ross’ abbreviations) 
along with Philoponus, I do not think the argument of the present chapter turns on this minor 
detail: either meaning is consistent with the account I wish to give here, whether it is essentially an 
activity like light, or essentially in activity like light. I return to this question in the final chapter. 
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with further questions. The balance of the dissertation gives a more complete account of the active 
intellect’s activity, more concrete than the abstract specification achieved in the present chapter. 
2.1 EXAMINING CONTEMPORARY VIEWS 
2.1.1 The Text of de Anima III.5 
But first I must begin with a translation and summary exposition of de Anima III.5 in its entirety—
speaking as uncontroversially as possible—before focusing in particular on what I am calling the 
Contemporary Consensus and how to understand the Analogy with Light.41 
[a] And since, just as in the whole of nature there is, on the one hand, some matter 
for each class [of thing] (and this is that which is capable of being all those things), 
[b] and there is, on the other hand, something else that is the cause and active 
principle in virtue of its making all things, [c] such as the art holds with respect to 
the matter: [d] it is necessary also that these distinctions exist in the soul. [e] So, on 
the one hand there is such an intellect in virtue of its becoming all things and, on the 
other hand, there is an intellect in virtue of its making all things, [f] as a certain state 
like light; for indeed the light in some way makes colors existing potentially to be 
colors in activity. [g] And this intellect is separable and impassible and unmixed, 
since in essence it is in activity. [h] For the agent is always more honorable than the 
patient and the principle is more honorable than the matter. [i] Knowledge in 
activity is the same as the thing; potential knowledge is temporally prior in the 
individual case, but in general it is not prior in time; [j] but [this intellect] does not at 
one time think and at another time not think. [k] And having been separated, this 
alone is the very thing that it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal [l] (but we do 
                                               
41 My exposition of III.5 here must be cursory; I cannot address all interpretive issues that the text 
raises, even in this dissertation taken as a whole. Once I have arrived at a fleshed-out interpretation 
of the bits which are my focus, I shall flag places where interpretive options remain on other details. 
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not remember because while this is impassible, the passive intellect is perishable, and 
without this it thinks nothing).42  
In [a] and [b] Aristotle introduces a distinction that holds in the whole of nature between 
matter and a causal or active principle (ποιητικόν). These are familiar Aristotelian categories 
illustrated by a familiar Aristotelian example in [c], the relationship between a craft and its matter. In 
[d] he applies this generic point to the present case by saying that these distinctions must obtain also 
in the soul, presumably in the human or intellectual soul. Although the text does lean in this 
direction on first reading, upon reflection it is also possible that the point is being made between 
different types of souls rather than between different powers or parts of the human soul, and so this 
remains an important interpretive question. Aristotle sums up this point as applied to nous in [e], 
which is a stronger claim than [d], since now not only is Aristotle positing active and passive 
principles in the neighborhood of intellectual activity, “in the soul” in a general way, but now more 
specifically that this distinction should obtain between two different intellects. He then gives another 
less familiar Aristotelian example in [f], as light in a way makes potential colors to be colors in 
activity. So goes the first part of III.5 as I have divided things, which is principally concerned with 
establishing the distinction between these two intellects and specifying, albeit in analogical terms, the 
distinctive activity of the active or productive intellect as it relates to the intellect which becomes all 
things. Importantly, as we shall see, specifying the nature and function of this matter-like intellect is 
as much an interpretive question as determining the nature and function of the active intellect.  
Things become even less straightforward in what I am calling the second half of the chapter. 
In [g] Aristotle gives a familiar list of descriptions of this intellect, with the addition of its essential 
activity (τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὤν ἐνεργείᾳ); only this last description was not also said of the intellect described 
                                               
42 De An. III.5 430a10-25 (complete chapter): Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη 
ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν 
πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς 
διαφοράς· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, 
οἷον τὸ φῶς· γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ 
φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς 
καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ· ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς 
ὕλης. τὸ δ’ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ 
προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ’ οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ 
μόνον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον· οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο 
μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ. 
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previously in III.4.43 In [h] he makes a familiar claim about the priority of form over matter and 
agent over patient, perhaps recalling the same distinction as earlier in the chapter. In [i] however, we 
may get something of a shift: is Aristotle speaking here of knowledge in activity or of the active 
intellect?44 That is to say, is this “knowledge in activity” or “knowledge insofar as it is active” (ἡ κατ' 
ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη) something distinct from the poiētikos nous that is essentially an activity (τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ ὤν ἐνεργείᾳ) mentioned in the preceding lines?45 In [j] we also find things open to 
interpretation: Aristotle says that something does not at one time think and at another time not 
think, but what is the subject of “think” here (νοεῖ)? A plausible answer is the active or productive 
intellect, the poiētikos nous introduced in this chapter. Are there other plausible alternatives for the 
subject of this verb, other plausibly non-intermittently thinking things? If not, how might our 
interpretation of [j] constrain our interpretation of [i], which left open the possibility that Aristotle 
might be speaking of something other than the poiētikos nous? 
The chapter draws to a close in [k] and [l] where Aristotle contrasts an immortal and eternal 
intellect with an intellect that is said to be “passive” and “perishable” (ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς 
φθαρτός). There are fine-grained questions of grammatical interpretation in these lines: to what does 
“this” refer in [k]? Perhaps even more puzzling are the final words of the chapter in [l]: “without 
this [it] thinks nothing.” Commentators have outlined roughly four readings of this final line:46 (a) 
“without the active intellect, the passive intellect thinks nothing” (b) “without the active intellect, 
nothing thinks” (c) “without the passive intellect, the active intellect thinks nothing” and (d) 
“without the passive intellect, nothing thinks.” The antecedent of “this” is up for interpretation, 
                                               
43 Aristotle calls the receptive or potential intellect of de An. III.4 “impassible” or “impassive” 
(ἀπαθές) at 429a15, “unmixed” (ἀμιγῆ) at 429a18, and “separable” (χωριστός) at 429b5. That 
intellect, however, is merely potentially (δυνάμει) or capable of being (δυνατός) its objects at 
429a21, so that the nous with which we think “is nothing of the existing things before it thinks” 
(οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν) at 429a24. 
44 This line is repeated at the opening of de An. III.7, and so some have speculated that it does not 
belong here. 
45 It is, of course, a mistake to confuse activity (ἐνέργεια) with active or agent principles (ποιητικόν) 
and acting (ποιεῖν), since on Aristotle’s view there is such a thing as a passive power (παθητικόν) 
being in activity (ἐνεργείᾳ) when it is being acted upon (πάσχειν). The confusion here is a result of 
the English language; the point is clearly distinguished in Greek. So while the inference may not be 
recommended in general, here the link between active intellect and knowledge in activity is achieved 
by active intellect’s essential activity (ἐνεργείᾳ), not its being active as an agent (ποιητικόν). 
46 See for example Ross Aristotle, 6th ed. (1995) 156. 
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differentiating (a) and (b) from (c) and (d). And whether “nothing” is the subject or object of 
“thinks” is similarly open to interpretation, differentiating (a) and (c) from (b) and (d). 
But even setting these detailed grammatical questions aside, careful readers finish this 
chapter wondering precisely how many intellectual relata are on scene and how precisely they are 
related. While things appear to be clearly defined and distinguished in the first half of the chapter, 
despite the dominance of analogical and metaphorical language there, matters become noticeably 
more obscure in the second half. This is not to say that everything is crystal clear in the first part, but 
rather that the distinctions being drawn there are themselves clear, at any rate, even if their precise 
application to Aristotle’s account of intellect leaves matters open to several different interpretations. 
But by the end of the chapter, in contrast, pronouns have no clear antecedents and verbs have no 
unambiguous subjects (or objects, for that matter), making the interpretive task even harder still. 
Against the background of these many uncertainties about the details, then, we finish the chapter 
asking a very broad question: which intellects are being contrasted here and how precisely are they 
related to one another? 
2.1.2 A Brief Survey of Views 
Before turning to my own activity-first analysis of the chapter, I find it helpful to summarize some 
of the dominant views that have come before. The goal of these sections, however, is not principally 
to enumerate the many divergent readings of the chapter, but rather to draw attention to a crucial 
similarity shared by most recent interpretations despite their many more specific differences. Indeed, 
it has become typical to organize the taxonomy of interpretations according to what each takes the 
active intellect to be or to be like. But just as my own method is to begin with questions about the 
active intellect’s activity and its correlative patient, so too my taxonomical method with respect to 
organizing other views will be informed by these questions. My aim in this section is to survey views 
as they are typically organized.47 In the following section, I shall take a closer look at many of the 
recent views, showing that, however else they may differ, recent interpreters agree on a logical 
feature of the chapter, in particular regarding relations between active and passive principles. By 
approaching the taxonomy of views in this alternative way in the following sections, we shall 
discover a surprising result: about a crucial feature of the passage, recent interpreters agree more 
                                               
47 Cf. e.g. the discussion in Shields (2016a) 312-5 for a taxonomy of exactly this shape.  
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with each other than with the ancient and medieval interpretations with which some of them 
identify.  
But I begin in this section with a brief summary of recent views according to how they are 
most typically organized, namely according to what they take the active intellect to be. The first and 
perhaps most prominent view is that the active intellect is Aristotle’s god. The descriptions certainly 
suggest this: “separable, impassible, unmixed, being essentially in activity.”48 Indeed, one could list 
the many descriptions of the active intellect from III.5 and find similar language being said of the 
god elsewhere in the corpus, giving this interpretive strategy a certain advantage, perhaps exhibiting 
the coherence of Aristotle’s system.49 Even the Light Analogy recalls quite vividly Socrates’ sun 
analogy from the end of Republic VI.50 The non-intermittence of this intellect’s thinking, as well as its 
immortal and eternal character, strongly suggest that it is something divine, if not the divine 
substance itself. It is difficult to resist the temptation to look to Metaphysics Λ, Nicomachean Ethics X, 
and Eudemian Ethics VIII for help here, particularly when (as is often pointed out) Aristotle regularly 
speaks of the god at climactic moments in his most important treatises.51 Defenders of this reading 
trace their interpretive lineage to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who most prominently among ancient 
authors articulated something like this view.52 Important to this view is the idea that the distinction 
between kinds of intellect, active and passive, obtains among types of soul, rather than within a single 
human soul. Caston has called this reading “taxonomical,” and it enjoys a certain degree of favor 
among recent interpreters.53 
Another view is that the distinction between active and passive intellects (as it is commonly 
called) obtains within the human soul in some form or another, as Aristotle’s own words suggest. 
Different interpreters draw the distinction in different ways, although they belong to the same 
interpretive genus insofar as they think that both intellects or aspects of intellect belong to individual 
                                               
48 De An. III.5 430a17-8. 
49 Such a strategy is most thoroughly deployed by Caston (1999), although the move is not 
uncommon. 
50 See, for example, Sprague (1972) passim, Burnyeat (2008) 41-2, Johansen (2012) 243, among others. 
51 Aristotle’s own language in the de Anima may even suggest this, since he often speaks of nous as 
something divine. Cf. e.g. de An. I.4 408b29 and II.2 413b24-29. 
52 Alexander’s view differs in important respects from Caston’s and others’, as I shall discuss in the 
following sections.  
53 Cf. e.g. Burnyeat (2008) 52, n48: “The point is well argued by Caston (1999).” 
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human beings. Polansky, for example, takes the active intellect to be the same as the state of 
knowledge, since Aristotle calls it a “certain state” (ἕξις τις), and knowledge is taken to be a hexis 
elsewhere in Aristotle’s philosophy.54 Furthermore, he argues that knowledge, once acquired, is 
something like an unmoved mover with respect to particular episodes of thinking, since those in 
possession of knowledge can contemplate the objects of that knowledge whenever they wish.55 So 
on this first view, the active intellect is the persisting state of knowledge that is responsible for 
initiating particular episodes of thinking. According to another related view, the active intellect is the 
same as the intellect in activity, that is to say, the active intellect is the intellect of III.4 when engaged 
in the activity of contemplating some universal intelligible object, coming to be formally identical to 
it. On this reading, the distinction between (so-called) active and passive intellects is a distinction 
between intellect in potentiality and intellect in activity, a familiar distinction from Aristotle’s work 
more generally. Some of these readings allow that there is something special or even transcendent 
about the human intellect in activity, so that it joins or participates in the activity of the eternally 
active intellect.56 Nevertheless, these views maintain that the distinction is here given as part of 
human psychology. So, on this second view of this genus, the distinction is between two states of 
the same human intellect, in potentia and in actu. Finally, there is a reading which understands active 
and passive intellect to be two aspects of a single human intellect considered as a single power.57 
This reading, too, emphasizes the role of the active intellect to initiate particular episodes of 
thinking, not as a settled hexis or state of knowledge, nor as the activity of thinking itself, but rather 
as that power of the intellect which moves the intellect to activity in any particular instance.  
Now, I do not wish to dwell on the details of these three variations, since their specific 
differences are not particularly relevant to my present inquiry. What these three human-readings 
have in common is that the active intellect plays some role in the activation or initiation of particular 
episodes of thinking. This stands in contrast to god-readings that emphasize the role the active 
intellect plays for all rational beings in endowing the world with intelligibility in general. It is this 
higher-order difference that I wish to point out in my survey of the popular taxonomy: on the one 
hand, there are those readings according to which the active intellect is singular and transcendent, 
                                               
54 See EN VI.3 passim for a discussion of knowledge and other intellectual virtues as hexeis. 
55 Polansky (2007) 462-3. 
56 See e.g. Gerson (2005) 156-162. 
57 See e.g. Wedin (1988) 160-208. 
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and thus conclude that its function is to endow the world with intelligibility in a general way; on the 
other hand, there are those readings according to which the active intellect is individuated in even 
human soul, and thus conclude that its function is to initiate particular episodes of thinking for 
individual human beings, with other more specific variations on the role thus understood.  
Before proceeding, I should note a very different human-reading that has fallen out of favor 
in recent decades, though it is not entirely without contemporary advocates. Modern-day followers 
of Thomas Aquinas take the active intellect to be something abstractive, being that intellectual 
power by which intellectual forms are abstracted from perceptual particulars.58 This view stands in 
contrast to the two general camps I have outlined above, since the active intellect in this case is 
responsible for an activity that stands between the two activities posited by those interpretive genera. 
Rather than being responsible for general intelligibility of the world or for the activation of particular 
episodes, these broadly Thomistic readings argue that the active intellect is responsible for what we 
might call particular intelligibility, that particular objects are intellectually available for particular 
knowers. I shall return to this reading at key moments later on in this dissertation: it is quite close to 
the view that I shall defend. According to usual ways of organizing views about the active intellect, 
his is considered a human-reading, but given my analysis his view differs from the rest. For the 
present survey, however, I note it in order to set it aside because of its paucity of defenders in recent 
years, at least as a matter of interpreting Aristotle.59  
                                               
58 See e.g. Sacra Studium Congregatio (1914): “Immaterialitatem necessario sequitur intellectualitas, 
et ita quidem ut secundum gradus elongationis a materia, sint quoque gradus intellectualitatis. 
Adaequatum intellectionis obiectum est communiter ipsum ens; proprium vero intellectus humani in 
praesenti statu unionis, quidditatibus abstractis a conditionibus materialibus continetur,” and 
“Cognitionem ergo accipimus a rebus sensibilibus. Cum autem sensibile non sit intelligibile in actu, 
praeter intellectum formaliter intelligentem, admittenda est in anima virtus activa, quae species 
intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstrahat” (my emphasis).  
59 For example, while Cory (2015) explains and defends Aquinas’ account of intellectual abstraction, 
she has said to me in personal conversation that she thought the view was surely not Aristotle’s. I 
have had many similar conversations with those working on Thomas expressing skepticism that the 
view could be found in Aristotle himself. The dominant thought seems to be that Aristotle’s active 
intellect is the divine intellect, and Thomas changes Aristotle’s view. Thomas, of course, understands 
himself to be straightforwardly explicating Aristotelian philosophical psychology, on this point at 
any rate.  
 28 
2.1.3 The Contemporary Consensus in Focus 
Now I propose to set aside that taxonomy and focus on a similarity shared by most every recent 
interpretation. This similarity comes into view when we shift our focus from asking “what is the 
active intellect?” to “what does the active intellect activate?” Accordingly, both my review of 
positions here and the argument I shall develop are organized around the question, “what is it that 
the active intellect acts on?” 
On both sides of this contemporary interpretive divide between god-readings and human-
readings of the nature of the active intellect, it has become common to speak of the “active and 
passive intellects” that are distinguished in III.5. Whatever their differences, most recent interpreters 
begin with this basic interpretive frame, speaking of two intellects that are here being distinguished. 
And this seems to be a reasonable starting point. After all, as I have already noted, active (ποιητικόν) 
and passive (παθητικόν) principles are correlatives in Aristotle’s system. Here at the beginning of 
III.5, one intellect is said to be active or productive while at the end of III.5 another intellect is said 
to be passive and perishable (παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός), so that Aristotle is here making use of both 
adjectives (or their verbal cousins). It is entirely reasonable, then, and not in itself problematic to 
frame the discussion of III.5 between these two intellects and according to this broader theoretical 
apparatus of active and passive principles. Indeed, I myself share this general approach, focusing on 
active and passive intellectual principles and their joint activity. 
Recent interpreters, however, take this analysis in a particular direction, notwithstanding 
their otherwise divergent readings. After all, on first glance at any rate, it is reasonable to suppose 
that this passive intellect is the very same as the matter-like intellect mentioned a few lines above at 
the beginning of III.5, the intellect which is there said to become all things (τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι). 
And by extension, it is not unreasonable, again on first glance, to suppose that this “passive 
intellect” is the intellect that was described in the previous chapter (de Anima III.4): an intellect 
which becomes intelligible objects in a way analogous to the way our perceptual powers come to be 
informed by and, in a way, even identical to their correlative perceptible objects. So, when 
contemporary interpreters frame their discussion of this passage in terms of “active and passive 
intellects,” they also assume without much argument that the passive intellect is the very same as the 
receptive intellect previously discussed in III.4. Such an identification of these two intellects—the 
passive intellect of III.5 and the receptive or potential intellect of III.4—is what I am calling the 
Contemporary Consensus. I shall first show that this view is very common, indeed that it is shared 
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by recent interpreters who otherwise disagree with respect to the active intellect’s nature and 
distinctive function. Then I shall turn to some reasons why people have found such an approach 
inviting. 
I begin by quoting Rodier in 1900 who writes:  
Faut-il donc admettre que l'intellect en puissance ou pathétique est lui aussi χωριστὸς, 
ἀμιγὴς, et ἀπαθής? La question doit croyons-nous, être résolue par l'affirmative. […] 
En tant que pure aptitude, l'intellect passif est, sans doute, séparé de toute matière.60  
Here he recognizes that these three attributes should be said of the potential or pathetic intellect. He 
calls the same intellect “en puissance,” “passif,” and “pathétique,” italicized as an exact transliteration 
of the Greek passive (παθητικὸς). He also concludes that the passive intellect is distinct from 
imagination and the bodily cognitive faculties which it nevertheless requires for its operation: 
Bien qu'il soit séparé en un sens en tant que pure aptitude l'intellect passif ne peut 
passer à l'acte sans le concours de l'imagination et, par suite, de l'organisme corporel 
[cites de An. III.7 on the necessity of a phantasm]. C'est donc à la passivité de 
l'intellect et à la matière que notre pensée doit son individualité [cites Meta. Λ.3 on 
nothing standing in the way of nous as a form surviving the corruption of the 
composite].61 
He is therefore committed to the idea that the passive and potential intellects are the same, and he 
seeks a way to explain why Aristotle would call this intellect “perishable” at the end of III.5.   
Hicks also writes in his 1907 commentary: “The intellect which can suffer [i.e. ὁ παθητικὸς 
νοῦς], which becomes all objects, is not immortal and eternal, but perishable […] it was ho dynamei 
nous with which A. started in c. 4.”62 Here, not only does Hicks match the receptive or potential 
intellect which becomes all things to the passive and perishable intellect at the end of III.5, but he 
straightforwardly equates this nous with the one called “potential” in III.4. Earlier in his analysis he 
assumes a similar identification:  
                                               
60 Rodier (1900) 461. 
61 Ibid. 467. 
62 Hicks (1907) 508. 
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The argument [concluding at line 13] does not [need to] prove the existence of a 
passive intellect. We already know that there is a potential or receptive intellect, a 
capacity of being affected by intelligibles and becoming thus actualised.63  
And further, he assumes that “the word τοιοῦτος is predicate and stands for both “passive” with ὁ 
μὲν and “active” with ὁ δὲ.”64 Hicks’ analysis is otherwise directed at a search for something which 
actualizes receptive nous, and he is inclined toward a more traditional abstractive reading, despite his 
commitment to the Contemporary Consensus. He begins his commentary on the chapter indicating 
that he wishes to avoid “committing myself to any positive view as to the nature of the distinction” 
(sc. between active and passive intellects), and yet he suggests that the distinction should obtain not 
among types of souls, but rather within the dianoetic or intellective soul itself.65 This remark, in 
addition to remarks favoring an abstraction-reading, put him firmly in the camp of human-readings. 
Ross too settles in the direction of a human-reading, writing:  
The phrase νοῦς ποιητικός has often been supposed to mean the divine reason. But 
that interpretation is clearly ruled out by the statement that both forms of reason 
exist in the soul (l. 13), which can only mean the human soul. […] The νοῦς 
ποιητικός is said (ll. 14-15) to exist by making all things, and the νοῦς παθητικός by 
becoming all things.66  
To illustrate what it means to “become all things,” Ross immediately quotes three bits from III.4, 
therefore identifying passive intellect with the matter-like intellect which becomes all things at the 
start of III.5 and the receptive intellect from III.4. Ross also says, in another work, that “The act of 
apprehension is ascribed, then, to passive reason.”67 Given that the intellect of III.4 is taken to be 
                                               
63 Ibid. 500.  
64 Ibid. Hicks contends that this adjective is predicative, roughly translating: “the one intellect is 
passive, like matter, in that it becomes all objects, the other intellect is active, like the efficient cause, 
in that it makes all objects.” While I disagree and instead take the τοιοῦτος to be attributive and the 
verb to be existential, I do not conclude with Hicks’ opponents that these are merely two aspects or 
modes of the same intellect, akin to the usual way of taking the distinction between theoretical and 
practical intellect. So I part ways with Hicks’ philological analysis, but I agree with his criticism of 
the two-aspect interpretation. The point of the several quotes is Hicks’ easy substitution of “passive” 
for “receptive or potential,” committing him to the Contemporary Consensus.  
65 Hicks (1907) 498, cf. 500: “The word ψυχῇ here would be more precisely τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ.” 
66 Ross (1961) 45. He echoes similar thoughts in Aristotle (1995) 153.  
67 Ross (1995) 153. 
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the intellect which apprehends, this latter quote is also a back reference to the receptive intellect of 
III.4. So Ross, while more firmly a defender of the human-reading than Hicks, is just as much 
committed to the Contemporary Consensus. 
Rist follows Ross in taking the en tē psychē to be evidence in favor of the human reading. He, 
too, is committed to the Contemporary Consensus, saying:  
In chapter four, as we have seen, the Intellect as a whole, including presumably the 
Passive Intellect, is held to be unmixed with the body and apathēs (429a15), but 
nevertheless the Passive Intellect, as its very name pathētikos shows, is receptive of the 
Forms of the objects (including the material objects) of its thought (429al5-16).68  
Lloyd takes a similar line, saying:  
The role of the passive reason is for the most part clear. Its function is to receive the 
intelligible forms; in that sense it ‘becomes’ everything. It evidently belongs to the 
individual person, as the sense-organs do, and it is explicitly said to be perishable. 
The passive reason, in fact, is brought into line with Aristotle’s doctrine concerning 
the other faculties of soul which also cease to function on the death of the 
individual.69  
So, we have two more human-readers who are both committed to the Contemporary Consensus. 
Hamlyn is less willing to speculate on the precise nature of the active intellect, indicating that 
Aristotle is unlike Aquinas on this point:  
The distinction is made by Aristotle only in a metaphysical way; there is no indication 
in his words that the active intellect plays any role other than that of a metaphysical 
ground for the actualization of the potentialities which make up the soul.70  
While he recognizes that this is similar to (what some might call) the mere metaphysical posit “of the 
Prime Mover in the universe at large,”71 his analysis assumes that this power is posited as a ground 
of intellectual operations in the individual soul. So, his view resembles certain god-readings in 
attributing to it an abstract and indeterminate role, as it were, lying in the background of ordinary 
                                               
68 Rist (1966) 14. 
69 Lloyd (1968) 198-9.  
70 Hamlyn (2002) 140. 
71 Ibid. 
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intellectual operations, but Hamlyn still regards the active intellect as part of the individual human 
soul. On the passive intellect, he writes:  
This is a much-discussed chapter which introduces the famous or notorious 
distinction between the active and passive intellects […] The intellect which was 
discussed in Chapter 4 was said to become all things; it is potentially what its objects 
are actually and becomes them, qua forms, in its actualization. The other intellect 
which is here postulated […] must therefore be entirely actual […].72 
So, although reluctant to register an opinion on the nature of the active intellect, Hamlyn 
nevertheless accepts the Contemporary Consensus without argument. 
Lear also is more comfortable with the idea that Aristotle is pointing readers in the direction 
of his god in III.5, as he discusses in the final lines of his section on the topic:  
There is, it would seem, only one active mind and that is Active Mind. Of course, 
Aristotle could fashion criteria for distinguishing ‘my active mind’ from yours and 
for distinguishing our active minds from Active Mind.73  
Although stopping short of an outright identification of active intellect with the god, Lear 
nevertheless moves in this direction more than the other authors we have considered in this section 
thus far. Like the others, however, Lear is clearly committed to the idea that the passive intellect is 
the very same intellect discussed in III.4. He writes:  
Generations of interpreters have called this Active Mind (nous poiētikos) (though 
Aristotle himself never uses this expression) to distinguish it from Passive Mind (nous 
pathētikos).  Passive Mind, it seems clear, is the mind we have already described: it is 
our ability to receive the intelligible forms of things.74  
He points back to his exposition of III.4 in his description of passive intellect in the quote (drawn 
from his section on III.5). So Lear is also committed to the Contemporary Consensus, saying that 
such a claim “seems clear.” 
Apostle, too, advocates for a human reading that nevertheless recognizes the similarities 
between the active intellect and the god. Here, however, the similarity only holds when the active 
intellect has been separated. To wit:  
                                               
72 Ibid. 
73 Lear (1988) 140. 
74 Ibid. 136. 
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Now the active intellect of a man while alive does not exist outside of the man; and 
although it exists separately from matter and has no organ, it is somehow in the man 
or is a part of the man while he is alive. […] When separated from the body after 
death, the active intellect exists as form or as mere actuality, like God, and it is the 
only part of a man which is immortal and eternal.75  
So while rejecting the god-reading, Apostle is like Lear in emphasizing an importantly god-like 
feature of the active intellect. On the other side, Apostle regards the “passive intellect” as the others 
do, as identical with the receptive intellect from III.4. When commenting on the intellect which 
becomes all things, Apostle writes:  
This is the intellect as potentiality, which in English is often called ‘passive intellect.’ 
This intellect, prior to being affected, was described in the last Section [on III.4] as 
(a) being unmixed with anything, (b) without affection, (c) not requiring an organ, 
and (d) not an actual thing prior to thinking. 
He continues to refer to the receptive intellect as “passive intellect” throughout his commentary on 
III.5, committing himself to the consensus view.76 
Kahn is similar in recognizing a close connection between the active intellect and the divine 
intellect. Indeed, as a result of his epistemological investigation into the character and role of nous, he 
concludes that “the Agent Intellect is in no sense part of us” nor is it “a principle of which we can 
be directly conscious at all.”77 He also holds that there is a “strict isomorphism, a kind of pre-
established harmony, between the structure of the Agent Intellect and the formal, rational structure 
of the natural world.”78 Accordingly, although he does not say explicitly that the active intellect is the 
same as the divine intellect, he takes the active intellect’s principal role to account for and reflect the 
intelligibility of the world in general. But he, more weakly than the others I admit, can be captured 
by the Contemporary Consensus, since he writes in another place: “By the incorporeal principle of 
nous as such I mean not only the Agent Intellect of DA 3.5, but also the passive or potential intellect 
insofar as it becomes identical with the noēta in the act of noein.”79 My case is difficult, to be sure, 
                                               
75 Apostle (1981) 161-2, 165. 
76 Ibid. 157-168. 
77 Kahn (1981) 412, 413. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Kahn (2003) 367. 
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though not entirely implausible, since this remark comes in a footnote where Kahn discusses the 
incorporeality of nous in view of the perishability of the human body. Although he does not explicitly 
reference the perishability of passive intellect, it is clearly in the background, motivating Kahn to 
explore ways that an incorporeal principle (the potential intellect of III.4) could also be perishable 
(the passive intellect of III.5), which exploration is explicit in both places. 
Kosman is more direct on the first count, concluding quite forcefully at the end of a careful 
discussion of the “maker mind” that it  
is, as the intrepid half of the tradition has always understood, divine, a fact to which 
we should be alerted by its description, with clear echoes of Metaphysics, as a being 
‘whose ousia is energeia.’ For just as light is (though in a special sense) most visible, and 
thus the source of seeing and therefore of visibility, so is the divine most thinkable 
and thus the source of thinking and therefore of thinkability; light is never in the 
dark, and God is always, as we know, busy thinking.80  
Kosman, however, is not as clearly committed to the Consensus even as Kahn is, though neither is 
there evidence that he rejects it. Rather, he entirely avoids discussion of the remark that “passive nous 
is perishable.” Still, he gives an indication that there are two noetic faculties under consideration: 
ours, which is presented in III.4 and he, on one occasion, calls “pathetic,”81 and the divine, which is 
discussed in III.5. So although he does not explicitly comment on the passive and perishable 
intellect, he nevertheless concedes that our own human intellect is going to be individuated and 
dependent on material existence in ways that the divine intellect will not.82 And although this does 
not count in any way against Kosman himself, it bears remarking that in the introduction to the 
edited volume in which Kosman’s article appears, Nussbaum writes: “Some commentators focus on 
Aristotle's discussions of the status and activities of nous: […] the relation between the active and 
                                               
80 Kosman (2003) 353. 
81 Ibid. 355-6. He is denying that the maker mind acts on a pathetic mind wholly incapable of 
thinking otherwise, but insists that it (presumably the same pathetic mind) is rather an intermittent 
capacity of the human soul for active consciousness, for θεωρία. Although he denies a certain 
conception of the relationship between the maker mind and the pathetic mind, he does not deny the 
appellation outright. Given his other commitments, it is reasonable to see this as an oblique 
reference to the otherwise unmentioned νοῦς παθητικός of III.5. 
82 Ibid. 352-8. 
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passive intellect (Kosman).”83 So, even if Kosman was more circumspect, Nussbaum’s gloss shows 
how pervasive the Consensus view is. 
Wilkes also remarks on these matters of noetic interpretation in her paper in the same edited 
volume, in which she argues against a dualist reading of Aristotle’s account of mind and soul. On the 
topic of de Anima III.5 she does admit quite directly in an “embarrassed postscript,” however, that “I 
wish he had never written this chapter.”84 She follows other god-readers in taking the active intellect 
not to be something that is one’s own, but rather something more general and universal that makes 
thinking possible, suggesting a similarity with Heraclitus’ fiery soul. Throughout her discussion, 
however, it is implicit that she’s taking the “passive intellect” to be the intellect with which we think, 
the one mentioned and discussed outside of this embarrassing chapter. Thankfully, by her lights (we 
might imagine), this intellect is said to be perishable, and this is the one that really matters for any 
meaningful analysis of human intellect, since it is the one with which we think. 
Similarly, Frede in his paper in the same volume clearly commits himself to the 
Contemporary Consensus. He first indicates his preference, “following in this a long tradition of 
interpreters,” for the idea that the active intellect, at any rate, is not a power or part of each human 
soul, but is rather the divine intellect.85 This is good news, by his lights, because it clearly need not 
threaten Aristotle’s more naturalistic conception of the human soul. He goes on, here committing 
himself to the Contemporary Consensus, saying:  
But even if we can thus set aside the active intellect, there still is the activity of the 
human, passive intellect to worry about. […] So one easily comes to think that not 
even the passive intellect does fit the [strictly hylomorphic and anti-dualist] view of 
the soul outlined above. But this would be a mistake […] this does not mean that the 
exercise of the intellect does not presuppose a body. It is Aristotle's view that we 
could not think the way we do unless, for example, we were capable of perception 
and could remember, and somehow process, what we perceive. Thus our ability to 
think presupposes a body.86  
                                               
83 Nussbaum (2003) 13. 
84 Wilkes (2003) 125.  
85 M. Frede (2003) 105. 
86 Ibid. 105-6. 
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So it is clear that, on Frede’s view, our intellect, the one with which we think and suppose, should 
rightly be called “passive” and “perishable” in comparison to the divine and “superhuman” active 
intellect. Frede articulates a similar view elsewhere.87 
Caston takes a similar line, joining those firmly committed to the idea that the active intellect 
is Aristotle’s god. He argues that the distinction “in the soul” (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) could mean any number 
of things, given Aristotle’s extensive list of the different meanings of “in” (ἐν) in Physics 4.3. 
Accordingly, he remains unconvinced by the preceding arguments in favor of human-readings.88 He 
concludes in a helpfully representative passage, which I shall quote at length:  
Aristotle’s concern in this passage is not, therefore, with events occurring in an 
individual at a given moment of time, but rather with the taxonomical relations that 
hold between certain species of soul and their differentia. What this clause states is 
that intellect, when it occurs separately (χωρισθείς), constitutes a species of soul that 
is nothing but its essence (μόνον τουθ' ὅπερ ἐστι) and that this alone is ‘immortal 
and eternal.’ Now, given that the essence of this intellect is said a few lines earlier to 
be activity as such (τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνέργεια, 430a18), it follows that this intellect is 
nothing but activity – it is something that lacks all potentiality. This, of course, is also 
a description Aristotle applies to God, who is just intellect (Metaph. 12.7, 1072b26-
30). The intellect that occurs separately from the other powers is thus a distinct type 
of soul after all, differing ‘as the eternal does from the perishable.’89 
                                               
87 Frede (1996b) 377-8, 388: “Cependant, ce qui rend la théorie aristotélicienne de la pensée humaine 
presque incompréhensible, c’est la thèse, avancée dans le De Anima III, 5, selon laquelle toute pensée 
humaine, tout νοεῖν, ne suppose pas un intellect seul, mais deux intellects, un intellect passif et un 
intellect actif ou agent. […] En particulier, on a trouvé qu’il était difficile de déterminer l’identité et la 
fonction de l’intellect agent. En ce qui concerne l’intellect passif, il semble qu’il ne soit rien d’autre 
que la capacité humaine ordinaire de penser. […] Ce n’est donc pas un analogue de Dieu, par 
exemple l’intellect ou la raison, qui règne dans l’âme, c’est Dieu lui-même qui est le principe à 
l’intérieur de l’âme, des opérations de l’âme, même de ses pensées. […] C’est ainsi, à mon avis, qu’on 
peut comprendre le langage de De anima III, 5 qui semble suggérer que l’intellect agent est tellement 
lié à l’âme particulière qu’il ne peut pas s’agir de Dieu. Maintenant, nous pouvons comprendre 
comment Aristote peut dire que la différence entre intellect agent et intellect passif se trouve dans 
l’âme.” 
88 Recall, for example, Ross’ view that leans heavily on the expression “in the soul.” 
89 Caston (1999) 211. 
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When explaining his argument earlier, Caston references the nous pathētikos which is our focus, “The 
so-called ‘agent intellect’ belongs to one type of soul and the ‘patient intellect’ to another.”90 In view 
of this take on the active intellect, Caston goes on to comment on the passive and perishable 
intellect at the end of III.5, assuming that Aristotle “compare[s] the second intellect with the 
perishable human intellect.”91 So, his commitment to a god-reading of the active (or “second” 
intellect) leads naturally into his commitment to the Contemporary Consensus, that the passive and 
perishable nous at the end of III.5 just is the human intellect under discussion in III.4. 
Charles understands the active intellect to be the ultimate organized structure of ideas, 
presumably an impersonal space of reasons that humans come to participate in. He writes:  
The active intellect, so understood, will be the organized structure in which each of 
the relevant universals is active. As an intellect, it is the appropriate locus, the ‘place 
for such forms’ […but] is not itself a distinct object. By analogy with light, its role is 
as the abiding and structured space in which distinct universals themselves are active. 
If this is correct, our minds (passive intellects) will function properly when they 
receive objects intelligibly organized in a coherent structure of this type. What the 
passive mind receives will be forms or kinds located in an organized and intelligible 
world.92 
This quote illustrates two things: first, that the active intellect is an intelligible structure of universal 
concepts shared by all human beings and perhaps located immanently in the world, rather than 
straightforwardly identified with the prime mover; and second, that Charles is committed to 
identifying “our minds” with the passive intellect. He does this throughout his treatment of intellect, 
committing him to the Contemporary Consensus.93 
Burnyeat articulates the same view with the same presuppositions. He concludes, following 
Charles, that the active, immortal intellect enables our thinking by being a system of concepts. He 
                                               
90 Ibid. 206. He also writes, dismissively, against those who distinguish between potential and patient 
(or passive) intellect: “Why on earth should Aristotle have thought there were two [sc. human] 
intellects? [Footnote:] Or worse, three – the agent intellect, the potential intellect and the patient 
intellect – as is frequently claimed in the commentary tradition” at 202, 202n6. 
91 Ibid. 213.  
92 Charles (2002) 134-5.  
93 Cf. ibid. 129-135, 261-3. See also Charles (1984) 252-4. 
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follows Caston by making it explicit that this is the divine intellect. He says the active intellect 
contributes to our mortal thinking in the following way: 
Simply by existing, I would suggest, by being what it is: an eternal intellect 
constituted, like any other intellect, as a system of concepts. The difference is that 
the divine intellect is a system (better, perhaps, the system) of absolutely correct 
concepts. As such, the deity does not need to act on us from up high, but merely to 
illuminate the intelligible forms. […] The Active Intellect is God.94  
Burnyeat makes explicit mention of Brentano, rejecting his rejection of this god-reading, who had 
called it, “prattle without all sense and reason.”95 Immediately before this passage, before drawing 
his conclusions concerning the nature of the active intellect, Burnyeat comments on the final lines of 
III.5, saying:  
‘This’ alone is immortal, so ‘we’ are not. Nor is the ‘passive intellect’, introduced 
earlier as the kind of intellect which exists by ‘becoming’, i.e. by coming to 
understand, all things.  But if and when the passive intellect does come to understand 
a thing or two, it cannot – the final sentence announces – do so without ‘this’.  Our 
mortal intellect needs an immortal intellect to achieve its goal of understanding.96  
As is perhaps becoming tedious to say, Burnyeat too is committed to the Contemporary Consensus. 
Johansen writes that he follows Frede, Caston, and Burnyeat in his take on the active 
intellect, firmly placing within the camp of god-readings, although he is less explicit on the point 
than those he cites.97 For our purposes, it is more important to note his take on the passive intellect:  
The implication seems to be that the agent intellect acts on intelligibles so that they 
can act on the passive intellect. […] The agent intellect, then, is separable as a 
different kind of substance from the passive intellect, a substance which is always 
active and survives the destruction of the passive intellect (430a24). Agent nous is, 
then, a separate substance from the mortal substance of which the passive intellect is 
a part.98  
                                               
94 Burnyeat (2008) 40-2. 
95 Brentano (1977) 24, quoted by Burnyeat (2008) at 42, 54n58.  
96 Burnyeat (2008) 40. 
97 Johansen (2012) 237n34. 
98 Ibid. 238-9. 
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We have seen, then, how naturally the Contemporary Consensus coheres with the god-reading: if the 
active intellect is simply the god, then it becomes far more natural for Aristotle to call our “passive” 
intellect “perishable” by comparison. So, without considering alternative views, most god-readers 
and many others embrace the Contemporary Consensus that the passive, perishable intellect is the 
subject of discussion in the preceding chapter, III.4. 
Barnes, though writing earlier, I save until the very last in my survey. He stands out as one 
who, while committing himself to the Contemporary Consensus, nevertheless notes his awareness of 
and his objection to those who reject this consensus. He writes in the main text:  
This notorious chapter distinguishes two sorts of intellect: one is the ‘matter’ of 
thought (430a10) and ‘becomes all things’ (430a15); it is called the ‘passive’ intellect, 
ho pathētikos nous, and it is perishable (430a25), because it is inseparable from body.99  
So, Barnes is like the others in assuming the identity of the passive and receptive intellects; indeed, 
he makes this assumption at the outset of his analysis of the chapter. But unlike the others, Barnes 
indicates that he has at least considered the arguments of those who had rejected the Contemporary 
view before it had become a consensus, saying in a footnote to the above quoted line:  
Here I differ from Brentano and the Thomists who identify nous pathētikos with 
phantasia; this seems to me inadmissible on linguistic grounds.  But Brentano’s 
discussion of III.5 remains the best.100  
Barnes, then, while committed to the Contemporary Consensus, and without providing a developed 
argument in its favor, nevertheless indicates some grounds for disagreeing with those who rejected 
it. It would be helpful to know, however, what “linguistic grounds” make this view “inadmissible.” 
So, we have seen in this lengthy survey how prevalent the Contemporary Consensus is, even 
among those who conclude very different things about the chapter. The received taxonomy is not 
helpful in pointing out this broad similarity. It has become an unargued assumption at the beginning 
of every recent treatment of the chapter that passive and perishable intellect is the human one, 
discussed at length in III.4.101 With the rising popularity of the view that the active intellect is the 
god in the last two decades, the Contemporary Consensus has become even more entrenched, since 
                                               
99 Barnes (1971) 12.  
100 Ibid.  
101 This assumption is even more common the more introductory the text. I have focused on 
extended discussions of Aristotle’s account of intellect in my lengthy review. 
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the perishability of human reason sits much more naturally with the idea that the active intellect is a 
specifically different substance, rather than a(nother) divine part of the human soul. Although there 
are few who explicitly reject the Contemporary Consensus in recent years, there are nevertheless 
some in the minority, but I shall not consider their distinct views in this chapter.102 Instead, I shall 
now turn to the reasons which have presumably motivated people to accept the Contemporary 
Consensus as the default reading. 
2.1.4 Evidence for the Contemporary Consensus 
There are two sorts of evidence in favor of the Contemporary Consensus, both independent of 
one’s views about the nature of the active intellect (i.e. god-reading or human-reading). The first is 
derived principally from the language and setup of III.5 itself. The second and perhaps more 
convincing argument rests on Aristotle’s analogy between perception and intellection with which he 
begins his account of intellect in III.4. I shall treat these two pieces of evidence for the 
Contemporary Consensus in turn. 
As I have already conceded, III.5 invites us to use Aristotle’s quite general apparatus of 
active and passive principles in our analysis of the intellectual case, and in particular of the intellects 
or intellectual powers themselves that we are driven to posit. It is clear that Aristotle is using this 
distinction to specify what the active intellect is and does, but it is already an act of interpretation to 
discern against what the active intellect stands in opposition. Given that Aristotle begins this chapter 
by distinguishing the intellect that becomes all things from the intellect that makes all things, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the correlative patient of the poiētikos nous, which is later called the 
pathētikos nous, is the same as the intellect which becomes all things. And presumably this reasonable 
supposition underlies quite a bit of the commentary I have reviewed in the preceding section.  
There is, therefore, an explicit opposition between the intellect that becomes all things and 
the intellect that makes all things in the first lines of the chapter, and although Aristotle does not use 
the adjective poiētikos in this chapter, there is nevertheless a further, though implicit, opposition 
between the intellect that makes or activates all things (ὁ δέ [νοῦς] τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν) and the 
                                               
102 Cf. Gerson (2005) 161 and Polansky (2008) 469. Their arguments against the Consensus, so far as 
I can tell, are the same as those I shall go on to cite in forthcoming sections, shared by ancient and 
medieval thinkers; my argument against the Consensus is different from and more substantive than 
these earlier arguments that are held by many over the tradition but are dismissed today. 
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intellect that is passive or liable to be acted upon (παθητικὸς νοῦς). While the second of these pairs 
of opposition is not explicit in the text, it is nevertheless strongly suggested by Aristotle’s 
terminology, given the more general relation between acting and being acted upon (ποιεῖν and 
πάσχειν) or between active and passive (ποιητικόν and παθητικόν). It is not unreasonable, then, to 
suppose that Aristotle is making the same distinction among intellectual principles in both sections 
of the chapter, beginning and end. Accordingly, most recent interpreters conclude 
straightforwardly—and, as we have seen, oftentimes simply assume without any argument at all—
that the intellect said to become all things (ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι) at the beginning 
of the chapter is the same as the intellect called passive and perishable (παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός) at 
the end. 
Independent from that set of evidence is the further claim that the intellect that becomes all 
things—the one mentioned at the beginning of III.5—is the same as the intellect described 
previously in III.4. The latter intellect comes to be identical to and informed by its objects like the 
senses come to be their respective objects.103 Indeed, in III.4 he even likens the receptive intellect to 
a wax tablet on which there comes to be writing as we make use of it.104 Furthermore, much of the 
argument in III.4 turns on the fact that intellect must have everything as an object, that it must be 
able to know all things.105 Both the receptive intellect of III.4 and the matter-like intellect at the 
beginning of III.5, then, are said to know or become all things. Given these similarities, it is 
independently reasonable to say that the two intellects are the same.  
While the immediately preceding claim that identifies the becoming intellect with the 
receptive intellect is a necessary part of what I am calling the Contemporary Consensus, this claim is 
nevertheless not distinctive to the view I am targeting: I am happy to concede this claim. It is very 
likely, again for independent reasons, that III.4 describes the intellect that Aristotle says “becomes all 
things” at the beginning of III.5. It is important to maintain, however, that this claim is a necessary 
part of the Contemporary Consensus, however insufficient or indistinctive, since on that view the 
receptive intellect of III.4 just is the passive intellect at the end of III.5. The matter-like intellect that 
becomes all things, taken from the beginning of III.5, serves as the link between these other two, 
being the middle term in an argument for the Contemporary Consensus from the transitivity of 
                                               
103 Cf. de An. III.4 429a13-18. 
104 Cf. de An. III.4 429b30-30a2. 
105 Cf. de An. III.4 429a18-27. 
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identity. The first premise identifies the passive intellect with the matter-like intellect, both 
mentioned in III.5. The second premise identifies the matter-like intellect of III.5 with the receptive 
intellect of III.4. Taken together, then, those two moves constitute a single argument for the 
Contemporary Consensus: so goes the first argument for the consensus view.106 
A second argument proceeds a little more directly, proposing that already in III.4 there is 
sufficient evidence to say that the receptive intellect is passive (παθητικὸς). In particular, de Anima 
III.4 begins with the analogy between perception and intellect. Although Aristotle goes to great 
lengths earlier in the treatise to emphasize how different perception is from other more ordinary 
cases of passion or being-acted-upon (πάσχειν), he nevertheless allows the generic description of 
perception as a being-acted-upon of a certain sort (πάσχειν τι), admitting of the same basic 
analysis.107 In the perceptual case, the active principle which acts upon perceptual powers in this 
special sort of way is the perceptible object, so that the perceptible object and the perceptual power 
come to share in a single activity of perceiving and being-perceived.108 Aristotle therefore begins and 
ends his treatment of perception with this sort of analysis, in view of acting and being acted upon, in 
terms of active and passive principles. 
Aristotle begins his treatment of intellect in de Anima III.4 in a similar way. He writes: 
If thinking is indeed just like perceiving, then it would be either a sort of being- 
acted-upon by the intelligible, or something else such as that. So intellect must be 
impassible but receptive of the forms and potentially such as this thing but not this 
thing [sc. itself], and it must be similarly disposed, just as the perceptual faculty is 
related to perceptible objects, so too intellect is related to the intelligible objects.109 
He is therefore happy to speak, at least provisionally, of intellection or noetic thinking (νοεῖν) being 
a certain sort of being acted upon (πάσχειν τι), recalling how he previously described perception. He 
does leave open, however, that it might be something else of a similar sort, still leaving in place the 
                                               
106 I am happy to accept the second premise, but with pre-modern commentators I reject the first. 
107 Cf. de An. II.5 passim, but especially at 418a1-6. 
108 Cf. de An. III.2 425b26-426a26. 
109 De An. III.5 429a13-18: εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ 
νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον 
ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ 
νοητά. 
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basic analogy between intellectual and perceptual powers on the one hand, and between intelligible 
and perceptible objects on the other hand. 
Moreover, notwithstanding his preliminary caginess regarding talk of intellectual being acted 
upon, and his initial openness to an alternative intellectual account, Aristotle closes the chapter by 
using this passive terminology once again, now in raising a puzzle for his account.110 The difficulty 
he raises is this: how can intellect be impassible (ἀπαθές) if thinking is a sort of being acted upon 
(πάσχειν τι)? On the one hand, his reply to the aporia may not be particularly relevant at this point; it 
is perhaps sufficient to note that, in the final analysis, he returns to the terminology of suffering and 
being acted upon by the intelligible object. Indeed, in raising the aporia he even mentions 
parenthetically the general relation between acting and being acted upon (ποιεῖν and πάσχειν).  
On the other hand, it is possible that thinking in this passive way about noein is precisely 
what generates the aporia to begin with, and that the aporia opens up if we think that noein is rather 
something different but of a similar sort (τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον). The solution itself leans heavily on 
the notions of actuality and potentiality, terms which Aristotle uses in II.5 when expanding his 
account of ordinary motion and change so as to explain and accommodate the special, quasi-passive 
character of perception. So, perhaps Aristotle is working to amend the active/passive analysis of 
intellect in more appropriate terms of actuality and potentiality, a finer grained analysis first 
developed for perception. 
But while it is important to recall that the intellectual case comes with at least as many 
qualifications regarding the use of passive language as the perceptual case, it is perhaps even more 
important to appreciate several more qualifications besides.111 To wit: 
But that the impassivity of the perceptual and intellectual faculties is not alike, is clear 
in view of the perceptual organs and of perception. For perception, on the one hand, 
cannot perceive after the agency of an exceedingly perceptible object, for example it 
cannot perceive sound after the agency of very loud sounds, nor can it see or smell 
after the agency of strong colors or odors. But intellect, whenever it thinks the 
exceedingly intelligible, does not think more weakly the inferior things, but even 
                                               
110 De An. III.4 429b22-27. 
111 For remarks on the special passivity (or perhaps better, special impassivity) of perception, see de 
An. II.5 passim.  
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more strongly. For while the perceptual faculty is not without body, the other is 
separate.112 
But just as in the perceptual case, it is possible that while insisting on the apatheia of a psychic 
capacity, Aristotle nevertheless allows and indeed requires an agent/patient analysis of that capacity’s 
activity. So, despite Aristotle’s choice of words in III.4, and his insistence on the even more special 
apatheia in the case of intellect, it is not without reason that people have come to call that receptive 
(δεκτικός) or potential (δυνάμει) intellect of III.4 also passive (παθητικός), a term said of nous for 
the first time at the end of III.5. 
2.1.5 First Objections to the Contemporary Consensus 
The view that the receptive intellect of III.4 is the same as the passive intellect of III.5 is, therefore, 
a commitment which is shared by many otherwise differing interpretations put forward in recent 
years. Furthermore, there is some reason to proceed with this interpretive assumption, at least at 
first glance. What is interesting about this view, however, is that it seems to have been entirely 
absent from ancient and medieval interpretations. While it is true that the interpretation of this brief 
chapter has been disputed since the earliest days at the Lyceum after Aristotle’s departure, on this 
matter, at any rate, interpreters have not often disagreed.113 And as for later examples, Averroes, 
Avicenna, and Aquinas all give very different readings of Aristotle’s discussion of intellect, but they 
all agree that the passive intellect mentioned alongside the active or agent intellect cannot be the 
same as the receptive intellect of the previous chapter.114 In this they follow Theophrastus, 
Themistius, Philoponus, and perhaps even Alexander, as we shall see.115 
                                               
112 De An. III.4 429a29-b5: ὅτι δ’ οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερὸν 
ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ 
σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ 
ὀσμῶν οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὀσμᾶσθαι· ἀλλ’ ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ 
ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός. 
113 See Themistius On Aristotle’s On the Soul, tr. Robert B. Todd (1996) 133-4, one of the few sources 
we have for Theophrastus’ own views about soul and intellect. 
114 Averroes and Avicenna both thought the active intellect was singular and transcendent, while 
Aquinas posited individual active intellects in the soul of each person. Averroes also held that the 
receptive intellect was singular and shared by all, but Avicenna and Aquinas held that the receptive 
intellect was individuated in each human soul. They therefore held representatively diverse views on 
the matter, but all three of them held that the passive intellect was a third distinct intellect, all 
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The reason for this pre-modern consensus against the interpretive consensus of today is 
fairly simple, it seems to me: until relatively recently, it has been commonly agreed that Aristotle’s 
receptive intellect from III.4 is imperishable and incorporeal, given the arguments in that chapter for 
its being separable, impassible, and unmixed. That the passive intellect is called “perishable” at the 
end of III.5 has counted for them as sufficient evidence that this cannot be the same intellect as the 
one previously discussed and said to be both separable from and unmixed with body. Indeed, in an 
interesting interpretive twist, some recent commentators have suggested that the remark at the end 
of III.5 is evidence in the other direction, that Aristotle denies the incorruptibility of the receptive 
intellect.116 It is as if many recent interpreters are unaware of their own assumption that the passive 
and receptive intellects are the same: not only is the Contemporary Consensus a consensus, but it 
has risen above question or debate, so that people are often not even aware that they are making 
such an assumption.  
Moreover, this is perhaps ironic given that for many medieval interpreters the 
incorruptibility of the soul is something commonly held with similar conviction, quite independent 
of these more local interpretive concerns. Accordingly, much of this argument, at any rate, against 
the Contemporary Consensus turns on our evaluation of the strength and import of Aristotle’s 
arguments in III.4 against the corporeality and corruptibility of receptive nous. As I have confessed 
above, and did not deny but confessed: this is not the topic of my present study. So perhaps another 
argument is called for to explain the pre-modern prima facie rejection of the Contemporary 
Consensus, in the face of our own contemporaries’ prima facie acceptance of it.  
And there happens to be a second promising argument that can be developed on the basis of 
the (im)passivity of receptive nous, though it is not without its own set of difficulties. In the final line 
of III.5 ([l] in the quote above), Aristotle not only says that the passive intellect is perishable, but 
also that something else is impassible (ἀπαθές). Indeed, his claim that the passive intellect is 
perishable is an adversative clause, so that the final parenthetical sentence of III.5 reads: “(but we do 
                                                                                                                                                       
agreeing that each human had their own individual passive intellect which was bodily and perishable. 
See, for example, Aquinas’ Contra Averroistas on this point. 
115 Alexander is a trickier case, so I do not insist as strongly that he rejected the Contemporary 
Consensus, but he surely did not explicitly commit himself to it, either. I shall treat of these figures 
in more detail at the end of this section. See Fotinis tr. (1979). 
116 Shields (2016c) is a good representative of this point since on his view, as we have seen, if the 
human soul is incorruptible it would be in virtue of the active intellect, but not the (so-called) passive 
intellect, which he takes to be the subject-matter in III.4. 
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not remember because while this is impassible, the passive intellect is perishable, and without this it 
thinks nothing).”117 At this stage of the argument it is not possible to determine the interpretation of 
this final line, that is, which of the four interpretations outlined above should be favored. Indeed, 
that is the explanandum in a certain sense, and so a particular interpretive decision cannot be cited as 
evidence without begging the question. One piece of evidence can be gleaned from this line, 
however: the idea that something is called impassible or impassive (ἀπαθές) in opposition to the 
passive and perishable intellect. 
This presents a challenge to the Contemporary Consensus because, in III.4 at any rate, any 
time the receptive intellect is said to be passive—or more precisely, any time the receptive intellect’s 
activity is said to be a being-acted-upon (πάσχειν)—Aristotle immediately issues a qualification that 
nous is nevertheless impassible (ἀπαθής). As we have seen, at most this receptive intellect is passive 
in the sense that its activity admits of analysis in terms of agent and patient, standing as patient to 
intelligible objects, while nevertheless itself being even less liable to being acted upon than the 
perceptual powers, which are themselves said to be impassible or impassive. To be sure, when taken 
out of context, simply calling an intellect “passive” might refer to the receptive intellect’s being acted 
upon, in a highly qualified way, by some intelligible object, while nevertheless being impassively 
receptive to such objects. But given the precise context of Aristotle’s claim that “the passive intellect 
is perishable,” in which the passive intellect is explicitly opposed to one that is impassible, it becomes 
harder to make this move. In short, while paschein might have been attributed to receptive nous, it was 
never said to be pathētikos, and, what is more, apatheia has certainly never been denied of it. 
Someone defending the Contemporary Consensus might argue that Aristotle is assuming in 
III.5 that the active intellect is even more impassible than receptive intellect, just like receptive 
intellect was said to be more robustly impassible than perceptual capacities in III.4. On this view, 
then, there would be three grades of apatheia, with each lower stage being more passive than the 
stage higher than it. I have two worries about this approach. First, in III.4 Aristotle made these two 
grades of impassivity (i.e. perceptual and intellectual) quite explicit, taking several lines to draw 
explicit attention to a distinction between perceptual and intellectual impassivity. In contrast, on this 
interpretive approach Aristotle would have simply left implicit a further distinction between two 
grades of intellectual impassivity, one belonging to the active intellect and the other belonging to the 
passive intellect. On this defense of the Consensus view, the line might be glossed in the following 
                                               
117 De An. III.5 430a24-5. 
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way: “while this active intellect is impassible in the third degree, the passive and receptive intellect is 
only impassible in the second degree discussed in the previous chapter, and so it is perishable.” But 
again, one might worry that this is quite a step to leave implicit, especially given the explicit 
distinction between perceptual and (receptive) intellectual impassivity in such close proximity.  
Another worry one might have for this approach regards the reasons and conclusions in the 
discussion of intellectual apatheia in III.4, rather than the mere fact that Aristotle there makes such a 
distinction between perceptual and intellectual impassivity. There, in the above quoted passage, the 
conclusion of the argument is that perceptual powers while being impassible are nevertheless not 
without body, while the receptive intellect is impassible in a more robust way, and is therefore 
separable or separated, presumably from the body. Although I have resisted and continue to resist 
too thorough a discussion of the arguments in III.4, it bears mentioning at least this much: even if 
the active intellect is impassible to a higher degree than the receptive intellect, nevertheless Aristotle 
takes even the receptive intellect’s impassivity to be sufficiently robust to isolate it from bodily 
disruption, as loud sounds can destroy hearing. It would be quite odd, then, if the receptive intellect 
were sufficiently impassible not to suffer the kinds of harm the perceptual faculties are liable to 
suffer, but was nevertheless itself perishable. Even if there is some further distinction between 
active-intellectual impassivity and receptive-intellectual impassivity, given the arguments concerning 
the latter’s impassivity in III.4 it would be quite odd if the further difference between these two 
kinds of impassivity were marked by imperishability and perishability: imperishability is already 
associated with this purported second level, with receptive-intellectual apatheia on this reading. And, 
of course, all of this is quite a lot for Aristotle to have left implicit, particularly if another simpler 
interpretive strategy is available. 
As I suggested earlier, these two arguments against the Contemporary Consensus—one 
from receptive intellect’s incorruptibility and another from its impassivity—seem to have been 
sufficient for ancient and medieval commentators to join in rejecting the view. I shall survey these 
views to illustrate how united they are against the Contemporary Consensus, despite other 
interpretive differences between them downstream.  
Themistius argues that the passive and perishable intellect is distinct from the potential 
intellect which is separable from the body. In this he takes himself to be following Theophrastus 
(whom he quotes at length) and Aristotle himself. He argues that both of them also called the 
passive and perishable intellect “common,” with Aristotle, at any rate, using this term earlier in the 
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treatise in I.4.118 Themistius writes, first in his own voice regarding Aristotle’s various claims about 
passive and potential intellect:  
He could, therefore, be saying that the common intellect is the one that is passive 
and perishable. Yet regarding the potential intellect at least he explicitly says that it 
must be impassible, separable, and receptive of the form, […] unmixed with body, 
without a bodily organ […]. So if his claims about this are not in conflict, then 
according to him the common and potential intellects must be distinct. While the 
common intellect is perishable, passive, and inseparable from and mixed with the 
body, the potential intellect is impassible, unmixed with body, and separable (for he 
says this of it explicitly).119 
He adds to this the testimony of Theophrastus:  
From all this it is clear that we are not inappropriately assuming that one intellect is 
passive and perishable, which they also call ‘common’ and ‘inseparable from the 
body’ (it is mixture with this that Theophrastus says causes loss of memory and 
confusion; and that another is like a combination from the potential and the actual 
intellects, which they [sc. Aristotle and Theophrastus] posit as separate from the 
body, imperishable, and ungenerated.120  
So it is clear that neither Themistius nor Theophrastus (as Themistius understands him) equate the 
potential intellect of III.4 with the passive and perishable intellect of III.5. What is more, Themistius 
takes it that the active intellect is part of the human soul, and he takes himself to be following 
Theophrastus in this, as well. 
Philoponus and ‘Philoponus’ similarly reject this identification.121 Indeed, ‘Philoponus’ 
explicitly equates the passive intellect with the power of imagination, when commenting on the final 
                                               
118 De An. I.4 408b24-29. The use of this passage is controversial, since it is not clear that Aristotle is 
speaking of a common intellect (my emphasis): καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου 
τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε 
μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως 
θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. 
119 Themistius, (1996) with my edits, 105, 21-31. 
120 Themistius (1996) with my edits, 108, 28-33. 
121 I do not wish to get into disputes about authorship or attribution of these two works. So, I adopt 
the convention of the Cornell series of Aristotelian Commentators. 
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line of III.5: “when imagination is destroyed intellect can no longer act through it or through itself.” 
And later: “Aristotle is of the opinion that imagination is perishable, for see, he says that passive 
intellect is perishable.”122 Similarly Philoponus, when writing on Aristotle’s account of intellect in 
another commentary, also interprets the final lines of III.5 as answering the preceding question from 
III.4, namely why we are not always thinking. The two authors, while likely not the same, 
nevertheless toe the same line on this particular point. The author of the commentary on the de 
Intellectu writes:  
Why then, he asks, do we not remember always? Because, he says, even if intellect is 
impassible, and because of that we ought not to forget, still the imagination is 
perishable—it is the imagination that he calls ‘passive intellect’ as has been said more 
than once. Since the imagination is perishable, and without the imagination either 
helping or hindering intellect does not understand, it is no wonder that we do not 
understand always.123  
So, it is clear that both commentaries attributed to Philoponus agree on this point: the perishable 
passive intellect is not the potential intellect of III.4, but rather the bodily power of imagination 
which is uncontroversially said to corrupt with the body. The authors of these two texts also follow 
a human-reading with respect to the nature of the active intellect. 
Moreover, in a text attributed to Simplicius, the author is motivated by a desire to square 
Aristotle’s account with Plato’s, inviting us to “admire his harmony with Plato, and also his greater 
working out of details, which Plato handed down in a more general and synoptic way appropriate to 
his earlier time.”124 Simplicius also posits three aspects of intellect, arguing that the passive intellect is 
passible and perishable until it has been elevated, made intelligible, and raised to activity by the 
productive intellect, rendering it a properly immaterial intellect. He writes:  
The passive intellect is material and potential and precisely this, passive and 
imperfect intellect as a whole, so long as it is passive. And for this reason it is 
perishable qua passive. It becomes immaterial, intellect in act, and intelligible in 
                                               
122 ‘Philoponus,’ On Aristotle’s On the Soul 3.1-8, tr. William Charlton (2000) with my edits, 541,20-
542,6. 
123 Philoponus, On Aristotle on the Intellect, tr. William Charlton (1991) with my edits, 61,64-77. 
124 ‘Simplicius,’ On Aristotle’s On the Soul 3.1-5, tr. H. J. Blumenthal (2000) with my edits, 246, 18-21. 
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contact with what acts, perfectly immaterial and perfect intellect in its ascent to the 
one that is active.125 
Here there is something of an intimate connection between the passive and perishable intellect that 
we begin with, and the impassible and immaterial intellect that is activated by the productive or 
active intellect. This view differs quite a bit from those that have come before, being more open to 
the possibility of the active intellect’s transcendence, to its resembling the divine intellect. However, 
even in view of these differences, Simplicius is not comfortable straightforwardly equating the two 
intellects, passive and receptive, but recognizes a substantial distinction between them. 
Alexander is a somewhat special case, being committed, at least in some respect, to the idea 
that the active intellect is Aristotle’s god. The de Anima and the de Intellectu attributed to him explicitly 
describe three distinct intellects: the material, the habitual, and the active or productive. “Material 
intellect” is his term for the potential or receptive intellect of III.4 which is said to be matter-like at 
the start of III.5; he does not take it to have a bodily organ nor to be material in the ordinary sense. 
This is the intellect prior to having come to know anything, while the habitual intellect is the material 
intellect that has come to possess knowledge. The active or productive intellect, he says, makes the 
material intellect to have a habitus of knowledge. The active intellect activates and produces actually 
intelligible objects for the material intellect, thereby making the material intellect to grasp those 
forms. He identifies this active intellect with the intellect “from the outside” and the “first cause.”126 
For him both the material and habitual intellects are imperishable, making it difficult for him to 
identify either with the passive and perishable intellect at the end of III.5. Indeed, he does not call 
any intellect “passive” (παθητικός) in his discussion of intellect, explicitly denying that even the 
receptive intellect should be called “passive,” despite the general analogy with perception.127 
Moreover, the only thing called “perishable” (φθαρτός) in this discussion is that which presents 
material objects to the intellect properly so-called.128 So, Alexander explicitly rejects the 
Contemporary Consensus on a number of counts.  
                                               
125 Ibid. 247, 32-35. 
126 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima, trans. Athanasios P. Fotinis (Washington: University Press 
of America, 1979), 88.17-91.6 and 108.22-110.16. See also Supplement to On the Soul, trans. R.W. 
Sharples (London: Bloomsbury, 2004) and On the Soul Part 1, trans. Victor Caston (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2012). 
127 Ibid. 111.6-15. 
128 Ibid. 89.21-90.11. 
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To further illustrate the widespread acceptance of the Contemporary Consensus, let us 
consider someone who is very familiar with the ancient commentary tradition. Oftentimes even 
these scholars do not appreciate in full measure the ancient commentators’ rejection of what has 
become today’s consensus view. In particular, it is difficult to appreciate the pre-modern claim that 
the passive intellect is a perceptual power (such as phantasia) if one is otherwise committed to the 
idea that the passive intellect is the same as the receptive intellect. For example, when introducing 
the view that passive intellect was equated by many commentators with phantasia, Richard Sorabji 
writes: 
The passive intellect is identified with phantasia by some, even though Aristotle 
distinguishes phantasia as a perceptual faculty. Passive intellect is too passive to be 
real intellect, according to Proclus. But Themistius had already connected potential 
intellect with phantasia as a storehouse of imprints that can be turned into concepts. 
And Philoponus says that passive intellect, being the same as imagination, takes 
imprints from perceptible objects and possesses them within itself.129 
Sorabji here clearly assumes the Contemporary Consensus in his interpretation of the very passages 
from the ancient commentators that express disagreement with that modern interpretive 
assumption. Passive intellect, for these pre-modern authors, is decidedly not the same as the potential 
or receptive intellect in III.4, and so they are quite happy to concede that passive intellect is, strictly 
speaking, a perceptual faculty, called “intellect” perhaps in virtue of its participation in intellectual 
faculties properly so-called.130 Sorabji’s implicit argument “even though Aristotle distinguishes 
phantasia as a perceptual faculty” therefore does not constitute an objection to their view. 
Furthermore, against his gloss, Themistius does not connect potential intellect with phantasia in the 
passages Sorabji references, but rather passive intellect: in his interpretation of these authors, Sorabji 
equates the potential or receptive intellect from III.4 and the passive intellect from III.5, which is a 
view, as I have shown, that the ancient commentators simply do not share. So it seems that even 
those who are otherwise quite familiar with the ancient commentators find themselves committed to 
                                               
129 Sorabji, ed. (2005) 3(j), 121 (internal references to passages in his Sourcebook removed). 
130 On this point see, for example, the passage from Proclus at 3(j)(4) immediately following 
Sorabji’s introduction quoted above, tr. Jan Opsomer: “But in my view [Aristotle] wanted to 
emphasize [imagination’s] intermediate position between the highest and the lowest types of gnōsis, 
and therefore he called it both ‘intellect’, because of its resemblance with the highest, and ‘passive’ 
because of its kinship with the lowest.” 
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the Contemporary Consensus and, due to their own interpretive assumptions, are led to attribute 
conflicting or contradictory views to those commentators who rejected these very assumptions. 
And to survey three important medieval views very briefly in addition: (1) Avicenna has 
three intellectual moving parts: bodily imagination that prepares the individual human intellect, one 
immaterial receptive intellect that is also proper to each human, and another immaterial productive 
intellect that is transcendent. He understands passive intellect to be the bodily imagination which is 
perishable and which comes to have the hexeis of knowledge.131 (2) Averroes also has three intellects, 
but he considers both immaterial intellects, i.e. the receptive and the active or productive intellects, 
to be transcendent, singular, and external to individual humans. Accordingly, on his view, only the 
passive and perishable intellect is individually multiplied and proper to each human being.132 Finally, 
(3) Aquinas has three intellectual powers: the passive as a bodily and perishable cognitive power, 
while the possible and agent intellects are held to be properly immaterial. He differs from both 
Avicenna and Averroes, however, in that he takes all three to belong to each individual human 
being. He explicitly says that the passive intellect is the same as what he calls the “cogitative power,” 
the most elevated inner sense power which is a perfection and extension of the natural estimative 
power found in animals. While he does not follow Philoponus and others in equating this with 
imagination as such, he nevertheless equates it with a corporeal cognitive power which trades in 
images and appearances, preparing the intelligible object for intellectual consideration.133 All three of 
these medieval authors are similarly motivated to distinguish passive intellect from 
potential/receptive/possible intellect insofar as the latter is explicitly said to be separable and 
impassible in III.4, while the former is explicitly said to be passive and perishable in III.5. How they 
go on to describe the nature and function of these three intellectual powers lies downstream of a 
basic agreement about there being (at least) three distinct intellects.  
Finally, I should quote Brentano at length on this point, who found himself frustrated in 
view of those among his contemporaries who missed this distinction. Although belonging, we might 
say, to our own interpretive era, he nevertheless shares much with the preceding ancient and 
medieval commentary traditions. With respect to the passive intellect, he writes: 
                                               
131 The receptive intellect as such does not come to possess the intellectual states in a habitual way. 
Cf. Brentano (2003), 315–316. 
132 Cf. Ibid. 316–319. 
133 Cf. Aquinas (1994) 204–236 (no. 671–794). See also the treatise de Unitate Intellectus contra 
Averroistas. 
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In the third place we must ask what the expression nous pathētikos, and even before 
that, what the expression ou mnēmoneuomen is supposed to mean. […] the added 
adjective pathētikos is by itself sufficient to show clearly that Aristotle here speaks of 
something entirely different from what he had called nous earlier in this chapter 
[III.5]. (For he had said in chapter 4 that the receptive intellect is apathēs, and had 
concluded from this in chapter 5 that the active intellect is also apathēs; then he had 
proclaimed the intellect in the sense of intellectual part itself to be incorruptible.) But 
the passage from chapter 4 lies far back, and so it could happen that commentators 
who did not remember it were misled by the expression pathētikos into contrasting 
this nous with that other nous that had been described as the poiētikon of our 
intellectual thoughts. In this way several of the most acute exegetes were carried so 
far from the correct path that they declared the receptive intellect itself to be 
something sensory and corruptible. Naturally, if someone once adopts this prejudice 
he can no longer find his way through the Aristotelian doctrine. The entire theory of 
knowledge, which appeared to us to be so lucid and simple, now becomes a wad of 
confusion impossible to disentangle. Thus this little word is responsible for a great 
deal. But what, in our view, is the nous pathētikos? It is the imagination which, as a 
sensory faculty according to chapter 4 does not partake in the apatheia of the 
receptive intellect.134 
                                               
134 Brentano, tr. Rolf George (1977) with my edits, 140-1. From Brentano (1867) 206-8: “An dritter 
Stelle müssen wir fragen, was der Ausdruck νοῦς παθητικός, und zuvor noch, was das οὐ 
μνημονεύομεν bedeuten wolle. […] das beigefügte Attribut παθητικός, ist zwar an und für sich 
allerdings genügend, um klar zu zeigen, dass Aristoteles jetzt von etwas ganz Anderem als allem 
jenem spreche, was er früher in diesem Capitel νοῦς genannt habe (den er hatte ja im vierten Capitel 
gesagt, der aufnehmende Verstand sei ἀπαθής, hatte hieraus im fünften Capitel gefolgert, auch der 
wirkende Verstand sei ἀπαθής, und hatte dann den Verstand im Sinne des intellectiven Theiles selbst für 
unvergänglich erklärt); allein die Stelle des vierten Capitels liegt doch schon etwas ferner, und so 
konnte es geschehen, dass Erklärer, die nicht an sie zurück dachten, gerade durch den Ausdruck 
παθητικός verleitet wurden, diesen νοῦς jenem νοῦς gegenüber zu stellen, der als das ποιητικόν 
unserer geistigen Gedanken bezeichnet worden war. Auf diese Weise also wurden mehrere der 
scharfsinnigsten Exegeten so weit vom rechten Wege abgeführt, dass sie den aufnehmenden 
Verstand selbst für etwas Sinnliches und Corruptibeles erklärten, und natürlich war es dem, welchem 
dieses Vorurtheil einmal festand, nicht mehr möglich, sich in der Aristotelischen Lehre zurecht zu 
finden. Seine ganze Erkenntnisstheorie, die uns so licht und einfach erschien, war nun ein Knäuel 
von unauflöslichem Gewirre. So Grosses hat dieses kleine Wort verschuldet. Was also ist nach 
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I, for my part, find Brentano’s commentary both compelling and distressing, since it seems that the 
view of his contemporaries has won and become the default view of our own contemporaries. It is 
perhaps worth revisiting this alternative pre-modern interpretation of Aristotle which, as Brentano 
testifies, renders the entire theory of knowledge “so licht und einfach.” 
In view of Aristotle’s use of the terms “impassible” or “impassive” (ἀπαθής) and 
“perishable” (φθαρτός) in the final line of III.5, it is unlikely he meant for “passive intellect” (νοῦς 
παθητικός) to refer to the receptive intellect from the preceding chapter, III.4. While I agree with 
the older interpretive tradition on this point, I concede that these arguments alone may not be 
decisive or convincing given contemporary biases against them. Still, I take these arguments to be, 
while perhaps indecisive on their own, nevertheless sufficiently compelling to search for another 
interpretation so that we can avoid making ad hoc distinctions in order to render Aristotle’s account 
coherent. The search for further arguments and argumentative strategies against the Contemporary 
Consensus is at least well-motivated by these considerations, if not demanded outright. 
2.1.6 A Second Version of the Contemporary Consensus 
I want to pause to consider a more nuanced conception of the Contemporary Consensus which 
appreciates all the preceding difficulties and develops a thoughtful reply to them. This version has 
been most prominently defended by Michael Wedin.135 The basic idea is this: there is no single 
subject under discussion in III.4. There Aristotle says quite a bit about nous but is not yet speaking 
carefully about the distinct aspects of intellect or indeed distinct intellectual powers. The purpose of 
III.5, on this reading, is to distinguish the active and passive principles in the intellect already 
described without distinction in III.4. So, the active intellect is that part of intellect which is 
separable, impassible, and unmixed, being essentially in activity, while the passive intellect is that part 
of intellect which is receptive, potential, passive and perishable. As Wedin says: 
                                                                                                                                                       
unserer Behauptung der νοῦς παθητικός? Er ist die Phantasie, welche als sinnliches Vermögen, wie 
das vierte Capitel lehrt, nicht an der ἀπάθεια des aufnehmenden Verstandes Theil hat.” 
135 Although providing a thorough critique of Wedin’s view, Magee (2003) seems to agree with him 
on this point, at 124: “[Aristotle] distinguishes the powers of the intellect as creative or active 
(poiētikon—430a12) and as potential (what becomes all things [panta ginesthai—430a15]) or passive 
(pathētikos—430a24). Thus, it seems that Wedin is correct that the discussion of the intellect in DA 
3.4 applies to the intellect as a whole.” Shields (2016a) seems also to adopt something like this view, 
though he is less explicit in his commentary (320-9). 
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There is, however, an additional point that demands comment, namely, the fact that 
De Anima III.4 has already listed [separable, unaffected, unmixed] among the mind’s 
characteristics. This has inclined a number of commentators toward the view that 
both receptive and productive minds are separate, unaffected, and unmixed and that 
they differ on the point […] that productive mind is, additionally, activity. 
Unfortunately, problems arise here. First, the view overlooks the fact that [essential 
activity] is given not just as another, even if distinguishing, feature of productive 
mind but rather as the reason for productive mind being separate, unaffected, and 
mixed [sic, should read “unmixed”]. Second, III.5 certainly appears to deny just these 
features of receptive mind, so how can III.4 be supposed to attribute them to it? The 
mind of which [separable, unaffected, unmixed] are properties, namely productive 
mind, is referred to by means of the indicator expression “οὗτος ὁ νοῦς” (“this 
mind”), and this would seem to imply that they are not properties of that “other” 
mind, namely, receptive mind or the mind that becomes all things. Finally, there is 
III.5’s assertion that receptive mind is perishable.136 
Wedin, therefore, sees the tensions between a certain reading of III.4 and descriptions of passive 
intellect in III.5. Immediately following this passage and in footnotes throughout he objects to 
Brentano, Rodier, and Hicks who all concluded that receptive intellect—the nous that becomes all 
things—shares these three features on the basis of the discussion in III.4. And further, it is clear that 
he equates receptive and passive intellects, especially clear in his third and final point. But he does 
not equate receptive intellect with the intellect described generally in III.4. He goes on to state his 
positive view: 
My solution would be to deny that III.4 means to address receptive mind in the first 
place. Here it is important to emphasize that we do not take the mind in potentiality 
(νοῦς δυνάμει) of 429b30-31 in III.4 to be the same as III.5’s νοῦς that becomes all 
things. And since we do not take receptive mind to differ from ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς, 
neither is the latter meant to be addressed in III.4. Rather, the “potential” mind of 
III.4 is simply the ordinary, intentional-level mind that happens not to be actually2 
thinking. As such, the expression “νοῦς δυνάμει” gives us a way of talking about 
what a subject is capable of, noetically speaking. Receptive and productive minds are 
                                               
136 Wedin (1988) 183-4. 
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mechanisms rung in to explain how that capability is exercised. So the subject of 
III.4 is simply the individual mind of the ordinary person and III.5 provides a 
(partial) account of how it must be organized to function the way it does.137 
So, to recall the transitivity of identity syllogism from before, whereas I deny the identification of the 
passive intellect with the intellect that becomes all things (what Wedin calls the “receptive mind,”), 
Wedin denies the identification of the receptive intellect that becomes all things with the potential 
intellect of III.4. Accordingly, Wedin and those who might follow him, then, are only committed to 
the Contemporary Consensus in a way. They do not so closely align the passive intellect with the 
intellect of III.4 that they fall prey to the objections of the preceding section. But, this style of 
reading nevertheless insists that the passive intellect is the same as the receptive intellect which 
becomes all things and which is analogous to the perceptual faculty. 
While the argument that I develop in the balance of the chapter gains some ground against 
Wedin’s view, I concede that my argument is strongest against those who hold to the Contemporary 
Consensus in a more straightforward and simple way. Nevertheless it is, to some extent, enough that 
Wedin identifies the passive intellect with the receptive intellect, even if he does not see the 
receptive intellect as unambiguously under discussion in III.4. In view of this denial, I shall outline 
very briefly some reasons for rejecting Wedin’s view, reasons both for suspecting that the intellect 
under discussion in III.4 really is the receptive intellect that becomes all things, and for thinking that 
the various properties that are also said of the active intellect in III.5 are indeed said of the receptive 
intellect in III.4 (namely separable, impassible, unmixed). 
Now, it is possible that Wedin’s solution helps to straighten out some of the apparently 
conflicting descriptions of intellect in the two chapters, and furthermore it is understandable why 
someone might find in III.5 and in the “passive intellect” references to receptive intellect in III.4. If 
Wedin is right, the task of III.5 is to distinguish active and passive principles in the otherwise 
undifferentiated discussion of nous in III.4. But it is still unclear where we can find the active intellect 
in III.4. To be sure, the same properties are mentioned in III.4 of some intellect that are attributed to 
active intellect in III.5. But note that the arguments for these properties in III.4 have to do with that 
intellect’s ability to know all things.  
In the first place, immediately after a comparison between nous and perception, Aristotle 
concludes that it must be unmixed “since it thinks all things” (ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ).138 It is possible that 
                                               
137 Ibid. 184-5. 
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noein in general might refer to either receptive or productive intellectual activity, but in this context it 
is far more likely that the “thinks all things” should mean “thinks all things in a way analogous to 
perception.” So, on this count at any rate, the intellect under discussion seems to be unmixed 
precisely because it can become all things. Secondly, nous in III.4 is said to be impassible in a more 
robust way than sense perception. The discussion presupposes that the nous and noein under 
discussion is broadly analogous to perception, by which a receptive power comes to share the form 
of some object. But nous, unlike hearing for example, cannot be destroyed by too loud a noise or, in 
general, too strong of an object. This intellect is therefore said to be impassible with respect to its 
reception of form from its respective objects.139 Finally, nous in III.4 is said to be separable as a result 
of the preceding discussion comparing and contrasting nous with sense perception.140 It is quite clear, 
therefore, that these three properties are attributed to an intellect that is analogous to perception in 
virtue of its differences from perception: the presupposed analogy with sense perception fixes that 
he is speaking of the receptive intellect (pace Wedin), while the precise arguments show how this 
receptive intellect goes beyond perceptual faculties and differs from them.  
This is the most that I will have to say in response to Wedin in particular. His view, while 
distinctive, will nevertheless be a secondary target in the coming section, in that I argue against the 
identification of the passive and receptive intellects on the merits of the argument in III.5. That he 
does not identify the receptive intellect with the nous discussed in III.4 shows an appreciation of the 
tension between the two chapters and it escapes the counter-arguments that have been heretofore 
developed. One of the advantages of my new approach is that I can capture his more sophisticated 
version of the Contemporary Consensus along with more straightforward adherents to the view. 
2.2 AGAINST THE CONTEMPORARY CONSENSUS 
2.2.1 A New Argument Against the Consensus 
My interpretive approach, as I have said, will focus on the distinctive activity and correlative patient 
of the active intellect. One way of characterizing the present argument about the Contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                       
138 Cf. De An. III.4 429a18. 
139 Cf. De An. III.4 429a29-b4. 
140 Cf. De An. III.4 429b5. 
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Consensus regards the (im)passivity of receptive nous. Should we expect the receptive intellect—that 
is, the one analogous to perceptual faculties—to be called “passive” at the end of III.5 or not, based 
on its more thorough treatment in III.4? I want to suggest that this is the wrong question, or at least 
not the only relevant question. After all, it might otherwise, quite generally and outside of the context 
of III.5, be reasonable to call the receptive intellect “passive” in some highly qualified respect. My 
argument will be that, in the precise context of III.5, at any rate, this appellation is not merited. 
Although I agree with the preliminary arguments against the Contemporary Consensus, those are, as 
it were, merely procedural or principled objections to the view, relying on the idea that Aristotle 
would never, in any context whatsoever, have called the receptive intellect of III.4 “passive” or 
“perishable.” My argument, in contrast, is more substantive and proceeds on the merits: I shall argue 
that given the functional descriptions of the active intellect in III.5—in particular the analogy with 
light—we ought not to conclude that the passive intellect of III.5 is the same as the receptive 
intellect of III.4, let alone assume this position without argument.  
Accordingly, the view for which I am advocating is indebted to all of the ancient and 
medieval commentators whom I have cited previously, as well as to Brentano. I am not nor could I 
be satisfied with their arguments, however; given the ascendancy of the Contemporary Consensus, a 
new argument is called for. So, while I recognize my debt to these thinkers and I certainly hope they 
would appreciate and agree with the argument I here develop, I take it to be a novel argumentative 
approach in favor of a traditional interpretive claim. 
My argument proceeds in several stages, ultimately arriving at an inconsistent triad. The one 
claim of this triad which will require the most argument concerns the Light Analogy from III.5, 
which I shall discuss at length in the following sections. The upshot of my argument is this: although 
it may be reasonable to speak in a qualified way of the intelligible object acting on receptive nous, 
thus making receptive nous the patient in that activity of acting and being-acted-upon between 
intelligible object and receptive intellect, and although this is how Aristotle recommends that we 
understand the activity of intellection or noetic thinking in III.4, nevertheless this is neither the 
activity nor the agent/patient relation that Aristotle has in view in III.5. Even if receptive intellect 
can be understood as the passive principle or the patient in some intellectual activity, it is not the 
relevant patient here. Accordingly, I conclude that we have independent and substantive reason both 
to reject the idea that the passive intellect is our “ordinary” human mind and to search for some 
third thing that Aristotle might be inclined to call “passive nous.” 
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2.2.2 The Two Analogies Introduced 
Given my activity-first approach to the active intellect, Aristotle’s two functional descriptions given 
in III.5 enjoy pride of place in my analysis. In the first place he gives an analogy with craft and craft-
matter (and indeed with these two relata in nature as a whole), in which there are two principles: (i) a 
material principle capable of coming to be and (ii) a correlative causal principle which brings such 
generation or production about. This analogy invokes familiar Aristotelian categories, though it is 
difficult to see yet in this chapter what Aristotle’s intention might be for the intellectual case. He 
clearly has in mind some creative or productive intellectual principle, though it is not yet clear what 
its mode of producing whatever it produces might be. 
What is more, this opening sentence raises important questions about the relationship 
between this chapter and the preceding one, since it is not yet clear how the receptive intellect 
described in III.4 might fit into these alternatives. On the one hand, one might suppose that 
Aristotle here speaks of the intellect in III.4 as precisely that intellect “in virtue of its becoming all 
things.” There is much to recommend this view, though we must not be too quick to draw this 
conclusion.141 While it may be that in some respects the intellect which becomes all things resembles 
the intellect in the preceding chapter, we must not immediately rule out the possibility that the 
intellect that makes all things was also discussed there. Nevertheless, it is fairly safe to assume that 
the intellect that becomes all things is the same as the receptive intellect, being analogous to the 
perceptual faculties, even if this receptive intellect does not exhaust the subject matter of III.4. 
Furthermore, given the model proposed in III.4 we might note a possible tension in the 
application of these active/passive intellectual principles in the two analogies of III.5. In III.4, let us 
recall that the active principle in thinking seems to be the object of thought. The account of III.4 
begins with this point, that thinking is a kind of being-acted-upon, similar to perception, whereby an 
object acts upon a receptive faculty. If that was the account, we might find the Craft Analogy at the 
opening of III.5 to posit a superfluous active intellectual principle. That is to say: if the intelligible 
object were sufficient by itself to impose form upon the receptive intellect, why suppose that there is 
in addition an active or productive intellect which brings this receptive intellectual activity about? 
                                               
141 After all, as Wedin (1988) and others have suggested, it is possible that Aristotle here in III.5 is 
distinguishing two aspects of the noetic faculty which was previously considered in III.4 without 
qualification or differentiation. 
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The second functional description Aristotle gives of the active intellect is an analogy with 
light and color. A reading of this analogy suggests that the active principle in thought (νοῦς 
ποιητικός) principally actualizes the potentially intelligible object for the knower. This point is 
recognized even by some recent interpreters.142 The relevant passage from our chapter reads thus, let 
us recall from de Anima III.5: 
[e] So, on the one hand there is such an intellect in virtue of its becoming all things 
and, on the other hand, there is an intellect in virtue of its making all things, [f] as a 
certain state like light; for indeed the light in some way makes colors existing 
potentially to be colors in activity.143  
The structure of the analogy should be clear enough. In this context, Aristotle is emphasizing how 
light in some way makes potential colors to be actual colors or colors in activity. Light is the active 
state (ἕξις ποιητική) whose activity (ἐνέργεια) serves as an analogue for the active intellect’s 
distinctive activity. Color is the proper object of sight, the visible, made to be actually colored and 
actually visible by the activity of light. Without light, the relevant visual objects are only potential 
colors or potentially visible. So the active intellect must be a similarly active state which makes 
potential objects of intellect to be intelligible objects in activity. This much, I take it, should be 
uncontroversial.144 
 









                                               
142 Cf. e.g. Johansen (2012) 238. 
143 De An. III.5 430a14-17. 
144 I leave open here what it means for a color or intelligible object to be active; that color is made to 
be active is common to all views. 
  Sight Intellect 
Object Generally Visibles (τὰ ὁρατά) Intelligibles (τὰ νοητά) 
Object Specifically Colors (τὰ χρώματα)      ??? 
Active State (ἕξις) Light (φώς) Active Intellect (ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς) 
Receptive Faculty Faculty of Sight (ὄψις) Potential Intellect (ὁ δυνατὸς νοῦς) 
Receptive Intellect (ὁ δεκτικὸς νοῦς) 
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There are, of course, questions that immediately arise for this simple picture, and I shall address 
them in what follows. For now, we see that Aristotle gives two functional descriptions to the active 
intellect, explicating how it is an active intellectual principle, in one way like craft and in another way 
like light. 
2.2.3 The Two Analogies in Tension 
There is some tension, however, between these two analogies which are just lines apart, and it bears 
noting this at the outset. The Craft Analogy suggests a two-place relation, perhaps between a builder 
or the art of building itself and the materials, where the relevant activity is the building and coming-
to-be of (e.g.) a house. The activity here is constructive and there is, in the builder, a unity between 
the efficient and formal causes. The terminus of this construction is some concrete product external 
to the builder’s activity, namely the house.145 In contrast, the Light Analogy does not suggest a 
construction but an activation: here Aristotle suggests a two-place relation between a patient which 
possesses of itself some power and an agent which is capable of actualizing this power in the patient. 
One might suppose that light here acts as a kind of enabler or activator for the colored object to do 
what is already in its nature to do qua colored. The coming to be in this second case, then, is not the 
imposition of some new form or the creation of some new product, but rather the activating of 
some form already possessed in the patient. Whereas in the former analogy we tend to suppose a 
concurrence of formal and efficient causality in the agent (e.g. the builder), we do not suppose the 
action of light to endow something with the color that it has: the contribution of light seems to be 
purely efficient, actualizing a formal agency that the colored object already possesses. In short, in the 
case of craft a new form is realized in the matter; in the case of light no new form is produced in the 
illumined object. This difference can be noted without returning to the intellectual side of either 
analogy. 
Once we do so return, however, difficulties multiply on us. We should expect at least one of 
the two intellectual powers or aspects being compared in the Craft Analogy to be the receptive 
intellect, the intellectual analogue of the perceptual faculty. Whether strictly identical with the 
intellect of III.4 or parsing out one aspect of it, the receptive intellect which becomes all things 
seems to be that which is most comparable to the receptive perceptual faculty, such as sight. So that 
                                               
145 Recall, for example, the distinction from EN I.1 between goods that are constituted by an 
activity, and goods which are separable products from the activities that produce them. 
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when we move toward some more determinate description on the basis of the Craft Analogy, we are 
led to think that the intellect which makes all things makes them in the receptive intellectual faculty 
in some way analogous to how sensible objects act upon receptive perceptual faculties. 
And yet, once we arrive at the Light Analogy there is no longer anything analogous to the 
perceptual faculty. Here, where the analogy is actually in the domain of the visual and perceptual, 
Aristotle describes a process which, at least in the perceptual case, lies causally upstream of episodes 
of vision. In this analogy, the receptive visual faculty is not mentioned; the activity of light is related 
simply to colors and the active intellect is said to be like light thus understood. It may be true that as 
a result of light’s or the active intellect’s activity, some object (now actual) can act upon some 
suitably related receptive faculty. But I take it that the absence of a receptive faculty in the case of 
vision should steer our interpretation of the analogy and our understanding of the active intellect’s 
role, at least as suggested by this analogy. Perhaps the activity described here, like the activity of 
light, is somehow distinct from and even prior to the action of an object on a receptive faculty. If 
the intellectual activity in question were more properly analogous to that of an object on a receptive 
power, we should expect Aristotle to have crafted a wholly different analogy. But as it is, no 
receptive power is mentioned in describing the analogous case of light and color: unlike other 
discussions of vision, here potential colors occupy the passive place in the relation, rather than being 
the active party to some passive and receptive faculty. 
There are, of course, many ways to handle this tension between these two analogies, and the 
reading of the Light Analogy that I have outlined is by no means fixed. But at the outset it is 
important to appreciate the tension between even these two functional descriptions that we do get in 
the very brief and very cryptic III.5. Although each analogy may, on its own, strike us as familiar and 
straightforward, when both are used to describe one and the same faculty of the soul, we are left 
with difficulties. 
2.2.4 “Like Light, Which in a Way…” 
Two possibilities in particular might seem attractive in resolving this tension, both giving a sort of 
interpretive precedence to the Craft Analogy over the Light Analogy. Both strategies seek to save 
the idea that the active intellect informs the receptive intellect just as craft informs matter by 
interpreting somewhat creatively what it means for light to act on or make colors in activity. The 
first strategy is to say that when light makes colors in activity, it does not make colors actually visible 
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but rather makes them to be actually seen.146 According to this strategy, while a receptive faculty is 
not explicitly mentioned, it is implicit in the idea that colors are being made to be active in the receptive 
faculty. This is principally drawn from de Anima III.2 in which Aristotle addresses some remaining 
issues regarding perception before turning to his account of phantasia and nous. He writes: 
The activity of the perceptible object and of perception is the same and one, but the 
being is not the same for them. I mean for example sound in activity and the sense 
of hearing in activity: for that which has the sense of hearing is not always hearing, 
and that which has sound is not always sounding, but whenever that which can hear 
is active and that which can sound sounds, at that time the active sense of hearing 
and active sound come to be at once, which someone might call the hearing and the 
sounding. If indeed motion (both action and passion) is in the thing moved, it is 
necessary also that active sound and active sense of hearing be in that which is 
capable: for the activity of the motive and productive principle comes to be in the 
passive principle. For this reason it is not necessary that the mover be moved. So, the 
activity of that which can produce sound is sound or sounding, while the activity of 
that which is capable of hearing is hearing or the sense of hearing: for hearing is 
twofold and sound is twofold. And the same account holds also in the case of other 
senses and sensible objects. For just as the acting and the being acted upon are in the 
patient and not the agent, in this way also the activity of the perceptible object and of 
the perceptual faculty is in the perceptual faculty. But while there are names in some 
cases, such as sounding and hearing, in other cases other things are without a name: 
for while the activity of sight is called seeing, the activity of color is without a name, 
[…]. And since the activity of the perceptible object and of the perceptual faculty is 
one, though the being is different, it is necessary that what is called sound and the 
sense of hearing in this way [sc. in activity] perish and are preserved at the same 
time.147 
                                               
146 Cf. Frede (1996b) and Kosman (2003). 
147 De An. III.2 425b26-426a11: ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι 
καὶ μία, τὸ δ’ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς· λέγω δ’ οἷον ὁ ψόφος ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ κατ’ 
ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀκοὴν ἔχοντα μὴ ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ, ὅταν δ’ ἐνεργῇ 
τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν, τότε ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται 
καὶ ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ψόφος, ὧν εἴπειεν ἄν τις τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἄκουσιν τὸ δὲ ψόφησιν. εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ 
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The upshot of this passage is that the fullest activity of the perceptible object is in the perceptual 
faculty, and so it follows that color in its most robust respect, though without a name, is 
nevertheless extensionally the same activity as the activity of seeing. That is, when color is fully 
active, its activity is in the faculty of sight, so that while different in being, the activities of visible 
object and visual faculty are numerically one and the same.  
This may help square these two analogies in the following way. Although the Light Analogy 
may suggest a relation only between light and color, as we have seen, Aristotle is elsewhere 
committed to the idea that color’s fullest and most proper activity is achieved only when being seen, 
when operating on and, indeed, at work in a sighted animal’s visual faculty. Accordingly, if bringing 
about this activity is attributed to light, then it aligns much better with the Craft Analogy, whose 
activity is in some materials, and eventually in a house. Indeed, although sounding and hearing are 
Aristotle’s principal examples in this psychological context, building is his principal example in the 
natural philosophical context where he makes the same point.148 This first attempt at squaring the 
analogies, then, tweaks the color-term of the analogy so that we think in perhaps unintuitive yet 
nevertheless Aristotelian ways about active colors, drawing on his settled scientific account of active 
colors and active sense objects generally. A preliminary worry for this account is that a receptive 
power is simply not mentioned in the Light Analogy, but he only mentions the activation of the 
perceptual agents, namely colors. It is as if Aristotle had given an analogy of craft activating a 
craftsman: to be sure, the craftsman’s fullest activation is when he is building a house. But whenever 
Aristotle wants to speak of the activity of house-building, he says so, and does not speak 
periphrastically about the activation of the craftsman. Perhaps if he were in the habit of speaking in 
this way, and if we had a similarly stretched analogy in the craft case, this interpretive approach 
                                                                                                                                                       
κίνησις (καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ πάθος) ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὴν 
κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῷ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ 
πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται· διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι 
ψόφος ἢ ψόφησις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ἀκοὴ ἢ ἄκουσις· διττὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν ὁ ψόφος. 
ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ 
πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ τοῦ 
αἰσθητικοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ. ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἐνίων μὲν ὠνόμασται, οἷον ἡ ψόφησις καὶ ἡ ἄκουσις, ἐπ’ 
ἐνίων δ’ ἀνώνυμον θάτερον· ὅρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χρώματος 
ἀνώνυμος […]. ἐπεὶ δὲ μία μέν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δ’ εἶναι 
ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον […]. 
148 Cf. Phys. III.1-3 passim. 
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would have more plausibility. But as it is, it seems unlikely that when Aristotle speaks of active 
colors he really means for us to understand colors that are being seen in episodes of active seeing. 
The second strategy, which also gives interpretive priority to the Craft Analogy, focuses 
instead on how we think about the light-term of the Light Analogy. It should be noted that for 
Aristotle, strictly speaking, light does not actualize color but rather the transparent medium. He 
gives his settled view about light and vision in de Anima II.7, and there the details work a bit 
differently from what is suggested here in III.5. In short, he says there that light is something like an 
enabling condition for a colored object to move and inform the receptive visual faculty. Light is an 
active hexis of the medium by which the sensible object moves the sense faculty. It is the nature of 
colored things to act upon an actually transparent medium, and if there is no such medium or if the 
medium lacks this active state, then the colored object will not act. So goes de Anima II.7: 
Every color is capable of moving the actually transparent, and this is its nature. For 
this very reason it is not visible without light, but the color of each and every thing is 
seen in light. For this reason we first must speak about light, what it is. Indeed, there 
is something transparent. And by “transparent” I mean that which is not visible 
simply and in itself, but on account of another color. […] And light is the activity of 
this, of the transparent qua transparent.149 
Properly, then, light does little more than allow a sensible object that is already there to act upon the 
appropriate receptive faculty. Why should we think, here in the context of III.5, that the active 
intellect which is likened to light is anything more than an enabling condition, allowing an intelligible 
object that is already there to act upon the receptive intellect?  
A preliminary answer, simply enough, is that Aristotle says so, in this context at any rate. I 
grant that nowhere in the chapter on light and vision does Aristotle say that light acts on and makes 
potential colors to be actual in such strong and straightforward terms; but here, in our chapter, he 
says that light in fact makes potential colors to be colors actually so or colors in activity. Surely we 
should have II.7 in mind, but we should not go on to ignore or dismiss what Aristotle says quite 
explicitly here. Importantly, here Aristotle says that light actualizes potential colors “in a way” 
                                               
149 De An. II.7 418a31-6, 9-10: πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ 
τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις· διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ 
ὁρᾶται. διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστιν. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι 
μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ’ αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. […] φῶς δέ 
ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές. 
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(τρόπον τινα). It may be that “light making potential colors to be colors in activity” is an imprecise 
description of light. The crucial interpretive question, however, is what we conclude about this 
qualification “in a way.” 
Two generic possibilities seem to be available. It should be uncontroversial that Aristotle is 
explicitly flagging that light only can be described in these terms imprecisely, that he is perhaps not 
entirely comfortable describing light’s activity in this way. Accordingly, both possibilities that I see 
maintain this basic point. Perhaps he is speaking imprecisely when he claims that “light makes colors 
potentially existing to be colors in activity,” and he means for us to recall the more exact conception 
of light from II.7; or perhaps he is speaking imprecisely about light precisely in order to describe the 
operation of the active intellect, and he means for us to ignore the more exact conception from II.7. 
In either case “in a way” flags that Aristotle is aware that his present description is strange given 
what he says earlier in II.7. The interpretive question is whether this loose-speech is relevant to how 
we ought to interpret the present analogy, whether it is meant to wheel in or rather screen off a 
more precise description of light found in a more remote passage. 
It is hard to justify the former interpretation, that he means for us to ignore the imprecise 
locution here, looking instead to II.7. After all, however imprecise this description of light may be, it 
is nevertheless exactly the description Aristotle calls attention to here when likening the activity of 
the active intellect to light. Accordingly, the other interpretation can give a clear and decisive answer 
when asked, “Why does Aristotle give a loose account of light in this context?” It is not clear, 
however, what someone reaching for the scientific conception of light could say in reply. Why 
would Aristotle give us this imprecise description of light, only to urge us to recall and replace it 
with one that is more precise? I find that interpretive strategy to be a non-starter, since it cannot 
supply a reason for Aristotle’s present imprecision besides, perhaps, carelessness. 
In contrast, according to the other interpretive strategy, Aristotle’s imprecision is careful. The 
following might explain his imprecise description of light: Sometimes X is analogous to Y only 
under an inexact description of Y. In these cases, an exact description of Y would, in fact, be 
distracting rather than helpful. So, although Aristotle may expect us to be familiar with his settled 
scientific view of light, we should not allow this background knowledge to distract us from the 
description of light he opts for here in III.5, however scientifically imprecise such a description may 
be. As a matter of interpretive principle, whenever interpreting analogies, we should privilege the 
proximate context of an analogy over more remote details concerning one of its elements: if “light 
actualizing potential colors” puzzles us or strikes us as unexpected, perhaps we should examine our 
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own expectations regarding this analogy’s purpose before attributing to Aristotle careless 
imprecision. 
Thus, I prefer the latter interpretive option since it explains everything that is to be explained 
in the text, in particular why Aristotle is deliberately choosing an imprecise description of light here: 
it is because the imprecise description serves as a better analogue for the active intellect’s activity 
than a precise description would have. The former interpretive option, however, cannot explain this: 
as we have seen, according to that reading, “in a way” marks that Aristotle knows he is speaking 
imprecisely and means to direct us to a more precise conception, yet he leaves unexplained why he 
would speak imprecisely in the first place, especially when explaining one of the more obscure 
aspects of his psychological account.  On my alternative reading, Aristotle’s imprecision is careful; the 
rival view, however, must see his imprecision as careless. So, the settled scientific view of light from 
II.7 according to which light is merely the active state of a transparent medium qua transparent 
should be set aside in favor of his description here. 
Furthermore, I should add that this interpretation of “in a way” also has consequences for 
the first strategy I considered. Not only does light in a way act on colors, but what it means for those 
colors to be active is now different from the settled account from II.7 or even III.2. After all, light is 
not a sufficient condition for seeing, so it cannot directly bring about acts of vision so that colors are 
active in a visual faculty. Light can only supply the medium and, in so doing, activate colors to be 
able to do what they do; light cannot supply or directly cause acts of vision. So, light only “in a way” 
acts on colors, making them to be active colors, again, only “in a way.” 
2.2.5 Sicut Cervus… 
Once we understand the restricted scope of the analogy between the active intellect and light in de 
Anima III.5, we are still left to puzzle over what “making potential colors to be colors in activity” 
might mean as a description of light, let alone as an analogous description of the active intellect. 
Under this description, which Aristotle isolates for his present purpose of explaining some feature of 
intellect, it remains unclear what the precise contribution and function of light—and by analogy, the 
active intellect—might be. I propose the following image to help understand what Aristotle might be 
on about here, first on the light side of the analogy before carrying things back to the intellectual 
side. 
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Let us imagine the following scenario. In the first place, a deer lies sleeping in a meadow 
littered with wildflowers. It is dark, still early morning before the sun rises. Then, as time goes on, 
the sun begins to illuminate the field of grass and flowers, but our deer remains asleep. What should 
we say is the contribution of light, and how have the colored objects changed as the sun has risen 
over the field? A very plausible reply along the lines of our passage: the sun has activated a power or 
potentiality (δύναμις) of the colored objects to act, that is, the power to do the sorts of things 
colored objects do qua colored. Before the sun came up, these flowers were idle and inactive in this 
respect, unable to perform their characteristic activity qua colored, namely to act on the visual 
powers of sighted animals. The sunlight makes them to be colored in an actual and active sense. But 
let us not forget that our deer remains sleeping, and (let us stipulate) no other sighted animals are 
about this particular field on this particular morning. 
Let us draw some preliminary conclusions about the case. It is clear, in the first place, that 
nothing sees or is seen before sunrise. By stipulation there is no light (perhaps a cloudy night with a 
new moon), no illumined flowers, and no perceptual subjects. Prior to sunrise, all interested parties 
are inactive. So what happens when the sun rises? It would be a mistake, on the one hand, to say 
that the sunlight caused the very color of the wildflowers, since in an important respect these retain 
their color in the darkness, in potentiality, at any rate. But, on the other hand, it would also be a 
mistake to say that the sunlight caused these wildflowers to be seen, since in the absence of a sighted 
animal whose eyes are open and whose visual faculty is active, there is no activity of seeing to be 
explained. The sun is therefore both unnecessary for the color that visible objects retain even in the 
darkness, and insufficient for the activity of seeing that visible objects can accomplish only in the 
presence of a sighted animal with eyes wide open. It would be better to say that the sunlight is 
responsible for something in between these two, perhaps that it activates the color which the flowers 
possess of themselves without thereby necessarily causing their color to be seen: the light acts on the 
colored objects so that the colored objects are now able to act on their correlative objects, namely the 
visual faculty of sighted animals. The light activates the agency of idle and inactive colors which 
retain their own agency and correlative patients. We are thus able to isolate the contribution of light 
on a colored object, making Aristotle’s perhaps scientifically imprecise remarks from III.5 more 
intuitive. 
Let us now develop the image still further. Our late-sleeping deer now opens his eyes: 
immediately he sees the wildflowers in the meadow that have already been illumined by the morning 
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sun. The opening of his eyes permits him to be acted upon perceptually by the illumined flowers.150 
But had he opened his eyes hours before, there would have been nothing for him to see: no colored 
objects would be able to act upon him in the appropriate way. Prior to the sunrise, no actual 
perceptual agents were available to achieve the present activity of seeing and being seen; on the 
other side, prior to his opening his eyes, no actual perceptual patients were so available. But, when 
illumined flower meets with open eyes, the joint activity of seeing and being seen is realized. We can 
therefore discern three actualizations here: the activation of the flowers qua visible, the activation of 
the eye qua visually receptive, and the joint activity of them both when they come into appropriate 
proximity.151 
Now, suppose that things had been different: alternatively, this deer is much less sleepy and 
rather, with eyes gradually opening as the dark of night gives way to the light of morning, he watches 
the dawn illumine the flower-filled meadow. As the sun dawns gradually over the whole field, and as 
his eyes gradually open up, he sees with ever-increasing clarity the colors of the flowers. In this case, 
all three changes progress together: as the flowers are gradually illuminated before his gradually 
opening eyes, the activity of seeing and being seen gradually becomes more complete. Now, if this is 
the version of the scenario under consideration, it would be easy to miss the complexity of the case. 
That is, in this version, due to the presence of a sighted animal, the contribution of light illuminating 
the flowers is bound up with the full-blown activity of seeing and being seen. But if we consider the 
first case of the sleepy deer, it becomes easier to distinguish between the distinct aspects of an 
otherwise complex and indistinct process.152 
I need not deny that such a situation is possible; instead, I insist only that such a 
convergence of these several activities is not necessary. The scenario just described is a contingently 
complex one, in which otherwise distinct relations and changes are coincident and, coincidentally, 
                                               
150 The nature of even this being-acted-upon (πάσχειν) is, of course, non-standard, cf. de An. II.5. 
151 I say “proximity” rather than “contact” because sight is a distance, not a contact, sense. I set this 
issue aside, though it is part of the appeal for the present argumentative purpose that sight works 
through an easily discernible medium. Though it is true that Aristotle often speaks of action and 
passion in terms of contact, nevertheless he also speaks of it in terms of proximity. Cf. Meta. Θ.5 
1048a5-11, where as soon as non-rational agent and patient come near (πλησιάζωσι), the joint 
activity of acting and being acted upon immediately and necessarily ensues.  
152 This reminds me of the argument at Rep. II 372e: focusing on the virtuous and best city will not 
provide an occasion for recognizing the complexity of the case and the distinct parts. Better, 
Socrates says, to explore the luxurious and indeed feverish city. Similarly, too, in the case of our 
sleepy deer. 
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liable to be confused. Rather, if light can accomplish its work in the absence of any sighted animals, 
as in the first case with the deer who remains asleep past dawn, then light’s proper work must 
exclude what occasionally happens to be accomplished in the presence of sighted animals. Light 
makes the flowers to be actually available to be seen: it is rather the illumined flower, not the sunlight, 
which as such goes on to trigger the full-blown activity of seeing and being seen in a sighted animal. 
Without light, the colored object remains incapable—or better, only potentially capable—of doing 
what colored objects characteristically do; once illumined, this potential visibility has been actualized 
and activated, so that the colored object is now capable of acting upon the correlative perceptual 
patient, should one happen to walk by or wake up. The latter scenario involving our deer waking 
before dawn risks confusing, rather than distinguishing, the several interactions and agent/patient 
relations at work here. That is, when the sighted animal is present and visually receptive all along, we 
are more likely to confuse the action of light on a colored object with the action of a colored object 
on a visual subject.  
So, according to my view and in accordance with the description of light Aristotle offers in 
this context for this explanatory purpose, we have two distinct agent/patient pairs with two distinct 
activities of acting and being acted upon on the visual side of the analogy. In the first place, the light 
acts upon the colored object raising it from dynamis to energeia, so that it comes to be active and 
capable of performing its characteristic activity. Indeed, such objects are already performing some 
significant part of their characteristic activity, insofar as they can move through the illumined 
medium and act upon any object that happens to come by. In this way we might rightly call them 
active colors or colors in activity (ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα), even before it is actually being seen by some 
animal. And yet, in the absence of any sighted animal, qua colored such an illumined object has not 
yet achieved its fullest activity. It has become an actual and indeed active agent but it still lacks its 
correlative patient.153 Moreover, in the second place, a colored object having been thus illumined 
acts upon and informs the visual faculty of some sighted animal, when the visual faculty is actually 
receptive and when the two are brought into the appropriate proximity. So, according to this more 
                                               
153 On my view, these active colors as such need not already be being seen. However, as we have 
seen, de An. III.2 may suggest that the fullest activity of perceptible objects is in being perceived. I 
wish to block this reading by conceding some respect in which these illumined colors are not fully 
active if they are not presently being seen, but insisting on some other significant respect in which 
these illumined colors are already active.  
 71 
intuitive (though perhaps not scientific) account of light and vision, we have two activities and two 
intertwined agent/patient pairs.  
2.2.6 …Ita Anima Mea 
Now, perhaps this is not how Aristotle prefers to think of the case of vision. But recall that, 
according to the view I am here developing, he prefers to describe light in an imprecise or 
unscientific way precisely in order to illuminate the analogous case of intellect. Accordingly, an 
alternative reading of the Light Analogy is now available to us: the active intellect acts upon its 
correlative patient, presumably potentially intelligible objects, which is analogous to the action of the 
sunlight on a yet-to-be-illumined flower or, in general, of light on unlit colors. Once they have been 
made to be actually intelligible, these objects go on to inform the receptive intellectual faculty—the 
nous of the preceding chapter in III.4 that is like eyesight—in a distinct activity constituted by the 
coming together of a further and distinct agent/patient pair. The active intellect therefore makes an 
object to be available for thinking, so that it comes to be capable of moving and informing our 
receptive intellectual faculty in a way analogous to how a now-illumined flower moves and informs 
our receptive visual faculty. Importantly, on my reading, the focus of III.5 is the former of these two 
activities and the former of these two agent/patient pairs: again, light and colors are mentioned in 
the analogy, but not any receptive visual faculty, so that light is the agent and unlit color is the 
patient.  
But when returning to our explanandum, the intellectual case, we encounter something of a 
difficulty: if it is true that the fullest activity of the perceptible object and the perceptual power are 
the same, and if we are to understand the intellectual case on a similar model as perception, then it 
might be thought (as we saw before) that the active intellect activates both objects and the receptive 
power together. Perhaps in making the intelligible objects active the agent intellect thereby also 
makes the intellectual power actual: actual intelligibility and actual thinking may turn out to be the 
same. Now perhaps there is some way of blocking this move and insisting on some non-trivial 
respect in which illumined colors are active even when not presently being seen, when in the 
absence of sighted animals.154 And so perhaps analogously there is some non-trivial respect in which 
activated intelligible objects are active even when not presently being thought.  
                                               
154 As I have argued at the end of each of the two preceding sections. 
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However, unlike the visual case where sighted animals can come or go and eyes can open 
and shut, in the intellectual case the receptive faculty is always present and (quite reasonably) always 
receptive. That is, in the intellectual case the receptive faculty that is analogous to the visual faculty is 
always beholding what is before its eyes.155 Accordingly, the occasional and coincidental 
complication suggested by the wakeful deer always obtains in the intellectual case. In asking for 
which of the two activities the agent intellect is responsible or which of the two is the proper patient 
of the agent intellect—namely, the question I have been asking in this chapter—Kosman has said 
that for Aristotle this is a “specious question.”156 As a final point in my exposition of the Light 
Analogy I would like to defend the idea that my question is, in fact, a good one. 
I do not deny that colors and the visible, when fully actual and active, are actually being seen 
by some perceptual subject.157 But I suspect (with Kosman, in fact) that there are more than two 
stages of act and potency when it comes to visibility, among many other things. Furthermore, given 
that Aristotle is speaking imprecisely about the contribution of light here, it is also natural that he is 
speaking imperfectly about active colors. If we recall the intuitive way that light might be said to act 
on colors, it does not follow from that intuitive conception that light is a sufficient condition for 
seeing; after all, the deer is able to sleep in. But I must immediately concede that as soon as 
intelligible objects, at any rate, are actualized they will move the receptive faculty, since its eyes are 
never closed. I might therefore seem to be splitting hairs when I still insist that the active intellect is 
principally responsible for actualizing the intelligible object.  
But I take it that this speaks to the purpose of de Anima III.5 and its relation to III.4, as we 
shall see in the balance of this chapter. Perhaps we have good and independent reasons to think that 
intelligibles stand in need of actualization in order for them to be available to be thought, just as 
                                               
155 Upon writing this sentence I realize that Richard Rorty and those sympathetic with his critique of 
the ocular metaphor would not be pleased. I hope in the balance of this dissertation to save some 
important sense in which knowledge and thinking remains speculative and systematic, while 
nevertheless conceding a place for a more active, productive, and edifying intellectual activity. Cf. 
Rorty (1979) 365ff. 
156 Kosman (2013) 345. His analysis is very sophisticated, and the question he calls “specious” is 
characterized in two different ways: while I, too, object to one of his characterizations as “specious,” 
the second of the two specifications of the question seems entirely acceptable to me. I articulate my 
defense of one of these specifications in what follows. 
157 Again, cf. de An. III.2 425b26-426a26, and perhaps also Phys. III.1-3 passim.  
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flowers need to be illumined before they are available to be seen.158 And in any case, these remain 
distinct conceptual and causal moments that can be distinguished even in the intellectual case, 
notwithstanding receptive intellect’s ever-wakeful state.159 Even if episodes of thinking follow this 
“intellectual illumination” with a temporal immediacy, it does not follow that intellectual 
illumination as such is responsible for episodes of thinking. Here I lean heavily on the distinctions 
made clear in the case of the sleepy deer: the same distinctions are available and, indeed, relevant in 
the intellectual case. So perhaps Kosman has a point that extensionally speaking there is no 
difference, that in the intellectual case illumination immediately gives way to reception. But it does 
not follow that these are therefore the same activities to be analyzed in the same way with the same 
correlative principles. 
So on my view, then, there are two distinct activities and two distinct agent/patient pairs that 
are involved on both sides of the analogy between perception and intellect. In III.5 the focus is the 
activity of illumination whereby light activates potential colors rendering them active. In III.4. The 
focus is the activity of seeing-and-being-seen whereby a perceptible object acts on the perceptual 
faculty. So, on the intellectual side of the analogy we similarly have two distinct activities with two 
agent/patient pairs. There is, of course, the action of an intelligible object on the receptive intellect, 
as presented in III.4. But there is a prior activity in which the active intellect activates the very 
intelligible object, and this is the topic of discussion in III.5. 
2.2.7  An Inconsistent Triad 
I have so far developed an account of the active intellect’s activity on the basis of the Light Analogy, 
asking what active nous activates. I have worked to establish the following claim: 
(α) The active intellect acts upon potentially intelligible objects. 
I have further sought to distinguish one activity in which the objects are themselves activated and 
another (conceptually, if not temporally) posterior activity in which those objects act on and inform 
a receptive faculty. I think this distinction obtains in both the perceptual and intellectual cases. 
                                               
158 As I shall argue, the discussion of potential noēta at the end of III.4 naturally precedes the 
discussion of an activating intellect in III.5. 
159 The worry, of course, will be whether this is a distinction without a difference. I shall address that 
concern in what follows.  
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Furthermore, since I have insisted on distinguishing these activities and agent/patient relations, 
claim (α) is closely related to another: 
(α') The active intellect does not act upon the receptive intellect of III.4. 
This clearly follows from the preceding discussion, in particular the last section which sought to 
distinguish, again at least in conceptual and ontological terms if not numerically or temporally, the 
light/color relation from the color/vision relation. If this is right, then we must say in the intellectual 
case that the active intellect’s proper patient is not the receptive intellect that is analogous to sight, 
but rather potentially intelligible objects that are analogous to yet-to-be-illumined colors. Recall that 
this view is supported by the fact that nowhere in the Light Analogy is the faculty of vision 
mentioned: only light and colors are terms on the vision side of the analogy, so we should neither 
expect nor supply vision’s correlate, the receptive intellect, as a term on the intellectual side of the 
analogy. While the next two claims of the triad are somewhat straightforward and do not require 
much argument, these first claims (α) and (α') are hard-won. 
In the second place, as I have noted throughout, the terms “active” and “passive” 
(ποιητικόν and παθητικόν) are uncontroversial correlates in Aristotle’s system, as are acting and 
being acted upon (ποιεῖν and πάσχειν). Accordingly it is entirely reasonable, when Aristotle begins 
the discussion of this new active intellect which makes all things, that we should ask, “What does it 
activate? What does it act upon? What is its correlative patient?” So, when a patient or passive nous is 
mentioned in this very context, in the final lines of III.5, we reasonably conclude that it is the patient 
we have been looking for: 
(β) The active intellect acts upon the passive intellect of III.5. 
And finally, in the third place, is the Contemporary Consensus which is my target: 
(γ) The receptive intellect of III.4 is the same as the passive intellect of III.5. 
The Contemporary Consensus, as we have seen, is simply that the passive intellect just is the intellect 
from III.4 which is analogous to our perceptual faculties, insofar as both are receptive of their 
respective objects, whether perceptible or intelligible. 
These are clearly inconsistent, (α'), (β), and (γ): the only way the active intellect can fail to act 
on the receptive intellect and yet still act on the passive intellect is if these are two distinct faculties, 
that is, if we reject the Contemporary Consensus that identifies these two. In view of this 
inconsistent triad, there are four obvious ways of responding to the argument. First, one might deny 
(α) entirely, and by extension also (α'), supposing that the active intellect is responsible for initiating 
and shaping episodes of human thinking, notwithstanding the preceding arguments against this view 
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based upon the Light Analogy.160 In the second place one might deny the inference from (α) to (α'), 
arguing that it is possible that these two things both constitute the active intellect’s correlative 
patient, both potentially intelligible objects and receptive intellect.161 In the third place, one might 
deny (β), saying perhaps that “the passive intellect” here need not refer to the proximate patient of 
the active intellect, which are properly speaking objects and not an intellect, but rather to the 
ultimate or derived patient of the active intellect, namely the receptive intellect which is acted upon 
by the intelligible object.162 Indeed, on my view there still remains a question of how both the passive 
intellect and the potentially intelligible objects could be patients for the active intellect, if the passive 
intellect is not the same as the receptive intellect, a question which I shall address in a subsequent 
chapter.  
My preferred response to the inconsistent triad is to reject (γ), the Contemporary Consensus. 
Although this strategy raises still more questions—questions which I shall answer in the balance of 
the dissertation—it nevertheless adequately answers the questions already on the table. “What is the 
active intellect’s distinctive activity?” It activates potentially intelligible objects by making them 
available for thinking, as light makes visible objects available for seeing, which activity, on the 
intellectual side at any rate, is yet to be described or determined in more concrete terms. “What does 
the active intellect activate?” It activates passive intellect and potentially intelligible objects, which 
bear some important relation to each other yet to be determined. By rejecting the Contemporary 
Consensus, I am able to preserve a close reading of the Light Analogy (as exemplified in (α)) without 
confusing conceptually distinct relations or activities (as exemplified in the inference from (α) to (α')) 
and without sacrificing Aristotle’s preferred and correlative terminology of active and passive 
principles (as exemplified in (β)). 
So goes my argument against the Contemporary Consensus on the merits of III.5 itself, 
rather than resorting to arguments on the basis of the supposed incorruptibility or the sometimes 
qualified impassivity of receptive nous. It is possible for one to accept my argument and still hold that 
receptive intellect is both passive and perishable, as perhaps highly qualified but nevertheless 
appropriate descriptions in other contexts. Notwithstanding that concession and however passively 
                                               
160 Recall Frede (1996b) and Kosman (2003). 
161 Recall Charles (2002). 
162 Johansen (2012) seems to hold a view of this kind, among others who hold to the Contemporary 
Consensus but opt for a natural reading of the light analogy, accepting (α) and (α'). 
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we might characterize receptive intellect in other contexts, I take my argument to be strong evidence 
against the consensus view. Aristotle must have in mind three distinct intellects—receptive, active, 
and passive— with the precise function of (at least) the latter two yet to be determined in more 
specific terms. 
2.3 DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE PICTURE 
2.3.1 An Expected Development 
Several treatments of de Anima III.5 suggest that the chapter is an unexpected interruption in an 
otherwise coherent exposition of human psychological powers in the third book. On my view, 
however, this newly posited intellectual power plays an important role in the intellectual lives of 
human beings and is integral to the overall argument of these chapters, without prejudice to the idea 
that the active intellect could still be the divine intellect.163 But if that is right, then we might have 
expected Aristotle to prepare readers for the discussion. Someone might object that according to my 
reading, too, this chapter’s place in Aristotle’s account of intellect remains obscure and unexpected. 
On this count I have an answer, and I believe it is an answer which gives some independent 
evidence in favor of my view against the alternatives already considered in this chapter. In general, 
we should prefer a reading of III.5 that fits well with the surrounding chapters.  
In the first place, although god-readers are quite right that Aristotle will mention the divine 
as either first mover or first intelligible at key moments in other treatises,164 in those contexts 
Aristotle is much more explicit about any heavenward ascent or heavenly appeal. Here, in contrast, 
readers are unprepared for any mention of the divine intellect, especially if this intellect’s activity is 
simply to guarantee the intelligibility of the world in general. Nor are his remarks about 
incorruptibility and separability sufficient to make this case, since earlier in de Anima I.4 and II.2 
Aristotle suggests that intellect as a faculty of the human soul may share these “rather divine” 
characteristics. Since the god is not even mentioned in III.4-5, it is difficult at best to read III.5 as 
                                               
163 If the active intellect is the divine intellect, its role cannot be the same as that posited by god-
readers of recent years: it cannot merely be responsible for the general intelligibility of the world, but 
must play some role in rendering particular objects actually intelligible for particular knowers. More 
to come. 
164 Cf. e.g. Caston (1999) and Burnyeat (2008), referencing Meta. Λ, Phys. VIII, EN X and EE VIII.  
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about the divine intellect unconnected with some role in human intellectual activity. Furthermore, it 
is not clear why Aristotle would need to establish the general intelligibility of the world in a 
psychological treatise: such a claim seems far more appropriate to another context, and something 
he could rightly take for granted here. I take it that god-readings, especially those that only attribute 
this abstract metaphysical role to the active intellect, are not preferable for these reasons. 
Secondly, although the idea that III.5 distinguishes two aspects of a single intellect already 
described in III.4 has some initial plausibility, Aristotle does not prepare readers for such a 
distinction or for the receptive intellect to require further clarification.165 On that interpretation 
Aristotle is making explicit in III.5 a complexity in the intellect already described in III.4: unlike 
other distinctions Aristotle draws, such a distinction would raise more questions than it solves. As I 
have noted, the intellect of III.4 seems to be adequately described as the intellect that becomes all 
things in a way analogous to perception, without any active or productive remainder. And 
furthermore, the three allegedly problematic descriptions Wedin considers in his defense of this 
interpretation—separable, impassible, unmixed—all seem to involve the nous that is analogous to 
perception insofar as it is receptive of all things, as we have seen. Although there may be some initial 
plausibility to those interpretations given evidence internal to the chapter and, moreover, some 
motivation for them given the apparent tensions between III.4 and III.5 on receptive intellect’s 
impassivity, this strategy also struggles to explain how the chapters in III form a coherent whole. 
Other interpretations have more plausible answers to this question about how III.5 fits in. 
On these views, it is common to draw on the several questions Aristotle raises at the end of III.4 in 
order explain III.5’s place in the dialectic. I quote this last paragraph of III.4 at length: 
[a] But someone might raise a puzzle: if intellect is simple and impassible and has 
nothing in common in any respect, just as Anaxagoras says, how will it think, if 
thinking is a kind of being-acted-upon (for it seems acting and being acted upon 
obtains in virtue of something common between them); [b] and further someone 
might raise a puzzle whether intellect itself, too, is intelligible. [a′] For either intellect 
will belong to other things, if it is not intelligible as other but the intelligible is 
something one in form, or it will be something mixed, which makes it intelligible just 
like the other things. [a″] Now, to be sure, being acted upon according to something 
common has been discussed previously, that intellect is in some way potentially the 
                                               
165 Pace Wedin (1988). 
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intelligible objects, but not in actuality before it thinks. And it is potentially so just as 
on a tablet on which nothing is actually written, this very thing happens in the case 
of intellect. [b′] And even intellect itself is intelligible just as the intelligible objects. 
For in the case of things without matter the thinking thing and the thing thought are 
the same; for theoretical knowledge and the thing known (taken in this way) are the 
same. [c] But we must consider the reason for [our?] not always thinking. [b″] But 
in things having matter each of the intelligible objects is potentially present. So that 
intellect will not belong to them (for intellect is a potentiality for such things without 
matter), but the intelligible object will belong to intellect.166 
As we have seen, some say that the active intellect’s distinctive activity is initiating particular 
episodes of thought.167 Their view may be taken to answer the first puzzle mentioned at the end of 
the preceding chapter in [a] and answered in [a′] and [a″], namely how intellectual activity could 
ever get going if intellection is a kind of being-acted-upon, but the receptive intellect is impassible. 
In addition, Aristotle has discussed previously in III.4 (though without raising a problem about it) 
how the person possessed of knowledge can contemplate whenever he wishes: perhaps the agent 
intellect answers the efficient causal need suggested by those remarks.168 Finally, these “triggering” 
readings not only explain how particular episodes of thinking can ever get going, but they also 
purport to explain why we are not always thinking. Aristotle raises this further question and sets it 
aside while responding to the second main puzzle at the end of III.4, quoted in [c] above. So, the 
human-readings that attribute to the active intellect a role in initiating particular episodes of thought 
                                               
166 De An. III.4 429b22-430a9: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ 
μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν (ᾗ γάρ τι 
κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν), ἔτι δ’ εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός; ἢ γὰρ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ’ ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητός, ἓν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει, ἢ μεμιγμένον τι 
ἕξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τἆλλα. ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διῄρηται πρότερον, ὅτι 
δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ’ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ· δυνάμει δ’ οὕτως ὥσπερ 
ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. καὶ 
αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ 
νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν (τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ 
νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν. ὥστ’ 
ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ 
νοητὸν ὑπάρξει. 
167 Cf. e.g. Frede (1996b) and Polansky (2007). 
168 De An. III.4 429b5-9. 
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at will have the advantage of pointing directly to these loose ends from III.4: [a] How do episodes 
of thinking in receptive intellect ever get started and perhaps more precisely, how does one initiate 
thinking at will? And [c] why are we not always thinking? These questions are clearly raised in III.4 
without clear answers; these interpretations look to the active intellect of III.5 to answer them, 
plausibly enough. 
On my view, however, it is not the first puzzle (with its cousin questions) but rather the 
second which leads us naturally into III.5: I look instead to Aristotle’s remarks about intelligibility. 
Two things are important to note about the end of III.4 on my view. In the first place, Aristotle 
seems to say that the first puzzle has already been solved, that sufficient resources are already in 
place to dissolve the apparent difficulty. He reminds us of this in [a″]. Any difficulty that remains 
for answering [a] seems to concern the way in which intellect and intelligibility will obtain or belong 
(ὑπάρξει) to intellect and to the objects of intellect. The problem of acting and being acted upon 
only arises if we risk mixing intellect with material things, as Aristotle says in the first part of his 
reply to [a] in [a′]. On my view, then, Aristotle takes up a more determinate worry in [b] that 
isolates what remains of the puzzle from [a]. This interpretive strategy gains some further support 
by the fact that the final line of the chapter recalls the language of [a′], suggesting that solving the 
second problem will resolve any remaining issues from the first, as well. So, I take the second 
question to have a certain priority, so that adequately answering it will solve any remaining difficulty 
that the more general act/potency analysis of intellect does not already solve.  
The second question in [b] concerns whether or not intellect itself is intelligible, and he says 
rather straightforwardly in [b′] that intellect itself is intelligible because intellect is without matter. 
Things without matter can easily come to be identical with the knowing subject, so that the 
intelligibility of immaterial things is, in some significant respect, beyond question. This reply, while 
adequately answering the question in [b], nevertheless raises some further questions. First, he 
remarks in [c] that it is not clear, if intellect and knowledge (taken “thusly”) are immaterial and 
therefore intelligible, why we are not always thinking.169 He also raises in [b″] the further issue of 
the intelligibility of things having matter: although immaterial things are intelligible without question, 
intelligible objects only belong to or obtain for material things potentially.  
                                               
169 While there is no first personal language in [c] I take it that he is speaking of our not always 
thinking and the intermittence of human thought. Although I can see the possibility of other 
interpretations on grammatical grounds, I have a hard time imagining what the philosophical upshot 
of an impersonal reading of this line might amount to. 
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While this section does, in a certain sense, reply to the question raised in [b], and so is justly 
named [b″] in my breakdown of the passage, it also implicitly raises its own new question and could 
have just as well been named [d]. For since we (presumably) can know material things, but those 
things are only potentially intelligible, how is it that we can ever come to know them? One gloss on 
the final lines of III.4 runs thus: “The intelligibility of intellect itself is not an interesting question: 
intellect is immaterial and so it is almost automatically intelligible or intelligible by default. The real 
question is not whether intellect itself is intelligible, but whether and how material things are 
intelligible. For insofar as they are material, they are only potentially intelligible.” According to this 
gloss, a question immediately arises that is, we might say, implicit at the very end of the passage 
above: “[d] But, in the case of things having matter, how is the noēton that is potentially present 
actualized or activated?” 
This is perhaps among the greatest pieces of evidence in favor of my reading. According to 
my interpretation of the Light Analogy, the active intellect’s activity should be specified as 
“actualizing or activating potentially intelligible objects.” This is, to be sure, an abstract description 
and may even seem puzzling within the very proximate context of III.5 taken in isolation. But in 
view of the discussion of intelligibility at the end of III.4, and given the priority of the question 
about intelligibility to the question about intellectual action and passion in that context, we should 
not find this description of the active intellect surprising at all. Rather, the intellect posited in III.5 
answers the questions raised and fills a role that is called for in the final lines of the preceding 
chapter, de Anima III.4. 
2.3.2 Further Specifying Intellectual Poiēsis and Pathētika 
The picture we are left with is an intellectual power of some kind that makes intelligible objects to be 
actually available for thinking in a way that neither directly accomplishes the activity of thinking nor 
completely determines the content of thought.170 Accordingly this intellect does not guarantee the 
intelligibility of nature generally and for all rational subjects regardless of their engagement, nor is it 
responsible for the deliberate and self-willed character of contemplative episodes. Its agency is rather 
found in making available intelligible objects for contemplation. This point follows rather 
                                               
170 I describe this here as an “intellectual power,” but I wish to leave open whether this is a power of 
the human soul or not. I shall have more to say about this question of what the agent intellect is in 
the final chapter; the bulk of my argument concerns what its activity and correlative patient are. 
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straightforwardly from my reading of the Light Analogy. My hypothesis is that this activity—
activating potentially intelligible objects—describes some part of the learning process. Facilitating 
learning in an individual case is an activity lying upstream of initiating particular episodes of thinking, 
yet is not as abstract as endowing the world in general with intelligibility.  
This interpretation has not often been discussed in recent years, but when it is considered it 
is usually summarily dismissed. There are two reasons for this. First, it is unclear where Aristotle 
might mention this intellectual activity whereby potentially intelligible objects are made available for 
thinking. As Johansen remarks in a footnote regarding an interpretation similar to my own, “it is not 
clear that there is such a job for the agent intellect to perform.”171 And secondly, it is unclear what 
sort of thing might be a proper patient of such an activity: what are potentially intelligible objects? 
According to most recent views, the two agent/patient pairs that I have distinguished are usually 
collapsed and confused, so that the active intellect’s patient is the receptive intellect with which we 
think. But given the preceding discussion, we have reason to think that the proper patient of the 
active intellect should be the potentially intelligible objects, something analogous to wildflowers at 
night. Even so, it is not clear what sorts of objects or cognitive items these potentially intelligible 
objects might be, or what it means to actualize or activate their potential qua intelligible. 
For these reasons, then, the view that the active intellect plays some role in learning has not 
received much attention. The argument of the next several chapters works toward answering this 
need. I shall first consider Aristotle’s idea that, in general, we learn by doing the very things we are 
learning how to do. I work to square this paradoxical idea with Aristotle’s well-known distinctions 
between potentiality and actuality. Then, I consider his idea that all intellectual or dianoetic learning, 
in particular, proceeds from some preexisting gnosis. By considering these ethical, metaphysical, and 
epistemological points in Aristotle’s theory, I draw conclusions for his psychology. In the final 
chapter I return to this question, “What does active nous activate?” with a proposal for the 
epistemological significance of the active intellect, particularly in the process of teaching and 
intellectual learning. 
But that is only the first of the two pressing questions raised by the preliminary account of 
this chapter. The other concerns the nature of these potentially intelligible objects and their 
relationship with the passive intellect. As we shall see, potentially intelligible objects are only 
potentially so in virtue of their particularized content that is bounded by the here and now. 
                                               
171 Johansen (2012) 239, n 39. 
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Cognition of these objects, then, belongs to some part of the perceptual faculty. Nevertheless, 
insofar as our cognition of them is related to properly intellectual activity, they are rightly called 
intelligible, albeit with the qualification “potentially.” I shall argue that the passive intellect is that 
faculty of soul in virtue of which these objects are cognized and made available qua potentially 
intelligible.  
My view will, in the end, have a great deal in common with Philoponus, Aquinas, and 
Brentano among others who concluded that the passive intellect is phantasia or something quite like 
it, and potentially intelligible objects are images when playing a certain role in intellectual activity. 
But since my method in this dissertation begins not with what these intellectual faculties are, but 
rather with what they do, my argument does not end with the idea that passive intellect is phantasia 
and potentially intelligible objects are phantasmata. Rather, this is the hypothesis with which I begin, 
and the argument concerns not the identity or character of these cognitive items, but rather the role 
they play in intellectual activity properly so-called. Accordingly, my argument will rely heavily on the 
idea that there is no noein without phantasmata, and that, in every case, humans think the intelligible 
forms in the images. 
2.3.3 Still Further Questions 
While those are the two most pressing questions which will shape the balance of the dissertation, 
there remain three more questions of interpretation that I shall answer once my own positive 
account is in place. I note them here as a promissory note. While I do not thoroughly treat of them 
(for they could require an investigation all to themselves), I address them briefly in the final chapter, 
indicating the consequences of my account for these questions. 
First, I must explain how my reading of the active intellect and of the Light Analogy coheres 
with the Craft Analogy. While I have given some indication of why I do not prefer interpretive 
strategies that privilege the Craft Analogy, some questions still remain about my own reading of that 
analogy and how I resolve the tension between the two. Unfortunately, my reply will not be available 
until I develop, in more concrete terms, my view of the active intellect’s distinctive activity. So I shall 
return to this question once I have such an account in hand. 
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Second, I must explain what it means for the active intellect to think non-intermittently, that 
is to say, how it “does not at one time think and at another time not think.”172 In view of the claim 
from III.4 that we, at any rate, do not always think, and furthermore in view of a standing question 
regarding why this might be the case, this line in III.5 is particularly interesting. The tension between 
our intermittent thinking and the active intellect’s non-intermittent thinking stands in need of 
explanation, along with an account of the reason for each. Although, on my view, our intermittent 
thinking is not the focus of III.5, I must nevertheless indicate what I take to be the reason for it. 
But, in order to answer these questions about the non-intermittence of active or productive thinking, 
I must first give an account of active or productive thinking as such: what does it mean for the active 
intellect to think at all? Having done this, I shall return to questions of (non)intermittence at the end. 
Finally, and not unrelated to the preceding point, is the question of the divine intellect. 
Where does Aristotle’s highest intellectual subject and highest intelligible object fit into my account 
of active intellect? I have said that my main purpose is not to answer questions about the active 
intellect’s identity or peculiar nature, and so this question properly lies outside of my topic. 
Nevertheless, my view has some implications for the god-reading: perhaps the divine intellect is the 
active intellect, but if it is, it must play a much more active role than contemporary god-readings 
suppose. 
2.3.4 Learning, Generic and Specific 
But first, given my hypothesis that the active intellect is responsible for some part of the process of 
learning, the next chapter will consider Aristotle’s account of learning in general. The following 
chapter will consider applications of this general account to the intellectual case, and in particular to 
the acquisition of immediate first principles. With an epistemological account of dianoetic learning 
in place proceeding from genuinely psychological concerns, we will be in a position to describe in 
more concrete terms the active intellect’s distinctive role—actualizing potentially intelligible 




                                               
172 De An. III.5 430a22. 
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3. RECOGNIZING ARISTOTLE’S POTENTIAL:                                                         
FIRST POTENTIALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LEARNING BY DOING 
τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἵαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην 
καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς 
ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες.  
---Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. 
Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν 
ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.173 
 
In recent years there has been significant interest in the distinctions Aristotle makes in de Anima II.5 
between stages of potentiality and actuality or activity, and how they relate to the peculiar character 
of perceptual and intellectual states and activities.174 Much of this discussion is born out of related 
but, I take it, separable debates about the precise way in which perception involves a physiological or 
material change in the sensory organ, if at all.175 Because perception is a special kind of being acted 
on by what is perceptible, in this chapter Aristotle gives an account of this affective specific 
difference before going on to give more detailed accounts of each of the proper sense faculties in de 
Anima II.7-11. Furthermore, since in de Anima III.4 Aristotle considers intellectual activity to be 
                                               
173 Rep. VII 518b8-c5. 
174 Cf. e.g. M. F. Burnyeat, “De Anima II.5,” Phronesis 47 (2002): 28-90; Robert Heinaman, 
“Actuality, Potentiality and De Anima II.5,” Phronesis 52 (2007): 139-87; John Bowin, “Aristotle on 
Various Types of Alteration in De Anima II.5,” Phronesis 56 (2011): 138-61; John Bowin, “Aristotle 
on ‘First Transitions’ in De Anima II 5,” Apeiron 45 (2012): 262-282. 
175 E.g. Richard Sorabji, “Body and Soul in Aristotle,” Philosophy 49 (1974), 63-89. Reprinted in 
Articles on Aristotle, Volume 4: Psychology and Aesthetics, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, 
and Richard Sorabji, (London, 1979): 42-64; Myles Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind 
Still Credible? A Draft” in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, edited by Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003): 15-26; Victor Caston, “The Spirit and The 
Letter: Aristotle on Perception,” in Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought, edited by Ricardo 
Salles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005): 245-320. 
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analogous to perception as a special kind of being acted on by the intelligible object, or something 
different of a similar sort,176 it is important also for those investigating his account of intellect to 
understand the several distinctions of II.5. And it is especially important for those pursuing an 
activity-first interpretive strategy when it comes to intellect—that is, a strategy focusing on the 
several relations of agent and patient in the intellectual case—to study the place where Aristotle 
outlines how the agent-patient analysis should be applied in a special way in the perceptual and 
intellectual cases. 
 Accordingly, the more proximate aim of this dissertation chapter is to provide an alternative 
interpretation of what Burnyeat has called the “Triple Scheme” and the transitions which it involves, 
classically understood to be introduced in de Anima II.5.177 In particular, I consider the first stage of 
the schema and ask precisely how this first kind of dynamis ought to be understood. I approach this 
interpretive question obliquely, by considering the relevance of a more general distinction in 
Aristotle’s philosophy, one between natural and developed or acquired capacities.178 In II.5 Aristotle 
treats these two sorts of capacity alongside each other, plausibly showing some analogy between the 
acquisition, possession, and activation of perceptual capacities and knowledge. He of course notes 
some disanalogies as the chapter unfolds, but his account (and that of many interpreters) begins with 
the similarities first.179 My motivating concern is that Aristotle might not have explicitly flagged all of 
the dissimilarities between perceptual and intellectual capacities earlier on in this passage, and so 
parts of the chapter that many have taken to apply to natural and acquired capacities alike, and 
similarly to their acquisition and development, may turn out to be even more subtle. 
                                               
176 Cf. De An. III.4 429a13-15: ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. 
177 I follow Bowin in adopting Burnyeat’s term “Triple Scheme,” though as I shall argue, different 
versions of this general schema from II.5 and Phys. VIII.4 are possible with respect to the relations 
and transitions between these three stages. I am advocating for a version of the Triple Scheme that 
is more complex than the model standardly defended by Burnyeat and others, though I am happy to 
adopt the generic term for the sake of exposition. 
178 In opposing these two categories of capacity, I do not intend to deny that acquired or developed 
capacities (like the virtues) are both in accord with and perfections of nature. “Natural” here 
signifies only the manner of coming to be. I follow this usage throughout unless explicitly suggested 
otherwise. 
179 Heinaman (2007) does disagree with Burnyeat (2002) on this point, arguing that Aristotle’s 
remarks about the stages of potential knowledge do not generalize to first and second potentiality. 
However, his argument for this is on the basis of Aristotle’s natural philosophy in Phys. VIII.4. 
Heinaman’s point is negative, whereas mine tries to fill in the positive story: how far do Aristotle’s 
remarks here generalize? To answer that, we must press on. 
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 This suspicion is confirmed as the investigation continues, when one considers the Triple 
Scheme as it is standardly understood in the light of this difference between capacities that arise by 
nature and those developed by other means. According to Aristotle, the latter come to be by prior 
activity while the former do not. That he holds this in the case of moral virtues is well known and 
his defense of the coherence of his account is often discussed; it is not usually noted, however, that 
Aristotle is committed to the very same principle in the case of properly intellectual virtues.180 All 
kinds of learning, then, are accomplished by engaging in the relevant kind of prior activity, namely 
by doing the very thing one is learning to do. So goes Aristotle’s well-known Learning Principle (as I 
shall call it): we come to be temperate by doing temperate things and house-builders by building 
houses and, in general, we acquire and develop moral and intellectual hexeis by engaging in prior 
activity of an appropriately identical sort. 
 This thought, though intuitive, presents a puzzle: how can someone do the very things he is 
learning to do before he learns them? Either a student will remain hopelessly ignorant because of his 
present inability to do the things he wants to learn, or he can already do them and therefore does not 
need to learn.181 I here propose a new way of thinking through this paradoxical yet intuitive claim 
about learning, in particular by revisiting Aristotle’s distinctions between kinds of potentiality and 
actuality. These distinctions, in my view, help to articulate his Learning Principle in more precise 
terms, removing any apparent difficulty. A very common way of interpreting those distinctions, 
however, is not only unhelpful in illuminating and defending the Learning Principle but is also 
straightforwardly incompatible with it. In order to avoid attributing an outright contradiction to 
Aristotle, then, in this chapter I propose an alternative interpretation of these distinctions in kinds of 
potentiality and actuality. 
 In particular, in de Anima II.5 Aristotle outlines three stages: (1) having the capacity to learn 
grammar, (2) having learned grammar, and (3) actively deploying grammatical knowledge.  It is 
uncontroversial that Aristotle distinguishes these three stages, which have together come to be called 
the Triple Scheme. As these distinctions are typically understood, however, the first stage is regarded 
merely as a passive capacity to learn grammar and to undergo an intellectual change of some sort, 
but not yet as an active capacity to do grammatical things in any way. According to this Standard 
                                               
180 Cf. e.g. EN II.1, 4 and Meta. Θ.5, 8. I shall explore these passages in detail in the coming pages. 
Kosman (2003) and Burnyeat (2002) make note of this, though I disagree with them on specifics. 
181 This puzzle bears obvious similarities to Meno’s paradox. 
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View (as I shall call it), one cannot do grammatical things, even imperfectly, until one has already 
learned it. The capacity to learn at the first stage, then, is commonly regarded only as a capacity for 
acquiring or developing an actual capacity, but not yet as a capacity for engaging in the relevant 
activity, again, even in an unrefined way.182 
 The focus of this chapter, then, is how to resolve a tension between these two well-known 
pieces of Aristotelian doctrine. On the one hand, the Learning Principle indicates that we learn by 
doing the very things we are learning to do. On the other hand, the capacity that an unlearned 
person has to learn is not typically regarded also and already as a capacity to engage in the relevant 
prior activity. The tension is clear: one account of learning requires doing the very things one is 
learning to do, while another characterization seems to rule this distinctive sort of prior activity out. 
The guiding question of this third chapter is: how ought we to interpret the distinctions in II.5 and 
the Triple Scheme derived therefrom in a way that is informed by Aristotle’s Learning Principle? Do 
constraints on the very possibility of learning-by-doing offer any insight into the various 
metaphysical distinctions Aristotle introduces in kinds of actuality and potentiality, and in particular 
how we ought to conceive of first potentiality?183 Or, conversely, do these technical distinctions 
offer any help in understanding Aristotle’s Learning Principle, rendering it more defensible in the 
face of prima facie charges of incoherence?  
My answer to both questions is in the affirmative: I shall argue, in the course of this chapter, 
that an interpretation of II.5 and related passages that is, in the first place, informed by an abstract 
theoretical constraint issuing from Aristotle’s Learning Principle will, in the second place, help to 
render that very same principle more intuitive. Accordingly, I propose at the outset the following 
general constraint on an adequate interpretation of first potentiality in particular and of the Triple 
Scheme more generally: the possibility of learning-by-doing as given in Aristotle’s Learning Principle 
must not be ruled out from the start. Therefore, I begin my investigation with a more thorough 
treatment of this principle and what it entails. In the final analysis, I conclude that, for Aristotle, the 
capacity to learn must also be the capacity to engage in the prior activity by which we learn. 
                                               
182 “Potentiality,” “capacity,” and “capability” translate dynamis interchangeably. “Potentiality” and 
“capacity” are used the most; “capability,” is preferable in some contexts, being related to the 
English “capable” as dynamis is related to dynatos. My choices are determined by what sounds most 
suitable in English; it does not mark a philosophically relevant distinction. 
183 I follow the traditional convention of calling stage (1) “first potentiality,” which is based in large 
part on comparing II.5 with II.1 where “first actuality” is introduced. Though I do call some aspects 
of this comparison into question, for the purposes of terminology I shall follow the convention. 
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3.1 ARISTOTLE’S LEARNING PRINCIPLE 
Aristotle’s view that we learn by doing is both intuitive and puzzling. He concludes early in his 
treatment of moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics II that we come to be temperate by doing temperate 
things, just as we come to be house builders by building houses and grammatical people by doing 
grammatical things.184 He cites the same principle as evidence for another argument in Metaphysics 
Θ.8, that one cannot become a house builder or a lyre player without ever having engaged in the 
activities of house building or lyre playing.185 That passage is followed immediately by a further 
argument in which Aristotle mentions the very same principle, but this time as providing a possible 
(yet upon reflection unproblematic) exception to a teleological argument.186 So, this Learning 
Principle is clearly on Aristotle’s mind, either doing explicit work in explaining how we learn or 
otherwise generating possible evidence or counter-evidence for arguments related to actuality and 
potentiality more broadly. And yet both in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
explicitly admits the apparent puzzle: how can one exercise a capacity in order to acquire it, that is, 
before one acquires it? 
3.1.1 The Learning Principle Introduced 
Before delving into the details of this challenge or Aristotle’s responses to it, let us consider the 
principle itself. His remarks from the opening of Nicomachean Ethics II express a familiar thought: 
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature (ὅσα φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίγνεται), we 
acquire capacities of them beforehand and later exhibit the activities (this very thing 
is clear in the case of the senses: for it was not from often seeing or often hearing 
that we received these senses, but rather, having them we used them, and did not 
                                               
184 Cf. EN II.1103a26-b2 and II.4 1105a22-25. Grammar is Aristotle’s example, though becoming 
grammatikos is more precisely rendered into English by “literate.” I shall continue using the English 
“grammatical,” however, due to complexities in English when describing how we “come to be 
literate speakers or writers by saying or writing literate (sc. grammatical) things.” Aristotle’s Greek 
turns on the same adjective grammatikos describing the speaker or writer and the spoken or written 
word. In order to preserve this parallelism, I prefer to stretch English usage by calling a speaker or 
writer “grammatical” rather than calling a spoken or written word “literate.” 
185 Cf. Meta. Θ.8 1049b27-50a3. 
186 Cf. Meta. Θ.8 1050a4-14. 
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come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by having exercised 
beforehand (τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον), just as also in the 
case of the arts. For the things that are necessary for us to have learned to do, we 
learn by doing them (ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν), for 
example people become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; 
indeed in this way also we become just by doing just things, temperate by doing 
temperate things, courageous by doing courageous things.187 
Aristotle thus begins his account of moral virtue by showing how this class of capacities is different 
from those that arise by nature, like the senses.188 He of course qualifies his point to allow that the 
moral virtues are not contrary to our nature, since things in general cannot be habituated contrary to 
their nature. The virtues—at least the moral ones, and plausibly also the intellectual ones—do not 
arise by nature but are nevertheless perfections of nature.189 
 Now, I concede that Aristotle here in the Nicomachean Ethics quite clearly speaks of virtue 
“being perfected by habituation” (τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους) and makes other similar 
references to habituation (ἔθος), so that any extension of his conclusions from the moral to the 
intellectual case would require further argument. And while he speaks of virtue and learning without 
qualification here, in the opening lines of Nicomachean Ethics II Aristotle seems explicitly to restrict 
his discussion to moral virtues and their distinctive mode of development.190 So, at first, one might 
                                               
187 EN II.1 1103a27-b3, following Ross: ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων 
πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ 
γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες 
ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, 
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον 
οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια 
πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ’ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι. 
188 See also EN II.4. I cannot give a full treatment of the subtle issues specific to the acquisition of 
moral virtue here. My aim is to abstract from the moral case and discuss what holds generically of 
both moral and intellectual virtue, as I shall argue in what follows. 
189 Cf. EN II.1 1103a20-26. 
190 Cf. EN II.1 1103a14-19: “Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual 
virtue for the most part has both its birth and its growth by teaching (for which reason it requires 
experience and time), while moral virtue comes about by habituation, whence also its name is one 
that is formed by a slight variation from the word “habituation.” From this it is also plain that none 
of the moral virtues arises in us by nature, for nothing existing by nature is habituated otherwise” 
(following Ross). Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν 
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reasonably suspect that the idea of learning-by-doing discussed in the above passage may also be 
restricted to the moral case, and not apply to other acquired capacities such as the intellectual 
virtues. Accordingly, one might reasonably suppose on the basis of this passage alone that “learning-
by-doing” is straightforwardly synonymous with “learning-by-practice” or “learning-by-
habituation.”191 
 On the contrary, however, even in this passage the point extends beyond the ethical or 
moral case to other learned capacities that similarly do not arise by nature, “also in the case of the 
arts.” And later in Nicomachean Ethics II.4 he applies the same principle to someone learning grammar 
(quoted below). In the same spirit, three passages from Metaphysics Θ explicitly apply this principle to 
the development of intellectual virtues as well as moral ones, so that we acquire all the virtues 
through prior activity, learning by doing those very things which we are learning how to do. As I 
shall show, then, the Learning Principle’s insistence on prior activity applies generically to all cases of 
learning, both moral and intellectual, and is therefore not sufficiently captured by “habituation” 
(ἔθος). 
3.1.2 The Learning Principle in Metaphysics Θ.5 
In the first place is Θ.5, at the beginning of which Aristotle makes a distinction between types of 
capacities. I shall begin with this passage from Metaphysics Θ and return to the other two passages 
mentioned as the chapter unfolds. To wit: 
[a] Since all capacities are either innate (like the senses), arise by habituation  (like 
that of flute-playing), or arise by learning (like that of the arts): [b] on the one hand 
it is necessary that we possess those [coming to be] by habituation and by logos 
having previously exercised them, [c] on the other hand it is not necessary [for] 
those [capacities] not of this sort, i.e. those which involve being-acted-upon.192  
                                                                                                                                                       
διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας 
δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν 
παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν 
ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται. 
191 Cf. e.g. Hamlyn (1976) 175ff., Kosman (2003) 352, Bronstein (2008) 210-216. Burnyeat (2002) 61 
recognizes this, but dismisses it “None of this is on display in De Anima II 5.” 
192 Meta. Θ.5 1047b31-35: Ἁπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν 
αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἔθει οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν 
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This passage and Nicomachean Ethics II.1 are two loci classici in which Aristotle describes the notion of 
prior activity in learning. Here in Θ.5 Aristotle uses a participle of a compound verb 
(προενεργήσαντας, from προενεργεῖν), while there in Nicomachean Ethics II.1 he uses a participle 
modified adverbially (ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, from ἐνεργεῖν πρότερον). This is a first important 
point of similarity between the two passages, though here in Θ.5 Aristotle quite explicitly applies his 
Learning Principle to both kinds of development alike, to capacities arising by habituation and by 
learning or logos.193 Thus the notion of prior activity quite clearly applies to moral and intellectual 
formation alike, and is therefore not distinctive of those capacities arising by habituation (ἔθει). 
 A second important point of similarity between these passages concerns the extensional 
scope of the distinction Aristotle has in view. Both passages oppose, on the one hand, innate (τῶν 
μὲν συγγενῶν) or naturally acquired capacities (ὅσα φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίγνεται) and those capacities 
that, on the other hand, are acquired either by habituation (τῶν δὲ ἔθει and ὅσαι ἔθει) or by learning 
and logos (τῶν δὲ μαθήσει and ὅσαι […] λόγῳ), or generally speaking things that we must learn how 
to do (ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν). These descriptions line up fairly straightforwardly so that, at least 
extensionally, he is distinguishing the same kinds of capacity in each case. Those capacities that arise 
for us by nature are all and only those capacities which are innate. And those capacities that are 
acquired by habituation or by logos are all and only capacities for things that we must learn how to 
do.194 
                                                                                                                                                       
ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν, ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν 
οὐκ ἀνάγκη.  
193 Due to difficulties in translation, I shall ordinarily leave logos untranslated. 
194 One might still worry that the distinctions in EN II.1 are not exhaustive, so that Aristotle may be 
opposing natural and ethical capacities while remaining silent there on the third class of dianoetic 
capacities. This view may be recommended by Aristotle’s remarks in the opening line of EN II, in 
which he sets aside the dianoetic virtues for consideration later. We can say three things in reply to 
this worry. First, as long as the class of innate capacities is coextensive between the two passages, 
there is sufficient similarity for the comparison to be helpful regarding both kinds of virtue. This is 
admittedly a weak reply. But we can add to this, now that we have considered Θ.5, that what he says 
there about the virtues should hold of both moral and intellectual virtues, most notably what he says 
about acquisition by prior activity. There need be no conflict between these passages simply because 
one provides an analysis that is narrower in scope more suitable to that context. What is more, and 
this is the third point, in EN he includes the arts and the virtues in the class of “things which we 
must learn to do” (ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν). Including the arts as an example suggests that we 
read the relative clause as exhaustive, rather than restricted to certain kinds of learning: τέχνη is, 
after all, a category of intellectual or dianoetic virtue as we learn later in EN VI.4 while still in the 
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 Another notable similarity between the passages concerns how Aristotle goes on to apply the 
distinction in the balance of Θ.5. He there distinguishes these two kinds of capacity as those which 
admit of a single activation and those which admit of two (or perhaps more) modes of activity. Since 
non-rational potencies only admit of one mode of activation, whenever that which is capable of 
acting meets that which is capable of being acted upon in the right way, the correlative potencies are 
activated and their joint activity ensues straightaway. For example, whenever that which is capable of 
heating meets that which is capable of being heated, the joint activity of heating and being-heated 
immediately begins.195  
 But rational capacities (τὰ κατὰ λόγον), Aristotle points out, admit of contrary activations so 
that, for example, the physician can use the medical art to heal or to harm some patient. As a result, 
capacities of this sort do not activate as soon as agent and patient meet, since something further 
must determine which mode of activation obtains. When the medical agent meets the medical 
patient, it is yet undetermined whether health or disease will result. Accordingly Aristotle posits 
desire or deliberate choice (ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν) as determining precisely how the capacity is 
activated, how the agent acts upon the patient, in any given case.196 Let us set aside the role of this 
“other deciding factor” (ἕτερον τι τὸ κύριον), whether desire or choice, but we shall return to it in a 
later section. For the present, let us attend to the distinctive feature of rational capacities that drives 
Aristotle to posit this other factor at all. It is a certain indeterminacy of activity that remains even 
when the rational capacities (τὰ κατὰ λόγον) have been developed.  
                                                                                                                                                       
ethical context. It is not, of course, a speculative or theoretical virtue like ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς, or σοφία. 
Further evidence for this can be drawn from EN II.4 and de Anima II.5 since, in the first passage, 
grammar is given as a craft example to which the Learning Principle applies and, in the second 
passage, grammar is the example of knowledge (ἐπισήμη) with respect to which someone is said to 
be a knower in varying degrees. We shall return to a consideration of these passages. 
195 Although something’s “being heated” would be a passive affection or suffering (πάσχειν), this 
would still be characterized as a kind of activity (ἐνεργεῖν), correlative in one sense with the activity 
of heating, but also in another sense with the capability of being heated. Cf. Meta. Δ.15 1021a14-19: 
“And active and passive things [are relative] according to active and passive capacity (κατὰ δύναμιν) 
and to the activations of the capacities (ἐνεργείας τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων), such as that which can heat is 
relative to that which can be heated, and again that which is heating is relative to that which is being 
heated and that which is cutting to that which is being cut, in virtue of being actively engaged (ὡς 
ἐνεργοῦντα).” We shall return to this point later in the chapter. 
196 Cf. Meta. Θ.5 1048a5-15. 
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 An important question remains, however, concerning the habituated capacities in the context 
of Θ.5: though mentioned at the outset, the ensuing discussion only concerns rational and non-
rational capacities. Natural capacities (e.g. to heat or be heated) clearly belong to the class of non-
rational; given the opposition of habituation and logos in the opening of the chapter we might also 
conclude that habituated capacities belong to it, as well.197 This point is confirmed in part by remarks 
at the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics V, where Aristotle says:  
For things do not stand in the same way concerning the sciences and capacities as 
concerning the states. For the same capacity or science seems to be of contraries, but 
the contrary state is not of contraries, e.g. contrary things are not done as a result of 
health, but healthy things only.198  
So, once they have been habituated, ethical or bodily hexeis are more like natural capacities than 
rational ones, admitting of only one sort of activation. But before they are developed, they share the 
same indeterminacy as the sciences and arts do when developed. While the person who has already 
been successfully habituated to possess a moral virtue (or unsuccessfully, to possess vice), and also 
the person whose bodily capacities been habituated to possess a certain state like health, the person 
does not then admit of a range of activity, nevertheless that his capacities can in the first place be 
habituated either way does show that these capacities as such can admit of various modes of activity. 
Once the relevant capacity comes to have a certain habituated state, no variability remains (unlike 
rational capacities), but the prior possibility to acquire contrary states is enough to show the 
similarity between the first stage of potentiality in the intellectual and moral cases, in contrast to the 
natural capacities which do not admit of development by prior activity. On this point, both the 
Ethics and the Metaphysics passages recognize as distinctive capacities that admit of a range of 
activities, at least at some stage. 
 Returning to Nicomachean Ethics II.1, let us consider something Aristotle says immediately 
before our passage: 
From this it is also clear that none of the moral virtues comes to be in us by nature; 
for none of the things existing by nature can be habituated contrary to nature. For 
example, the stone which by nature moves downwards could not be habituated to 
                                               
197 Cf. e.g. EN I.13 and VI.2 on the irrational parts of the soul and their attendant virtues. 
198 EN V.1 1129a11-16: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἕξις δ’ ἡ ἐναντία 
τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον. 
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move upwards, not even if one tries to habituate it by casting it upwards ten 
thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything 
else that is disposed by nature in one way be habituated in another. Consequently, 
the virtues come to be in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but rather we 
are disposed by nature to receive them, and they are brought to perfection by 
habit.199 
Aristotle’s argument concerning the impossibility of habituating a stone’s motion relies on the 
assumption that a stone only admits of one kind of natural motion, that is, downward motion. 
Where Metaphysics Θ.5 is, for the most part, silent on habituation, the argument of Nicomachean Ethics 
II.1 concerns habituation and therefore properly moral virtue, concluding that “none of the things 
arising by nature can be habituated differently” (οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν 
ἐθισθείη).200 Though specific to habituation, this claim rests upon a more general fact about 
capacities which arise by nature and those that do not. In the purely natural case, the mode of 
actualization is fixed and does not admit of being otherwise, while for other capacities the mode of 
actualization admits of some variation. As soon as a natural capacity is truly present, it is no longer 
capable of development or varying activation; before that time, no activity is possible at all. The 
argument here is somewhat overdetermined because of the ethical context: Aristotle’s purpose is 
only to deny that ethical virtues can arise in us by nature. But the reason why stones cannot be 
habituated to move any differently is because their natural capacity for locomotion does not admit 
of varying actualization in general. On the authority of Metaphysics Θ.5 and Nicomachean Ethics II.1 we 
know that our capacities for moral and intellectual virtues are alike in this, at least: they do admit of 
varying actualization. 
 In view of these arguments, however, one notable difference between the two passages does 
become clear: where the Ethics passage considers differences in the acquisition or development of 
these capacities, whether natural or acquired, the passage in Metaphysics Θ.5 considers their activation 
once they have already become fully developed. This is an interesting difference between the 
                                               
199 EN II.1 1103a18-26, following Ross: ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει 
ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος 
οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ’ ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥιπτῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, 
οὐδ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὔτ’ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν 
ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. 
200 EN II.1 1103a20. 
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passages, and raises important questions about the two passages’ distinct purposes. I might suggest, 
for instance, that while Metaphysics Θ is concerned with different kinds of activity and the ways in 
which activity is prior to potentiality, the Ethics is more concerned with how we come to be virtuous 
and possess virtuous hexeis, at least when beginning the account of moral virtue in the second book. 
Accordingly, we are more likely to find discussions that focus on the acquisition of hexeis in the 
ethical context, rather than in the metaphysical context where energeia is of greater interest. But for 
our present inquiry what is interesting is more general: both passages rely upon the same basic 
distinction between the same kinds of capacity, making mention of the same distinctive features of 
each. 
 We can conclude, then, that while Aristotle’s discussion in Nicomachean Ethics II.1 is directed 
in a special way toward the moral case, his remarks about moral virtue should not be taken to 
exclude the intellectual case entirely, on the authority of Metaphysics Θ.5. Similarly, although the 
discussion in Metaphysics Θ.5 is directed in a special way toward the exercise of rational capacities, the 
same general principle applies to habituated capacities. There are, to be sure, differences between 
habituated and rational capacities in precisely how the general principle applies. But prior activity is 
somehow involved in the development of any and all capacities which do not arise simply in the 
ordinary course of nature. 
3.1.3 Intellectual Habits and Habituation 
At this point a difficulty may arise due, in part, to conventions in translating Aristotle’s Greek into 
modern English, and so occasions a bit of an interlude. As things stand, “habit” can render both 
Greek words ethos and hexis: though the former is more common in recent literature, the latter has an 
old-fashioned claim to the word, as well. The difficulty arises, it seems, from the Latin habitus for 
hexis, given the relation between habere and echein, so that it became common in Scholastic authors to 
refer, for instance, to the habitus scientiae for hexis epistēmēs, the intellectual virtue of scientific 
knowledge.201 So when using “habit” in this way, following the Latin convention, the meaning of the 
                                               
201 See, for instance, the Cooke translation in the Loeb edition of the Categories (1937). First, at 8b25-
29: “By ‘quality’ I mean that in virtue of which men are called such and such. The word ‘quality’ has 
many senses. Let habits and dispositions here constitute one kind of quality. The former are unlike 
the latter in being more lasting and stable. Comprised among what we call ‘habits’ are virtues and all 
kinds of knowledge.” And later at 9a5-8: “Those qualities, then, it is clear, men incline to 
denominate ‘habits,’ which are by their nature more lasting and the more hard to displace. Those 
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term is weaker and its scope broader, simply signaling the possession of some stable state. 
Importantly, using this sense of “habit” does not preclude an intellectual or dianoetic application, as 
is seen most notably with the Latin habitus scientiae already mentioned. But, of course, colloquially the 
English “habit” has a narrower and more restricted sense, signaling something acquired by practice 
or habituation. I shall here set aside the interesting etymological work one could do to explain this 
phenomenon; the important thing for our purposes is to note the potentially perilous ambiguity. 
While it is true that, for Aristotle, intellectual virtues are not strictly-speaking acquired by habituation 
(ἔθει), we must maintain that even intellectual virtues are habits in the sense of developed and stable 
states (ἕξεις).202 
 This much should be uncontroversial given what Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics VI, as 
well as in the Physics and Metaphysics.203 Yet it can be an early point of confusion when giving an 
account of the acquisition of hexeis quite generally, as opposed to detailing what holds specifically of 
the process of habituation and those distinctively ethical hexeis, the truly habituated habits. Again, 
Aristotle claims that all hexeis coming to be by habituation (ἔθει) or by rational account (λόγῳ) arise 
by prior activity: we have concluded, therefore, that prior activity alone cannot be what makes 
habituation or the acquisition of ethical virtues distinctive. Aristotle is quite clear that those virtues 
arising by logos arise through prior activity as well. Habituation and logos must specify the kind of 
                                                                                                                                                       
who cannot at all master knowledge and are of a changeable temper are scarcely described nowadays 
as possessing the ‘habit’ of knowing, although we might say that their minds, when regarded from 
that point of view, are disposed in a way towards knowledge—I mean, in a better or worse.” See 
also the Freese translation of the Loeb edition of the Rhetoric (2006, first published 1926) at 554a7-8: 
“Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a familiarity arising from habit (ἀπὸ 
ἕξεως).” Finally, see Aquinas’s Commentary on the de Anima: habitus scientiae at §359 and habitualiter at 
§367, ad loc. 
202 This ambiguity can cause difficulty when speaking of grades of knowledge, as well. Those familiar 
with the Scholastic way of speaking will be comfortable speaking of potential, habitual, and actual 
knowledge to describe the three stages of the Triple Scheme, where here “habitual” describes the 
kind of knowledge belonging to one who has or possesses (ἔχει) the relevant intellectual virtue, that 
is, a hexis. In recent literature “habitual” has given way to “dispositional” (cf. e.g. Polansky (2007) 
232 and Kosman (2013) 59), though this choice is not without its own cost given the subtle 
distinction in Aristotle between state (ἕξις) and disposition (διάθεσις). The grammatical limitations 
of “state” are obvious, despite its attractiveness otherwise, given misleading English senses of 
“static” or “statically.” 
203 “We must undertake, then, [to discover] what the best hexis is of each of these, for that is the 
virtue of each” (VI.1 1139a16-17). See also, for example, Phys. VII.3 in which Aristotle discusses the 
acquisition of bodily, moral, and intellectual hexeis, and Meta. Θ.5, already mentioned above. 
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prior activity that the learner must engage in, rather than prior activity being involved in one kind of 
learning only, and not in the other. This means that insofar as learning by habituation (ἔθει) is 
typically called “learning through practice” in recent literature,204 we ought not thereby to conclude 
that practice or habituation is the only kind of learning through prior activity. In fleeing that mistake, 
however, we must not claim that intellectual learning itself is a kind of “learning through practice” or 
“intellectual habituation.”205 Habituation, unlike prior activity, is distinctive to moral virtue. This is 
why I have so far chosen to refer to “learning by doing” to describe the prior activity which holds 
generically of both cases. 
3.1.4 Toward a Generic Specification of the Learning Principle 
Given that our ultimate inquiry is into intellectual virtues and activities, our larger objective is to 
discover how one might learn through prior activity by logos rather than by ethos, how one engages in 
intellectual activity in order to learn intellectually, without making it so that intellectual and moral 
virtues alike are acquired by habituation alone or are “learned through practice.”206 But before we 
can begin that inquiry in earnest, it would help to have a metaphysical picture in place which applies 
to the acquisition of all psychic hexeis, both moral and intellectual, arising by logos and by habituation 
alike.207 And even beyond the scope of this dissertation, as I shall argue, much of what has seemed 
puzzling about Aristotle’s Learning Principle concerns not what is specific to moral formation but 
something more generic. Therefore, I here seek to offer a defense of the coherence of the Learning 
                                               
204 Insofar as “practice” is meant to render μελέτημα or μελέτη, I have no problem characterizing 
prior activity as “learning through practice.” But there is sufficient opportunity for 
misunderstanding, insofar as “practice” is meant to render ethos. Bowin (2011) is a good case: at 143 
n11 he contrasts learning through practice and learning by logos, “merely through absorbing it from a 
teacher.” 
205 Recall Hamlyn (1976) 175f., Bronstein (2008) 210-216, Burnyeat (2002) 61, Kosman (2003) 352. 
Polansky (2007) also seems to suggest something along these lines, at 233: “Aristotle uses the term 
ἕξις in 417a32, which we must translate as ‘habit,’ ‘state,’ ‘condition,’ or ‘disposition.’ As emphasized 
in the ethical works, habits or dispositions, whether moral or intellectual virtues, develop through 
practice or habituation (see NE ii 1, EE ii 2, MM I 6, Meta. 1049b29-1050a2).” Note the equivocal 
use of “habit” from hexis and “habituation,” which, as I have just described, renders ethos and not 
hexis. 
206 This is the project of the following dissertation chapter. 
207 Cf. Phys. VII.3 which describes moral and intellectual hexeis as hexeis of the soul. 
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Principle in general, considering only what applies generically and abstracting from what is peculiar 
to the more often discussed moral case, or indeed to the intellectual case to be discussed later.  
 One suggestion for an abstract and generic specification of the Learning Principle given the 
discussion so far: in order to acquire a hexis, one must—in a way yet to be determined—engage in 
the very same activity toward which the hexis under development is directed. We learn to φ by φ-ing 
and we develop a capacity to φ by φ-ing, by engaging in the very same activity toward which the 
capacity under development is directed.208 That is, in order to become learned, the student must 
somehow engage in an activity that is—at some non-trivial level of description—the same as the 
expert’s. In this way, we become temperate by doing temperate things and knowledgeable by doing 
knowledgeable things: on Aristotle’s view the student certainly performs activities of these kinds 
somehow, though indeed the student as yet lacks the relevant virtue. So, much weighs on the adverbial 
qualifier “somehow” here, as will be noted by those, both ancient and contemporary, who might 
charge Aristotle with incoherence on this point. But for now let us set this issue aside for 
clarification later, leaving the placeholder “somehow” to do its place-holding work. 
  But even granting that the Learning Principle in some generic way applies also to intellectual 
virtues, so that prior activity must be somehow involved, one may object that this precise 
specification “becoming temperate by doing temperate acts” (1103b1) or generally “learning to do 
things by doing them” (1103a32-33) may apply more specifically to the moral virtues and arts 
acquired by habituation, to that distinctive mode of prior activity. After all, I am already conceding 
that in Nicomachean Ethics II.1 Aristotle is making a distinctively ethical point and applying this 
theoretical machinery to begin a treatment of moral virtue in particular. And it may be that, though 
artistic skills bear something in common with and plausibly count as intellectual virtues,209 some are 
                                               
208 It is possible that these two descriptions are subtly different, learning to φ and developing a 
capacity to ψ. So perhaps, at this stage, one could use two different Greek variables here (as I have 
done in this note, differently from the body text). As I shall argue, however, this is an unnecessary 
complication: on Aristotle’s view, the verbal specification of that which is being learned or 
developed is the same as the prior activity one performs in order to learn or develop it. I shall argue 
for this view presently. 
209 I note here that, though τέχνη is included in the excellent states of the rational soul discussed in 
EN VI, there may be subtle reasons for denying that the possession of an art counts as a possession 
of a dianoetic virtue properly so-called. On this question cf. VI.5 at 1140b22-30, which some take to 
be evidence that τέχνη is not itself a virtue, but that there is virtue of τέχνη. It is not clear to me that 
one needs to deny that τέχνη in general is a virtue of a particular sort in order to understand the 
point Aristotle is making here vis-à-vis φρόνησις. For example, perhaps τέχνη is a genus of particular 
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nevertheless acquired in part by habituation.210 Given these considerations, perhaps prior activity 
taken more generally is implied in dianoetic learning, but the examples Aristotle gives seem to 
describe prior activity by habituation, rather than prior activity simpliciter.  
 The worry is that, while recognizing something true about Aristotle’s account of learning, my 
first proposed specification of the Learning Principle misses the mark and includes too much of 
what is specific to the habituated mode of prior activity. In our search for a generic characterization 
of the Learning Principle that applies to all learned capacities, both habituated and non-habituated, 
why take examples from the practical and productive cases as a guide? Why ought we to suppose 
that we come to possess speculative knowledge by engaging in the very speculative activities towards 
which the knowledge under development is directed? Why think that we, for example, acquire 
speculative (θεωρητική) knowledge of (e.g.) elephants by speculating about (θεωρεῖν) elephants?211 
3.1.5 The Incoherence Challenge to the Learning Principle 
This is perhaps a fine moment to consider the incoherence challenge to the Learning Principle, since 
how Aristotle replies to this worry might provide some further help in specifying the Principle. In 
particular, as we shall see, Aristotle does not back down or weaken his insistence on the necessity of 
prior activity of an appropriately identical sort; rather, he qualifies the character of the agent who 
engages in such prior activity. The challenge runs thus: how can one become temperate by 
performing temperate acts before one has become temperate, or in general how can one develop a 
capacity by exercising it? How can one learn to do something by doing it, before he has learned? 
Aristotle raises this worry in his account of moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics II.4, but it also comes 
up in his general account of activity and potentiality in Metaphysics Θ.8, as we shall see in the 
following section. Although the discussion in the ethical context has a distinctively ethical flavor, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
virtues, since each art may be considered its own excellent intellectual state. Perhaps, in contrast, 
φρόνησις is a sui generis virtue along with σοφία (Whiting, personal correspondence). 
210 Aristotle in Meta. Θ.5 offers flute-playing as an example of a capacity acquired by habituation, 
suggesting that at least some of the arts are acquired by habituation properly-so-called, assuming 
quite plausibly that flute-playing is an art. He also offers “the arts” collectively as an example of 
capacities acquired by learning (μαθήσει), suggesting that at least some of the arts are acquired by 
both modes. The details of this account will be set aside for future consideration elsewhere. 
211 I use “speculative,” “theoretical,” and “contemplative” knowledge interchangeably to render 
θεωρητική. Similarly I use “(universally) consider,” “speculate,” and “contemplate” interchangeably 
to render θεωρεῖν. 
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very same difficulty is characterized in epistemic terms in the Metaphysics, generalizing to all learning 
including the theoretical kind. Just as prior activity applies to both moral and intellectual virtues, so 
too does this challenge of incoherence. 
 There are, however, other challenges and difficulties which are not so generic. After all, a 
significant part of the discussion in Nicomachean Ethics II.4 concerns the specific conditions of moral 
virtue, ones which do not apply to art or craft. Let us consider the main points of the chapter, 
setting aside those that concern moral virtue in particular. 
[a] Someone might raise the question: what do we mean by saying that we must 
become just by doing just things, and temperate by doing temperate things; for if 
they do just and temperate things, they are already just and temperate, just as if they 
do grammatical and musical things, they are grammatical and musical people. [b] Or 
is it not so even in the case of the arts? It is possible to do something grammatical, 
either by chance or at another’s instruction. So someone will be a grammatical 
person at that time whenever he has done something both grammatical and 
grammatically, and this is to do it according to the grammatical [sc. knowledge] 
within himself. [c] And yet the cases of the arts and the virtues are not the same […] 
[d] So, actions are said to be just and temperate whenever they are such as ones the 
just or the temperate person would do; while the just or temperate person is not the 
one who does these things, but the one who does them also as just and temperate 
people do them. It is well said, then, that the just person comes to be from doing just 
things and the temperate person comes to be from doing temperate things; without 
doing these, no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.212 
                                               
212 EN II.4 1105a17-27, b5-12, following Ross: Ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν 
δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ 
σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ 
καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ 
τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ 
γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν. ἔτι οὐδ’ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν 
τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· […] τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα 
οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ 
δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν 
ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. I omit the end of the chapter with some 
hesitation, not indeed because it is particularly relevant to my present argument, but rather because I 
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While I do not intend to address the peculiarities of the moral case, either presently or in the 
chapters to follow, it is clear that at least some of the trouble addressed in Nicomachean Ethics II.4 
generalizes to all acquired capacities, while indeed leaving some issues distinctive to the acquisition 
of moral virtue alone. Accordingly, it is likely that there are in fact two sets of difficulties Aristotle 
addresses in Nicomachean Ethics II.4: one set which concerns the possibility of prior activity in 
general, and one set which concerns moral habituation in particular (which section of the chapter I 
have, for the most part, omitted in [c]). Though he addresses them here together, given the 
distinctively moral context of the passage, it is nevertheless possible to discern the two distinct sets 
of issues even there in II.4. As before, my proximate aim here is to develop an account of learning-
by-doing that is both generic and generically defensible against these challenges. While I am 
ultimately more concerned with the applications of this framework to the intellectual case, my hope 
is that, once we have a handle on the possibility and intelligibility of prior activity in general, we will 
be better situated to solve issues that are more specific to the moral and the intellectual cases, 
respectively.  
But for the present chapter I am setting aside the peculiar conditions of moral virtues and 
focusing on the coherence challenge to prior activity quite generally. Here the challenge of 
incoherence is generically the same, applying to both grammar and temperance alike, and therefore 
concerns the possibility of prior activity in general: if one learns to φ by φ-ing, how can one φ before 
one has learned how to φ? If one develops a capacity to φ by φ-ing, how can one φ before the 
capacity to φ has developed, no matter whether φ-ing is a moral or intellectual activity? The 
challenge of incoherence is simple and predictable. Not much more needs to be said about the 
challenge itself, except perhaps that Aristotle is aware of the challenge and seems not to be 
particularly worried about it, with a solution ready at hand.  
The key lesson in II.4 is that the student and the expert are truly doing the same things, 
although in different ways. Aristotle specifies the student’s prior activity and the expert’s perfected 
activity with the same adjective; what differs is their adverbial characterization. And he glosses this 
adverb in terms of the knowledge (a developed hexis) in the agent. While the unlearned person 
cannot do grammatical things grammatically, that is in accord with his own knowledge, Aristotle 
nevertheless clearly affirms that the student becomes temperate by doing temperate things and 
                                                                                                                                                       
have always found it particularly damning on a personal level, and indeed on both sides of the 
analogy (cf. 1105b12-18). 
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grammatical by doing grammatical things. What changes is how, but not whether, the student 
engages in the relevant activity. According to Nicomachean Ethics II.4, then, Aristotle does not think 
the expert performs a wholly new activity, but rather the same activity performed by the student, but 
now in a refined and deliberate way, in accord with his own knowledge rather than at another’s 
instruction. Thus through unrefined and undeliberate activity of an appropriate sort, one’s activity 
becomes more refined.213 The unexpected and perhaps uncomfortable consequence for Aristotle’s 
solution to the paradox, however, is that the unlearned person must also already be capable of 
engaging in the relevant activity, though not yet capable of doing it as the expert does. In virtue of 
what capacity is he already so capable?  
In order to answer this question, perhaps Aristotle has in mind subtle distinctions that are 
only implicit in the above passages. I turn to those distinctions later in this chapter. For now, I must 
address a more immediate worry: someone might still be skeptical that this solution would apply to 
the intellectual case and, more specifically, to theoretical knowledge. Perhaps the arts, while unlike 
the moral virtues, are nevertheless more like the moral virtues than either is like theoretical 
knowledge. So I here repeat the skeptical questions raised at the end of the previous section: why 
ought we to suppose that we come to possess speculative knowledge by engaging in the very 
speculative activities towards which the knowledge under development is directed? Why think that 
we, for example, acquire speculative knowledge of elephants by speculating about elephants? 
3.1.6 The Learning Principle in Metaphysics Θ.8 
In reply to the questions of the previous two sections I now turn to two passages a little later in 
Metaphysics Θ, in chapter eight, in which Aristotle provides several different arguments for the 
priority of activity (ἐνέργεια) to potentiality (δύναμις).214 After giving an argument that activity is in 
one sense temporally prior and in another sense temporally posterior to potentiality, he goes on a bit 
of a digression considering our very topic of learning-by-doing. Much of the passage concerns the 
                                               
213 Christopher Taylor suggests a similar view. He offers it, however, as a fix for Aristotle’s lack of 
nuance, being skeptical that he adequately solves the problem. See Nicomachean Ethics: Books II-IV 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 61-63, 81-96. 
214 I choose to translate ἐνέργεια as “activity” rather than “actuality” since this, in my view, more 
appropriately captures the meaning of the term in our passages, at any rate. More thorough 
treatment of this proposal has been offered recently by Kosman (2013) and Marmodoro (2014). 
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usual incoherence challenge to his Learning Principle. Before introducing this challenge, however, he 
describes the Principle in much the same way as we have seen in the Ethics:  
[a] For something existing in activity always comes to be from something existing in 
potentiality by the agency of something actively existing; for example, a man comes 
to be from a man, a musical man comes to be from a musical man, and always from 
some first mover; and the mover is already in activity. [b] And it has been said in the 
discourse on being that everything that comes into being comes to be something 
from something by the agency of something, and this last thing is the same in form. 
[c] For this reason, too, it seems to be impossible for one who has never built 
houses at all to be a house builder, or for one who has never played the lyre at all to 
be a lyre-player: for one who is learning to play the lyre learns to play the lyre by 
playing the lyre, and likewise also other kinds of student. [d] From this arises the 
sophistical quibble that someone not having knowledge will do that towards which 
the knowledge is directed, for the one learning does not have it. [e] But on account 
of the fact that something of the thing coming to be has come to be, and in general 
something of the thing being moved has been moved (and this is clear in the treatises 
on motion), perhaps it is also necessary that the one learning have something of the 
knowledge. [f] But also, then, in this case, at any rate, it is clear that the activity is 
even thus prior to potentiality according to generation and time.215 
Both examples here are of craft, which were indeed mentioned in the relevant ethical passages. With 
this in mind, these examples alone provide no new evidence for the case of speculative knowledge. 
However, in raising the skeptical challenge to this Learning Principle, and in giving his brief solution, 
Aristotle speaks of this Principle in slightly different terms.  
                                               
215 Meta. Θ.8 1049b24-50a3: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ 
ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου·τὸ δὲ 
κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἔστιν. εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγοις ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον 
γίγνεται ἔκ τινος τι καὶ ὑπό τινος, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτό. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ἀδύνατον εἶναι 
οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθὲν ἢ κιθαριστὴν μηθὲν κιθαρίσαντα· ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων 
κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. ὅθεν ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος 
ἐγίγνετο ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων τις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ποιήσει οὗ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων οὐκ ἔχει. ἀλλὰ 
διὰ τὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου γεγενῆσθαί τι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως κινουμένου κεκινῆσθαί τι (δῆλον δ’ ἐν τοῖς 
περὶ κινήσεως τοῦτο) καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴσως. ἀλλ’ οὖν καὶ 
ταύτῃ γε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ οὕτω προτέρα τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρόνον. 
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Note first that he begins by speaking of the Learning Principle in the same way as in the 
Ethics, so that not only is prior activity involved in some generic way, but we learn by doing those 
very things which we are learning how to do.216 Indeed, here he does not signal the sameness of 
these activities with the same adjective as he did before—“doing grammatical things”—but rather 
with the same verb. It is hard to overemphasize Aristotle’s insistence on this point in the above 
passage, since the Greek is even stronger than my English translation: “for one who is learning to 
play the lyre learns to play the lyre by playing the lyre” (ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων 
μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν).  
Furthermore, in this context he also speaks of what is being learned in epistemic terms, 
suggesting that this way of characterizing the prior activity may not hold to the process of 
habituation only, but rather to all acquired hexeis, those that arise by habituation and by logos. Indeed, 
even previously in Nicomachean Ethics II.4 he speaks of the expert doing grammatical things 
grammatically, where this is glossed as “that which is in accord with the grammatical [sc. knowledge] 
within himself” (ὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν). Here, however, the epistemic language is 
explicit.217 Nevertheless, given Aristotle’s habit of using this term (ἐπιστήμη) in stricter and more 
relaxed senses, this is so far insufficient evidence for the stronger claim for which I have been 
advocating. In the light of this passage, it is clearly open to us to think of non-habituated speculative 
knowledge being acquired similarly by prior activity (e.g. ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων θεωρεῖν θεωρῶν 
μανθάνει θεωρεῖν), but we are left seeking a stronger confirmation of the view. 
                                               
216 Cf. EN II.1 1103a32-33. 
217 Though, to be sure, the solution differs slightly from the solution given in EN II.4. While there 
Aristotle concedes that the unlearned person does not have any knowledge, and so is incapable of 
doing grammatical things grammatically, here he suggests that as soon as the learning process has 
begun something of the grammatical knowledge under development must have already come to be. 
Importantly here he is speaking of something which is already in via, and the context of the 
argument in Phys. VI to which he refers requires this. If something is already in the process of 
moving, changing, or coming to be, something of that process must have already been completed. If 
this were not the case, we cannot rightly say that the process has yet begun. How does this account 
“perhaps” apply to the case of learning? Aristotle suggests that if someone is undergoing the process 
of learning, perhaps one must already have come to possess something of the knowledge one is 
presently learning. On this point see APo. B.8 93a21-24. This point is supposed to help defuse the 
worry about the dependence of learning on prior activity. So just as something undergoing a change 
must already possess something of the form to be acquired, so someone undergoing the process of 
learning must already possess something of the knowledge under development. Makin (2006) 
discusses the differences at 189-190. 
 105 
And indeed, in the passage immediately following, Aristotle gives a different argument for 
the priority of activity to potentiality that provides further evidence for my claim. Here he focuses 
on the teleological priority of activity, showing that the purpose or proper function of a capacity is 
prior in some sense to the inactive possession of the same capacity. But he must make a series of 
qualifications because of the difficult case of learning-by-doing: 
[g] Yet indeed activity is prior to potentiality also in being, at any rate, in the first 
place because the things which are posterior in order of generation are prior in form 
and in being (for instance, a man is prior to a boy and a human being is prior to seed: 
for the one already has the form and the other not [yet]), [h] and because everything 
that comes to be advances toward a principle, that is, toward an end (for the that-for-
the-sake-of-which is a principle, and coming-to-be is for the sake of the end), [i] the 
activity is an end and the potentiality is acquired for the sake of this: for the animals 
do not see so that they may have sight, but they have sight in order to see. And 
similarly also they have the art of house building so that they may build houses, and 
speculative knowledge so that they may speculate; but they do not speculate so that 
they may have speculative knowledge, [j] unless they are studying (εἰ μὴ οἱ 
μελετῶντες); but these do not speculate, except in this very way (οὐχὶ θεωροῦσιν 
ἀλλ' ἢ ὡδί) or about something they have no need to speculate.218 
This is of course a very difficult passage, one which ought to be given a treatment of its own 
regarding its specific implications for the intellectual case.219 However, for our present more generic 
purposes, this passage makes clear that those who are contemplating in order to have theoretical 
knowledge (θεωροῦσιν ἵνα θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν) might be thought to be an exception to Aristotle’s 
                                               
218 Meta. Θ.8 1050a4-14, my emphasis added: Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει 
ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ’ οὔ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ 
οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις), τέλος δ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις 
λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ ζῷα ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ 
καὶ οἰκοδομικὴν ἵνα οἰκοδομῶσι καὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν ἵνα θεωρῶσιν· ἀλλ’ οὐ θεωροῦσιν ἵνα 
θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν, εἰ μὴ οἱ μελετῶντες· οὗτοι δὲ οὐχὶ θεωροῦσιν ἀλλ’ ἢ ὡδί, ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν 
δέονται θεωρεῖν.  I see no need to excise ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν δέονται θεωρεῖν with Diels; though it is a 
difficult line, I think a reading can be given that makes sense of his choice of verb. 
219 I shall return to some of these issues in the following chapter, titled fittingly enough 
“Contemplating in Order to Learn.” 
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teleological argument here, hence the parenthetical qualification. Much of our present inquiry turns 
on an interpretation of these lines. 
 His argument proceeds in the following way: 
(i) That which is later in generation is prior in form and in being to what comes earlier. 
(ii) Everything advances toward an end, which is later in generation. 
(iii) Potentiality (δύναμις) is directed toward activity (ἐνέργεια) as its end. 
(iv) So, activity is later in generation than potentiality (ii, iii). 
(v) So, activity is prior in form and in being to potentiality (i, iv). 
Aristotle thus argues for the idea that dynamis must be teleologically directed to energeia as its end and, 
given those prior assumptions, that energeia must therefore be ontologically prior to dynamis.220 This is 
the core premise that he must substantiate, (iii) above, that dynamis is teleologically directed toward 
energeia because energeia is that for the sake of which its respective dynamis is acquired, developed, or 
possessed in the first place. He gives three examples to make this plain: vision, which is a natural 
capacity; the building art, which is an acquired productive capacity; and speculative knowledge 
(θεωρητική), which is an acquired capacity of a different sort. The argument concludes that the 
possession of these several capacities is directed toward their respective use, rather than the other 
way around. In this way, (iv) is substantiated and the argument goes through easily from there (if 
only implicitly in the text). 
But given that he had just cited cases of learning-by-doing earlier in the same chapter, indeed 
in lines immediately preceding this passage, Aristotle anticipates the obvious objection: what about 
those who are building houses or contemplating precisely in order to learn? In reply he gives two 
qualifications to this argument in rapid succession: first, he allows that those who are studying and 
learning are, in some sense, engaging in the relevant activity for the sake of acquisition. But he 
immediately qualifies this qualification: those who are studying are only contemplating in a way (ὡδί) 
and not in the fullest sense. Here he cannot simply mean those who are practicing what they have 
already learned: the context of the passage makes clear that the getting of knowledge is at issue. 
                                               
220 I am suspicious that this line may, in fact, be one of Aristotle’s jokes: καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν 
βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος. Whether one translates the second καὶ as epexegetical or not, the 
line has a curious feel, due to the juxtaposition of ἀρχὴ and τέλος, which is related to the striking 
idea that energeia must be prior to dynamis because it is the end toward which dynamis is directed. Allan 
Gotthelf first suggested to me that Aristotle may have made jokes of this kind; it seems to me this 
joke, in particular, is well suited to Gotthelf’s own more substantive philosophical interests. 
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These two qualifications, in my view, say quite a bit about the place of prior intellectual 
activity in Aristotle’s account. The student’s prior contemplative activity constitutes a pressing 
enough objection that he mentions the case at all, confirming the view I have been urging. Those 
who are engaged in theoretical or speculative learning are in some significant sense contemplating 
that they might acquire and possess theoretical knowledge. But he immediately rejects the force of 
this objection for his present teleological argument, denying that this prior activity is properly an 
end. If those who are learning cannot be said to be engaged in theoretical activity at all, then 
Aristotle would not have needed to make this series of qualifications. His purpose in denying that 
they are contemplating, then, is to deny that their activity is perfected or complete. Given these two, 
as it were, equal and opposite qualifications, we must posit some space for prior activity which is not 
properly an end in itself, but is rather directed toward the development of some capacity or state of 
a capacity.221  
 And yet this is precisely what we should expect if all hexeis, both moral and intellectual, are 
developed by somehow engaging in the very same activity toward which the hexis under 
development is directed. If the expert’s noetic grasp of the essence of elephants allows him to 
intellectually consider the essence of elephants, then the Learning Principle would suggest that 
students come to have that knowledge of elephants by contemplating or intellectually considering 
elephants. If an expert’s epistemic grasp of some geometric proof allows him to deduce some 
conclusion regarding triangles, then this version of the Principle would suggest that students come 
                                               
221 One potential difficulty is the precise meaning of μελετάω here. It typically means “to study” or 
“to practice.” In Aristotle it seems to bear a range of meaning that is not exclusively tied to practice, 
though this is included under it. He speaks in the Prot. at 52.48 of those “who have studied the 
causes and accounts [of the heavenly bodies] (οἱ μὲν τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τοὺς λόγους μεμελετηκότες),” 
clearly indicating a speculative sense. Another Fr. 611.70 speaks of the Spartans who, from 
childhood, practice being short in speech (βραχυλογεῖν). He uses the term somewhat generally at 
Rhet. III.10 1411b11-2, citing the saying “in every respect, practicing small mindedness” as an 
example of metaphor, “for to practice something is to increase it.” While the saying in question 
speaks of practicing φρονεῖν, the principle cited in explaining the metaphor is quite general. 
Furthermore, he uses the verb to give an example in a thoroughly ethical context in EN III.5 1114a8 
which implies habituation, arguing that the moral virtues and vices come to be by doing the activities 
associated with them. Pol. VII.14 1333b39 speaks of practicing military exercises and VIII.6 1341b17 
speaks of an audience’s effects on those practicing musical arts (τοὺς τεχνίτας…μελετῶντας). We 
can conclude, then, that while Aristotle does not use the verb often, he uses it broadly to include 
ethical, technical, practical and theoretical cases. Nevertheless, Ross’ rendering “learning by practice” 
in our passage from Meta. Θ.8 seems to be an over-translation, especially given the explicitly 
theoretical context here. 
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to have demonstrative knowledge of some feature of triangles by performing demonstrations 
concerning that very feature of triangles. And yet the prior activities cited in these cases of learning 
are not ends in themselves but rather an intellectual activity that is performed for the sake of getting 
knowledge and not yet for the pure motive of contemplation as such. This is perhaps what Aristotle 
means when he says that students do not consider intellectually things that they need to consider; 
they have no independent reason to engage in this intellectual activity, which presumably the expert 
has. 
I therefore admit that the student and the expert must differ somehow in their respective 
activities, or rather ways of engaging in the same activity. Perhaps we have arrived at a preliminary 
way of spelling out this distinction: our account must distinguish between the prior activity which is 
performed for the sake of developing a capacity, and the perfected activity of the expert which is the 
fulfillment and end of the developed capacity.222 More indeed must be said about this place-holder 
“somehow.” But as for the characterization of the Learning Principle “those things that we must 
learn how to do, we learn by doing them,” we may associate it not simply with moral or productive 
habituation, but also with hexeis developing by logos, like the arts and scientific knowledge. In some 
important sense, then, we not only come to be temperate by doing temperate things, lyre-players by 
playing the lyre, and grammatical by doing grammatical things, but we also indeed come to be 
knowledgeable about elephants by contemplating elephants. 
3.1.7 Summary and Conclusions 
Let’s take stock so far. In the first sections of this chapter I have argued that we must understand 
Aristotle’s Learning Principle—that we learn by doing—as having a broader application than just the 
moral or ethical case. Accordingly, I have suggested that describing this principle as emphasizing 
“learning through habituation” or “learning by practice” obscures an important feature of Aristotle’s 
account. While it is true for him that we can learn by practice or habituation (ἔθει), we can also learn 
by a rational account (λόγῳ). In both cases, Aristotle is quite clear, the learner must engage in some 
prior activity (προενεργεῖν or ἐνεργεῖν πρότερον). And yet most commentators use the phrase 
“learning through practice” to pick out precisely this feature, the need for prior activity. This has led, 
                                               
222 My idea, then, is that just as there is a fulfillment or actuality (ἐντελέχεια) which is not an activity 
(ἐνέργεια), so there is an activity which is not perfected as a fulfillment or actuality. This will be 
developed more precisely in the next section. 
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in my view, to an under-appreciation for the role of prior activity in both kinds of learning, both 
ethical and dianoetic, thereby conflating the difficulty of prior activity in general with the difficulties 
peculiar to moral or ethical formation (e.g. concerning right motivation, choice, pleasure and pain, 
etc.). On the other hand, even those who recognize the importance of prior activity for intellectual 
development often use the language of “intellectual habituation,” which risks a similar entanglement 
with the peculiarities of moral formation. Interpreters have been right to worry about characterizing 
theoretical learning in terms of habituation, since such learning proceeds by logos. But in the face of 
this, we should not deny prior intellectual activity, but rather intellectual habituation. 
In contrast, I have argued that we should understand habituation to be one distinctive mode 
of prior activity involved in moral formation, with logos being another such mode of prior activity 
involved in intellectual formation. This makes sense of the datives specifying two kinds of capacities 
by their two modes of acquisition in Metaphysics Θ.5 (τῶν δὲ ἔθει [...], τῶν δὲ μαθήσει at 1047b32-3 
and ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ at 1047b35), both of which similarly involve proenergeia. There will be 
peculiarities to each case, but we can begin with similarities first, especially when the challenge of 
incoherence concerns what is common to both (i.e. prior activity). In the light of these remarks and 
others from Θ.8, I have described Aristotle’s Learning Principle in the following abstract and 
generic terms to apply to all cases of learning: 
Learning Principle: If φ-ing is something we learn to do, we learn to φ by actively φ-ing. 
It is therefore by actively engaging in the very activity toward which the capacity under development 
is directed that the student develops a capacity. Accordingly, I follow Aristotle in specifying these 
two activities with the same verb, and indeed insisting on this: the activity of the student and that of 
the expert must be the same activity at some non-trivial level of description. 
 So far, however, I have simply widened the scope of the classical incoherence challenge to 
this Learning Principle: it is the very notion of prior activity which is the sticking point. After my 
intervention, this challenge now threatens all kinds of learning, both moral and intellectual. One may 
still rightly ask: how can one learn to φ by φ-ing, before one has learned to φ? Although we have 
made note of Aristotle’s replies to this worry, I have suggested that his solution simply raises a 
further question: if the student is already somehow engaged in the same activity as the expert, in virtue 
of what capacity is the student already so capable? I have suggested that he must have in mind subtle 
distinctions regarding capability and capacity more generally.  
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And here it is helpful to recall that my approach in this chapter is oblique and dual-faceted: I 
have proposed, in the first place, that this abstract and preliminary specification of the Learning 
Principle will help us to develop a more subtle interpretation of the so-called Triple Scheme of 
dynamis, hexis, and energeia and, in the second place, that this revised and corrected version of the 
Triple Scheme will help us in turn to defend the coherence of the Learning Principle with which we 
began. So it is to the Triple Scheme of de Anima II.5, with its distinctions regarding potentiality and 
actuality—or better, capacity and teleological fulfillment (περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας)—that my 
argument now turns. 
3.2 THE TRIPLE SCHEME 
The aim of this section is to revisit the distinctions in kinds of potentiality and actuality that Aristotle 
develops in de Anima II.5 with the preceding treatment of the Learning Principle in mind, an aspect 
of Aristotle’s thought that is not typically emphasized in the literature on the so-called Triple 
Scheme.223 Of particular interest will be the kind of dynamis that is often called first potentiality 
which Aristotle attributes to the unlearned person. 
3.2.1 The Triple Scheme Introduced 
“Triple Scheme” is the term used by Myles Burnyeat and others to describe Aristotle’s various 
distinctions between potentiality, actuality and activity found in de Anima II.5.224 There Aristotle 
presents several distinctions in preparation for his detailed account of the perceptual powers of the 
soul. Regarding the first distinction between two senses of potentiality, Aristotle writes: 
[a] But we must also make distinctions concerning potentiality and actuality; for just 
now we have been speaking about them without qualification. [b] For in one way 
“knower” is as we might call a man a knower, because a man is of the class of 
                                               
223 Burnyeat (2002) considers this when he introduces the Triple Scheme at 53, but then goes on 
immediately to minimize the role of learning-by-doing in the change occuring throughout the 
learning process at 54-56. He focuses on change, so that activity plays no substantive role in his 
account. 
224 See e.g. Burnyeat (2002); Burnyeat, Aristotle’s Divine Intellect (2008). Heinaman (2007); Bowin, 
(2011); Bowin (2012). 
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knowers and those having knowledge, [c] and in another way, as we call someone a 
knower who already possesses [e.g.] grammatical knowledge. [d] Each of these is 
capable (δυνατός), but not in the same way (οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον), the one because 
his kind and his matter is of a certain sort, the other because he can contemplate at 
will (βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν), unless something from without should stand in 
the way. [e] But the one already contemplating is actually (ἐντελεχείᾳ) and properly 
knowing this A. [f] Both of the first two, then, are potential knowers, but the one 
[comes to be] having been altered through learning and having changed often from a 
contrary state, while the other [comes to be] from possessing sense225 or grammatical 
knowledge but not exercising it to exercising it in another way (ἄλλον τρόπον).226 
Aristotle here points out that before one learns grammar one must have a certain potentiality or 
capacity to learn grammar. And yet even after one has learned grammar, one still remains in a state 
of potentiality whenever this knowledge is inactive: the fullest and most complete actuality is 
achieved only when actively using grammar. The second stage tends to receive more attention 
because it is metaphysically amphibious: in one way inactive possession of knowledge is a fulfillment 
of some more basic capacity to learn, while in another way it remains potential insofar as it is 
inactive and unused.227 So conceived, Aristotle’s three-fold distinction is intuitive and helpful to 
articulate even the most basic claims about these sorts of capacities, regarding both their 
development and their exercise. 
 Moreover, this passage immediately reminds the reader of a distinction from de Anima II.1 
between two kinds or aspects of actuality or fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) in which knowledge and its use 
                                               
225 Many find it necessary to read “mathematical knowledge,” arithmētikēn instead of aisthēsin. The 
view I develop offers some justification for a mention of aisthēsin, the reading of all the manuscripts 
and commentaries (except Themistius’ paraphrase). 
226 de An. II.5 417a21-b2: διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας· νῦν γὰρ ἁπλῶς 
ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐπιστῆμόν τι ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμονα ὅτι 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμην· ἔστι δ’ ὡς ἤδη λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν 
ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν· ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ὅτι 
τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὁ δ’ ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν· 
ὁ δ’ ἤδη θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε τὸ Α. ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ 
πρῶτοι, κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ 
ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως, ὁ δ’ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ, 
εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἄλλον τρόπον. 
227 See also de An. III.4 429b5-9 and Phys. VIII.4 255a30-b13. 
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is also the example. There Aristotle is seeking a generic definition of soul and concludes that soul is 
more like form, which is an actuality. Twice he makes the following distinction between kinds of 
actuality: 
[a] The matter is potentiality and the form is actuality (ἐντελέχεια), and this is said in 
two ways, on the one hand like knowledge and on the other hand like contemplating. 
[…] [b] Consequently it is necessary that the soul be a substance as the form of a 
natural body having life potentially. And substance is actuality. Therefore [soul is] the 
actuality of this sort of body. [c] But this is said in two ways, on the one hand like 
knowledge, and on the other hand like contemplating. [d] Thus it is clear that [the 
soul is actuality] like knowledge: for both sleep and wakefulness exist in virtue of 
soul being present, wakefulness is analogous to contemplating and sleep is analogous 
to having but not exercising [sc. knowledge] (τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν). [e] But 
knowledge is prior in generation [sc. to the use of knowledge] in the individual case. 
[f] Wherefore soul is the first actuality (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη) of a natural body 
potentially having life.228  
It is therefore tempting to interpret the two passages as describing the same distinction, and even to 
consider de Anima II.1 as one of the three loci classici in which Aristotle appeals to the Triple Scheme 
of act and potency.229 Further, it is understandable why one would identify the first sort of actuality 
with the second sort of potentiality, insofar as both involve having knowledge but not exercising it. 
Since Aristotle explicitly calls this “first actuality” (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη) one can name the other 
stages (e.g. first potentiality, second actuality, etc.) from this, as is commonly done.230 
                                               
228 De An. 412a9-11, 19-28: ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ 
δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἡ δ’ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια· τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια. αὕτη δὲ 
λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ’ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ 
ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δ’ ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, 
ὁ δ’ ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν· προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ἡ 
ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. 
229 The third is Phys. VIII.4. As Burnyeat (2002) 48-51 and Bowin (2011) 152-3 n35 point out, 
however, II.1 gives an incomplete version of the Triple Scheme, and Burnyeat is skeptical of 
wheeling Phys. in. 
230 As Burnyeat (2002) notes at 50-1, aspects of the scheme are incompletely described and (on his 
view) perhaps foreshadowed in de Anima II.1 when Aristotle gives two senses of ἐντελέχεια.  
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The three stages so far described, at any rate, are uncontroversial. What is up for 
interpretation, however, is the precise relationship between them, especially when all three are 
mentioned in de Anima II.5. For example, does Aristotle mean for these three stages to be taken 
successively, so the first stage does not admit of activity at all? Or rather, does he intend to show 
how the two sorts of potentiality both already admit of activity but in different ways? Strictly 
speaking Aristotle in de Anima II.5 mentions two sorts of potentiality and only one sort of entelecheia, 
namely contemplative activity. Although the second stage can be conceived of as an actuality (as 
above in de Anima II.1), Aristotle does not use the term “actuality” or entelecheia to describe it in II.5, 
the passage which is our focus. So, to what extent these two passages ought to be read together, and 
what the precise relationship between the three stages might be, very much remains up for 
interpretation. 
3.2.2 The Standard View of the Triple Scheme 
It is clear, at any rate, why interpreting these two passages alongside each other is inviting, and in 
particular why one would identify the first sort of actuality discussed in II.1 with the second sort of 
potentiality discussed in II.5, both exemplified by the inactive possession of knowledge. Interpreting 
these two passages closely together produces the Standard View of the Triple Scheme:231  
 
Figure 2. The Standard View of the Triple Scheme 
 Stage232 1: First Potentiality   Capacity to learn grammar 
 Stage 2: First Actuality/   Having learned grammar/ 
   Second Potentiality   Capacity to use grammar    
 Stage 3: Second Actuality   Using grammar233 
                                               
231 In what follows, I bring several different views under a single heading. It is true that people may 
be committed to what I am calling the “Standard View” in varying degrees, either in strength or in 
explicitness, but I take it to be a sufficiently common and dominant view that the name is merited. 
232 A note about the diagram: these stages are not principally temporal, though it follows that the 
first stage must temporally precede the second stage. And further, on this model, one must come to 
possess the hexis at second potentiality before one can exhibit the fully developed energeia at second 
actuality. Nevertheless, these stages are not principally temporal but metaphysical, indicating stages 
in the life, as it were, of a capacity. Importantly, on the Standard View, the higher stage is the 
fulfilment or actualization of what came before, and so what comes before must have already been 
established before proceeding to the next stage. One question I shall raise, however, is whether it is 
appropriate to characterize the distinctions in II.1 and II.5 as “stages” in this way at all. 
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Accordingly, there are two intertwined potentiality-actuality pairs, so that stage (1) (first potentiality) 
is directed straightforwardly to stage (2) (first actuality), and then stage (2) (now as second 
potentiality) is directed straightforwardly to stage (3) (second actuality). On this view, each 
potentiality is directed simply and straightforwardly toward its respective actuality, taking the two 
potentialities from II.5 to be fulfilled, respectively, in the two actualities from II.1. The first 
transition is therefore a process ending in a developed capacity, while the second transition proceeds 
from an already developed capacity toward activity. So, these two distinct transitions are intertwined 
due to the convergence of first actuality and second potentiality, together constituting the second 
stage. The Standard View is a linear model from a capacity for development, to a developed capacity 
for activity, finally to its correlative activity. 
 As it is typically characterized, then, first potentiality is merely the capability to become 
actually capable, a capacity for developing some actual capacity, or a “raw potentiality.”234 First 
actuality, constituting the second stage, is an actual capacity in virtue of which someone is truly 
capable of engaging in the relevant activity. Strong proponents of the Standard View explicitly say 
that the original first potentiality must be developed into first actuality before it can admit of activity 
in any respect.235 First potentiality as such does not admit of any activity, but admits of activity only 
                                                                                                                                                       
233 Perhaps “saying something grammatical” or even “grammatically.” This is difficult, as will be 
clear.  
234 See, for example, Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 232: “The unlearned person has raw or undeveloped potentiality, where the knowledgeable 
person has developed potentiality or a dispositional capacity to do something” (my emphasis). 
235 See, for example, Pavlos Kontos, “Non-Virtuous Intellectual States in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47 (2014): 207: “Aristotle claims that every human being is potentially a 
knower (epistemōn), and that ‘man is among the knowers and those who possess knowledge’. Being a 
knower, however, is something that admits of different levels of realization. If we can come to know 
Greek, it is because we have a first potentiality which is due to our being rational creatures. This 
first potentiality remains dissociated from any sort of actualization, however, as long as it 
does not take the form of a second potentiality (the acquired ability to speak Greek)” (my 
emphasis). The upshot here is that, on Kontos’ reading, the capacity at first potentiality must acquire 
some further determinate form in order for it to admit of any sort of actualization, which I read to 
mean activity or energeia. After all, second potentiality or first actuality counts as a sort of 
actualization in the sense of entelecheia, which he surely cannot be ruling out here. So, the quote sums 
up nicely the kind of consensus that has formed in how first potentiality is conceived in II.5, which I 
am calling the Standard View, since Kontos claims this as part of a preliminary and ostensibly 
uncontroversial exposition. 
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by way of first developing into an actual capacity at the second stage.236 So on this view only a 
person at second potentiality is truly capable of engaging in activity. So goes the Core Claim of the 
Standard View: 
Core Claim:  At first potentiality, before one has perfected and developed one’s  
  capacity to φ, one is yet incapable of actively φ-ing.237 
Now, to be sure, the Standard View into which this Core Claim fits is somewhat well-
motivated. It is true that the inactive possession of a developed capacity (at first actuality) truly is the 
perfection and fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) of the undeveloped capacity (at first potentiality). Once the 
student learns, it is right to say that some capacity has been actualized and perfected in him. 
Furthermore, it is right to say that the learned person is most fully and perfectly capable of φ-ing. 
The second sort of potentiality is capability at its most complete and most capable, just as the 
second sort of actuality (sc. refined activity issuing from that knowledge) is perfection and realization 
                                               
236 See, for example, Aryeh Kosman, The Activity of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2013), 57-62, especially at 57: “Humans in general have the ability to speak French in that they have 
the capacity to learn any language and to come to speak it. A normal infant, for example, is able to 
speak French in the way in which a dog or a dolphin is not able, even though in another way she is 
unable to speak if she has yet to learn the language.” And at 59: “There is therefore a sense in 
which our infant’s ability to speak French is a double ability; it is, as it were, the ability to be able 
to speak French (where to speak French refers to what we have called actively speaking 
French), as distinct from the ability of an adult French speaker, who has realized that ability and 
already is able to speak French” (my emphasis). See also Everson (1997) 91: “Even an infant can 
truly be said to have the capacity for literacy—this is to say that it is capable of acquiring a 
knowledge of reading and writing. This capacity, however, is a different capacity from that 
possessed by someone who has already acquired that knowledge since, unlike the infant, he is able to 
use it. The first capacity is realized when the second capacity is acquired, whilst the latter is 
realized when the knowledge is exercised.” See also Wedin (1988) 44: “Children are potential 
knowers not in the sense that they are capable of producing actual pieces of knowledge but only in 
the sense that they are capable of becoming actual producers of knowledge. They do this by 
acquiring certain structures that enable them, for example, to give a geometric proof on demand.”  
237 A very closely related claim is that first potentiality as such is not proximately a capacity for the 
activity ultimately aimed at, but is only a capacity for development. Using the language of “passive” 
is difficult here, as Aristotle himself notes immediately following our II.5: on the one hand, passive 
capacities are things capable of being acted upon, such as something that is capable of being heated 
or, in general, capable of being developed. But there is another kind of passive activity such as 
perception or intellection, whereby some object acts on some perceptual or intellectual subject 
without changing the subject. While granting that all intellectual activity is passive in this sense, I 
nevertheless insist that learning is not passive like something being heated. But as the consensus 
holds it, first potentiality is not a capacity for activity, but only a capacity for passive development 
into such a capacity. 
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in its fullest degree.238 In order to understand fully Aristotle’s precise argument in II.5, however, it is 
not sufficient to have only these three stages in view, but also to understand the relations and 
transitions between them. What makes the Standard View distinctive is characterizing first 
potentiality itself in merely passive and developmental terms, denying that first potentiality as such 
could also and already be a capacity to actively engage in the relevant activity.  
Most authors assume, in accordance with the Standard View above, that when Aristotle 
distinguishes the two sorts of potential knower in II.5 he also has in mind their respective actualities 
(ἐντελέχειαι) as discussed in II.1, and they go on to presume linear transitions between them. 
Because of the clear identification of these stages across the different argumentative contexts, the 
Standard View takes a further step and uses the context of II.1 to fix the relations and transitions 
between these stages as they are introduced in II.5. So, if we read these two passages closely enough 
together, then the first kind of potential knower in II.5 is only capable of the acquisition and 
possession of knowledge, being directed toward the first sort of actuality from II.1. Importantly, 
however, on the Standard View the first potential knower is not said to be capable of or directed 
toward intellectual activity in any respect, since (on this view) only the second potential knower is 
capable of doing that. The Core Claim is designed to capture this distinctive feature of the Standard 
View: first potentiality as such is not a capacity for activity, but only a capacity for development. 
 Accordingly, on the Standard View the first transition is from the potential knower in virtue 
of his kind and matter to his actuality as a knower who possesses but does not use his knowledge. 
The second transition is understood to be from the potential knower in possession of knowledge 
but not using it to his actually exercising the knowledge he already has. Aristotle says that the second 
transition is accomplished at will, thus giving us a class of second transitions in which developed 
capacities come to be actualized in their respective activities. The first transition, from the first grade 
of potential knower to the second, is said to come about “having been altered through learning and 
having often changed from a contrary state.”239 
 Authors vary in how explicitly they are committed to this view, but the vast majority begin 
by conceiving of first and second potentiality as substantially different sorts of potentialities, one 
                                               
238 See Meta. Θ.3 1047a30-31: “The word ‘activity’ (ἐνέργεια), which is placed together with 
‘actuality’ (ἐντελέχειαν), […].” See also Meta. Θ.8 1050a21-23: “For the function (ἔργον) is the end 
(τέλος), and the activity (ἐνέργεια) is the function, and for this reason the word ‘activity’ is said 
according to the function and stretches toward actuality (ἐντελέχειαν).” 
239 De An. II.5 417a32-3: διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως. 
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that is merely directed toward development and one that is directed toward activity in the proper 
sense. Some may allow that prior activity is involved in some cases of capacity’s development, but 
they do not consider prior activity to be an exercise of first potentiality as such.240 Others explicitly 
deny the relevance of learning by doing to our conception of first potentiality, perhaps even seeing it 
as a potential problem.241 For the most part, however, the idea of learning by doing is simply not 
mentioned in the context of interpreting the Triple Scheme, and so many are not explicitly 
committed to the Core Claim. But, by my lights, these authors still overemphasize the way in which 
first potentiality is a capacity to learn and to acquire or develop some capacity, so that by omission 
they lean in favor of the Standard View, only speaking of exercise or activity once someone has 
already learned.242 My concern is that the Standard View has become so common when speaking 
about the distinctions Aristotle introduces in act and potency, that most risk minimizing to the point 
of denying his commitment to learning-by-doing, which is another essential feature of “first 
potentiality.”  
Moreover, most remain implicitly committed to the Standard View because they apply the 
Triple Scheme to the development of natural capacities, most commonly to the development of 
perceptual capacities. To see how this would commit someone to the Core Claim, let us recall that 
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics II.1 states quite clearly that knowledge and virtue develop by engaging 
in relevantly identical prior activity, while perception does not develop in this way. It is not by often 
seeing that we develop eyesight, and so whatever state precedes the development of eyesight is 
decidedly not yet capable of engaging in visual activity. Now, to be sure, the development of 
                                               
240 Cf. e.g. Burnyeat (2002) and Kosman (2003). 
241 Bowin (2011) at 143 prefers to discuss those “forms of learning [that] are not achieved through 
practicing what is learned, but merely through absorbing it from a teacher.” He goes on to grant, 
citing Kosman (2003), “a subject may be said to change toward a disposition by means of the activities 
that the disposition is a disposition for, as in dispositions acquired through practice.” He maintains a 
skepticism that Aristotle saved the coherence of this idea. Nevertheless, Bowin’s reading allows that 
these activities can contribute to the getting of dispositions; however he does not entertain the 
possibility that first potentiality is not only directed toward acquiring and possessing “dispositions,” 
hence his desire to stick to cases of learning-by-absorption and to set aside cases of learning-by-
doing. Besides the fact that learning-by-absorption (or by mere absorption) is impossible on 
Aristotle’s view—that is, if I am right—the idea of prior activity would render the account of first 
transitions in Bowin (2012) even more interesting. But as things stand, he mentions learning by prior 
activity only with great reluctance. 
242 Johansen (2012) 23-24, 138-9, 158-61, 241. 
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knowledge and of vision are alike in some broad sense. But if first potentiality applies also to natural 
capacities, first potentiality as such need not be a capacity for engaging in prior activity.  
For these more implicit adherents to the Core Claim, their conception of first potentiality is 
at issue, so that the prior activity involved in learning is merely accidental to their conception of 
these metaphysical distinctions. On a view of this sort, what is common to natural and learned 
capacities and what is essential to first potentiality is the capacity to develop simpliciter, and not the 
capacity for development specifically by prior activity. In this way, many are implicitly committed to 
the Core Claim of the Standard View. Whatever their differences, my opponents agree that first 
potentiality as such is a passive capacity for development, perhaps but not necessarily by learning. 
And this view is motivated in large part by reading de Anima II.1 and II.5 together. 
3.2.3 Initial Worries about the Standard View 
This assumption about Aristotle’s purpose and meaning in II.5 is implicit or unargued in many 
authors and lies at the heart of the Standard View of the Triple Scheme: first potentiality is directed 
principally and proximately toward the acquisition of yet another more determinate capacity, and 
therefore only derivatively or remotely toward engaging in some activity. Potentiality of the first sort 
in II.5 is directed at actuality of the first sort in II.1, namely a settled and developed hexis; potentiality 
of the second sort in II.5 is directed at actuality of the second sort from II.1, namely energeia. 
Accordingly, the only activity that most commentators mention is the refined activity of the learned 
person, characterizing first potentiality simply a capacity for getting an actual capacity, a capacity for 
becoming truly capable. The result is that on these interpretations, first potentiality is something that 
can apply also to passive capacities that develop by nature rather than by prior activity.243  
 Even on first glance, however, subtle differences between the discussions of de Anima II.1 
and II.5 suggest that the Standard View is oversimplified, at least in the tendency of its adherents to 
read these two passages closely alongside each other. First and most obviously, the distinction in II.1 
is between two different sorts of actuality (ἐντελέχεια), while the distinction in II.5 mostly concerns 
two different sorts of potentiality (δύναμις). While it is true that Aristotle introduces this passage 
                                               
243 This is not necessary, but rather an intimately related and friendly thesis to the Standard View. 
Since first potentiality is not conceived of as (necessarily) capable itself of any activity, it follows that 
undeveloped capacities which develop in a purely passive way (i.e. by nature) are included as first 
potentialities. Natural capacities will be discussed in a later section of the chapter. 
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saying that distinctions must be made between potentiality and actuality alike, he goes on to give two 
sorts of potentiality and only one kind of actuality (ἐντελέχεια), here identified with activity 
(ἐνέργεια). That is to say, what is called “first actuality” in II.1 is considered to be a second kind of 
potentiality here, while the only kind of actuality which is named here in II.5 was the second sort 
mentioned in II.1, energeia.  
 The Standard View certainly recognizes this, and accordingly builds out from Aristotle’s 
term “first actuality” (πρώτη ἐντελέχεια) from II.1 to give us a set of four terms, with second 
potentiality coinciding with first actuality. While this reading itself may have some prima facie 
plausibility, it already risks oversimplifying the different points of emphasis between the two 
passages, thereby prejudicing readers against other possible readings of II.5. According to a possible 
alternative, one which I shall go on to defend, two ways of being capable of engaging in a single 
activity are being distinguished in II.5. On that reading, Aristotle does not have in mind two kinds of 
potentialities and their respective actualities, but rather two kinds of being capable of engaging in a 
single activity. Among other things, such a reading would make some sense of the fact that in the 
context of II.5, only the last of the three knowers mentioned is said to be in actuality (ἐντελεχείᾳ), 
suggesting that both potential knowers are being related and directed to a single fulfillment or 
perfection, namely activity. The Standard View seeks to assimilate the two chapters in a 
straightforward way, and as a result risks minimizing or ignoring entirely these subtle differences. 
 Furthermore, given what Aristotle says later in II.5 about the disanalogies between the 
development of sense and intellect, namely that one comes about through learning and teaching 
while the other comes about through natural generation, we might expect even the initial scheme to 
be sensitive to these differences.244 In fact, this distinction is perhaps foreshadowed in Aristotle’s 
description of the second sort of potential knower as someone “possessing sense or grammatical 
knowledge.”245 Many recent interpreters, however, follow Themistius’ paraphrase and emend the 
text to read “mathematical [knowledge]” (ἀριθμητικὴν) instead of “sense” (αἴσθησιν), for a number 
of reasons.246 The most prominent is the assumption that the entire Triple Scheme, as many 
understand it, is meant to apply analogously to sense and intellect alike. But against the background 
                                               
244 Cf. de An. II.5 417b16-24. 
245 De An. II.5 417a32-b1. 
246 Cf. Ross’ (1961) ad loc. See also Burnyeat (2002) 153 n68. Philoponus, Simplicius, and Sophonius 
all read αἴσθησιν, along with all other manuscripts we have. 
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of the alternative I am urging, which has been to point out the differences between natural and 
acquired capacities on Aristotle’s view, we might be suspicious from the start that the analogy 
between knowledge and perception might break down at the level of first potentiality. The rigid 
linear schema of the Standard View risks ruling out any possible disanalogy here, and even motivates 
changing the text to erase what might have been an explicit cue that Aristotle had this disanalogy in 
view even earlier in the exposition of these various distinctions. 
 Finally, most of these standard readings are not attentive to a possible distinction between 
actuality (ἐντελέχεια) and activity (ἐνέργεια) in Aristotle’s account, especially in his usage between 
the two passages in view, de Anima II.1 and II.5. We already know that these Greek terms can come 
apart on the basis of the discussion in II.1: there first actuality (πρώτη ἐντελέχεια) is defined as 
having knowledge but not exercising it (ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν). While it is true for both passages 
that both terms can describe the person who is actually engaged in activity and putting knowledge to 
use, these interpretations are unable to accommodate the possibility of activity being involved 
elsewhere in the schema. Given that an entelecheia is possible that is not as such an energeia (namely first 
actuality or πρώτη ἐντελέχεια), we should be prima facie suspicious of a schema which rules out the 
very possibility of an energeia which is not itself a complete or perfect entelecheia. 
 This is especially important when reading our passage, since Aristotle suggests that the 
second kind of potential knower goes from not exercising his knowledge to exercising it in another 
way (ὁ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν γραμματικὴν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ, εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἄλλον 
τρόπον).247 Though the sentence is incomplete, most commentators supply some form of γίγνεσθαι 
ἐπιστήμων, and I am not opposed to this aspect of their reading, at least. The most natural way to 
read this line, however, is for “in another way” (ἄλλον τρόπον) to be describing the transition to 
activity (εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν), so that the difference between the two knowers is how they transition to 
activity. In support of this idea is the consistent description of someone with a hexis, both here and 
elsewhere, as someone who can exercise their (e.g.) knowledge at will. The specific difference 
Aristotle cites is not that the second sort of potential knower can contemplate simpliciter, but rather at 
will.248 But, because the Standard View presumes a deflated sense of first potentiality from the start, 
                                               
247 De An. II.5 417a32-b2. 
248 De An. III.4 429b5-9. More must be said about degrees of refinement and deliberateness of 
activity throughout the process of development. 
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it has trouble reading these lines in the text in the natural way, and must argue that allon tropon 
modifies something else.249 
 At the outset it is important to note, then, that the Standard View of the Triple Scheme 
understands first potentiality as a mere capacity for gaining a further capacity, as a kind of “raw 
potentiality” which, of itself, cannot yet admit of any activity until and unless it has developed into 
second potentiality. This is most clearly contained in what I am calling the Core Claim of the 
Standard View, that “At first potentiality, before one has perfected and developed one’s capacity to 
φ, one is yet incapable of actively φ-ing.” These interpreters see activity (ἐνέργεια) as following from 
the second stage of the scheme as they understand it, but their reading denies, either implicitly or 
explicitly, that activity is possible elsewhere. Furthermore, even for those who allow this possibility, 
it is not part of how they conceive of first potentiality as such, considering the capacity for prior 
activity to be accidental to what makes first potentiality a potentiality. 
As we have seen, this raises three prima facie worries about the Standard View as a matter of 
interpreting II.5: (i) it merges the discussions of II.1 and II.5, possibly losing sight of what is 
distinctive to the respective passages, in particular regarding what Aristotle chooses to call 
potentiality and actuality in each place; (ii) in doing so it treats natural and acquired capacities as both 
falling under the Triple Scheme in an analogous way, in particular assuming that first potentiality 
applies to both kinds of capacity; and (iii) in making this assumption about first potentiality (viz. that 
it is “mere” or “raw” potential), the Standard View has trouble accommodating parts of II.5 that 
suggest the difference between the two sorts of potential knower is not their respective capability or 
incapability of engaging in intellectual activity simpliciter, but rather their respective capability or 
incapability of intellectual activity in a very distinctive way, namely well or correctly, and whenever one 
wishes.  
3.2.4 A Non-Standard Defender of the Core Claim 
My opponents are, for the most part then, committed to the idea that first and second potentialities 
differ in that the first is a passive potentiality for being acted upon while the second is an active 
potentiality (at least in some respect) for acting and engaging in activity. Mary Louise Gill is 
                                               
249 Cf. e.g. Hicks (1907) 356: “417b1 ἄλλον τρόπον. Take these words with μεταβαλὼν understood, 
“by another sort of change,” and not with ἐνεργεῖν.” This raises the question: by another sort of 
change to what? The answer is only given in the case of one who is exercising his knowledge. 
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something of a special case, since she and I both read de Anima II.5 as outlining two potentialities of 
a similar sort that are directed to the same thing in different ways. Before considering our 
similarities, she nevertheless is committed to the Core Claim, so that the capacity to act only comes 
at the second stage. She writes: 
Aristotle describes the second potential knower as one who possesses the relevant 
knowledge (417a24-25); the change leading to that possession has already occurred, 
and consequently the subject and his goal have been successfully unified. The second 
subject is said to be δυνατός in the sense that, when he wishes, he is able to theorize 
(δυνατός θεωρεῖν) if nothing external interferes (417a27-28). Since the property 
acquired by means of the change is itself a capacity for some activity, the second 
subject has a capacity that the first subject lacks.250 
So, on Gill’s view, that which is acquired and possessed by the second potential knower is a capacity 
for activity, something that the first potential knower lacked. She is therefore explicitly committed to 
the Standard View because she straightforwardly considers first potentiality to be a passive 
potentiality, a capacity to be acted upon but not, as such, to act. She explicitly denies that a person at 
first potentiality is capable of theorizing or engaging in intellectual activity of any sort. 
Gill’s account is slightly more complex, however, meriting special mention here. For her, 
both potentialities are similar in that they are both potentialities for gaining and having a property or 
state. While second potentiality makes the second sort of knower capable of activity, this is not what 
second potentiality is as such. It just so happens that the property in question is a capacity for activity. 
Indeed, immediately after the above passage she goes on to explain:  
Since the property acquired by means of the change is itself a capacity for some 
activity, the second subject has a capacity that the first subject lacks. But the issue is 
not his capacity for activity but his potentiality for the capacity or state that enables 
the activity. This potentiality is second level rather than first because, in virtue of 
possessing the capacity, he can exercise at will, if not prevented. The distinction 
between the two levels of potentiality thus turns on the actual state of the subject.251 
Gill is therefore interested in explaining how both potential knowers are examples of passive 
potentialities, that is, potentialities for the acquisition and possession of some property. For her it is 
                                               
250 Mary Louise Gill, Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity (1991), 181. 
251 Ibid. 
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merely accidental to the case that the property being acquired is a capacity for an activity. Indeed, 
she also uses the Greek variable φ, but for her φ stands in for a property or positive state, the form 
that stands opposed to privation and which is the goal of a change. In my case, in contrast, the φ 
toward which these two potentialities are both directed is an activity, not a state, form, or property. 
Nevertheless, her view resembles mine structurally given how we read II.5. We both 
emphasize that the difference between the two potential knowers is a state of a capacity that exists in 
a different way or at a different stage in both. We agree, in short, that both first and second 
potentialities are directed at the same φ. On this narrow interpretive point, I agree with her analysis, 
which is worth quoting at length: 
The most common view of Aristotle’s distinction is that the first subject has a 
potentiality for the first actuality (the state of knowledge) and the second knower a 
potentiality for the second actuality (the activity of theorizing). Clearly, Aristotle does 
think that the second subject has a potentiality that the first subject lacks, since the 
positive character acquired by means of the change—the knowledge—is itself a 
capacity for an activity. Thus, the second subject can theorize because this activity is 
made possible by the knowledge that he has acquired. The question is whether this is 
the distinction at issue in II.5, and there is reason to doubt that it is. de Anima II.1 
points out that the term “actuality” (ἐντελέχεια) is ambiguous and can apply either 
to knowledge (the first actuality) or to theorizing (the second actuality). Aristotle 
does not say that “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) is ambiguous, yet the standard 
interpretation of II.5 assumes that it is. Given Aristotle’s distinction in II.1, he could 
easily have said in II.5 that the first subject is a potential knower, the second a 
potential theorizer. Instead, he calls both subjects “potential knowers” (κατὰ 
δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες). Since he distinguishes knowledge from theorizing in II.1, as 
two sorts of actualities, his language in II.5 is likely to be carefully chosen. If his 
language is precise, then both subjects should have a potentiality for the same goal—
the state of knowledge—which is the first actuality. On this view, the potentialities 
are related to the same end, but the subjects have the potentiality in different ways 
(417a26)252 
                                               
252 Ibid. 178. 
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So, Gill and I read the passage in the same way in this important respect, that both potential 
knowers are directed toward the same thing. We diverge, however, in what we conclude as a result: I 
say that the capacity in both cases is active and directed at the same activity, where the variable φ 
stands in for some activity, namely theorizing and knowing this here A. Her conclusion, in contrast, 
is that the capacity in both cases is passive and directed at the acquisition, development, and 
possession of some property, namely the state of knowledge, so that the variable φ stands in for a 
property or state. And again, although she concedes that the second sort of potential knower is 
capable of engaging in theoretical activity, she does not take this to be the relevant “issue” or respect 
in which he is said to be a potential knower in this passage. This seems to turn on her understanding 
“to know” (ἐπίστασθαι) in an inert way for Aristotle. But, as Aristotle makes clear, the one who is 
“already theorizing” is also “actually and in the most proper sense knowing this here A” (ὁ δ’ ἤδη 
θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε τὸ Α.).253 Furthermore, this third subject, 
who both theorizes and in the proper sense knows, is the only entelecheia mentioned in the passage. 
Accordingly, the difference between theorizing and knowing that Gill suggests does not seem to be 
operative in the passage. 
But this is all perhaps a needless complication: in the end, despite her helpful interpretive 
work on the distinctions drawn in II.5, she concludes that the capacity for activity only exists at the 
second stage, and even then this active capacity is secondary to what second potentiality is as such, 
firmly committing her to the Core Claim. And although Gill is an exceptional case, most others are 
motivated to accept the Standard View in part by reading II.1 and II.5 together. I have so far 
outlined initial worries about both standard and non-standard commitments to the Core Claim by 
drawing on II.5 itself. I now go on to consider more general commitments in Aristotle which 
constrain our interpretation, most notably drawing from his account of learning. Accordingly, in 
what follows I propose an alternative reading of II.5 and of the distinctions between potentiality, 
actuality, and activity which are drawn from it. 
                                               
253 De An. II.5 417a28-29. 
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3.3 AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT 
3.3.1 A Path Forward 
At this stage, however, one may rightly wonder: what could these two pieces of Aristotelian 
doctrine, the Triple Scheme and the Learning Principle, have to do with one another? Or while that 
much may be obvious, how might each aid in the other’s interpretation? Let us pause to consider an 
example. It is often said among those who hike long-distance trails that the best training for hiking 
up and down mountains with a heavy pack is to hike up and down mountains with a heavy pack. 
This advice has an Aristotelian ring to it: we come to be backpackers by backpacking.254 Among 
novices it is quite natural to ask, however, just how fit someone has to be for such a training 
program to be effective. Many people are not physically disposed and therefore not able to become 
backpackers by backpacking; this program would be too advanced for them. The proposed program 
will only suit those who are already able, in some non-trivial sense, to carry a heavy pack up and 
down mountains. 
 But, as we have said, specifying in what non-trivial sense they must already be capable of 
backpacking is precisely the problem of making Aristotle’s Learning Principle coherent in the moral 
and intellectual cases. It is not simply the obvious risk of incoherence that Aristotle faces, but more 
precisely a dilemma in how he ought to conceive of potentiality or capability, in particular that 
belonging to someone before learning or discovering. If, on the one hand, Aristotle were to 
conceive of someone at first potentiality as so capable that he can already engage in the relevant 
activity, straightforwardly and without trouble, then this ability would stand in need of no further 
development: if this were so, the distinction between first and second potentiality would seem to 
collapse. Returning to our example, if the hiker can already backpack up and down mountains, then 
she stands in no need of this training. If, on the other hand, Aristotle were to conceive of someone 
at first potentiality as needing development before he would be capable in any sense of engaging in the 
relevant activity, then his Learning Principle cannot hold, even in the abstract and preliminary terms 
                                               
254 For the purposes of this example I am focusing on the physical aspects of backpacking, rather 
than the many technai that one must acquire as well. Insofar as I am focusing on a bodily hexis, 
however, the example will have a limited interpretive application. On the other hand, the bodily case 
is clearer and more apparent to us, so following Aristotle’s usual method, let us begin there, noting 
that there will be important disanalogies that could only be avoided by a more technical and 
complex example. 
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we have so far specified it. In short, if the hiker must become able to backpack first, then she cannot 
become a backpacker by backpacking; but if she can already backpack, then she needs no training.255 
The incoherence objection to the Learning Principle, then, can be fruitfully understood in more 
precise terms as a puzzle about how to specify first potentiality and how to understand the capability 
that the unlearned person already has to learn. 
 From this it should be clear that the Triple Scheme of act and potency in the case of 
developed or learned capacities is helpful in considering his Learning Principle. In particular, 
Aristotle’s specification of first potentiality as “being capable in virtue of one’s kind or matter” 
(417a27) is very much to the point. What is presupposed here is not the presence of form in 
actuality but rather the capability or potentiality to receive and develop some form in actuality. The 
debate might be characterized in the following way: what potentiality must the matter already 
possess in order to develop the relevant form in actuality through prior activity? Or alternatively, 
what is the nature of the positive state or hexis which comes to be in actuality by prior activity? 
 This chapter, then, aims to accomplish more than simply resolving an apparent tension 
between the Learning Principle and common conceptions of first potentiality. Although my 
argument will, in the following sections, be structured around resolving this tension, I want to 
emphasize that something deeper is motivating my project. I take it that Aristotle developed the 
concept of first potentiality precisely to explain the peculiar capability that the unlearned person has 
to learn, which is to learn by doing the very thing he is learning to do. So although resolving this tension 
between the Standard View of the Triple Scheme and Aristotle’s account of learning serves as a 
motivating occasion or starting point for my analysis, I conclude that these two bits of Aristotelian 
philosophy are connected at a deep level. 
3.3.2 Examining the Learning Principle: Scylla and Charybdis 
We have seen that two claims commonly attributed to Aristotle are in tension. Recall: 
Learning Principle: If φ-ing is something we learn to do, we learn to φ by actively φ-ing. 
Core Claim:   At first potentiality, before one has perfected and developed one’s  
   capacity to φ, one is yet incapable of actively φ-ing. 
                                               
255 I note again the clear parallels to Meno’s paradox. 
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To avoid attributing an outright contradiction to Aristotle, at least one claim must be weakened or 
abandoned entirely. Let us begin with the Learning Principle. There are two opposing errors when 
interpreting Aristotle’s account of learning. The first and more obvious error, which most 
interpreters successfully flee, is attributing outright incoherence to him: the student’s prior activity 
cannot be an exercise of the very knowledge or art or virtue that he is acquiring. To avoid this, 
however, some go so far as to deny any meaningful identity at all between the student’s and the 
expert’s activities.256 
 But perhaps the apprentice, strictly speaking, does not learn to build houses by building houses 
because, after all, only the master can do that. Rather, on one approach, the apprentice learns to 
build houses by doing more basic activities, such as laying bricks and driving nails. A similar story 
can be told for learning to swim, read, or play the piano: in each case, on this view, the student 
learns not by doing the unified activities themselves (e.g. house-building), but rather by doing more 
basic activities (e.g. laying bricks). A second strategy accepts that the prior activity is unified, but 
denies that it is the student’s own activity. The apprentice is capable of building houses only in an 
insignificant way, since it is done “by chance or at the prompting of another.”257 Accordingly, on this 
view, no active capacity on the part of the student is necessary because his activity is, after all, not up 
to him.  
 An advantage of these approaches is that the charge of incoherence cannot even arise against 
them. Incoherence is a risk only when insisting that the student and the expert are both (e.g.) 
building houses. However appealing either approach may be, neither seems to be Aristotle’s, and 
they therefore constitute a second opposing interpretive error. Instead, Aristotle insists almost 
without qualification that the activity of someone learning to φ is the same activity as someone who 
                                               
256 For example: perhaps the student’s grammatical activity is only homonymously so-called, since he 
lacks the relevant knowledge. However, this is not how Aristotle chooses to describe things (cf. EN 
II.4 1105a5-12). Wherever something is only homonymously so-called (e.g. a non-functioning axe at 
de An. II.1 412b11-15), Aristotle explicitly flags this. For another possible complication and my reply 
to it, see the earlier discussion of “contemplating in order to learn” from Meta. Θ.8 above. 
257 EN II.4 1105a23. See for example Stephen Makin’s commentary on the Meta.: “In [Nicomachean 
Ethics] 2.4 Aristotle responds to the charge of paradox. Since there can be instances of φ-ing which 
are not exercises of the capacity to φ, someone could play the piano without possessing the capacity 
to play the piano: for example, playing a tune under instruction, without being able to repeat it at 
will” (2006, 99). This does not seem to be Aristotle’s reply in that passage, however. Given that the 
student must himself play the piano in order to learn, he must already possess the capacity to play 
the piano. What he lacks is the capacity to play the piano as the master pianist does, deliberately and in a 
refined way. 
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has already learned. As we have seen, he chooses to describe these two activities in the same way, 
characterizing the difference between them with an adverb. Moreover, Aristotle glosses the adverb 
“grammatically” as “in accord with the grammatical knowledge within himself,”258 confirming the 
thought that the adverb does not mark a difference in the things done but in the agents doing them. 
The student must have the capacity already because the adverb (and his teacher) modifies and shapes 
the activity he is already engaged in. So, on the first approach, while I doubt that Aristotle would 
avoid or oppose describing the student’s activity in more basic terms (e.g. apprentice house-builders 
learn by laying bricks), there is nevertheless a preponderance of textual evidence suggesting that he 
would not deny the more unified description either, that they are, indeed, building houses.259 
 As for the second approach, where the prior activity is not truly the student’s own, it is true 
that for Aristotle there are some changes that are accomplished by an agent with no activity on the 
part of the patient, such as heating and being heated. In these cases he says that the patient is 
capable of undergoing a change, but not itself capable of actively engaging in the activity.260 Indeed, 
Aristotle considers such passive capacities in one of the key discussions of learning. But there, recall 
that passive capacities are opposed to ones that are learned and developed by prior activity: 
[b] on the one hand it is necessary that we possess those [coming to be] by 
habituation and by logos having previously exercised them, [c] on the other hand it is 
                                               
258 EN II.4 1105a25. 
259 It occurs to me that at any given moment someone may not be doing the full and unified activity, 
indeed in some sense this could be said even about the expert. I am presuming in some broad sense 
a view of action broadly inspired by Michael Thompson’s Naïve Action Theory in Life and Action 
(2008), so that what one is on about can be specified in unified terms even if one is only performing 
some small piece of the activity. After all, at no single moment can one travelling from Pittsburgh to 
Washington DC be said to be moving from Pittsburgh to Washington DC.  
260 Even the capacity (dynamis) to be-acted-upon (paschein) is a capacity for a sort of activity (energeia). 
Aristotle distinguishes agents that act (poiein) and patients that are-acted-upon (paschein) in virtue of 
active or passive capacities (e.g. capacities to heat and to be heated). Furthermore, both agents and 
patients admit of capacity (dynamis) and activity (energeia) (on the agent’s side, X can heat Y versus X 
is now heating Y; on the patient’s side, Y can be heated by X versus Y is now being heated by X). 
Although intuitive, we lack unambiguous terms in English to describe e.g. the “passive activity” of 
something now being heated. “Capable” is correlative with “active,” but “active” is not here meant 
as correlative with “passive.” There is a further difficulty here since, for both perception and 
intellection, the activity toward which the capacities are directed is a passive capacity in which some 
object acts on the subject, whether perceptual or intellectual. I therefore speak in terms of “passive 
development,” to screen off this complication which is, to be sure, relevant to Aristotle’s purpose in 
de An. II.5. 
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not necessary [for] those [capacities] not of this sort, i.e. those which involve being-
acted-upon.261  
Thus, passivity and being-acted-upon are marks of capacities that do not develop by prior activity. 
While the natural development of passive capacities may be like putting sight into blind eyes, 
Aristotle follows Plato in not describing learning in this way.262 And although there may be some 
respects in which even learning is a passive process, under the guidance of a teacher or by chance,263 
Aristotle is clear that it is not merely passive.264 The student must be an active participant in whatever 
change he is undergoing through learning: no matter how strong the teacher or how good the luck, 
someone who has never done temperate things or built any houses has no hope of becoming a 
house-builder or temperate.265 We must therefore avoid characterizing learning straightforwardly as a 
passive change in the student, but rather as a change throughout which the student himself must 
also be active. Therefore, I take it to be uncontroversial that Aristotle, at any rate, is committed to 
the Learning Principle in the way I have described, so that the student and the expert must be 
engaged in the same activity in some significant way. So, denying this would be an error when 
interpreting Aristotle.266 
                                               
261 Meta. Θ.5 1047b31-35: τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν, ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ 
τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. 
262 See Rep. VII 518b7ff. quoted at the start of this chapter. See also Thrasymachus’ threat at Rep. I 
345b3ff: “What then shall I do? Shall I bring forth the logos and insert it into your soul?” To which 
Socrates replies, “God forbid!” 
263 See Phys. III.3 202a31-b22. Learning can be described in passive terms; the error is describing it in 
merely passive terms. 
264 See de An. II.5 417b12-16: “The [change] from being potentially learned and possessed of 
knowledge under the agency of one actually [learned] and capable of teaching either ought not to be 
called a being-acted-upon (paschein), just as we said, or there are two ways of alteration: the change 
toward privative dispositions and the change toward states and nature.” τὸ δ’ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος 
μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ 
πάσχειν φατέον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλ- λοιώσεως, τήν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς 
διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν. 
265 “Having been altered through learning” (διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐναντίας 
μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως) at de An. II.5 417a31l allows that the student is actively engaged in being altered. 
266 But why is denying the Learning Principle a pitfall that we must avoid in general, or rather, why is 
Aristotle right to insist that we come to be house builders by building houses ourselves? I cannot offer a 
proper philosophical defense of Aristotle’s Learning Principle in this chapter, but here is a brief 
suggestion: perhaps becoming capable of the expert’s unified activity can only be effected by 
engaging in unified activity from the start. The student on his way to being a master builder must 
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 For the purposes of interpreting Aristotle, then, we must avoid these two opposing errors: 
learning cannot involve the prior exercise of the very knowledge or art or virtue that is aimed at, but 
we must not deny outright that the student’s prior activity is appropriately identical to the activity of 
the expert. Accordingly, an interpretation that avoids both errors is attractive, showing how 
Aristotle’s account of learning escapes incoherence without having him deny the very things he 
insists upon.  
3.3.3 Examining the Core Claim: Toward an Amended View 
If we affirm the possibility of learning by doing in the precise way that the Learning Principle 
requires, by emphasizing the appropriate identity between the prior and perfected activities of the 
student and the expert, we must turn our attention to the Core Claim and the Standard View that it 
motivates. The question that causes trouble for the Core Claim of the Standard View is the 
following: in virtue of what capacity is the student already capable of doing the very things he is 
learning to do? Returning to the grammar student, if he is himself already doing grammatical things, 
though not yet grammatically, then he must already have a capacity for doing grammatical things, at 
least. This is especially true since, for Aristotle, capacities are attributed in view of someone 
exhibiting the activities issuing from them, an indispensable commitment in his metaphysical 
account.267 
 Moreover, for Aristotle, knowledge and art and virtue are not capacities (δυνάμεις) without 
qualification, but rather states (ἕξεις) or perhaps, if you will, states of capacities.268 So, from the 
standpoint of capacities, what is acquired by learning is not a wholly new capacity but rather a new 
state of a capacity that one already possessed. Perhaps we can say that the capacity itself develops 
into the hexis, so that one does not possess a raw capacity with some development tacked on, but 
rather the capacity itself develops and comes to be (e.g.) knowledge. Similarly, with respect to the 
Learning Principle, an important point has been that Aristotle describes the activity of the student 
                                                                                                                                                       
already be aiming at the unified activity of house building, even if only exhibiting this unity in a 
rough and unrefined way. In contrast, the person who is simply laying bricks but not aiming at 
house building will never become a master builder; no amount of unintegrated or more basic prior 
activity in learning will produce the unified activity of the expert. 
267 See, for example, de An. I.1 402b9-14. 
268 See, for example, EN II.5 and VI.1-6 passim. 
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and of the expert with the same adjective or verb, but with different adverbs: learning does not 
produce a wholly new activity, but rather the same activity now performed in a new way. Indeed, we 
should recognize an intimate connection between these two points of clarification in Aristotle’s 
account, so that with the new adverbial specification of the expert’s activity he is describing the new 
state from which the refined activity now proceeds. Indeed he says just this in Nicomachean Ethics 
II.4, glossing “grammatically” as “according to the grammatical knowledge within himself.” 
Knowledge and virtue understood as “developed capacities” refers to a capacity that has now 
achieved a developed state, and not to a wholly new capacity that has come into existence after a 
process of development. 
 So, I am suggesting that, for Aristotle, capacities in an undeveloped state achieve a 
developed state through their own prior exercise: it is the undeveloped capacity itself which 
undergoes development. On this view, capacities which we already possess undergo development 
through prior activity, achieving a developed state as an end result. I am therefore attributing to 
Aristotle a way of speaking that is perhaps non-standard in English, though not entirely 
unfamiliar.269 According to our ordinary way of speaking, students may lack the capacity to play the 
piano or the capacity to do something grammatical, and these are the wholly new capacities that 
develop as a result of learning. But this is because we are in the habit of hearing “the capacity to φ” as 
“the refined capacity to φ.” I am suspicious that this is an ambiguity in our own language where 
Aristotle is more precise. According to our way of speaking, perhaps it is right to say that the student 
is capable of doing grammatical things without yet having the capacity to do grammatical things. Yet, 
when asked “in virtue of what capacity is he so capable?” there is resistance (on the Standard View) 
to the idea that it is in virtue of the capacity to do grammatical things. Indeed, on this point Aristotle 
may be urging a nuance overlooked perhaps even by his own contemporaries, since he sees a more 
intimate connection between capacities and activities, so that every activity is performed in virtue of 
some capacity an agent already has. Unless we deny that the student is actively participating in his 
own learning—instead considering education to be like putting sight into blind eyes—we must admit 
that the capacity is already there, albeit in an undeveloped state. This capacity surely does not issue 
in a refined or deliberate activity, which must instead be guided by a teacher (or by chance). But in 
                                               
269 Consider, for example, the difference between “a storm is developing” and “a fetus is developing 
fingernails.” In the former case what develops is an end state; in the latter case some subject is 
undergoing the development of an end state. “Develop” can be used transitively or intransitively, so 
that what develops can be either an end state or a subject. 
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those cases the teacher is guiding the student’s own activity and giving it shape, rather than 
straightforwardly acting on some merely passive capacity to develop. Aristotle challenges us to set 
aside ordinary language for more exact ways of speaking. 
 If, for Aristotle, the unlearned person is already capable of engaging in an activity 
appropriately identical to the activity of the expert, and it is by means of engaging in this prior 
activity that he develops the capacity to φ, then we must reject the strong claim that an unlearned 
person at first potentiality is incapable of any sort of activity before he develops. Rather, the person 
at first potentiality who is capable of learning grammar (like the first potential knower in de Anima 
II.5) is eo ipso capable of doing grammatical things, for this is the only way to learn grammar (as in 
Nicomachean Ethics II.4). So, it is by the exercise of an undeveloped capacity that the very same 
capacity undergoes development. This requires that first potentiality not only admit of development 
as a capacity but also admit of the appropriate prior activity. Therefore, the Core Claim of the 
Standard View ought to be abandoned. 
 Importantly, however, such prior activity cannot be an exercise of the developed capacity: one 
does not acquire knowledge or virtue by exercising the very thing one is acquiring.270 Although the 
prior activity of the student is in a significant respect the same as the perfected activity of the expert, 
it cannot follow—on pain of incoherence—that the prior activity of the student is an exercise of 
very knowledge or virtue he has yet to develop. Rather, Aristotle’s account of learning escapes the 
usual charge of incoherence because the prior activity is an exercise of the undeveloped capacity that 
the subject already possesses before he learns; the same capacity undergoes development as it is 
exercised. If we avoid conceiving of developed capacities like knowledge and virtue as newly 
acquired capacities, this alternative comes into focus. What is acquired is the ability to engage in the 
very same activity as before but now in a new way: the novelty in the expert’s activity is marked by 
an adverb, not by a verb. What one acquires through learning, then, is a developed state of a capacity 
that one already had, rather than a new capacity altogether. 
                                               
270 Some translations of Nicomachean Ethics II.1 are misleading: Aristotle does not claim that we get 
the virtues by previously exercising them, as Ross’ translation suggests. Rather, we get the virtues by 
engaging in appropriate activity beforehand (τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον); 
one does the very things one is learning how to do, but importantly this does not issue from the 
developed states themselves that one has yet to achieve. Pace Taylor (2006), 82 “But now [in II.4] 
Aristotle seems to have slipped away from addressing the crucial problem, at least as it arises from 
the formulation in chapter 1. There he explicitly asserts (1103a31-2) that we acquire the virtues and 
other skills by having previously exercised them.” 
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 Now, some defenders of the Standard View may be content to say that first potentiality is 
ultimately directed toward some activity; indeed, they might even insist on this.271 On this approach, 
first potentiality is proximately directed toward development, so that first potentiality is most 
properly a capacity to become capable of φ-ing and not yet a capacity to φ. Nevertheless, this version 
of the Standard View allows that “raw capacities” are ultimately and remotely directed toward 
activity. To see why this concession by defenders of the Standard View is still too weak, consider 
again the difference between learned and natural capacities. After all, the same could be said of 
undeveloped natural capacities, that they are ultimately directed toward activity but not yet proximately. 
As Aristotle explicitly says, we do not see before we develop eyesight and, in general, we must 
develop natural capacities before we can exercise them. In the case of natural capacities, a developed 
capacity may be a stepping stone ultimately en route to some activity, but there is no crossing to 
activity without it. In those cases, while activity may indeed be ontologically and conceptually prior 
to potentiality, it remains temporally posterior to development. In stark contrast, however, Aristotle 
clearly maintains that we learn by doing the very things we are learning to do, so that activity of the 
appropriate sort must also temporally precede the development of these capacities. First potentiality 
must itself already proximately admit of activity, since any capacity to learn must already involve a 
capacity to engage in the relevant prior activity. It is as if, in these cases, the stepping stones 
gradually become available only by means of crossing to the other side, perhaps like a field bridge 
that soldiers must build from both shores.  
 The image of the field bridge is helpful for illustrating a further feature of Aristotle’s account 
of learning. Soldiers must cross the river before they have built the bridge; indeed, at first, they cross 
for the sake of building. This might seem puzzling, since they are ultimately building the bridge for 
the sake of crossing. If capacities are ordinarily developed for the sake of using them, and if in 
general capacities are directed toward their activities, this reversal may seem unexpected. Here 
activity is prior and more proximate than development. I reply that although the soldiers must cross 
the river in order to build the bridge, this crossing is ultimately directed at a much more stable 
crossing that uses the bridge. Although an unrefined river-crossing necessarily precedes and helps to 
accomplish the bridge-building, it is ultimately a stable and refined river-crossing which is aimed 
at.272 This prior activity (προ-ἐνέργεια) is therefore not an actuality (ἐντελέχεια), since it is not yet an 
                                               
271 See Kosman (2013) 59-60. 
272 Recall Meta. Θ.8 (1050a10-15) above. 
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end (τέλος) that is possessed (ἔχειν).273 In this respect the only activity which can be rightly said to 
be an actuality (ἐντελέχεια) must proceed from a settled state (ἕξις). In this way, we have arrived at a 
final qualification of this section: although first potentiality is already a capacity for and directed 
toward the relevantly unified yet unrefined activity, this activity is nevertheless imperfect and not an 
end in itself.274  
3.3.4 Squaring the Triple Scheme 
In view of the preceding discussion, let us recall the Standard View of the Triple Scheme: 
 
Figure 2. The Standard View of the Triple Scheme 
 Stage 1: First Potentiality   Capacity to learn grammar 
 Stage 2: First Actuality/   Having learned grammar/ 
   Second Potentiality   Capacity to use grammar    
 Stage 3: Second Actuality   Using grammar 
 
Given the discussion so far, an alternative account has come into view, one according to which the 
proper and fundamental correlates are potentiality or capacity (δύναμις) and activity (ἐνέργεια), each 
admitting of various grades of development and refinement. The following model results: 
 
Figure 3. The Two-Dimensional Scheme 
 CAPACITY      ACTIVITY 
 Stage 1: Undeveloped Capacity   Stage 3.1: Unrefined Activity 
    
 Stage 2: Developed Capacity    Stage 3.2 Refined Activity 
                                               
273 Though the precise etymology of the word is difficult and indeed controversial, it seems clear that 
the word implies the possession of an end or complete state. 
274 A possible worry for my view is that Aristotle says in de An. II.1 in “But knowledge is prior in 
generation [sc. to the use of knowledge] in the individual case.” I supplied “to the use of 
knowledge,” but there is in fact no comparative correlate in the text: προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. One may take this line in the following way: knowledge is not just prior to the 
use of knowledge, but also to intellectual activity more generally (θεωρεῖν). However, the activity 
that has been mentioned here is given as an example of entelecheia, and so is an activity perfect and 
complete. I am proposing, however, that there is another kind of θεωρεῖν which is prior to the 
possession of knowledge in generation even in the individual case. The wider context, in which the 
only activity on offer is a complete and perfected activity, vitiates the force of this objection. 
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On this picture, the fundamental relation is between capacity and activity, between capability and 
exercise. The horizontal dotted line at the top represents the unrefined and undeliberate character of 
activity issuing from an undeveloped capacity. The bolded line at the bottom represents the refined 
character of activity issuing from a developed capacity, which is accomplished at will. The vertical 
dotted line on the side from undeveloped to developed capacity shows the gradual development of 
the capacity as a capacity along a continuum throughout the process of learning, by which the 
developed state gradually, as it were, settles in. 
 This Amended View, which the above figure illustrates, captures everything that the 
Standard View wants to maintain, most importantly that the developed capacity is a fulfillment of 
the undeveloped capacity and that this developed capacity is directed toward a refined and deliberate 
activity. The Standard View’s strictly linear and one-dimensional structure, however, cannot capture 
the fact that, for Aristotle, at all stages of his development a learner is capable of engaging in activity. 
This feature of first potentiality can be captured by this Amended View because it is two-
dimensional and not strictly linear. Opposing capacity and activity on one axis and the grades of 
development or refinement on another allow us to capture all aspects of this complex 
developmental process. 
 Let us return to the chapter from which the schema was originally derived, de Anima II.5: 
[a] But we must also make distinctions concerning potentiality and actuality; for just 
now we have been speaking about them without qualification. [b] For in one way 
“knower” is as we might call a man a knower, because a man is of the class of 
knowers and those having knowledge, [c] and in another way, as we call someone a 
knower who already possesses [e.g.] grammatical knowledge. [d] Each of these is 
capable (δυνατός), but not in the same way (οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον), the one because 
his kind and his matter is of a certain sort, the other because he can contemplate at 
will (βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν), unless something from without should stand in 
the way. [e] But the one already contemplating is actually (ἐντελεχείᾳ) and properly 
knowing this A. [f] Both of the first two, then, are potential knowers, but the one 
[comes to be] having been altered through learning and having changed often from a 
contrary state, while the other [comes to be] from possessing sense or grammatical 
knowledge but not exercising it to exercising it in another way (ἄλλον τρόπον).275 
                                               
275 De An. II.5 417a21-b2. 
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There are features of this passage that the Standard View simply cannot explain. First, Aristotle says 
that each of the first two knowers is capable, but in other passages this word indicates a capability for 
activity.276 While the first potential knower is not here explicitly said to be capable of contemplating 
(δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν), analogous language is used just lines later when recapping the same distinction: 
But for now let this much be distinguished, that “in potential” is not spoken of in a 
simple way, but in one way as we might say the child is capable of strategizing277 
(δυνατὸς στρατηγεῖν), and in another way as the person of an appropriate age; in 
this latter way something possesses the perceptual faculty.278 
First potentiality here is clearly a capability for φ-ing and this should inform any reading of the 
preceding chapter. Moreover, Aristotle does not say our longer passage what the Core Claim says, 
that the second potential knower is the only one of the two who can contemplate, but rather that the 
second one can contemplate whenever he wishes. If the second alone were capable of 
contemplating, why add “at will”? Rather, both are capable of contemplating simpliciter and the 
second knower can do this at will, this being his specific difference.279 Finally, our passage ends by 
emphasizing how the second knower goes from not acting to acting “in another way,” going to 
                                               
276 See, for example, Meta. Δ.12 and Θ.6. I concede that “in potential” (δυνάμει) is said in more 
extended senses, such as the matter of a statue, but this matter is not said to be capable (δυνατὸς). 
Aristotle prefers to use the term “capable” when something is capable of engaging in an activity, 
perhaps most generally the activity of motion or change (κίνεσθαι). See also de Interpretatione 13 
23a7ff. What is more, Aristotle attributes an active capability to the person at first potentiality: this is 
not the mere capability of being changed or being acted upon, but already a capability of engaging in 
activity. 
277 Although the English “strategize” is a potentially misleading choice for the Greek στρατηγεῖν, it 
is preferable to “being a general” because the Greek verb can denote acting as a general as well as 
simply being one. The “-ize” suffix can sometimes help convey this meaning in English, but alas 
“generalize” already means something altogether different. 
278 De An. II.5 417b30-a1: νῦν δὲ διωρίσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει 
λεγομένου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν 
ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα, οὕτως ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητικόν. “Perceptual faculty” translates αἰσθητικόν, which is an 
adjective denoting “perceptive” or “perceptual.” I supply “faculty,” in part because it is not a term I 
have used thus far to translate as dynamis and there is no noun here in the Greek. 
279 It is perhaps possible that someone who is learning is capable of varying degrees of deliberateness 
and refinement along the way. This is why it is helpful to look at the limit case of someone who is 
wholly unlearned, whose (e.g.) grammatical activity will be maximally at the mercy of another’s 
prompting and guidance. As the hexis of grammatical knowledge settles in, the student becomes 
more and more capable of deliberate and refined grammatical activity, approaching the expert’s 
activity. 
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activity in a different way than the first knower. This recalls Aristotle’s earlier claim that both of the 
first two knowers are capable “but not in the same way.”280 These two adverbial phrases suggest a 
difference between two cases involving activity (and capacities for activity) properly so-called. Thus, 
on my reading, our passage is making a distinction between two different ways of being capable of 
actively φ-ing, and how each one transitions to the activity of φ-ing in a different way. 
 Although in other contexts (e.g. de Anima II.1), Aristotle readily calls the inactive possession 
of knowledge an “actuality” (ἐντελέχεια), he resists doing so in our passage. Rather, he speaks in our 
passage of two potential knowers and only one actual one, namely the one who is actively 
contemplating. In this light, it is quite revealing when interpreters “find Aristotle unwilling to tell us 
as much as we would like to know about the actuality side of the distinction.”281 It is precisely 
because in this passage he does not want us thinking of the inactive possession of knowledge as a 
perfection of some more fundamental capacity, though it is surely so. Rather, he here compares two 
ways of being capable of contemplating and how each of these capacities is directed toward the 
same activity in a different way. 
3.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
3.4.1 Avoiding Redundancy from the Start 
Someone might object at this juncture: “I concede: if learning by doing is to be possible in this 
special sense, as Aristotle clearly maintains, then for an unlearned person to be capable of learning 
he must also be capable of engaging in the appropriately identical prior activity. But why should we 
equate these two, identifying someone’s capacity for prior activity with the capacity to learn and 
develop? Perhaps the capacity for prior activity is more general, like the capacity for speaking a 
                                               
280 These adverbial phrases can be taken to modify different things in the passage, as Hicks (1907) 
suggests ad loc., but the position of the phrase suggests this alternative. At the very least, the mere 
possibility of my reading must be conceded. 
281 See Burnyeat (2002) 47, 52. I agree with his method, however, not to reach too far outside of de 
An. II.5 in order to interpret it (53). We disagree about how much can be brought in from elsewhere 
and just how “incomplete” the account in II.5 is. 
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natural language, or perhaps more specific, like the capacity to utter dental stops.282 But why suppose 
the capacities to learn and to speak, for example, French are the same capacity?” This objection rests 
on the Core Claim lying at the heart of the Standard View, which holds that first potentiality is a 
capacity for passive development, but not as such a capacity for active engagement in activity. The 
objector grants some version of the Learning Principle but is uncomfortable with saying that the 
very same capacity is actualized in the student’s learning and in his prior activity. The objector agrees 
that the prior activity is an exercise of some capacity the student has, but denies that it is the same as 
the capacity to learn. 
 In the first place, it is not my view that the capacities for learning by prior activity and for 
refined activity are completely identical, nor are the respective activities completely identical. 
Following Aristotle, I have sought to distinguish ways in which the activities are the same and ways 
they differ by using verbs and adverbs. In a similar way, on my Amended View, although the 
capacity itself is the same in both the student and the expert, it exists in two different states of 
development: the student’s capacity in an undeveloped state issues in unrefined activity, the expert’s 
capacity in a developed state issues in refined activity. Nevertheless, I have been urging that a 
student learning (e.g.) to speak French by speaking French is already exercising his capacity to speak 
French, though in an undeveloped state. 
 Even given these qualifications, there may still be worries about identifying the capacity for 
learning and for prior activity, perhaps that my view would result in a problematic multiplication of 
first potentialities. The objector presses: one should rather say that an unlearned person has a 
capacity for learning and indeed for prior activity, that is, a capacity for speaking some natural 
language, but not yet for speaking French. On this approach, the undeveloped capacity is 
indeterminate and therefore should not be described in unified and determinate terms, for speaking 
French in particular. This objection is motivated by the idea that the determinate capacity 
characteristic of a fluent French-speaker is not yet possessed by the student. Rather, the student 
possesses some indeterminate and general capacity for an indeterminate and general activity. We 
attribute too many first potentialities to the one year-old if we say he has a first potentiality with 
respect to each and every natural language. 
                                               
282 The idea that activities themselves are more specific is considered above in III.3.2. The objector 
here in III.4.1 grants that the activity itself is an instance of speaking French, but denies that this 
unified activity issues from a capacity for speaking French. 
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 I reply that such a multiplication of capacities is benign. When we say that human beings 
have the capacity to learn and to speak natural languages, every possible natural language is 
subsumed under this description, perhaps just as a finite magnitude is infinitely divisible. If we adopt 
the objector’s preferred description, we say that a learner’s unrefined French-speaking is an exercise 
of a general capacity for speaking natural language. But this indeterminate capacity is never exercised 
in an indeterminate way: the toddler is always learning to speak a specific language, the musical 
student is always learning to play a specific instrument. Accordingly, although the prior activity in 
each case is unrefined, it is never indeterminate in the way that the objector insists. To be sure, I 
readily admit that the toddler’s unrefined French-speaking and the adult’s refined French-speaking 
are both exercises of the general capacity every human has for language. However, unlike the 
objector, I do not thereby deny that both activities are also exercises of the capacity to speak French, 
described in more determinate terms. Any multiplication of first potentialities is a benign reflection 
of a truly multifaceted phenomenon: it makes sense to characterize the general capacity to speak a 
natural language as a capacity to speak French when considering someone who is learning to speak 
French, leaving unmentioned other less relevant ways this general capacity can be exercised and 
developed (e.g. learning and speaking Basque).  
 What is more, as long as the objector insists on separating the capacity to learn and the 
capacity for prior activity, he faces a dilemma himself. Whatever other descriptions he might ascribe, 
in order to avoid denying the Learning Principle he must also admit that the student is already 
speaking French, though in an unrefined way. Given that the student’s activity is already an instance 
of French-speaking, and since Aristotle posits capacities on the basis of the activities that realize 
them, the student must already be exercising a capacity for speaking French.283 But, if the capacity 
for prior activity is distinct from the capacity to learn, as the objector insists, then the student will 
already have two distinct capacities for French, one for learning and one for speaking. And once he 
learns, he will have a third distinct capacity for French, now for speaking in a refined way. Thus the 
dilemma: the objector must either deny the Learning Principle or risk a truly problematic 
multiplication of capacities for French. Why ought we to posit these distinct capacities, one which is 
actualized in learning alone and another which is actualized in the prior activity that brings learning 
about? Or, from a different angle, why posit one capacity which is directed at the unrefined prior 
                                               
283 On positing capacities in virtue of activities, see again de An. I.1 402b9-14. 
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activity of φ-ing and another distinct capacity which is directed at the very same activity once it is 
performed in a refined way?  
 An advantage of the Amended View is that we can avoid this problematic redundancy 
simply and from the start: first potentiality just is the capacity to learn by doing, and so it is at the 
same time a capacity for development and a capacity for activity. In this way, the very same capacity 
undergoes development through learning and thereupon, to keep with our example, issues in refined 
French-speaking. This is precisely the way Aristotle avoids redundancy in other contexts, that is, by 
refusing a problematic multiplication at the start.284 Similarly in the present discussion I insist on 
identifying the capacity to learn with the capacity to engage in the prior activity by which learning 
comes about. This undeveloped capacity of the student undergoes development as a capacity through 
its own unrefined activity, thereby coming to have a developed state. By conceiving of first 
potentiality in this way, we can avoid the risk of redundancy from the start. 
3.4.2 Returning to Natural Capacities 
So, when we learn, we do not acquire entirely new capacities by exercising them, for surely 
incoherence would result. Rather, undeveloped capacities we already have undergo development as 
capacities and achieve developed states through prior exercise. First potentiality consists in the 
ability to engage in unrefined activity of φ-ing in order to refine and develop one’s very capacity to φ. 
But one might wonder about natural capacities at this juncture, especially since, on the Standard 
View, the concept of first potentiality applies to all capacities, natural and learned alike. An upshot 
of my argument, however, is that first potentiality is a distinctive sort of capability in virtue of which 
one can learn by engaging in the appropriate prior activity that Aristotle’s Learning Principle 
requires. If so, it follows that first potentiality simply has no analogue in the case of natural 
capacities, because it applies only to capacities that develop by learning and by prior activity. But at 
first this might seem strange, given that the purpose of de Anima II.5 is to introduce perceptual 
capacities, which are natural.  
                                               
284 When faced with an analogous difficulty about whether there is some further perceptual power 
that is aware of first-order perception, he worries about both redundancy and regress. Instead of 
entertaining the possibility of a second-order faculty for perceptual awareness, he rejects the notion 
at the outset, insisting that each perceptual power must also be aware of its own activities. See de An. 
III.2 425b12-17. 
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 Before attending to concerns about the purpose of de Anima II.5 as a whole, from which our 
passages have been drawn, let us consider another more specific concern about the analogy between 
natural and learned capacities. First potentiality, on my view, is capable of actualization in two 
respects—in its own development and in unrefined activity—and such duality might seem to be a 
strange consequence. After all, an important argument in favor of my view draws on Aristotle’s 
broader conception of capacity and activity. He is committed, in the first place, to the idea that every 
true capacity is capable of engaging in its correlative activity.285 Some capacities are active (e.g. that 
which can heat) and some are passive (e.g. that which can be heated).286 But at least in the case of 
natural capacities, when something in possession of a capacity comes into the appropriate sort of 
contact with its correlative agent or patient, the relevant activity results straightaway and always in 
the same way.287 
 Perceptual capacities, for example, develop by nature and exist in a developed state as soon 
as the animal is generated. Indeed, Aristotle makes this claim later on in de Anima II.5: whenever 
some animal has been generated, it already possesses the capacity to perceive, and already at a level 
analogous to knowledge.288 Taken with the passage from Nicomachean Ethics II.1 quoted earlier, 
Aristotle thinks perceptual capacities do not develop through prior exercise but rather through the 
ordinary course of generation and, once they come to be, they already exist in their most perfected 
state, analogous to possessing knowledge. Accordingly, one might be tempted to say that, for 
Aristotle, whatever immediately precedes animal generation is capable of perceiving in the same way 
that the unlearned person is capable of doing grammatical things, seeking an analogy between 
natural and learned capacities at the level of first potentiality. And perhaps one might be tempted to 
understand the unlearned person’s capacity simply on the model of natural capacities, so that the 
                                               
285 For an extended discussion of this principle, see Meta. Θ.6-7, especially 1049a1-5. See also Meta. 
Δ.12 1019a32-b15. 
286 Recall “active” here denotes agency (correlative with passivity), but does not necessarily denote 
activity (correlative with capacity or capability). Active capacities and active activities are distinct, but 
share an agential character. 
287 Natural capacities go to activity always in the same way, while the same is not true for non-natural 
capacities. The hot always heats whenever it heats, while capacities for moral activity admit of 
different modes of activity before they achieve a settled state. Once they achieve the settled state 
they activate in a fixed way like natural capacities; this is not true of intellectual capacities which 
always admit of multiple modes of activation. Recall Meta. Θ.5 and EN V.1, above. 
288 de An. II.5 417b16-18. 
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unlearned person passively receives form just like the proximate matter in generation. In either case, 
since Aristotle clearly compares the development of natural and learned capacities, saying that the 
first transition for perception is accomplished by natural generation, one might conclude that it is a 
first transition from a first potentiality even for perception and for natural capacities generally.289 On 
the Standard View, the analogy with perception and knowledge in the passage is thoroughgoing, so 
that the development of each capacity can be captured by the same three-stage model. 
 In his discussions of the Triple Scheme, however, Aristotle never mentions a natural capacity 
at the level of first potentiality.290 Indeed, in de Anima II.5 itself he clearly states that first potentiality 
is actualized “by having been altered through learning” (417a31), suggesting that this stage is 
distinctively associated with development by learning and not by nature. Although this quote implies 
some passivity in learning, it is compatible with the student being actively engaged in his own 
learning, as discussed previously. And although Aristotle certainly does say that the first transition in 
the perceptual case is accomplished in generation, this need not mean that natural generation is a 
transition from first potentiality to second potentiality. Rather, all Aristotle must mean is that first 
transitions are directed toward second potentialities, while leaving open what the terminus a quo is in 
each case. 
 This ought to be left open, moreover, since he denies in other passages that the preceding 
matter in generation is potentially living or perceiving in this proximate respect. Unlike the 
unlearned person, the preceding matter of natural capacities is only potentially capable of living or 
perceiving.291 The unlearned person, as I have argued, must already be capable of engaging in a 
distinctive kind of activity, and so he is already capable in a true and proper sense. The same cannot 
                                               
289 Burnyeat (2002) at 52 n64 adopts this line: “But before birth comes the prōtē metabolē of 417b 17, 
and we shall find that this passage from being a first to being a second potentiality perceiver has a 
role of its own in the refinement process.” 
290 See also Phys. VIII.4 255a30-b13. These two passages give all three stages and place natural 
capacities at the second stage. In other places Aristotle distinguishes between (e.g.) possessing and 
using knowledge without mentioning first potentiality. 
291 See, perhaps most importantly, Meta. Θ.7 1049a14-18: “Seed is not yet [in potential (δυνάμει)] 
(for it must also change in another), but whenever it is already such through its own principle, then 
this (τοῦτο) is in potential (δυνάμει): but that (ἐκεῖνο) [sc. seed] lacks another principle, just as the 
earth is not yet potentially a statue (for once it has changed, it will be bronze).” See also de An. II.1 
412b25-27: “But that which is potentially so as to live is not that which has lost the soul, but that 
which has it: but the seed and the fruit are potentially such a body” (my emphasis), i.e. seed is 
potentially capable of living.  
 143 
be said of the preceding matter in the development of natural capacities; in those cases the matter is 
only potentially, but not yet actually, capable of φ-ing. This preceding stage is, as it were, at zeroth 
potentiality. As soon as it comes to be actualized, however, it is capable of heating or living or 
perceiving in the second and developed way. It seems as if, in the case of natural capacities, first 
potentiality is skipped. 
 This result is unsurprising if we understand first and second potentiality to be two different 
ways of being actually capable of engaging in an activity. On Aristotle’s view at any rate, natural 
capacities admit of only one mode of activity (e.g. as fire heats) and as soon as such a capacity is 
truly present it is already capable of its most developed and refined activity. To be sure, there is still a 
process of development for natural capacities, but whatever developmental stages precede the 
developed capacity are not yet capable of activity, for “it was not from often seeing or often hearing 
that we received these senses.” Accordingly, natural capacities represent the base case where 
development leaps, as it were, from a state where activity is truly impossible to another where 
activity is perfect and refined. The proper actualization of any capacity is some activity, and if no 
activity is yet possible, then the capacity itself is not yet actually present. In contrast, prior activity is 
involved in the development of all capacities that develop by learning, so that such capacities admit 
of activity both before and after they undergo development. This creates a complication of the base 
case: for natural capacities the presence or absence of a capacity is determined straightforwardly by 
the capability or incapability of engaging in refined activity, but for learned capacities there are 
several stages of the developmental continuum on which one is capable of engaging in activity, as it 
were, at each step along the way. The correlative activities at each stage of development will, of 
course, exhibit varying degrees of refinement.  
 Now, perhaps whatever immediately precedes human generation is potentially capable of 
perceiving in the same way that it is potentially capable of contemplating: an analogy might obtain 
between the two capacities at what I am calling zeroth potentiality. But, Aristotle tells us, as soon as 
we are generated we possess our perceptual capacities in a developed state corresponding to the 
possession of knowledge; in contrast, our intellectual and moral capacities must still be developed by 
prior activity.292 
                                               
292 An infant can possess intellectual or moral first potentialities and therefore be capable of 
unrefined intellectual or moral activities without yet actively exercising them. Just as a builder cannot 
exercise his art unless he has the right materials, so too an infant may not exercise some yet 
undeveloped intellectual or moral capacity, lacking the right perceptual or desiderative “materials.” 
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Figure 4. Perceptual vs. Intellectual Development 
Stages Perception Intellection 
Stage 3: Activity Activity of Perceiving Activity of Contemplating 
Stage 2: Developed Capacity Capacity to Perceive Capacity of Knowledge 
Stage 1: Undeveloped Capacity *NO ANALOGUE* Capacity to Learn 
Stage 0: Pre-Generation Potential Capacity to Perceive Potential Capacity to Contempl. 
 
Thus we return to the concern with which this section began: this complexity in the case of learned 
capacities explains the dual-directedness of first potentiality. On the one hand, an undeveloped 
capacity at first potentiality admits of development as a capacity, while on the other hand it already 
admits of activation in prior activity. This explains how first potentiality has both active and passive 
features. While it is true that as soon as natural capacities are actually present they admit of fully 
refined activity, Aristotle holds a more complex account for learned capacities. But this should not 
lead us to deny the general principle that capacity is always directed toward activity; rather, the 
complication in the case of learned capacities is that capacity and its correlative activity admit of 
degrees of development and refinement on a continuum as the student learns. Far from being a 
problem for Aristotle’s view, the dual-directedness of first potentiality is precisely what his theory of 
learning demands. 
3.4.3 The Broader Purpose of de Anima II.5 
In this final section I briefly address a remaining worry about my interpretation of de Anima II.5, 
although it would be impossible to give a comprehensive treatment in a single paper, even more 
difficult when making connections to other texts.293 I have maintained throughout that de Anima II.5 
considers perception generically and prepares for the more detailed account of perception to follow. 
But my argument has been that a key distinction in the chapter does not apply to capacities that 
develop by nature, including perception. But why would Aristotle introduce a concept that does not 
apply to perception in a chapter principally concerned with perception?294  
                                               
293 Burnyeat (2002) is as close as one might come to giving such a treatment in a single paper, taking 
over sixty pages. I give a more thorough treatment of this interpretive question in another place. 
294 See the first line of de An. II.5 at 416b33: “let us speak in general about the whole of perception” 
(λέγωμεν κοινῇ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως). 
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 One of his chief aims in the first half of de Anima II.5 is to distinguish two aspects of “to 
perceive” and “perception,” active and potential.295 Since the perceptual faculty remains even when 
it is not at work, it must be essentially potential and not (necessarily) active. So, Aristotle insists that 
the faculty taken in itself, while readily admitting of activity, must not be conceived of as necessarily 
active at any given time. But one may wonder at this point in the argument what it means for the 
perceptual faculty to be essentially a potentiality and of what sort of activity it might admit. Should 
we understand the fulfillment of the perceptual faculty on the model of learning, whereby some 
undeveloped capacity comes to have a more determinate form as it is used, perhaps as fire heats a 
pot of water? Or is perceptual activity better understood as analogous to the musician playing or the 
builder building, whereby some developed capacity goes to refined activity without needing to 
undergo any further development? These alternatives are only implicit in the first half of de Anima 
II.5, which Aristotle goes on to distinguish in the second half of the chapter. First potentiality is 
introduced in a chapter dedicated to perception precisely to dismiss its relevance to perception; 
though, as Aristotle says, there may be time to reintroduce and clarify the notion more thoroughly 
later on.296 
3.5 RECOGNIZING ARISTOTLE’S POTENTIAL 
This chapter began with a puzzle about learning, in particular about the intuitive thought that we 
learn to build houses by building houses and gain knowledge of elephants by intellectually 
considering elephants. I have argued that Aristotle’s distinction between two sorts of potentiality 
allows him to answer that puzzle in a distinctive way. In every case where a student is truly capable 
of learning, in virtue of the same capacity he is also capable of engaging in the relevant prior activity. 
It is by exercising an undeveloped capacity in an unrefined way that the very same capacity gradually 
achieves some developed state. Since natural capacities do not develop in this way, on Aristotle’s 
view, I concluded that first potentiality has no analogue in the natural case. So understood, first 
potentiality is directed toward two different ends: first its own development as a capacity, and 
                                               
295 “Active” (ἐνεργείᾳ) and not “actual” (ἐντελεχείᾳ): energeia here indicates activity, which entelecheia 
does not necessarily do. After all, first actuality (πρώτη ἐντελέχεια) is having but not exercising 
knowledge (ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν), cf. de An. II.1 412a26. 
296 See de An. II.5 417b29: many suppose (quite reasonably) that this points to de An. III.4 429b5-9.  
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secondly engaging in unrefined prior activity. This dual-directedness of first potentiality is a 
complication of the simple picture that obtains for natural capacities, so that learned capacities 
involve both passive and active features. This is nevertheless precisely what Aristotle’s account of 
learning requires. Thus Aristotle’s distinctions between two developmental stages of a capacity 
provide the necessary resources to defend his otherwise intuitive account of learning. 
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4. CONTEMPLATING IN ORDER TO LEARN:                                                            
SOME PROPOSALS REGARDING PRIOR INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY 
Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν 
ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει 
ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ σὺν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι 
στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ 
ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος 
τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη· τοῦτο δ’ εἶναί 
φαμεν τἀγαθόν. ἦ γάρ; 
--- Ναί. 
Τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη, τῆς περιαγωγῆς, 
τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ 
τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς 
δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι.297 
 
Let us review the argument so far. In the preceding chapter I argued for a certain interpretation of 
Aristotle’s account of learning that applies generically to every case of acquired or developed 
capacity. In particular, I have argued that, just as in moral formation, so too in intellectual formation 
there must be a particular kind of prior activity which precedes and brings about the development of 
intellectual hexeis, namely the activity of the expert. Recall that this view is strongly recommended by 
several passages, for example Metaphysics Θ.5: for all those capacities developed by habituation (ἔθος) 
or by logos, in order to develop them it is necessary for us to have already exercised them 
beforehand.298 Furthermore, in each case it is necessary that we learn by engaging in the very 
                                               
297 Rep. VII 518c4-d7. 
298 Cf. Meta. Θ.5 1047b34-5. “They” are subjects and not products of development (see chapter 
three). 
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activities we are learning to do. Accordingly, we acquire hexeis, both moral and intellectual, by 
engaging in the very activity toward which the hexis under development is directed. 
 I also argued that those capacities which develop by prior exercise, whether by habituation 
or by logos, presuppose a capacity for engaging in that very prior activity. First potentiality, on my 
view, is not only a capacity to learn but also a capacity to engage in the prior exercise that, on 
Aristotle’s view, drives and accomplishes the process of learning. Learning, therefore, is achieved by 
prior exercise of the very same capacity which undergoes development thereby. This more precise 
characterization of the role of prior activity in the acquisition of virtues, both moral and intellectual, 
is strongly recommended, in part by Metaphysics Θ.8: those who are learning to play the lyre learn to 
play the lyre by playing the lyre, and students engage in a kind of speculative thinking (θεωρεῖν) in 
order to acquire speculative knowledge (θεωρητική).299 The same more precise characterization 
holds of the moral and productive cases, as is well known from the Nicomachean Ethics.300 As a result, 
we came to an alternative view of the distinctions in de Anima II.5, in particular between the two 
potential knowers and their relation to the one actual and active knower mentioned in that passage. 
 Now, I have conceded that this “first activity” or “pre-activity” (προ-ενέργεια) is itself 
neither an end nor a perfection in the sense of entelecheia. And while it is true that this prior activity 
must be specifically the same activity toward which the hexis under development is directed, I have 
nevertheless insisted that this first activity does not and cannot proceed from that very hexis which is 
under development, on pain of incoherence. I have held rather that this prior activity proceeds from 
the dynamis qua undeveloped, which dynameis humans possess innately (at least in the cases of most 
interest to us).301 This presupposes an understanding of hexis as a developed or perfected state of a 
dynamis, and dynameis of this kind themselves admit of differing states of development.302 I have 
                                               
299 Cf. Meta. Θ.8 1049b28-50a15. 
300 Cf. especially EN II.1 1103a26-b5 and II.4 passim. 
301 Note that Aristotle’s arguments in APo. B.19 are directed against the view that we have innate 
intellectual hexeis, not dynameis. On my view this distinction is extraordinarily important, as I shall 
argue: we possess the undeveloped dynamis of nous in virtue of the kind of thing that we are (cf. de 
An. II.5 417a21-27), although it is actually nothing until it thinks (cf. de An. III.4 429a24). Nous-as-
hexis is that which is acquired and developed by first engaging in some kind of intellectual activity 
and is the topic of EN VI.6 and APo. B.19. For a contrasting view, see for example Michael Frede, 
“Aristotle’s Rationalism” (1996a): 170 and Gail Fine, Possibility of Inquiry (2014): 222-5. 
302 Cf. EN II.5, where hexis is introduced as a disposition with respect to affections, dynamis is that in 
virtue of which we are capable of experiencing the affections. Similarly in Meta. Δ.19-20 when 
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argued that these kinds of dynamis also must admit of correspondingly different modes of activity 
correlative with each stage of development.303 Finally, I have argued that for learned or developed 
capacities in general, dynamis without qualification is always directed proximately toward some energeia 
without qualification, and that the developed hexis is a perfected state of this dynamis that is directed 
toward performing its respective energeia in some stable, deliberate, and perfected way. The 
developed hexis, then, is a new capacity only in the qualified sense that it is a capacity for performing 
the same activity in a new way: the novelty here is adverbial, not verbal.304 
 Beyond this general story there is much to say concerning moral formation, but here I shall, 
for the most part, set that topic aside.305 But even concerning intellectual formation, so far I have 
characterized this first or prior intellectual activity in very general terms, so that one’s innate and 
undeveloped capacity of nous must come to be active in some unrefined way that is not possible 
whenever one wishes or when the need arises. In contrast, the further and refined intellectual 
activity—contemplating (θεωρεῖν) in the most proper, complete, and perfect sense—is coming to be 
intellectually active in a reliable and correct way whenever one wishes, according to and in virtue of 
the knowledge one already possesses. In this perfected case the activity proceeds according to a 
developed state or hexis of the intellectual capacity, a capacity which one had all along. In both cases 
the activity proceeds from that same innate nous-as-dynamis (the receptive or potential intellect), but 
in the second case the capacity itself has come to rest with respect to its own development, having 
now acquired a certain excellent and virtuous state. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Aristotle considers diathesis and hexis: hexis is a disposition which is well or badly disposed and is a 
firmer and more stable state than a disposition without qualification. He further argues that all 
dispositions, including the subclass of hexeis, are said in respect of place, capacity, or form. Now, I 
grant that some hexeis will be stable dispositions of a capacity to function badly, such as the moral 
vices or speculative error, but I wish (for the most part) to set these cases aside. My focus will be 
when such capacities are perfected and have come to rest in the soul in the right way, rather than 
corrupted to some firm yet poor condition. On non-virtuous hexeis see Kontos (2014). 
303 Cf. EN II.3 and what follows the key passage from Meta. Θ.5: the kinds of innate capacities 
which we come to develop are those which admit of a range in modes of activation or actualization: 
they can be done well or poorly (as with playing the lyre), to excess and defect (as with activities 
associated with pleasure and pain), for good or for ill ends (as with the exercise of medical art), or in 
varying degrees of precision, accuracy, or determinateness (as with intellectual activity). 
304 I use “verbal” in the same way as the grammarian speaks of “verbal adjectives,” describing the 
specific part of speech rather than a mode of expression more generally.  
305 In particular, difficulties surrounding the three conditions on (morally) virtuous action Aristotle 
gives in EN II.4, two of which do not hold of craft or theoretical knowledge. 
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 The specification of these intellectual activities and powers therefore differs adverbially, so 
that perfected intellectual activity is performed correctly, reliably, and deliberately while prior 
intellectual activity is not. Accordingly, on my account the verbal specification of this intellectual 
activity remains the same, so that prior intellectual activity must involve a student somehow 
contemplating and considering the intelligible objects, engaging in the same activity as the expert but 
in an undeliberate and unrefined way. It is different adverbially precisely because the student lacks in 
himself the relevant virtue that the expert has: the adverb “grammatically” or in general “as the 
expert” describes this acquired expertise. So, as an application of my more generic point, I have 
suggested that the student of the speculative sciences engages in active contemplation of the very 
objects he is learning, without doing so with the complete or perfected intellectual knowledge of the 
expert.306  
The present dissertation chapter is a defense of the view so applied, fleshing out some of the 
details of prior activity and learning-by-doing that are specific to the case of intellectual or dianoetic 
learning and development. There are two applications I shall explore in particular. I begin with a 
consideration of the activity of contemplation itself, according to which we come to be intellectually 
identical with some intelligible object. My focus is a remark in de Anima III.4 about the identity of 
knower and known and the grades of potentiality and actuality. Aristotle makes these remarks in the 
heart of his account of receptive intellect, so I shall apply my more general account of these 
distinctions in grades of potentiality to his remarks about intellect there. As a foil in this part of the 
chapter I present Burnyeat’s reading. While he raises an important question for a more intuitive and 
traditional reading of these lines—indeed, it is a question his opponents do not adequately address—
I shall argue that my account of first potentiality and the process of intellectual learning gives us the 
tools to maintain the more intuitive reading and preserve a fundamental analogy between intellect 
and perception, even in the face of Burnyeat’s alleged evidence to the contrary. 
The second application to the intellectual case concerns the claim at the opening of the 
Posterior Analytics, that all dianoetic learning proceeds from preexisting gnōsis. Given that prior activity 
in general is required for developed hexeis, this claim at the start of the Posterior Analytics seems to 
specify how dianoetic hexeis come to be, not by habituation but by logos. It is not immediately clear, 
however, how the necessity of prior activity fits with this other requirement about preexisting gnōsis. 
                                               
306 I say “intellectual knowledge” to mark that the student here lacks an intellectual virtue; she cannot 
lack any gnōsis at all. 
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I shall focus on the acquisition of nous, by which we are said to grasp the immediate first principles 
of art and scientific knowledge. The locus classicus for Aristotle’s account is Posterior Analytics B.19 
whose dialectic presupposes the principle that all dianoetic learning proceeds from preexisting 
knowledge.  
I end with a consideration of some further consequences of my view when applied to the 
intellectual case, in particular the idea that the theoretical intellect comes to possess theoretical hexeis 
by engaging in theoretical activities. The chapter as a whole considers the role of these theoretical 
activities in driving and accomplishing the learning process. In the final analysis we shall see that 
there are, in fact, two distinct types of prior intellectual activity involved in the learning process, one 
distinctive to the teacher and the other to the student. 
4.1 INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY IN THE DE ANIMA  
4.1.1 Intellectual Identity, Activity, and Potentiality 
From the de Anima alone we have the resources to speak of this generic intellectual activity—both 
prior and posterior to the acquisition of intellectual hexeis—in these broad terms, that the rational 
subject in each case comes to be identical with some object of thought.307 This intellectual activity is 
understood throughout de Anima III to be analogous in some significant way to the identity that 
obtains between the sensible object and the sensing subject during actual episodes of perceiving and 
being perceived.308 This characterization of theōria alone, however, leaves much to be desired, and 
seems rather to be a plausible starting point for an account of intellectual activity than to constitute a 
substantive account. So here we shall begin, addressing our first set of questions about potentiality, 
actuality, and activity, before moving on to a more fleshed-out account of these intellectual 
operations in the case of learning. 
                                               
307 In addition to the citations in the following footnote, Aristotle also speaks of active knowledge (ἡ 
κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη) as being the same as the object (αὐτὸ ἐστιν...τῷ πράγματι) at III.5 
430a20-22 and III.7 431a1-3, though it has been supposed that this may be inappropriately 
duplicated in one or the other chapter, cf. e.g. Ross (1961) ad loc. For a defense, see Hicks (1907) ad 
loc. I shall assume for the sake of the present argument that the line truly belongs in both passages. 
308 Cf. III.4 429a13-17, III.7 431a4-8, III.8 passim.  
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 There is a bit more we can say on the basis of the de Anima about this object of thought, 
although it remains a preliminary and abstract specification. We can say that the objects of thought 
are universal, so that the relevant intellectual activity must involve the grasp of universals, at least in 
some respect. This point may be obscured by the fact that Aristotle makes it only when speaking 
about the deliberateness of intellectual activity in the case of one already possessing knowledge. Let 
us recall from de Anima II.5: 
And perceiving in activity is said to correspond similarly to thinking. But the cases 
differ because, on the one hand, the objects that are productive of the activity of the 
former—the visible, the audible, and the rest of the sensibles—are from without. 
The reason is because perception in activity is of particulars, but knowledge is of the 
universal, and these are somehow within the soul itself. For this reason it is up to 
oneself to think, whenever he should wish, but perceiving is not up to him; for it is 
necessary that the sensible object be present.309 
 Now, to be sure, someone who possesses knowledge already possesses the intelligible 
objects, in some sense, within his soul, and as a result is able to contemplate those objects at will. It 
is likely, given related remarks in III.4, that this possession of the forms is to be equated with the 
possession of the relevant noetic hexeis, the simple grasp of immediate first principles. Indeed, as I 
have been arguing, Aristotle often exploits the connection between echein and hexis, so that his use of 
echein often signals something more robust. He goes on to develop his account in III.4: 
And whenever it [νοῦς] has come to be each of the things as the knower in activity is 
said to (and this happens whenever he is capable of being in activity on his own), it is 
even at that time [each thing] in some way in potentiality, but not in the same way as 
before he learned or discovered: and at that time it itself is capable of thinking 
itself.310 
                                               
309 De An. II.5 417b19-26: τὸ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν [sc. αἰσθάνεσθαι] δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν· 
διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως 
δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ’ 
ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν 
βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ’ οὐκ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν. 
310 De An. III.4 429b5-9: ὅταν δ’ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν 
(τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι’ αὑτοῦ), ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν 
ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν. The manuscripts give us 
δὲ αὐτὸν here, but Bywater emends the text to read δι’ αὑτοῦ so that the line would be rendered 
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Once knowledge is achieved in the soul in a settled way, as a stable state of the intellectual power, 
one can contemplate the intelligible objects whenever one wishes. Importantly whatever identity 
with the intelligible objects obtains for the person who can activate knowledge at will is still potential 
in some sense, but this is precisely the kind of potentiality we should expect from someone in 
possession of an intellectual hexis, someone at Stage (2) in the Triple Scheme with a fully developed 
intellectual dynamis with respect to some domain. This point should be routine, given the discussion 
of the Triple Scheme in the preceding chapter. 
 But, in the context of de Anima II.5, the very possibility of telling this story about exercising 
one’s knowledge at will rests upon a more basic claim, that intelligible objects are universals while 
the objects of sense are particulars. This more basic point about the different character of sensible 
and intelligible objects can be made irrespective of the distinction between someone already in 
possession of knowledge and someone yet unlearned; indeed, this is said to be the cause of the 
different ways in which episodes of thinking and sensing are activated. So, while the universal 
character of intelligible objects explains something interesting about those already in possession of 
knowledge, the general point still holds even for those who are yet to possess that knowledge. The 
objects of thought are universal quite generally, for the unlearned and the learned alike.  
 In a similar way, the de Anima often speaks of the objects of thought as “forms” and the 
intellect as “the place of forms” or the “form of forms.”311 With these passages we also come up 
against a similar complication, since the intellect is the place of forms most properly in the case of 
one already in possession of knowledge. The unlearned person who is engaged in prior intellectual 
activity comes to be identical with those forms without yet possessing them, as the Scholastics 
would say, habitually.312 It turns out, on my reading, that one could come to be intellectually identical 
                                                                                                                                                       
“and at that time he himself is capable of thinking by himself,” that is, upon his own initiative. While 
I think this is entirely consistent with what Aristotle says in II.5 and in this very passage concerning 
the person in possession of knowledge, I am not convinced that the line needs to be changed. 
Especially considering the question that follows at 429b26: “And further [someone might raise the 
puzzle] whether nous itself is intelligible” ἔτι δ’ εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός; 
311 Cf. de An. III.4 429a28 and III.8 432a3, respectively. 
312 See the discussion in the previous chapter about the Scholastic use of habitus to render hexis. Here, 
using present-day conventions, habitualiter might be best rendered not as “habitually” but perhaps 
rather “as a stable state.” It is important, however, to recall that this talk does not imply habituation 
(ἔθος) which is a mode of acquisition and development proper to the moral or ethical case. This is 
an unfortunate ambiguity in English. “Possess habitually,” on my reading, is how we ought to 
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with an intelligible form without thereby possessing it as a hexis, just as one could do some 
temperate thing without this action proceeding from or even immediately resulting in a firm ethical 
state, the virtue of temperance.313 We must be careful, then, since the intellect is the place of forms 
in two respects: it is the place of many forms potentially, being capable of different species of 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμαι), but it is also the place of any one of those forms actually and in the fullest 
sense whenever any one of those intelligible forms should come to be the object of a given act of 
contemplation. We can therefore contemplate and indeed become the universal intelligible form of 
elephant without possessing or even immediately coming to possess this form habitually (i.e. as a 
hexis). 
 Thus, on the picture I have been urging, the prior intellectual activity of one who is learning 
involves, at minimum, coming to be identical with the objects of thought, which are in some 
relevant sense said to be both forms and universals. Although the unlearned person does not yet 
possess (ἔχειν) these forms or universals when engaged in prior intellectual activity (for that is what 
distinguishes the person with the hexis of knowledge from the person who lacks it), nevertheless in 
virtue of engaging in this prior intellectual activity the student comes to be actually identical with 
these intelligible objects. It is this intellectual activity, whether prior or posterior to the possession of 
knowledge, which is analogous to the perceptual activity whereby perceivers come to be the same as 
the respective perceptible objects. But unlike the perceptual case, the receptive intellect must admit 
of activity that precedes and perfects its own development as a capacity. So that, for the unlearned 
person who is contemplating in order to learn, these intelligible objects come to be in the soul 
without necessarily coming to rest there as a result. 
4.1.2 A Potential Complication 
Now, as we have seen, Aristotle’s analysis of intellect depends at every turn on an analogy with 
perception, while conceding that intellect is distinctive and can reach beyond what sense can grasp. 
In this section I consider the analogy between intellect and sense with respect, on the one hand, to 
the identity between the perceiving or knowing subject and the object perceived or known and, on 
the other hand, to the varying grades of potentiality and actuality Aristotle develops throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                       
understand Aristotle’s use of ἐχειν in these passages, which, as we have seen, often implies a more 
robust “having” that corresponds to the robustness a hexis or habitus rather than a transient having. 
313 Cf. EN II.4 passim. Also consider the idea that a single good act does not make a person good. 
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de Anima (my focus in the preceding chapter). Indeed, the energeia/dynamis distinction that we have 
been considering seems to be particularly suited for the perceptual and intellectual cases, intricately 
bound up with the special kind of intentional identity proper to both perception and thought. This is 
recommended by both passages we have just seen, de Anima II.5 and III.4, and perhaps especially 
the latter, whose account of intellect begins by stating a basic analogy between intellectual activity 
and perception.314  
It is clear and commonly agreed that the identity of perceiver and thing perceived occurs at 
the stage of full activity, at the level of exercise of a developed perceptual capacity. According to a 
default reading of these two cases, thinking is straightforwardly analogous to perceiving in this 
regard: the identity between knower and object known is achieved at the level of intellectual activity, 
most clearly with the exercise of some developed intellectual capacity, but perhaps not only then, as 
we saw in the preceding section. Burnyeat, however, has challenged this reading, citing the passage 
from III.4 as a “proof text which shows unambiguously that that is wrong.”315  
When the intellect becomes each thing in the way in which an actual knower does 
(which happens as soon as the knower can exercise their power of their own accord) even then it is 
still in one sense just a capacity: not, however, a capacity in the same sense as before 
it learned or discovered.316 
This is the same passage from de Anima III.4 mentioned above, though I have given Burnyeat’s own 
translation. Of course, I concede that there are disanalogies between the two cases, but Burnyeat 
insists that the disanalogy reaches to the very ontological relations of potentiality and activity in the 
following way: on his view, the identity of subject and object is achieved at the level of activity in 
perception but at the level of hexis in intellection. This would be a surprising disanalogy given what 
we have seen so far. I take it that we should avoid attributing this disanalogy to Aristotle if possible, 
given everything in favor of a default and analogous reading from other passages. 
 According to Burnyeat, then, this passage confirms that the knower who is learned and in 
possession of knowledge has already achieved intellectual identity, which identity goes on to guide 
acts of contemplation in activity. While I concede that this passage concerns the knower in 
possession of knowledge, who has in some sense already become one-in-form with the objects of 
                                               
314 Cf. de An. III.4 429a10-18. 
315 Burnyeat Aristotle’s Divine Intellect (2008): 22. 
316 De An. III.4 429b5-9 (tr. Burnyeat after Hicks and Hamlyn, emphasis his); in Burnyeat (2008): 23. 
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his knowledge, I disagree with Burnyeat’s reading of “when the intellect becomes each thing.” 
Instead, I offer another interpretation of this passage in defense of the basic analogy between 
perception and intellection. On my view, the fully actual identity of knower and known is still 
achieved at the level of activity, just as in the perceptual case; the relevant disanalogy between the 
identity achieved by sense and intellect concerns differences in the development of natural and 
acquired capacities. As we saw in the preceding chapter, intellectual capacities are developed by and 
through their exercise, so that intellectual identity is achieved at the level of activity before to the 
acquisition and possession of knowledge. 
 Before addressing Burnyeat’s view, I note the two disanalogies between sense and intellect 
about which Aristotle is quite explicit in de Anima II.5 and on which most everyone agrees: 
The first change of the perceptive [animal] comes about from the male parent, and 
whenever it has been begotten it already has the ability to perceive, just as when [the 
intellectual being] possesses knowledge. And actual perceiving corresponds similarly 
to thinking. But the cases differ: on the one hand, the objects that bring the sensitive 
power to actuality, the visible, the audible, and the rest of the sensibles, are from 
without. The reason is that actual perception is of particulars, but knowledge is of 
the universal, and these are in some way within the soul itself. For this reason 
someone can think under his own power, whenever he wishes, but cannot perceive 
under his own power— for it is necessary that a sensible object be present.317 
Indeed, this very text is echoed later in Burnyeat’s alleged proof text in III.4.   
 Rather than coming to be by a process of learning or teaching, perceptual capacities develop 
by nature, and for Aristotle this is brought about by the action of the parents in early embryological 
development.318 Thus we are born with perceptual capacities already at a developed stage, even 
though our intellectual capacities are only at first potentiality.319 We must come to be knowers at a 
developed stage throughout life as a result of learning. Thus every human’s perceptual development 
is accomplished by the ordinary and natural process of generation, which process supplies a fully 
developed capacity for perceiving; things are not so for our intellectual faculties. This important 
                                               
317 De An. II.5 417b17-26. 
318 I wish to set aside the complicated details of animal generation here, and simply reflect on what 
Aristotle explicitly says in this context: whenever an animal is generated, the perceptual faculty is said 
to be already present. 
319 Recall the argument of the previous chapter: first potentiality has no analogue in the natural case. 
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disanalogy between intellect and perception should be familiar and routine, given the discussion of 
the preceding chapter. 
 Aristotle articulates a second difference in the above passage, and in even clearer terms: the 
objects of sense are purely external and particular, while intelligible objects are universal and, in a 
sense, already within the soul itself. The structure of the argument is interesting: the fundamental 
difference in the character of each class of object grounds the distinction between how each capacity 
is actualized. As a result, perceptual activities cannot occur without the prompting of an external 
perceptible object, while episodes of thinking can occur at will, at least for the person already in 
possession of knowledge. As we have seen, however, this special character of the objects of thought 
holds whether someone has already learned or not. 
While noting these two differences, Aristotle clearly establishes a general analogy between 
perception and thought. The developed perceptual capacity is paired schematically with the 
possession of knowledge, though the former arises by nature as a result of the process of generation 
and the latter is acquired throughout life as a result of learning. Furthermore, active perceiving is 
paired with the exercise of knowledge, though the former activity requires the prompting of an 
external object while the use of knowledge can occur at will. According to a default reading of these 
passages, the intellectual case is directly analogous in this respect: the intellectual identity of 
intellectual subject and intelligible object constitutes the exercise of intellectual capacities, and the 
having of such capacities is constituted by the ready ability to achieve this intellectual identity.320 
According to this reading, we should expect identity to fit into our schema in this way: 
 
Figure 5. The Default Reading of de Anima III.4 
STAGE APPLICATION TO PERCEPTION APPLICATION TO INTELLECT 
Stage 2 
Hexis 
Developed perceptual capacity/ 
Potential identity with perceptibles 
Developed intellectual capacity/ 
Potential identity with intelligibles 
Stage 3 
Energeia 
Actual identity with perceptibles 
(=Active perceiving) 
Actual identity with intelligibles 
(=Active thinking) 
                                               
320 In accordance with the argument of the preceding chapter, I want to say that both first and 
second potentiality knowers are capable of engaging in this intellectual activity. It is “zeroth” 




So, the activity of perception and thought is achieved by actual identity between subject and object: 
formal identity with the object is simply a description of what it means to exercise perceptual and 
intellectual capacities. 
Unfortunately for the default reading, however, Burnyeat points to a passage that suggests a 
more complicated story. Burnyeat’s contention is that Aristotle unambiguously introduces a third 
disanalogy beyond the other two in de Anima III.4, one which frustrates and complicates this more 
straightforward picture. He cites this alleged proof text as evidence for the claim that, in the 
intellectual case, identity with the object has already been achieved at stage (2) in a way analogous to 
perceptual identity at stage (3). That is to say, according to Burnyeat’s view, every knower at stage (2) 
must have already achieved intellectual identity simply in virtue of possessing the hexis, and further this 
identity persists in the knower as long as the habit of knowledge is maintained.321 According to his 
Complicating Reading, formal identity in the intellectual case is conceptually tied to the possession of 
knowledge, and unlike the perceptual case is not essentially tied to its exercise: 
 
Figure 6. The Complicating Reading of de Anima III.4 
STAGE APPLICATION TO PERCEPTION APPLICATION TO INTELLECT 
Stage 2 
Hexis 
Developed perceptual capacity/ 
Potential identity with perceptibles 
Developed intellectual capacity/ 
Actual identity with intellig ibles 
Stage 3 
Energeia 
Actual identity with perceptibles 
(=Actual perceiving) 
Actual identity with intelligibles has  
already been achieved above, and 
now guides actual thinking 
 
In this way, Burnyeat concludes, “the identity of intellect with its object holds already at second 
potentiality = first actuality, before the knower switches to the second actuality of exercising that 
intellectual power of their own accord.” 
There are some preliminary reasons for finding Burnyeat’s Complicating Reading 
unsatisfactory and thereby for preferring the simper straightforward reading. By linking intellectual 
identity with the possession of knowledge and not its exercise, Burnyeat leaves unanswered two 
                                               
321 Perhaps due to forgetfulness or related phenomena the possession of knowledge, and therefore 
its attendant identity with the object known, could be lost. 
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important and related questions about his own account: what intellectual potency remains yet to be 
actualized in the transition from the stage (2) to stage (3), and furthermore how do we characterize 
the activity that occurs at stage (3) in active episodes of thinking, above and beyond the identity of 
knower and known that, on his view, was already achieved at stage (2)? 
So far we have come to understand the activities of thought and perception alike according 
to the model of identity, so that they are both exercises of capacities for formal identity, issuing in 
the subject coming to be the form of some object in some relevant respect. Formal identity is, at 
least prima facie, simply a description of how the activities of perception and thought are to be 
conceived, on Aristotle’s view at any rate. The activity of seeing is the exercise of a capacity for 
receiving the colored form of a visible object, issuing in episodes of becoming ourselves visually 
informed by its color.322 And the case of intellect holds similarly, being either the same or something 
else of a similar sort.323 If instead actual identity is achieved already at the level of developed 
intellectual capacities and is conceptually linked with the possession of knowledge and not its exercise, 
then the model of formal identity would no longer be useful in characterizing the paired activity of 
thought, in specifying what it is to be thinking. If Burnyeat is right about this disanalogy, it is 
incumbent upon him to give a descriptive account of what occurs when knowledge is put to use. 
 There is a further and related difficulty: if intellectual identity is already achieved at stage (2), 
what potency remains to be actualized in active episodes of thinking? How are we to characterize the 
actual identity of knower and known at stage (2) so that there remains some further potentiality for 
contemplation that remains yet to be actualized in activity? Indeed, Burnyeat’s alleged proof text 
itself mentions a potency still remaining at stage (2). On the one hand the answer is simple: the 
potency that remains is for the activity of thinking, which comes about at will. On the other hand, as 
just mentioned, Burnyeat’s complication robs us of the standard means to describe what this activity 
might be—we can no longer lean on the model of formal identity in this regard. Both of these 
problems arise from locating the actual identity of knower and known at the second stage, 
conceptually tying intellectual identity to the possession of knowledge rather than to its exercise. 
This pair of problems is not all that rings off key here. Burnyeat’s reading dislodges the 
analogy with perception on precisely the point for which the analogy seems to have been introduced. 
                                               
322 Again, with the relevant qualifications. My thesis and line of argument is intended to be neutral 
on the Sorabji/Burnyeat question of the nature of perceptual affection. 
323 Cf. de An. III.4 429a10-18. 
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In the perceptual case it is in exercising one’s perceptual capacities that the perceiver has taken on 
the perceptible form of an object, that her perceptual faculty has come to be identical with some 
object (in the relevant respect). This is an unsurprising description of perceptual operation that 
Aristotle seems to exploit in explaining the nature of intellectual activity: the actual identity in both 
perceptual and intellectual cases seems to be conceptually linked with the exercise of some capacity, 
be it perceptual or intellectual. And this is how the default and straightforward reading takes things. 
In the perceptual case Burnyeat wants to agree with this analysis, but his conception of the 
intellectual case is different, as we have seen. And yet, if the application of the model of identity can 
shift so radically between the two cases, what remains of the analogy between the two cases? We 
might echo Burnyeat’s own words against him, albeit now in a different argumentative context: “I 
suggest that those who insist” that intellectual identity does not define intellectual activity, just as 
perceptual identity defines perceptual activity, “owe us an explanation of why Aristotle should 
tolerate such a significant lack of parallelism between the two types of cognition whose parallelism 
he trumpets both in the passage just quoted and elsewhere (III 4, 429a13-18).”324 
These considerations give rise to a rather difficult dilemma for Burnyeat so long as he locates 
intellectual identity at stage (2). On the one hand, he could admit that the model of identity is 
sufficient as a description of perceptual activity, conceptually linking perceptual identity with stage 
(3) perceptual activity, while nevertheless holding that the model is insufficient for explaining 
intellectual activity. But then it becomes difficult to see how anything would remain of even the 
broadest analogy between sense and intellect, and this would even make it strange to speak of 
intellect in terms of identity at all. On the other hand, he could maintain the general analogy between 
sense and intellect, but this would require him to dislodge the conceptual link between perceptual 
acts and achieved formal identity, inviting further explanation as to how the model of identity might 
apply every time it comes on scene. In either case his Complicating Reading forces us to give up 
something dear in our account of intellect, either the model of identity or the analogy between 
intellect and sense. In other words, while the earlier two disanalogies can be admitted without 
undermining the analogy between sense and intellect in general, it is difficult for the Complicating 
Reading to save any meaningful analogy between the two cases at all. 
With respect to these questions I should note that Burnyeat does not deny that formal 
identity between knower and known is relevant to episodes of actual thinking; indeed, he concedes 
                                               
324 Burnyeat (2008): 22. 
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that “the form already acquired is then actively guiding the knower’s thought.”325 He is motivated 
both by his alleged proof text and by the idea from II.5 that “knowledge is of the universal, and 
these are in some way within the soul itself.”326 It is true that in some sense the intelligible form is 
said to reside habitually in someone who possesses knowledge, but it is not obvious what this habit 
(ἕξις) amounts to in detail. Burnyeat takes for granted that if the intelligible form is “in the soul” in 
any way at all, that it must reside there as an actual and already achieved intellectual identity with the 
intelligible object. In both passages, however, Aristotle qualifies what he says with “in some way,” 
using the same Greek word (πως): if it is possible to interpret this qualification in several different 
ways, we ought to interpret it so as to minimize tension with Aristotle’s other commitments. 
4.1.3 Avoiding the Complication 
Now that we have seen some of the unsatisfying consequences of Burnyeat’s Complicating Reading 
I propose my own alternative, beginning with a detailed discussion of the passage in question: 
[Greek] ὅταν δ’ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ επιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν 
(τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι’ αὑτοῦ), ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει 
πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν.327 
 
[Burnyeat tr.] When the intellect becomes each thing in the way in which an actual 
knower does (which happens as soon as the knower can exercise their power of their own accord) 
even then it is still in one sense just a capacity: not, however, a capacity in the same 
sense as before it learned or discovered.328 
 
[Buttaci tr.] And whenever it [νοῦς] has come to be each of the things as the 
knower in activity is said to (and this happens whenever he is capable of being in 
activity on his own), it is even at that time [each thing] in some way in potentiality, 
but not in the same way as before he learned or discovered.329 
                                               
325 Burnyeat (2008), 23. 
326 De An. II.5 417b23-24 
327 De An. III.4 429b5-9. This text is what Burnyeat prints following Hicks, including punctuation. 
328 De An. III.4 429b5-9 (tr. Burnyeat after Hicks and Hamlyn, emphasis his) in Burnyeat (2008) 23.  
329 De An. III.4 429b5-9 (my translation). 
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I concede to Burnyeat that his proof text in fact establishes the following claim, broadly understood: 
(i) Knowers at stage (2) have already achieved intellectual identity with their objects. 
This is an important claim, and Burnyeat is right that it has not been fully appreciated or explained 
by those who prefer the default reading.  
 He goes on, however, to interpret the claim in the strongest possible terms, so that the gloss 
“already” is read in a conceptual and persisting sense: 
(ii) All knowers at stage (2) are, simply in virtue of possessing knowledge, already 
identical with their intelligible objects just as perceivers are at stage (3). 
As I outlined above, there are serious reasons to be uncomfortable if (i), in fact, implies Burnyeat’s 
stronger reading in (ii). The second claim is stronger because it insists that intellectual stage (2) and 
the possession of knowledge is constituted by a persisting identity of subject and object—even when 
the knower is not actually contemplating anything—that is analogous to the perceptual identity that 
obtains only during episodes of perceptual activity. Again, Burnyeat is surely right that this passage 
raises a question for the default view, so that those who insist on an analogy between perceptual and 
intellectual cases at stage (2) and (3) must explain what Aristotle could mean in these lines. Given the 
argument of the preceding chapter, I have a reply that is unavailable to those who wish to save the 
default reading, but who otherwise adhere to the Standard View of the Triple Scheme. Claim (i), 
derived straightforwardly from the alleged proof text, may not necessarily imply this robust 
intellectual identity at stage (2), but might simply mean that possession of knowledge in some way 
presupposes identity with the intelligible object. This is to say that claim (ii) is not the only possible 
way to read the passage and interpret claim (i), and it may even turn out to be the less likely reading.  
 Burnyeat notes that his translation follows Hamlyn and Hicks, and yet he departs from them 
both in how he translates the operative verb. They and I alike translate γένηται as an English 
present perfect, “has become,” while Burnyeat opts for the English present, “becomes.”330 In so 
translating Burnyeat has masked an ambiguity in the Greek: “whenever the intellect becomes” 
implies a persisting state throughout the action of the main clause. On the other hand, the English 
                                               
330 Hicks (1907): 483-4, where he takes the identity to be achieved in “actual operation.” Hamlyn 
(2002): 58: “When the intellect has become each thing in the way that one who actually knows is said 
to […].” Commenting on the line on p. 137: “The point of the last sentence is to distinguish 
between the intellect as a mere dunamis and the intellect as a hexis, between the capacity for thought 
that a child has and that which a trained thinker has (v. on 417a21 and 417b16).” Hamlyn refers to 
sections of his translation from de An. II.5, and not to those particular lines only. 
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“whenever the intellect has become” maintains a certain ambiguity as to the present state: it is not 
clear whether the intellect which “has become” some object persists in being identical with it 
throughout the action described in the main clause, or not.  
The Greek verb is an aorist subjunctive introduced by ὅταν (“whenever”), marking an 
indefinite temporal clause. In moods other than the indicative, and especially in indefinite temporal 
clauses, the aorist tense indicates a simple or completed aspect more than past time.331 It follows that 
ὅταν γένηται can be translated into English either way, as a simple present or as a present perfect.332 
The Greek aorist within an indefinite temporal clause indicates a completed rather than a continuing 
action with respect to the main clause. In this respect there is some affinity between the Greek aorist 
and the English present perfect. I want to suggest that the English present perfect more accurately 
reflects the Greek aorist in this context, leaving open whether the coming to be identical with the 
object persists, or not. The aorist aspect implies a completed action whose effects do not necessarily 
continue as a persisting state at present time; this is the fundamental difference between the aorist 
and perfect aspects in Greek. For example, the aorist is not typically used to express someone 
having died; instead, the perfect is used, since the completion of the action (or, if you will, passion) 
of dying results in the persisting state of death.  
One might even be tempted to conclude that Aristotle’s preference for the aorist rather than 
the perfect is evidence enough against Burnyeat’s translation and reading, arguing that if Aristotle 
intended intellectual identity to remain as a persisting state he would have used a perfect rather than 
an aorist verb. My argument is not that easy, however, since I concede that the perfect is rarely used 
in the subjunctive mood and is often replaced by the aorist, particularly in indefinite temporal 
clauses.333 Thus the aorist γένηται is even more ambiguous because of its mood and syntactic 
context: the (im)permanence of result is entirely undefined on grammatical grounds alone. The 
lesson here is that the English perfect has a broader range than the Greek perfect and can capture a 
simple past completed action without regard to permanence of result. And given what we know 
about the Greek aorist replacing the perfect in moods outside of the indicative, the aorist here 
                                               
331 Cf. Smyth § 1850-1860, 1923-1951, 2399-2400. 
332 The English simple past (“whenever the intellect became”) and past perfect (“whenever the 
intellect had become”) will not do, because even in indefinite temporal clauses our past tenses 
express past time; not so for the Greek aorist. It is also clear that the English future and future 
perfect will not do, since they do not capture completed action. 
333 Cf. Smyth § 1860, 2400 
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describes the same sort of completed action and maintains the same sort of ambiguity with respect 
to the permanence of result as the English present perfect.334  
For the specific context of our passage, then, the English present perfect more closely 
approximates what is expressed by the Greek aorist verb, including its perhaps frustrating ambiguity 
on such a crucial point. So when we translate γένηται as “has become” in English, we must note 
well that the Greek does not necessarily imply “has become and remains being,” as we are accustomed 
to hear whenever the perfect tense is used in Greek. Burnyeat’s argument is therefore shaken in 
some measure by this lesson: by taking the passage as a proof text and inferring claim (ii) from claim 
(i), he must think that ὅταν γένηται should be read to mean “whenever the intellect has become and 
remains being each thing,” so that the formal identity between knower and thing known persists as a 
permanent state during the action of the main clause, namely in the knower at stage (2). This reading 
of Burnyeat is strongly suggested by his translation “when the intellect becomes,” suggesting in 
English the permanence of result. While I admit that ὅταν γένηται could be translated in this way 
and could imply a persisting and permanent state, we must be careful not to insist that the text must 
mean this. Accordingly, his own translation of the alleged proof text biases things in favor of his 
argument, placing into jeopardy the passage’s claim to being a proof text at all. 
 In the light of these considerations, I suggest that a weaker alternative to (ii) is entirely 
possible on textual grounds as a gloss of (i) and as an interpretation of the passage as a whole: 
(iii) All knowers at stage (2), in virtue of having knowledge, have already become 
identical with intelligible objects previously, though this identity need not persist. 
The relevant difference between (ii) and (iii) can be summed up as a difference in what “already” is 
taken to mean in the original claim (i): in (ii) “already” is read with a Greek perfective sense, so that 
the prior intellectual identity that has been achieved persists as a permanent result, being 
conceptually located at intellectual stage (2) with the possession of knowledge; in (iii) “already” is 
read with a merely temporal and Greek aorist sense, so that some prior intellectual identity has been 
achieved but need not continue as a persisting state at stage (2), and therefore does not define what 
it means to be in possession of knowledge. On my reading, in short, the possession of knowledge 
                                               
334 The obvious difference between the English perfect and Greek aorist is that the aorist can 
capture specified as well as unspecified past time, whereas the English perfect is only used of 
unspecified time. This is irrelevant in this context, however, because the Greek aorist is embedded 
within an indefinite temporal clause, so specified time is not expressed by the aorist here. Thus the 
English perfect can translate the Greek aorist in this context without grammatical remainder. 
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presupposes but is not constituted by this actual intellectual identity. I grant that the grammar of the 
text itself leaves undetermined whether this identity persists as a permanent state, but that ambiguity 
is sufficient for this step of my argument. If the text is ambiguous in the way I have been urging, 
then it can nowise serve as “the proof text which shows unambiguously” that I and many others are 
wrong.335 
 Given the argument of the preceding chapter, however, we have independent reason to 
interpret the passage along the lines in (iii) rather than in (ii). As a general point about the developed 
capacities, both moral and intellectual, hexeis are developed by engaging in prior activity. Since 
knowledge is developed by engaging in prior intellectual activity, and since intellectual activity (both 
prior and perfected) is understood on the model of identity between intellectual faculty and 
intelligible object, we can conclude that it is by coming to be intellectually identical with the nature 
of elephants that one comes to possess knowledge of elephants. Therefore, we have the resources to 
avoid entirely the disanalogy that Burnyeat proposes for us by applying the generic lesson of the 
preceding chapter to our reading of this passage from de Anima III.4: of course the person in 
possession of knowledge will have already become identical with the intelligible objects, since the 
person in possession of knowledge will have already engaged in the activity of thinking about those 
very objects of knowledge. 
Moreover, the relevant disanalogy between perception and intellect is the one that Aristotle 
explicitly mentions in II.5, that perceptual capacities develop in the ordinary course of nature while 
intellectual capacities must develop through prior activity. Burnyeat is right that this passage in III.4 
is suggestive of something important to Aristotle’s account of intellect. On my view, however, this 
passage serves as a confirmation of my account of the Triple Scheme given in the preceding chapter: 
it is an important point of friction where we see hints of Aristotle’s idea that we develop hexeis of 
intellect by engaging in the activities of intellect, by becoming intellectually identical with intelligible 
objects.336 
                                               
335 Burnyeat (2008), 22. 
336 On this point, see a passage from Alexander’s de Anima: “So, when we come to be, we 
immediately have singly that intellect called both “potential” and “material,” as we have said, but the 
intellect’s being in activity and the hexeis of these we acquire later on account of daily teaching, of 
which hexis the intellect comes to be receptive as a result of the activity, and we acquire the 
theoretical intellect as a result of the activity of theorists” (τὸν μὲν οὖν δυνάμει τε καὶ ὑλικὸν νοῦν 
καλούμενον ἑκάτερον ὡς εἶπον εὐθὺς ἔχομεν γινόμενοι, τοὺς δὲ κατ’ ἐνέργειάν τε ὄντας καὶ 
ἕξεις τούτων ὕστερον κτώμεθα διὰ τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν διδασκαλίας, ἧς γίνεται δεκτικὸς ἐκ τῆς 
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Finally, Aristotle says that someone must have become the objects as the knower in activity is 
said to (ὡς ὁ επιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν). In order to interpret things the way Burnyeat 
has, he must read this line as saying: “When the intellect becomes each thing in the way in which an 
actual knower does, which is to say, the person in possession of knowledge.” It is true that Aristotle will often 
refer to the person in possession of knowledge as an actuality (ἐντελέχεια), but in those contexts he 
denies that the possession of knowledge is as such an exercise or activity (ἐνέργεια).337 As a final 
point against Burnyeat’s Complicating Reading, then, we should not think of the intellectual identity 
mentioned in the first line of his passage to be a persisting state of knowledge corresponding to 
stage (2), but rather the knower who is said to be in activity at stage (3). After all, the knower whom 
Aristotle mentions here is not one in actual possession of knowledge, but the one who is in activity 
(ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν). So, in view of the argument from chapter three, the analogy with perception can 
be preserved. 
We can therefore see one fruitful application of the work of the preceding chapter to an 
interpretive controversy concerning intellect. While there are surely many other issues to be 
considered regarding this intellectual identity, I suggest that they lie downstream of a basic 
appreciation of the distinctions in potentiality, actuality, and activity that seem to be operative 
throughout Aristotle’s account of soul, perception, and intellect. I have argued that it is crucially 
important to appreciate the prior activity of the student’s own receptive intellect in the process of 
intellectual learning. However, this cannot be the entire story: in the generic account of the 
preceding chapter the teacher played a substantial role in guiding and shaping the student’s prior 
activity. But so far I have said little about the teacher’s contribution. The balance of the chapter will 
be to work toward saying more about the teacher’s contribution in the case of intellectual learning. 
                                                                                                                                                       
ἐνεργείας, τὸν δὲ θεωρητικὸν ἐκ τῆς τῶν θεωρητῶν). This passage was said to be “out of context” 
and even “unintelligible” by Fotinis (1984) 106; he prints the bit about being receptive as a result of 
activity, but between asterisks. He does not even print a translation of the final seven words of the 
passage, however. On my understanding of the lessons of the preceding chapter as applied to 
theoretical intellect, this passage is eminently intelligible. 
337 Cf. de An. 417b12-16, esp. 13: λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην...ἐντελεχείᾳ. See also de An. 412a10-11, 21-
26, esp. 26: ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. 
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4.2 INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES IN THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS  
This is perhaps as much as we can say on the basis of the de Anima alone about intellectual activities, 
and so we find ourselves looking elsewhere in the corpus for a more detailed specification of what 
this prior intellectual activity might involve, and how a teacher might give it shape. One passage 
outside of the de Anima which seems to be especially relevant to the development of intellectual 
hexeis is Posterior Analytics B.19. I note at the outset that this passage focuses on scientific knowledge 
and nous neither as unqualified powers nor as activities of the soul, but rather as states (ἕξεις) and 
virtues (ἀρεταί).338 And yet, it is precisely these intellectual hexeis which the subject of our inquiry 
lacks: the person who in the process of learning engages in some prior intellectual activity without 
yet possessing these intellectual habits (as they might be called according to one sense of that term). 
The ultimate aim of this chapter is to understand the prior intellectual activities involved in the 
development of these intellectual hexeis, and so this section focuses on the acquisition of first 
principles. 
4.2.1 Prior Energeia and Preexisting Gnōsis  
Let us turn, then, to the Posterior Analytics, in particular with its treatment of induction and 
acquisition of first principles in B.19, a passage with which this dissertation project began. My 
general approach so far has been to discuss the process of learning in terms of some prior 
intellectual activity, an approach first recommended by what I have been calling Aristotle’s Learning 
Principle. We have seen that Aristotle says little about the character of the intelligible object beyond 
it being an essence, a form, and a universal; we also know little about the character of the intellectual 
activity beyond an immaterial identity between the subject and the intelligible object, an identity that 
is somehow analogous to the activity of perception. So, as a preliminary specification, the prior 
intellectual activity through which learning comes about must involve in some way contemplating 
and coming to be intellectually identical with those objects of thought—albeit in an undeliberate and 
unrefined way—in order to acquire an intellectual hexis that is directed toward contemplating that 
very same intelligible object in a more refined and deliberate way. 
                                               
338 I note that the use of hexis in de An. III.5 is different than the use of hexis in this context. For a 
contrasting view, see Lesher (1973). 
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 However, those familiar with the Posterior Analytics know that there Aristotle speaks in terms 
of preexisting knowledge or cognition (γνῶσις), that is, how new intellectual hexeis come to be not 
from prior activity but rather from other previously achieved cognition.339 Aristotle’s entire account 
of demonstrative scientific knowledge starts from this principle. And indeed, in B.19 part of the 
strategy is to show how noetic hexeis, by which we grasp the universal first principles both of art and 
of scientific knowledge, also come to be from an innate cognitive capacity for perception. So as I 
begin an appeal to the Posterior Analytics to flesh out my account of prior intellectual activity, 
someone familiar with these passages might rightly ask: “Why speak of prior intellectual activity, that 
is, activity of nous itself when undeveloped, if Aristotle seems to be happy to speak of the prior 
activity of lower level human cognitive capacities, most notably of perception?” 
From the outset I surely must admit that all dianoetic learning proceeds from preexisting 
knowledge or cognition (γνῶσις).340 So part of what the objector says is true enough: Aristotle says 
that learning requires the prior activity of lower level cognitive capacities. But this alone would be 
insufficient to effect intellectual learning. We saw in the preceding chapter that the student must 
already be engaged in the unified activity of the expert. The person who is just laying bricks can only 
ever learn to lay bricks. The person who is just playing a piano sonata with his right hand can only 
ever learn to play that hand’s part. A conclusion of the preceding chapter was that we learn by doing 
the very things we are learning to do, so that in order to learn to play a piano sonata, at some point 
in his development he must practice the piece with both hands together. Similarly with intellect, 
                                               
339 This is particularly interesting given how Aristotle puts this same principle in the ethical treatises 
(EN VI/EE V ch. 3) in participial terms: “All teaching is from things previously cognized, just as we 
said also in the Analytics” ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν (1139b26-7). When expressed with a participle of the compound verb 
progignoskein it recalls the analogous cases of proenergein and energein proteron, discussed at length in the 
previous chapter. Of course, my argument is that progignōskein and proenergein can imply two different 
kinds of prior activity. Neverhteless, there is an undeniable likeness between the expressions. 
340 Cf. APo. A.1. For the sake of argumentative clarity, as with some other common Greek terms, I 
shall ordinarily leave gnōsis untranslated. There is an important question about the normative 
character of the word, whether it is truth-entailing or not. In the former case we might translate it 
best as “knowledge,” while in the latter case we might best render it “cognition.” I am of the 
opinion that gnōsis in Greek probably had a more neutral sense but Aristotle sometimes uses it in a 
distinctively truth-entailing way, and that this creates a difficulty for the translator: should we build 
into our translation the more common meaning that Aristotle’s use presupposes, or do we exhibit 
the distinctive meaning that his distinctive use gives to a word that was otherwise not universally so 
used? 
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since the relevant expert activity in this case is an intellectual identity, the student must—at some 
point in his development—come to be intellectually identical with the objects about which he is 
learning. If only perceptual capacities were operative in him, then only perceptual hexeis could ever 
result. 
Furthermore, this requirement of preexisting gnōsis is carefully qualified so as to apply not to 
every case of learning, but only to dianoetic learning. A preliminary question arises regarding the 
purpose of including this qualification on learning in the statement of the principle. One may 
reasonably suppose, given Aristotle’s eventual solution in Posterior Analytics B.19, that this 
qualification was necessary to avoid a regress in preexisting gnōseis: if we are to avoid a regress, the 
process of acquiring the perceptual gnōsis—the one from which properly noetic or inductive learning 
proceeds—cannot itself presuppose still another gnōsis, and so on.341 That is, on pain of regress, 
whatever perceptual process produces the gnōsis from which induction proceeds must not fall under 
this principle. Thus the qualification is necessary, in the first place, to differentiate dianoetic learning 
from what we might call merely perceptual learning. This surely fits with the overall argument of the 
treatise: commentators from Aquinas to Barnes read the qualification in this way, and they are surely 
right.342 But this is not the full significance of Aristotle’s claim about dianoetic learning.  
 I have argued in the preceding chapter for an account of first potentiality and of the 
Learning Principle that are generic enough to accommodate all kinds of learning, both moral and 
intellectual, informed by the idea that Aristotle clearly regards prior activity as necessary for all kinds 
                                               
341 I use “noetic” throughout to refer to the hexis of nous in the narrow meaning, i.e. to the 
acquisition and grasp of first principles; I use “epistemic” to refer to the hexis of epistēmē in the strict 
sense. This qualification is especially important as Aristotle speaks most carefully and strictly when 
speaking about these things as hexeis. When discussing the power of nous in the de Anima, namely that 
potentiality or power which even the unlearned person has, Aristotle leads us to conclude that this is 
the power of the soul in virtue of which humans are said to have any number of the intellectual 
virtues, since it is that by which our souls cognize (γιγνώσκει), reason (φρονεῖ), think (διανοεῖται) 
and suppose (ὑπολαμβάνει) (de An. III.4 429a9, a23). Indeed, the same power is also said to have 
both theoretical and practical exercises (Cf. de An. III.10 433a13ff.). Importantly, Aristotle carefully 
avoids denying these powers of the unlearned person; as we have seen, what the unlearned person 
lacks are the developed hexeis, not the potentiality of nous without qualification. 
342 Aquinas ad loc. (tr. Larcher): “First, he asserts a universal proposition containing his thesis, 
namely, that the production of knowledge in us is caused from knowledge already existing; hence he 
says, ‘Every doctrine and every discipline...’ He does not say, ‘all knowledge,’ (omnis cognitio) because 
not all knowledge depends on previous knowledge, for that would involve an infinite process: but 
the acquisition of every discipline comes from knowledge already possessed.” See also Barnes 
(1994): 81. 
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of learning.343 Aristotle here tells us, however, that preceding gnōsis is required for all dianoetic 
learning. This is particularly revealing given that the two categories of virtue Aristotle considers are 
ethical or moral (ἠθική) and intellectual or dianoetic (διανοητική).344 While it is true that Aristotle 
must here exclude whatever process of learning results in perceptual gnōseis in order to avoid a 
regress, he is plausibly also excluding moral formation and the acquisition of the ethical virtues. This 
first principle of the Posterior Analytics, therefore, is meant to spell out in more explicit terms what 
holds specifically of learning by logos: his insistence that dianoetic learning should proceed from a 
preexisting gnōsis is simply a more precise way of talking about acquiring capacities which arise by 
logos.345 This is therefore not a denial or restatement of Aristotle’s more general learning principle—
that we learn by doing the very things we are learning to do, by prior activity—but rather a further 
specification of it, of how prior activity brings about learning in the dianoetic or intellectual case. 
 Thus, given the context of my argument, it is significant that Aristotle begins this treatise 
with some principle to describe this particular mode of learning and of hexis-acquisition. Since other 
interpretations of learning in Aristotle do not begin with a generic account of ethical and dianoetic 
learning which involves prior activity, those other interpretations do not foresee this need to 
distinguish between ethical and dianoetic learning, at least not in this way. Indeed, a possible worry 
                                               
343 Where “learning” implies the acquisition or development of some hexis. The genesis of the 
perceptual power simpliciter would not require prior activity and would therefore fall outside of the 
scope of the generic account I gave. I shall simply note here that a different account must be given 
for the coming to be of this perceptual dynamis. Even the acquisition of perceptual gnōsis, however, 
must come by prior activity of the perceptual power. As I shall argue in the coming sections, this is 
not dianoetic, but rather a kind of perceptual habituation. 
344 EN II.1 1103a14-18: “Virtue, then, being of two kinds, dianoetic and ethical, dianoetic virtue in 
the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and 
time), while ethical virtue comes about as a result of habituation” (trans. Ross, my edits) (Διττῆς δὴ 
τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ 
διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ’ 
ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους). 
Though I often follow the traditional convention of referring to intellectual and moral virtue, these 
words are translating ἀρετὴ διανοητική and ἀρετὴ ἠθική. Accordingly, I here use “intellectual” and 
“dianoetic” interchangeably, as well as “moral” and “ethical,” insofar as the latter in each pair simply 
transliterates the Greek term. It should be added that these are the two categories of psychic virtue. 
Aristotle does allow that there are bodily hexeis and therefore bodily virtues, like health or strength 
(cf. Phys. VII.3). 
345 This is related to Aristotle’s discussion in B.19 where only those cases of perceptual gnōsis that 
result in a logos are of interest to him. Non-logical gnōseis are of little interest to his project here. 
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about my view is that by emphasizing prior intellectual activity I have lost what is distinctive to 
learning by logos. But on my view, Aristotle gives us precisely that distinctive feature in the opening of 
the Posterior Analytics, by relying upon a preexisting gnōsis to inform or otherwise guide one’s 
intellectual formation, which requirement does not hold in the case of moral formation or the 
development of technical and perceptual empeiria, all capacities developing by habituation properly 
so-called (ἔθει). Far from excluding or ruling out the necessity of prior activity in intellectual 
formation, this principle ought to be understood as specifying how prior activity might operate. 
 We have therefore found in the opening lines of the Posterior Analytics something like a 
second Learning Principle which encapsulates what is distinctive about intellectual formation and 
the process of acquiring dianoetic virtues by learning (μαθήσει) and by logos.346 In the previous 
chapter I worked to show what holds of dianoetic and ethical learning alike, against a more popular 
conception which equates learning by prior activity and learning by habituation (ἔθει). Having 
established that, on the contrary, prior activity holds generically of both habituated and non-
habituated modes of learning, we can now make some progress toward understanding what holds 
specifically of each. More must be said, however, to explain how these General and Specific 
Learning Principles cohere: 
 General Learning Principle: For all learning, we learn to φ by φ-ing. 
 Specific Learning Principle: For all dianoetic learning, we learn from preexisting gnōsis. 
The task going forward is to explain, in some measure, how preexisting gnōseis are at work in shaping 
the prior activity of the intellectual faculty itself throughout the process of dianoetic learning. 
4.2.2 The Place of Experience in Metaphysics A.1 
So let us turn to the development of one dianoetic virtue in particular, nous. The problems, puzzles, 
and questions surrounding the interpretation of Posterior Analytics B.19 are legion.347 My focus and 
                                               
346 Technē and phronēsis are the difficult cases, though I shall consider some technical examples. I must 
set aside for the present how one learns to be prudent from preexisting gnōsis. Though I should say 
that, insofar as phronēsis is not a properly moral virtue, it plausibly does not arise from habituation in 
the strict sense either, but perhaps proceeds reflectively from the right moral habits. See for example 
John McDowell, “Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle’s Ethics” (2009b). 
347 One might raise questions about the argument at the beginning of the chapter, regarding both the 
structure of the argument against an innate grasp of first principles and precisely how to specify his 
primary argumentative target. Cf. e.g. Gail Fine, The Possibility of Inquiry (2014). One might 
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my point of entry will be Aristotle’s remarks about cognitive capacities and states in the middle of 
the chapter, though this will surely have implications for many other interpretive questions issuing 
from this difficult text. Given my focus, the most notable standing debate about which I must 
register an opinion is the nature of experience (ἐμπειρία). I suggest that current interpretive 
difficulties—both about B.19 and about empeiria more generally—may result in part from 
overlooking a distinction between logoi without qualification and the orthos logos, that is, the correct 
account. On the alternative interpretation I shall here develop, logoi without qualification proceed by 
induction from perceptual gnōseis without qualification, moving from particulars to universals, while 
the orthos logos proceeds inductively from the perfected perceptual gnōsis of empeiria. 
 Much of the current debate about this chapter regards the place of empeiria in the ascent to 
first principles. The character of perception and memory seem to be straightforward enough, being 
cognitive capacities and states that we share with many other animals, and are treated at length in the 
psychological treatises. And the robustly intellectual character of knowledge, art, and the grasp of 
their first principles is similarly familiar from the rest of the Analytics, the Metaphysics, and the shared 
book treating of intellectual virtue in the ethical treatises.348 Indeed, although the grasp of first 
principles stands in need of some explanation, that art and demonstrative knowledge proceed from 
first principles, at any rate, and that they must be of a certain character (immediate, better known 
than, etc.) has been clear from the earliest chapters of the Posterior Analytics.349 One way of 
characterizing B.19 is Aristotle’s attempt to cross this gap, to explain how we span the chasm 
between low-level cognitive capacities and states we share with other animals and the robustly 
intellectual capacities and states that are distinctive to us as rational animals, with empeiria—the most 
mysterious item of the bunch—serving as a kind of bridge. My ultimate aim is to suggest that this is 
decidedly not Aristotle’s purpose in the chapter, that bridging this gap from particular to universal or 
from perception to logoi in general is not his principal concern in B.19, but rather how we get the 
correct universals that constitute the grasp of the first principles of art and of demonstrative science. 
                                                                                                                                                       
alternatively raise questions about the character of first principles themselves, whether they are 
foundational but logically complex propositions or rather simple concepts, a question rendered 
difficult by remarks toward the end of the chapter. Cf. e.g. Jonathan Barnes’ edition of the Posterior 
Analytics (1994) and David Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (2002). Likewise one might ask 
whether the cognitive ascent described in the chapter terminates in ordinary-language concepts or 
robust scientific notions. Cf. e.g. Dominic Scott, Recollection and Experience (2007). 
348 Nicomachean VI or Eudemian V. 
349 Cf. APo. A.2 passim. 
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 But setting aside that larger concern, on every reading of our chapter empeiria serves as an 
important and indeed somewhat mysterious link in the cognitive chain going from perception and 
memory to the intellectual grasp of first principles of epistēmē and technē. The debate about its 
character has often been framed in terms of whether one regards empeiria as a grasp of particulars or 
universals, as Hasper and Yurdin have organized things in their recent joint paper.350 At the 
beginning of my own account, I frame the debate about the character of empeiria differently—
related, to be sure, but with a distinct focus. I ask the following question: In what way is experience 
a perfected and excellent cognitive state, and in what way is it, as such, cognitively incomplete? 
 On a first reading of Posterior Analytics B.19 (and the parallel discussion in Metaphysics A.1), we 
find that empeiria has a privileged place in the cognitive ascent that falls short of a grasp of first 
principles. Indeed, in Metaphysics A.1 Aristotle says that many memories of the same thing 
“complete” or “perfect” the capacity of a single experience (μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν 
ἀποτελοῦσιν).351 This idea is made more manifest when, also in A.1, Aristotle praises the success of 
the person of experience over against the person possessing only a logos: 
With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and we even see 
people of experience enjoying more success than those who have a logos without 
experience.352 
This is confirmed by how highly Aristotle speaks of experience in more particular scientific contexts, 
and for those in error how much he attributes to their inexperience. In the Prior Analytics Aristotle even 
says that experience “hands on” the principles of knowledge.353 As a preliminary constraint, then, 
empeiria itself must constitute a cognitive achievement and a perfection of the cognitive faculty.354 
 But Aristotle also indicates that empeiria leaves something to be desired. Despite its being a 
cognitive perfection that renders one practically successful when compared to an inexperienced 
                                               
350 Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Joel Yurdin “Between Perception and Scientific Knowledge: Aristotle’s 
Account of Experience” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (2014). 
351 Cf. Meta. A.1 980b25-981a1. 
352 Meta. A.1 981a12-15: πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἱ ἔμπειροι τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. 
353 Cf. APr. A.30 46a17-21. It is interesting to note that the verb here is paradounai, related to the 
Latin tradere from which we get the English ‘tradition.’ 
354 Cf. e.g. Robert Bolton’s “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I.1” (1991) for an 
opposing view. 
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person with a or even the logos, and although it significantly contributes to and, in the words of 
Polus, even makes science and art (ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποιησεν), it is nevertheless carefully 
distinguished from science and art. Indeed, far from being in tension with the first set of claims, this 
difference between empeiria and technē even explains why the person of experience enjoys the 
practical and productive success that he does, as Aristotle tells us immediately following the above: 
The reason is that empeiria is a gnōsis of particulars, while art is a gnōsis of universals, 
and all actions and productions are concerned with what is particular. For the 
physician does not heal a man except accidentally, but Callias or Socrates.355  
What makes empeiria rank lower than art as a cognitive state, namely its being of particulars, is also the 
very feature that explains its practical or productive advantage. Nevertheless, as part of his cognitive 
ascent to wisdom of the highest sort, Aristotle emphasizes universal and indeed impractical things.356 
So, one of the first ways to capture the difference between empeiria (whatever perfection it might be) 
and properly intellectual virtues is the difference between being of particulars and of universals. 
 Another way of capturing the difference, more familiar to the idiom of Posterior Analytics B, is 
between merely grasping the that (τὸ ὅτι) and (also) grasping the because (τὸ διότι), a second 
distinction Aristotle introduces just after discussing the relative success of the empeiros in A.1. To wit: 
For people of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the 
others know the “why” and the cause. Hence we think that the master-workers in 
each craft are more honorable and know in a truer sense and are wiser than the 
manual workers, because they know the causes of the things that are done (we think 
that manual workers are like certain soulless things which act indeed, but act without 
knowing what they do, as fire burns—but while soulless things perform each of their 
functions by a natural tendency, the laborers perform them through ethos. So, [master 
craftsmen] are not wiser because they are more practical, but because they have the 
logos and know the causes.357  
                                               
355 Meta. A.1 981a15-19: αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν 
καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον 
ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην. 
356 Cf. Meta. A.1 981b13-982a1. 
357 Meta. A.1 981a28-b6: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ’ οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι 
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον 
εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν (τοὺς 
 175 
Indeed, as Aristotle writes in another place later in the Metaphysics, the logos is unclear or obscure 
(ἄδηλος) when it does not express the cause.358 The logos which expresses and in virtue of which we 
grasp merely the fact that but not the reason why is rightly said to be deficient qua logos. As a second 
preliminary constraint, then, the logos of “mere thats” must be an unclear logos, which is neither 
perfect nor complete qua logos. Within the context of Metaphysics A.1, at any rate, the 
particular/universal distinction is introduced first to explain the practical and productive success of 
the empeiros, while the that/because distinction is introduced second to explain what the empeiros 
lacks. 
 It is very tempting to identify a gnōsis of particulars with a gnōsis of the fact that, and a gnōsis 
of universals with a gnōsis of the reason why.359 While this identification is suggested by the 
compressed argument of A.1, it is the cause of much of the interpretive difficulty: if every gnōsis of 
“mere thats” is a gnōsis of particulars only, how ought we to characterize the Historia Animalium, a 
lengthy account of “mere thats”?360 It would be odd to characterize the content and claims of the 
Historia Animalium in purely particular terms, for example as holding about these here elephants but 
not about this kind of elephant in general. And so this difficulty looms large for any straightforward 
identification of the two distinctions Aristotle introduces, particular/universal and that/because. On 
the one hand, empeiria seems to supply us with a gnōsis of what I have been calling “mere thats,” and 
in this way provides or itself constitutes a logos which is incomplete with respect to knowledge of the 
cause. On the other hand, Aristotle regards empeiria as a mastery over particulars, bringing to 
perfection many memories of a single thing. How ought we to square these two commitments? This 
tension becomes even more pronounced if we straightforwardly identify the particular/universal 
distinction with the that/because distinction, an identification Aristotle’s own discussion invites us 
to make. In view of this difficulty, however, perhaps these two distinctions do not align as well as is 
commonly supposed. 
                                                                                                                                                       
δ’, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια ποιεῖ μέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ—τὰ μὲν 
οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι’ ἔθος), ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὸ 
πρακτικοὺς εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν. 
358 Cf. Meta. H.4 1044b12-15: “The cause with respect to form is the logos, but the logos is unclear if it 
is without the cause (τὸ δ’ ὡς εἶδος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ ἄδηλος ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας ᾖ ὁ λόγος). For 
example, ‘what is an eclipse?’ ‘A privation of light.’ But if one were to add ‘that which occurs by the 
earth having come to be in between,’ that logos would be given along with the cause.” 
359 I deliberately use the more generic term gnōsis here, rather than logos. 
360 Cf. HA I.6. 
 176 
4.2.3 Framing an Account of Posterior Analytics B.19 
Given this discussion, perhaps the (merely) experienced are deficient in some significant respect and 
so qua experienced they seem to lack intellectual virtue properly so-called, but empeiria nevertheless 
seems to be itself a perfect and complete cognitive state, perhaps even a cognitive virtue or 
excellence of some non-intellectual sort. With these constraints in the background, I suggest that an 
explicit and focused reflection on the place of inexperience in Aristotle’s account promises to 
move things forward regarding how empeiria is already perfected and how it remains incomplete. 
Instead of asking what the empeiroi have, let us make a fresh start by asking what the apeiroi lack. 
 In order to focus our discussion, I propose two more determinate questions that any 
adequate interpretation of B.19 must answer, questions that seem to generate varying degrees of 
difficulties for recent views. My investigation into inexperience aims at answering these more 
determinate questions about our text. First, in B.19 Aristotle offers two different descriptions of the 
cognitive ascent from perception to logos: while both mention memory as an intermediate step, only 
the second also mentions experience. How are these two cognitive ascents related? Does Aristotle 
endorse both of them, or only the second that includes empeiria? Second, how ought we to interpret 
the “or” in the following lines: “And from experience or from the whole universal having come 
to rest in the soul […arises] the principle of art and scientific knowledge”?361 Does this mean, as 
many have supposed, that empeiria is itself universal? Or rather does it suggest something between 
empeiria and first principles? 
 These interpretive questions provide an occasion to reflect more fruitfully on inexperience. 
Aristotle occasionally mentions logoi arising from inexperience or insufficient experience, most often 
the scientific theories of his predecessors. And indeed, as we have already noted, he cites someone 
with a logos who lacks empeiria in Metaphysics A.1. These cases of inexperienced logoi create some space 
when returning to the peculiar difficulties of B.19 and to these two interpretive questions in 
particular, allowing for a more nuanced schema of perception, memory, empeiria, and logos, a new 
account of the relations between these cognitive capacities and states. 
                                               
361 APo. B.19 100a6-8, my emphasis added: ἐκ δ’ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου 
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ […] τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης. 
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 I begin by briefly noting alternative answers to the questions that I have raised. It is common 
to describe the cognitive ascent in B.19 as going from perception to memory to empeiria and finally 
to first principles, the grasp of which constitutes the intellectual virtue of nous.362 Aristotle writes: 
So, memory arises from perception, just as we said, and experience arises from 
memory coming to be often of the same thing. For memories constitute an 
experience that is one in number. And from experience or from the whole universal 
having come to rest in the soul, from the one beside the many, that which is 
singularly the same in all those things, [arises] the principle of art and scientific 
knowledge, of art if it is concerning coming to be, of scientific knowledge if it 
concerns what is.363 
Given this passage and the parallel discussion in Metaphysics A.1,364 we have in view the following 
description of the ascent to first principles. 
 Second Ascent: Perception  Memory  Empeiria  First Principles 
 I have named this the Second Ascent because this is neither the only nor the first 
description of cognitive ascent that Aristotle gives in B.19. Indeed, just lines prior to the above 
passage, he says: 
And it seems that this, at any rate, belongs to all animals. For they have an innate 
discriminative capacity, which people call “perception.” Given that perception is 
present, in some of the animals a persistence of the perceptible is engendered, in 
others it is not engendered. Thus, for those in whom it is not engendered, there is no 
gnōsis outside of the activity of perceiving, either in general or concerning the things 
which are not engendered. But for those in whom there is [a persistence], having 
                                               
362 Cf. APo. B.19 100b5-17. We of course must be careful to distinguish nous-as-dynamis and nous-as-
hexis or -as-virtue, as mentioned previously. While some may find in B.19 a mention of nous-as-
dynamis (again, cf. Lesher (1973), it is more likely that the discussion is of nous in the same sense as in 
Nicomachean Ethics VI.6, a state and not a capacity. Accordingly, nous in this context just is that 
dianoetic state in virtue of which we grasp the first principles, the orthos logos of a given mode in a 
given domain. 
363 APo. B.19 100a3-9: Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης 
πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. ἐκ 
δ’ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν 
ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ 
περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. 
364 Cf. Meta. A.1 980a27-981a12. 
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completed [acts of] perceiving they still have [a persistence] in the soul. And when 
many such things have occurred, some distinction already has arisen, between those 
animals in which a logos arises from the persistence of such things, and those in which 
it does not.365 
This passage comes at the end of a discussion of rival views about how we possess the first 
principles, whether they are innate or acquired. If they are acquired, as Aristotle wants to maintain, 
then they themselves must proceed from some preexisting gnōsis.366 Aristotle then points out that all 
animals have an innate discriminatory capacity, perception. But a distinction arises among animals, 
first between those in which perception leaves a lasting impression in memory and those in which 
no such persistence is possible. And, in the second place, there is a distinction among these 
remembering animals: on the one hand, there are those in which a logos arises from such memories 
or perceptual persistences, and on the other hand, those for which no such logos comes about.  
 One preliminary remark about this passage giving a different cognitive ascent. Some have 
interpreted this passage as describing cognitive capacities and different animal kinds in possession of 
these capacities, rather than describing cognitive states (ἕξεις) or cognitions (γνώσεις).367 
Accordingly, some may think that the apparent tension between these two ascents can be solved in 
the following way: in the first Aristotle is describing cognitive capacities or different cognitive lives 
that animals of different sorts can lead. On this view, the logos that arises in the first passage is not 
understood as any particular theory or account, but rather as the general capacity to reason which 
arises in some animals having memory (i.e. humans) but not in other animals. In contrast, on this 
view, the Second Ascent more properly describes determinate cognitive states on the way to the 
grasp of first principles. In this way, such interpreters dissolve any tension between the two 
cognitive ascents Aristotle describes. 
                                               
365 APo. B.19 99b34-100a3: φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζῴοις. ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν 
σύμφυτον κριτικήν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν· ἐνούσης δ’ αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐγγίγνεται 
μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, τοῖς δ’ οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίγνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ ἃ μὴ 
ἐγγίγνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνῶσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς δ’ ἔνεστιν αἰσθομένοις ἔχειν ἔτι 
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἤδη διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι 
λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή. 
366 Cf. APo. B.19 99b20-34, in view of the principle from APo. A.1 71a1-2.  
367 Cf. in the first place Pacius In Aristotelis Organon commentarius analyticus (1967), via Barnes (1994). 
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 Two replies to this view: first, memory is simply defined as a state (ἑξις) of the perceptual or 
imaginative capacity in the de Memoria.368 So, there does not seem to be a distinct capacity for 
memory which comes to have memories as particular states of that distinct capacity. Rather, animals 
are capable of having memories in virtue of having a perceptual capacity of a certain sort: it is the 
perceptual capacity itself in virtue of which some animals are capable of having memories. 
Accordingly, animals capable of forming memories do not have distinct capacities, one for 
perception and another for memory; rather, they have a perceptual capacity of a certain sort, one 
that is capable of retaining memories as perceptual states. For these animals, perceptual content 
persists in memory almost automatically.  If this is right, then the first distinction in the first passage 
is between animals in whom perceptual states (i.e. memories) remain and those in whom they do not 
remain, and the second distinction is similarly about logoi considered as cognitive states and not as a 
cognitive capacity in general. 
 In the second place, we must recall the argumentative context into which the first cognitive 
ascent fits, as we work backwards through the chapter. Aristotle insists that we do not have the first 
principles innately and that we must acquire them; but since this is a case of dianoetic learning, it must 
proceed from some preexisting gnōsis in view of Posterior Analytics A.1.369 He concludes a segment of 
his argument thus:  
So it is clear, both that we cannot have [first principles already] and that it is not 
possible for them to come to be in those who are ignorant and have no state. 
Consequently it is necessary to have some capacity, but not one such as will be more 
honorable than these in precision. And it seems that this, at any rate, belongs to all 
animals […].370  
His search, then, is for some preceding gnōsis, which he here understands to be a cognitive state 
(ἑξις). The next line, then, should strike us as a categorically incomplete answer: “consequently it is 
necessary to have some capacity (τινα δύναμιν).” It is not enough to find some capacity, since the 
grasp of first principles must arise from some cognitive state. Therefore, the bit about memory 
                                               
368 Cf. de Mem. 450a22-b11, as well as 451a15-18.  
369 Cf. APo. A.1 71a1-2: Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης 
γίνεται γνώσεως. 
370 APo. B.19 99b30-34: φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὔτ’ ἔχειν οἷόν τε, οὔτ’ ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν 
ἔχουσιν ἕξιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μέν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ’ ἔχειν ἣ ἔσται 
τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ’ ἀκρίβειαν. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζῴοις. 
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immediately following is not some further story Aristotle tells, having already found an answer in the 
more general capacity for perception. Rather, only with memories do we have an appropriately 
persisting gnōsis and cognitive hexis from which we can acquire the first principles. Moreover, that the 
perceptual capacity alone is insufficient to meet the demands of the preceding argument is 
confirmed by what he says next, that “this at any rate (γε) belongs to all animals,” and further why he 
says that for animals lacking memory, there is no gnōsis outside of the activity of perceiving. This is 
because the perceptual capacity alone does not answer the demand of his argument, but only the 
gnōseis that the perceptual capacity can provide.371 
 For these reasons we should take the items in the First Ascent not to describe capacities for 
memory or reason in general, but rather cognitive states, such as particular memories or rational 
accounts. Accordingly, we have in the First Ascent another proper description of an ascent of 
gnōseis or cognitive states, but in this case without mentioning empeiria: 
 First Ascent:  Perception  Memory  Logos 
Even some who recognize this, however, see the Second Ascent as more precise, giving it a kind of 
interpretive priority.372 I suggest, in contrast, that the two different ascents are both endorsed by 
Aristotle and both play a role in the progression from lower to higher cognitive states in B.19. What 
I am calling the First Ascent suggests that logoi can arise on the basis of memories alone.373 If that is 
right, then we are capable of having universals and reasoning universally without having yet achieved 
experience. In view of these two cognitive ascents, then, we are faced with a pressing question: how 
are intellectual states or activities possible without experience? 
 The second interpretive question I have proposed concerns a remark within the passage that 
gives the Second Ascent, a remark which closely aligns experience with a universal having come to 
                                               
371 Of course, sometimes Aristotle speaks of αἴσθησις in terms of the cognitive content it provides, 
and not merely as a capacity. Cf. e.g. APo. A.18 and A.31. In both cases we can take αἴσθησις to 
stand in for γνῶσις αἰσθητική.  
372 Cf. e.g. Barnes (1994) 262. Apostle (1981) suggests that logos in the first ascent is the same as 
empeiria in the second ascent (293). Hasper (Presentation 2015, University of Pittsburgh) suggests 
something similar, that empeiria is the only state between memory and scientific knowledge. This is 
standard for those who reject the progressive or corrective reading suggested by Charles (2002), 
below. 
373 On this point it may be helpful to recall that those animals capable of memory are said to be wiser 
and more teachable in Metaphysics A.1 980b21-25, that whatever vague or incomplete participation 
brute animals have in logoi is in virtue of memory, in the first instance. 
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rest in the soul. I shall not spend much time reviewing the point nor shall I offer decisive evidence 
against the two most common interpretations of the “or.” I hope instead to motivate a search for an 
alternative, suggesting that we should not be too quick to embrace these other readings. The first 
and perhaps most common reading is epexegetical, where the “or” simply means “that is to say.”374 
On this reading, experience just is a universal having come to rest in the soul. Another reading 
suggests that the “or” is corrective or progressive, and so ought to be understood as “or rather.”375 
On this reading Aristotle prefers to say that the first principles proceed from something universal 
and intermediate between empeiria and first principles, rather than from empeiria straightaway.  
But both approaches, among other things, struggle to explain the later thought that first principles 
arise by induction from a grasp of perceptual particulars: 
So, the hexeis do not exist in us determinately, nor do they come to be from other 
hexeis that are more knowable, but from perception. [...] So it is clear that it is 
necessary for us to come to know the first [principles] by induction; for in this way 
even the perception introduces the universal.376 
Both readings suggest that the first principles come from something universal, whether they 
consider empeiria to be this universal or not. This is in prima facie tension with the idea that the first 
principles proceed inductively from particulars, an idea to which Aristotle seems to be clearly 
committed.377 Another initial difficulty with these two approaches: in many other discussions, for 
example Prior Analytics A.30 and Metaphysics A.1, Aristotle suggests that empeiria is not as such a 
cognition of universals. That is, there is a distinction between the cognition of particulars which 
empeiria constitutes as such, and the universal cognitions that it makes possible.378 But these very 
                                               
374 Cf. e.g. Ross ad loc, as well as Hasper (Presentation 2015). 
375 Cf. e.g. Charles (2002) 149-151. 
376 APo. B.19 100a10-11, b2-5: δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ 
ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ. […] οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι αἱ ἕξεις, οὔτ’ ἀπ’ 
ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως. 
377 Cf. APo. A.1 71a5-9. Of course, there are difficulties in supposing that induction is sufficient to 
produce the first principles; many of these interpreters seek a further step by which we grasp the 
principles as principles. I address this alternative approach in passing in what follows, both in this 
chapter and in the next. I am generally unconvinced by their approach, however. For a recent 
defender of this view, see Gasser (2015), but it goes back at least as far as Kosman (1973). 
378 See, for example, HA 9.24 604b25-27: “In general, the people with experience say the horse and 
the sheep have about as many ailments as afflict man” (tr. Hasper, 2015); Hasper takes this as proof 
that empeiria has universal content. I, however, recognize a distinction between what gnōsis the state 
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same passages make it plain that first principles proceed directly from experience without a 
mediating state. On the one hand, experience and universals are treated as distinct cognitive items in 
these passages, against the epexegetical reading that endows empeiria with universal content; on the 
other hand, the relationship between experience and universals seems to be unmediated, against the 
corrective reading that posits a mediate universal gnōsis.  
 Finally and perhaps least compelling is a consideration of Aristotle’s usage. I shall not delve 
into particular passages here, but one might worry that the epexegetical reading is a familiar use of 
the Greek kai in Aristotle, but not a standard way in which he uses the conjunction ē. There are 
worries articulated on the other side about whether Aristotle ever uses ē correctively. Without 
leaning too heavily on these points, and certainly without giving a proper philological analysis here, I 
mention these considerations as reasons for being unhappy with the two dominant readings of the 
“or,” and invitations to pursue an alternative. To put my question in stronger terms going forward: 
what if the “or” in this line is neither epexegetical (identifying experience with a universal in the 
soul) nor corrective (pointing to an intermediate universal issuing from experience) but rather 
disjunctive? And if we entertain a disjunctive reading, what sort of disjunction is on offer? 
4.2.4 Toward an Alternative Account of Posterior Analytics B.19 
In view of these interpretive questions, then, let us survey places where Aristotle attributes logoi to 
those who lack experience. First and most clearly is Metaphysics A.1 itself, where Aristotle compares 
the person of mere experience and the person who has the art. Recall:  
With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and we even see 
people of experience enjoying more success than those who have a logos without 
experience.379 
At first he argues that empeiria does not seem to differ from art. But immediately Aristotle makes a 
further claim, that the person of experience will enjoy greater success than the person without it, no 
matter how able the inexperienced person is in theoretical matters. There are several ways that one 
might take these two distinct but related claims; it is clear, at any rate, that Aristotle is conceding the 
                                                                                                                                                       
of empeiria constitutes as such, and the logoi that are available to the empeiroi in virtue of their having 
achieved the relevant empeiria.  
379 Meta. A.1 981a12-15: πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἱ ἔμπειροι τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. 
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experienced person’s practical abilities while at the same time inviting us to move beyond a 
consideration of mere practicalities. After all, he goes on in the same chapter to insist that 
philosophical inquiry and the pursuit of wisdom first began when a class of people were afforded 
freedom from necessities and practicalities.380 Whatever we might say about his reasons for believing 
this, it is indisputable that Aristotle believed it: philosophic or theoretical wisdom is higher and more 
honorable in large part because it is not directed at action. So, I take the following to be 
uncontroversial: Aristotle is conceding that empeiria lends itself to a greater degree of practical 
success, while insisting that practical success is not the relevant measure of importance in this 
context. 
 More important for our purposes, however, is the exact contrast he draws when making 
these two points. Although Aristotle does compare art and experience, he says that they do not 
differ at all with respect to action; the experienced technician does not enjoy more success than the 
true physician. Aristotle is not contrasting the person of mere experience with an inexperienced 
person who possesses the art or science in question. Although this is a common way of taking these 
lines, the text itself does not suggest the possibility of someone who is inexperienced yet in 
possession of the relevant intellectual virtue.381 What Aristotle does say is that the empeiroi enjoy 
greater success than inexperienced people who have a logos (τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον 
ἐχόντων), while differing not at all in practical matters from those who possess the relevant art. This 
clarification is crucially important on my view: the text does not suggest the possibility of someone 
who has some intellectual virtue without experience. Indeed, as I insist, empeiria is a necessary 
condition for intellectual virtue. One cannot be a true physician in possession of the art of medicine 
without also possessing medical experience. After all, experience in each domain “hands on” the 
principles and “makes” art. The contrast case here is someone lacking in empeiria who possesses 
some and perhaps the logos in question, but not yet the orthos logos constituting the intellectual 
virtue.382 This passage suggests the possibility of someone having a logos without experience, while 
saying nothing about possessing the orthos logos without empeiria. 
                                               
380 Cf. Meta. A.1 981b13-982a3. 
381 Cf. e.g. De Groot Aristotle’s Empiricism (2014): 64-5. 
382 I must concede that in the second of Aristotle’s comparisons at 981a21 he mentions something 
having the logos without experience. Given his other commitments, however, most notably in APo. 
B.19, and given that even this passage does not force our interpretive hand, we should not conclude 
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 This conclusion is confirmed by a survey of passages in which he criticizes predecessor 
views for their lack of experience. It is clear in all of these contexts that other theorists have logoi—
that is to say, they have theoretical accounts—but Aristotle says that their logoi are deficient owing to 
inexperience with the relevant facts. First, Aristotle says in the Physics that those who fall into the 
Parmenidean dilemma have overgeneralized and exaggerated the force of the dilemma on account of 
their lack of experience (ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας).383 Second, in the Parva Naturalia he surveys 
several physikoi and their inadequate theories about respiration, who were rather inexperienced with 
the facts (ἀπειροτέρως τῶν συμβαινόντων): as a result they overgeneralized and concluded that all 
animals respire, speaking of the common only.384 Third, Aristotle entertains a logos in the de 
Generatione Animalium that he calls excessively universal and empty (καθόλου λίαν καὶ κενός), not 
proceeding from the appropriate principles, merely seeming to be without truly being related to the 
facts.385 And finally, similar passages can be found in the Eudemian Ethics where beliefs about 
friendship are considered excessively universal (λίαν … καθόλου), while others are preferable 
because they are closer and more proper to the phenomena (ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκεῖαι τῶν 
φαινομένων).386 This is by no means exhaustive, but rather representative, that Aristotle in different 
                                                                                                                                                       
that the logos here is the same as the orthos logos. Had he meant this, he would have named the 
physician or a person in possession of the relevant art or knowledge. 
383 Cf. Phys. I.8 191a24-33: ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν 
τῶν ὄντων ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καί φασιν οὔτε 
γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον 
ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι 
(εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἔκ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑποκεῖσθαι γάρ τι δεῖν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς 
συμβαῖνον αὔξοντες οὐδ’ εἶναι πολλά φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. 
384 De Resp. 470b6-10, 471b23-29: Περὶ γὰρ ἀναπνοῆς ὀλίγοι μέν τινες τῶν πρότερον φυσικῶν 
εἰρήκασιν· τίνος μέντοι χάριν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπεφήναντο, οἱ δὲ εἰρήκασι μέν, 
οὐ καλῶς δ’ εἰρήκασιν ἀλλ’ ἀπειροτέρως τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἔτι δὲ πάντα τὰ ζῷά φασιν 
ἀναπνεῖν· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές. […] αἴτιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ μὴ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καλῶς 
τό τε τῶν μορίων ἀπείρους εἶναι τῶν ἐντός, καὶ τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν ἕνεκά τινος τὴν φύσιν πάντα 
ποιεῖν· ζητοῦντες γὰρ τίνος ἕνεκα ἡ ἀναπνοὴ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων τοῦτ’ 
ἐπισκοποῦντες, οἷον ἐπὶ βραγχίων καὶ πνεύμονος, εὗρον ἂν θᾶττον τὴν αἰτίαν. 
385 GA 747b27-8a9: Ἴσως δὲ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν ἀπόδειξις εἶναι πιθανὴ τῶν εἰρημένων λογική—
λέγω δὲ λογικὴν διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι ὅσῳ καθόλου μᾶλλον πορρωτέρω τῶν οἰκείων ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν. […] 
οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος καθόλου λίαν καὶ κενός· οἱ γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν λόγοι κενοί, 
ἀλλὰ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ὄντες. 
386 EE 1235a29-31: δύο μὲν αὗται δόξαι περὶ φιλίας εἰσί λίαν τε καθόλου καὶ κεχωρισμέναι 
τοσοῦτον· ἄλλαι δὲ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκεῖαι τῶν φαινομένων. 
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contexts notes thinkers who have an overgeneralized logos due to a lack of experience. We must 
concede that logoi are indeed possible without empeiria and that inexperience often explains why a 
logos falls short. 
 Upon reflection, this point already disrupts much of the standard account of Posterior 
Analytics B.19 and Metaphysics A.1: if an ascent to universals and to logoi is possible even before one 
has empeiria, then the linear story that B.19 and other passages recommend at first glance (perception 
to memory, memory to empeiria, empeiria to logos) cannot be so simple. Something more must be 
going on in the inductive process than going about our merely perceptual lives until, having achieved 
full-bodied experience, we are finally able to “show the universal through the particular being 
clear.”387 Rather, inquiring humans are engaged in properly intellectual activities and are beginning to 
form properly intellectual states even early in their perceptual engagement with a domain. Theōrein is 
not an activity occurring only after one has exhausted perceptual activity, nor is a logos a cognitive 
state one can have only after achieving the limit of perceptual engagement constituted by empeiria. 
Rather theoretical intellectual activity along with its cognitive item (λόγοι) is possible even on the 
basis of an insufficient perceptual gnōsis, insufficient precisely on account of inexperience. 
 In view of the preceding discussion and the possibility of inexperienced logoi, let us now 
return to the first question I raised about the two different cognitive ascents Aristotle gives in our 
chapter.  
 First Ascent:  Perception  Memory  Logos 
 Second Ascent: Perception  Memory  Empeiria  First Principles 
Aristotle goes on to call this grasp of first principles nous, which should be identified with the virtue 
discussed in EN VI.6. And further, given the ethical background, we know that every intellectual 
virtue is the orthos logos in its domain: art and practical wisdom with respect to variable things; 
science, nous and philosophic wisdom with respect to those things whose principles are invariable.388 
Given that background, we know that the grasp of first principles constitutes an orthos logos in our 
chapter (though he does not use the term here). We can now note two differences between the 
ascents: the First Ascent does not proceed through experience and arrives at a logos without 
qualification, while the Second Ascent proceeds through experience and ends with the orthos logos. 
                                               
387 APo. A.1 71a8-9. Pace Michael Frede’s “Aristotle’s Rationalism” (1996).  
388 Cf. EN VI.2. 
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 With respect to this first question, I suggest that both ascents are endorsed by Aristotle and 
that one of the differences I have noted explains the other: logoi in general can proceed inductively 
from any perceptual state or gnōsis (i.e. any memory), while the orthos logos proceeds inductively from 
empeiria. Experience, then, is a cognition of particulars and is a perfection of the perceptual faculty, 
being that perceptual gnōsis from which the correct universals can be derived. Distinguishing 
between these two vertical progressions helps to nuance our cognitive picture a bit. Anyone with a 
perceptual gnōsis is capable of having a logos, but this logos is bound to be deficient on account of 
inexperience. This distinction between two vertical progressions immediately suggests another 
distinction between two horizontal progressions, one at the level of perception and another that is 
mirrored inductively at the level of logoi. The following picture results: 
 
Figure 7. The Cognitive Ascents in Posterior Analytics B.19 
Intellectual Gnōseis (λόγοι)                First Principle (ὀρθὸς λόγος) 
                   Intellectual Virtue (νοῦς) 
  intellectual development mirroring perceptual development      
 
       inductions  *the* induction 
 
Perceptual Gnōseis (μνῆμαι)     Experience (ἐμπειρία) 
  perceptual development and habituation 
 
On the basis of a single perceptual gnōsis or memory we can form a logos, but in order to 
achieve the orthos logos we must gradually develop perceptually until we achieve empeiria. This process 
is perceptual habituation, a non-dianoetic process by which we acquire the appropriate perceptual 
gnōsis.389 Along the way we also update our logoi and perhaps prior logoi inform how we progress 
perceptually. In the end, the correct universal is grasped from the particular rightly conceived, from 
                                               
389 As Hasper and Yurdin (2014) suggest quite convincingly, empeiria is associated very closely with 
habituation. I am happy to follow this suggestion in the light of Meta. A.1 981b2-5: τοὺς δ’, ὥσπερ 
καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια ποιεῖ μέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ—τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα 
φύσει τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι’ ἔθος. This is also a nice confirmation of 
my own view: the preexisting gnōsis on which dianoetic learning is ultimately based is itself acquired 
by habituation and not dianoetically by preexisting gnōsis. 
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the cognitive state Aristotle calls empeiria. But it is just as available on this picture to speak of the 
orthos logos proceeding from its predecessor logoi, so that in important respects the orthos logos proceeds 
both from a logos and also inductively from empeiria. And here we have the resources to answer the 
second interpretive question in B.19 regarding the infamous “or”: the first principles of art and 
demonstrative science proceed inductively from experience or considered in another way they proceed 
from prior logoi, being the orthos logos and the limit of intellectual development.  
4.2.5 Some Clarifications of the Alternative Picture 
A point of clarification: the “or” is not disjunctive in the sense that sometimes first principles 
proceed from universals and penultimate logoi in the absence of empeiria while at other times they 
proceed from empeiria without logoi of the that. There is a way in which the “or” is truly disjunctive, 
but not as supplying two alternatives in the object itself being described. Nor is it right to say that I 
am proposing an inclusive disjunction, since I am not merely suggesting that, in some cases, both are 
rightly said to be sources from which the first principles arise. I am suggesting something much 
stronger, that the disjunction distinguishes two ways of conceiving of the sources from which rather 
than distinguishing two separable alternatives, one possible without the other. Accordingly, on my 
view, in all standard cases of learning and discovery first principles arise both from the whole logos 
and from empeiria. Aristotle is therefore pointing to two progressions from which the orthos logos 
results. 
 But why does Aristotle say “or from the whole universal having come to rest” (ἢ ἐκ παντὸς 
ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου)? I take it that this is the penultimate logos, which fully expresses the that 
but not the because, which captures all and only the relevant phenomena and conceives of them in 
the right way, yet without yet grasping the cause. For example, Aristotle on one occasion offers a 
logos of the lunar eclipse that does not express the cause but nevertheless is fine-grained enough to 
pick out all and only lunar eclipses, being a kind of penultimate logos.390 This use of “whole” to 
express extensional adequacy was introduced in the early chapters of the treatise:391  
                                               
390 Cf. APo. B.8 93a29-b8, esp. at a37-8: τὸ πανσελήνου σκιὰν μὴ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν μηδενὸς ἡμῶν 
μεταξὺ ὄντος φανεροῦ. 
391 The same passage is used by Hasper and Yurdin (2014), though in a significantly different way. 
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I say this is ‘in respect of the whole’ (κατὰ παντὸς) which is not said of one but not 
of another, nor at one time but not at another […]. And there is a sign of this: for 
also the objections we bring to bear against those making claims ‘in respect of the 
whole,’ either if it does not hold for some case, or if it does not hold at some time.392 
So, the whole logos is that penultimate logos which is existentially adequate and a complete grasp of 
the fact that, but falls short of the orthos logos in that it does not yet capture the reason why. 
 There are however exceptional cases, as when the that and the because are grasped at the 
same time. Aristotle describes the possibility of this situation early in Posterior Analytics B, in which 
one grasps the fact that and the reason why at the same time, perhaps when investigating the cause 
of a lunar eclipse from the lunar surface.393 Again, my disjunctive reading does not allow that in 
some cases one can arrive at the orthos logos purely logically and in other cases purely empirically. Rather, 
this disjunction is conceptual, so that in each case we can distinguish two predecessor states to the 
orthos logos, one logical and one empirical (to stretch these adjectives meaningfully). But if it is 
possible to grasp that fact that and the reason why at the same time (as Aristotle allows), there will 
not always be a logos merely of the fact that from which the orthos logos of the reason why follows. In 
these cases a single logos arises of both the fact that and the reason why together, from experience 
alone. Perhaps there are other predecessor logoi that are incomplete in various respects, but not the 
logos kata pantos: in this special kind of case as soon as one comes to a complete intellectual grasp of 
the fact that, one also grasps the reason why. The penultimate whole logos is swallowed up by and 
contained potentially within the ultimate logos of some first principle. I need not say more about this 
case, except to admit that my conceptually disjunctive reading allows for limit cases like this. Usually, 
however, the orthos logos arises in different ways from the whole logos and from empeiria. In non-
standard cases, I am willing to allow the possibility of the orthos logos proceeding from experience 
without there ever being a distinct logos of only the fact that. What I must disallow, however, is that 
                                               
392 APo. A.4 73a28-9, 32-4: Κατὰ παντὸς μὲν οὖν τοῦτο λέγω ὃ ἂν ᾖ μὴ ἐπὶ τινὸς μὲν τινὸς δὲ μή, 
μηδὲ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δὲ μή, […] σημεῖον δέ καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἐνστάσεις οὕτω φέρομεν ὡς κατὰ παντὸς 
ἐρωτώμενοι ἢ εἰ ἐπί τινι μή ἢ εἴ ποτε μή. 
393 Cf. APo. B.2 90a24-31 and B.8 93a14-21. A parallel in APo. A.31 is considered in chapter five.  
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the orthos logos could ever arise purely at the level of logoi without experience. In every case of 
someone truly in possession of the orthos logos, that person must also have empeiria.394 
 In addition to sorting out interpretive issues native to the Posterior Analytics, I suggest that my 
new reading can help make sense of puzzling remarks elsewhere. In the first place, we are now in a 
position to understand his remark in Physics I.1 that we proceed in inquiry from universal to 
particular. On my view, Aristotle is there describing the horizontal progression at the level of logoi 
proceeding with greater degrees of determinacy. Perception as such is not conceived of as something 
universal, but rather the logoi that one forms on the basis of perception in early stages of inquiry. 
Indeed, throughout I have suggested a distinction between perceptual gnōseis as such and the logoi 
that they license. In Physics I.1, therefore, Aristotle is describing going from inexperienced to 
experienced logoi. A similar thought might be operative in Prior Analytics B.21, when Aristotle 
compares thinking with a universal knowledge (τῇ καθόλου) and with a proper knowledge (τῇ 
οἰκείᾳ). There he gives the Triple Scheme in a slightly different mode, suggesting that one can 
possess universal knowledge, which is said to be incorrect or inadequate in some way, and proper 
knowledge, which are both opposed to activity (τῷ ἐνεργεῖν).395 The point here is that we can 
conceive of early stages of inquiry in perceptual or in intellectual terms; if the latter, we have two 
passages in which Aristotle disapprovingly describes these early and inexperienced logoi as katholou.396 
In view of the account I have here proposed, we have the resources to understand this. 
In this section I offered an interpretation of Posterior Analytics B.19 where empeiria is a gnōsis of 
particulars from which the orthos logos arises by induction, but without which logoi remain possible, 
                                               
394 Another way to put the point: every logos that outstrips perception is empty. Aristotle often speaks 
of kenoi logoi in this very way. For a thorough treatment of the issue, see Sean Kelsey’s “Empty 
Words,” in Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science, ed. David Ebrey (Cambridge 2015). 
395 APr. B.21 67a26-b7: Τῇ μὲν οὖν καθόλου θεωροῦμεν τὰ ἐν μέρει, τῇ δ’ οἰκείᾳ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὥστ’ 
ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ αὐτά, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν μὲν τὴν καθόλου, ἀπατᾶσθαι 
δὲ τὴν κατὰ μέρος. ὁμοίως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων·[…] ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν οἶδε 
τὸ δὲ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀπατηθήσεται· ὅπερ ἔχουσιν αἱ καθόλου πρὸς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμας. οὐδὲν 
γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔξω τῆς αἰσθήσεως γενόμενον ἴσμεν, οὐδ’ ἂν ᾐσθημένοι τυγχάνωμεν, εἰ μὴ 
ὡς τῷ καθόλου καὶ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἐνεργεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι 
λέγεται τριχῶς, ἢ ὡς τῇ καθόλου ἢ ὡς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἢ ὡς τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἠπατῆσθαι 
τοσαυταχῶς. οὐδὲν οὖν κωλύει καὶ εἰδέναι καὶ ἠπατῆσθαι περὶ ταὐτό, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως. 
396 Both passages, Phys. I.1 and APr. B.21 deserve independent treatments, but I cannot give them 
here. Cf. e.g. McKirahan (1983), Gifford (1999), Labarge (2004), and Smith (1989). Their attention is 
focused mostly earlier in the chapter where the Meno paradox and recollection are mentioned. 
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even if such intellectual states do not count as virtuous. To be virtuous, I have argued, such 
intellectual states or logoi must proceed from empeiria. So, Aristotle’s purpose in B.19 is not to explain 
how we could ever achieve cognition of universals on the basis of particulars, but rather how we 
come to grasp the orthos logos on which the whole of art and demonstrative science rests.  
4.3 CONTEMPLATING IN ORDER TO LEARN 
A question, however, now arises about how one comes to be experienced. I have solved one set of 
problems about the acquisition of first principles by insisting on a robust conception of empeiria. 
Now, however, I must answer a new question: what accomplishes the process of perceptual 
habituation resulting in the perceptual virtue of empeiria? If we consider the cases of inexperienced 
logoi, Aristotle’s criticism regards their methodology: either they were not asking the right questions, 
considering the right cases, or conceiving of the phenomena in the right way. Perhaps the best 
example is dissection: in order to grasp thoroughly an animal’s internal organs and blood vessels, 
one must dissect it properly. One must strangle the animal rather than kill it by cutting, because if 
the blood is drained, one will not be able to see what is there to be seen.397 The achievement here is 
clearly a perceptual grasp of the phenomena, but the process by which it is achieved is by no means 
merely perceptual. One must already know how to dissect an animal in order to achieve empeiria. 
This raises a bit of a puzzle. 
 Let us try approaching the issue in a different way. In what way does induction produce the 
first principles? I have argued that induction is operative in two places in learning. First and most 
prominently, we grasp the first principles by induction from empeiria, itself a grasp of particulars. 
Also in some lesser way I have argued that we perform inductions throughout the process of 
learning, so that one arrives at preliminary logoi even before one comes to be perceptually 
experienced. This distinction in two sorts of vertical ascents gives horizontal dimensionality to the 
picture I have offered.  
                                               
397 HA 3.3 513a13-15: Χαλεπῆς δ’ οὔσης, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, τῆς θεωρίας ἐν μόνοις τοῖς 
ἀποπεπνιγμένοις τῶν ζῴων προλεπτυνθεῖσιν ἔστιν ἱκανῶς καταμαθεῖν, εἴ τινι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων 
ἐπιμελές. Cf. Yurdin, “Aristotle on Learning to be a Natural Scientist” (2015) and Lennox, 
“Aristotle, Dissection, and Generation: Experience, Expertise, and the Practices of Knowing,” in A. 
Falcon and D. Lefebvre eds. The Generation of Animals and Aristotle’s Philosophy (2015). Both 
give distinct though friendly readings of this. 
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But should we also conceive of the process toward empeiria as inductive? I think this would 
be a mistake, and for two important reasons: on my view, empeiria is itself a grasp of particulars, so 
that it is not the sort of thing that induction can produce. In addition, I have argued that empeiria is 
the perceptual gnōsis from which we induce the first principles, being that preexisting gnōsis from 
which this form of dianoetic learning proceeds. However, if we conceive of the acquisition of 
empeiria itself as a case of dianoetic learning by induction, then we soon face a regress. I have 
suggested instead that whatever perceptual process results in empeiria must be a kind of perceptual 
habituation. If this is right, then induction—being an argumentative and indeed logical form—cannot 
be the process responsible for producing empeiria—being perceptual gnōsis of particulars. 
How ought we to accommodate these two points, first that empeiria is produced by an 
intellectually driven process, but one which is not a case of dianoetic learning? Here it may be 
helpful to think of moral or productive habituation: in those cases it is true that students learn by 
doing the very things they are learning to do. But as we have seen, this cannot be the whole story. 
Someone or something must give shape to that prior activity: when we say that someone has been 
habituated, that often implies that someone has been doing the habituating. My (and Aristotle’s) 
point about prior activity and learning-by-doing was not meant to rule out the distinctive 
contribution of the teacher, but rather to specify it. The teacher does not use the student as a mere 
tool, even in cases of mere habituation, but neither is the teacher superfluous. Rather, the teacher 
gives shape to the student’s own activity. In the habituated case, to be sure, there is no requirement 
for preexisting gnōsis as in dianoetic learning; but so much the better to understand the case of 
perceptual habituation. 
 Perhaps, then, we can speak in a similar way about the process that is productive of empeiria. 
Perhaps the teacher gives shape to and habituates the student’s perceptual faculties, by dissecting 
animals or diagrams for them so that they can make the right inductions on the basis of the 
particulars rightly conceived. My account, therefore, suggests a distinction between two kinds of 
induction and a further distinction between two kinds of intellectual activity in the learning process. 
The latter distinction is between inductive activity generally, and the habituating activity of the 
teacher. All students must perform inductions and intellectually consider the perceptual particulars 
presented to them. And indeed, this activity happens quite naturally for humans. We form logoi on 
the basis of perceptual gnōseis as naturally as we and other animals form memories on the basis of 
active perceptual episodes. So, the student must form his own logoi in view of what is perceptually 
available to him. This holds even for those students that leave the classroom with the wrong 
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conceptions: everyone must contemplate in order to learn, regardless of whether what one learns is 
right or wrong, virtuous or not.  
But teachers may facilitate their success by making those perceptual particulars particularly 
clear, so that logoi derived from them more closely approach the correct account, the orthos logos. And 
it is this process that Aristotle seeks to explain in Posterior Analytics B.19, as I have argued. After all, 
achieving empeiria of the internal organs of frogs demands that one have seen a properly dissected 
frog, something rarely produced by chance or in the course of nature: someone, either a teacher or 
oneself (according to one’s own ordered method), must produce the correct dissection and, by 
extension, must habituate one’s perceptual faculty with respect to the object in question. This 
habituating activity, however, is very different from the more receptive and speculative intellectual 
activity whereby we form and consider logoi by induction. It is this distinctive intellectual activity that 









5. COMING TO KNOW BY MAKING:                                                                       
DISCOVERING PARALLELS WITH DE ANIMA III.5 
Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται 
λογισμόν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴτε ἓν εἴτε 
δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων. 
---Πῶς δ’ οὔ; 
Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται; 
---Ναί. 
Εἰ ἄρα ἓν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα 
νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλ’ ἕν. 
---Ὀρθῶς. 
Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ’ οὐ 
κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἦ γάρ; 
---Ναί. 
Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις 
ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοὐναντίον ἢ 
’κείνη.398 
 
In this chapter I propose an interpretation of the active intellect of de Anima III.5 that is informed 
by parallel passages in the Metaphysics and the epistemological discussion of the preceding chapters of 
this dissertation. While the parallel passages are not strictly psychological, they help to explain the 
intellectual activity that Aristotle plausibly attributes to the active intellect. Unlike other passages 
from the Metaphysics, for example those about divine thinking in Metaphysics Λ, these passages have 
not been widely noted in connection with de Anima III.5, and so support an interpretation of the 
                                               
398 Rep. VII 524b3-c8. 
 194 
active intellect which is not usually entertained, at least not in recent years.399 The connection may 
not be immediately clear, so the passage will require some introduction and some argumentative 
context in order to prepare for it. Having established this connection, I shall return to loose ends 
from the second chapter. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION AND RECAP 
Having drawn conclusions about intellectual activities, in particular those that are involved in the 
acquisition of intellectual virtue, we are now in a position to return to the question from the end of 
the second chapter. There we were left with an interpretation of the active intellect of de Anima III.5 
that is not usually entertained. I argued that the active intellect’s characteristic activity was neither 
the activation of particular episodes of intellectual thinking, nor the actual possession of knowledge, 
nor the guarantee of the general intelligibility of the world. Rather, on my view, the active intellect is 
responsible for making objects available for thinking, making them to be actually intelligible for 
individual knowers. My argument rested, in part, on a reading of the Light Analogy that focused on 
the absence of a receptive faculty on the visual side of the analogy. I argued that the action of light 
on a colored object must be understood as prior to the action of a (now illumined) colored object on 
a sighted animal’s visual faculty. For the purposes of the Light Analogy in III.5, I argued, Aristotle 
wants to focus on this prior relation of agent and patient, one which results in the prior activity of 
illuminating some previously unlit colored object. This accords with an intuitive way of thinking 
about the contribution and effect of light on colored things and of color on vision, respectively. So, 
on this view, light does not make the object’s color simpliciter, nor does it directly make the object to 
be seen.  
Analogously, on my view, the active intellect is not posited to answer an ontological demand 
about the intelligible character of the world in general and how it could ever be known by us (or by 
                                               
399 I admit, perhaps daringly, that I have not found another author who has made this connection, 
including commentators with whom I share broad interpretive stances such as Aquinas and 
Brentano. I also note the paucity of commentary on this passage even on its own. Makin (2006) is 
one of the few recent discussions of the examples and the possible upshot; most book-length studies 
of Metaphysics Θ such as Blair (1992), Witt (2003), and Beere (2009) do not mention the passage at 
all. Most other recent treatments, including Burnyeat (1984) and Hasper (2011) focus only on how 
to understand the geometrical examples themselves. 
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beings like us), nor is it posited to answer an immediate psychological demand about the mechanics 
of thought and how particular episodes of intellectual activity ever get going. Rather, on my view, it 
is posited in response to an epistemological need regarding the process of learning and how intelligible 
content becomes available for an individual knower to grasp and contemplate: abstractly and in 
short, the active intellect activates potentially intelligible objects. This was the result of my 
interpretive investigation into de Anima III.5 in the second chapter. But we were immediately faced 
with a pressing question: where in Aristotle’s thought do we find such an activity or the need for 
one?400 And if there is no need for such an activity, for what other activity could the active intellect 
be responsible? 
My hypothesis in the face of this important question was that it is to be found in the 
activities of teaching, learning, and discovery. So, in the intervening chapters I have focused on this 
process of learning and the different intellectual activities that seem to be involved in that process 
on Aristotle’s view. I first argued that for every case of learning, prior activity of an appropriately 
identical sort brings about the development of the capacity in question. In these cases, the capacity 
that is exercised in prior activity is the very same capacity which undergoes development as a result. 
What is acquired through learning, such as knowledge or moral virtue, is therefore not itself a 
capacity (δύναμις) without qualification but rather a developed state (ἕξις) of a capacity, a capacity 
which the student must have already possessed, though previously in an undeveloped state.401 As a 
result, theoretical knowledge is not passively absorbed from a teacher like sight put into blind eyes 
(to recall a Platonic point), but rather involves the learner himself engaging in contemplative activity 
throughout, although in an undeliberate, unrefined, or imperfect way. 
This clarification helped to resolve a difficulty about Aristotle’s account of learning: 
whenever we learn to φ by φ-ing, we surely do not learn by exercising the very knowledge which has 
yet to be acquired; we rather exercise the intellectual capacity which comes to have and indeed 
constitute the developed state of knowledge as a result. In these cases, then, the capacity to learn 
comes to constitute the state of knowledge that is possessed by the knower: a single capacity for 
intellectual activity has developed into and become knowledge, which, as such, is a developed, stable, 
                                               
400 Recall, for example, Johansen (2012) who at 239 n39 expressed skepticism that such an activity 
was needed for nous against Aquinas. 
401 Cf. e.g. EN II.5, V.1 and VI.1-6. Aristotle is explicit that knowledge, art, and virtue are all hexeis 
and not dynameis simpliciter. The idea that the grasp of first principles is a state and not a capacity 
simpliciter is also important to the argument of APo. B.19, as we have seen.  
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and excellent state of that very same capacity. It is not by exercising knowledge that we come to 
have it, but rather by exercising an intellectual capacity we already had (what I have called nous-as-
dynamis) that the very same capacity comes to have and to be knowledge as a developed state.402 
Aristotle’s intuitive idea—that we come to be lyre-players by playing the lyre, temperate by doing 
temperate things, and elephant experts by contemplating elephants—can be defended as coherent 
with these more metaphysical distinctions in place. In particular, this is now possible in view of my 
alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s claim in de Anima II.5 that the unlearned person is “capable” 
(δυνατός), namely that he is already capable of engaging in the activity toward which the capacity, 
once it has been developed, is directed. 
But when applied to the properly intellectual case and to features distinctive to it, moving 
beyond this generic account of learning-by-doing that applies also to cases of merely habituated 
states, this idea of prior activity and prior capability seemed to be in tension with—or otherwise in 
need of explanation in respect to—Aristotle’s explicit insistence on some preexisting gnōsis from 
which dianoetic learning proceeds in every case. That is to say, when it came to properly intellectual 
or dianoetic learning, Aristotle seems to be committed to two ideas that must be joined together in a 
single account, thus standing in need of further clarification: all learning proceeds both from prior 
activity of the intellectual faculty itself, which is in some substantial respect the same activity as the 
expert, and also from some preexisting gnōsis, which may or may not itself already be a properly 
intellectual gnōsis, depending on the case. My suggestion is to say that memories and experience are 
the habituated and cognitive states (ἕξεις) of the perceptual faculty which constitute the preexisting 
gnōseis from which intellectual activity ultimately proceeds.403 Of course, such gnōseis are bounded by 
particularizing conditions insofar as they are perceptual states.404 As a result, induction is the only 
form of reasoning available which proceeds from gnōseis of this sort.405 The intellect comes to 
generalize and consider these particulars in a universal way, thinking the forms in the images that are 
                                               
402 The same holds with other acquired “capacities” like art and moral virtue. In the case of moral 
virtue, it is a moral capacity which is exercised beforehand, not an intellectual one. The point, 
however is not usually recognized for capacities not coming to be by habituation. Recall Meta. Θ.5 
1047b31-35. 
403 Ultimately, as we have seen, all intellectual activity is dependent on a grasp of immediate first 
principles, or at least a provisional posit of them, which in both bases proceeds from perception. 
404 Cf. APo. A.31 87b28-35. 
405 Cf. APo. A.1 71a1-9. 
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already, as it were, before one’s eyes.406 Similarly, one comes to grasp the cause and the explanation 
within one’s grasp of the phenomena.  
Yet I pointed out that often inquiry does not proceed in a straightforward way: investigators 
and students do not first secure their memories into an organized experience and only afterwards 
perform intellectual inductions on the fully developed perceptual states constituting experience.407 
Rather, as is much more common, in natural philosophical inquiry at any rate, inductions and 
intellectual activities begin far earlier in the learning process. I have argued that in Posterior Analytics 
B.19 Aristotle speaks as if logoi without qualification can proceed straightaway from memories: 
experience is only mentioned when the resulting logoi are the orthoi logoi that constitute the principles 
of art or science, the intellectual virtue of nous.408 Against a popular reading of B.19, I have suggested 
that humans are capable of performing inductions and reasoning intellectually about perceptions and 
memories alone, even if one should fail to possess an experienced—that is, a virtuous or excellent—
perceptual state.  
                                               
406 Cf. de An. III.7 431b3. 
407 Cf. e.g. PA I.1 639b5-10: Νῦν γὰρ οὐ διώρισται περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐδέ γε τὸ νῦν ῥηθησόμενον, οἷον 
πότερον καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν δεικνύουσιν, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τὸν 
φυσικὸν τὰ φαινόμενα πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰ ζῷα θεωρήσαντα καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, ἔπειθ’ 
οὕτω λέγειν τὸ διὰ τί καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἢ ἄλλως πως. Here Aristotle raises the question whether 
natural philosophical inquiry will proceed in the same way as mathematicians who are studying 
astronomy, whereby one simply becomes experienced as to the phenomena and applies 
mathematical forms already independently developed. One might think that his point is settled and 
straightforward, as he says soon later at 640a13-15: Ἔοικε δ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρκτέον εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ 
πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι πρῶτον τὰ φαινόμενα ληπτέον περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, εἶθ’ οὕτω τὰς αἰτίας 
τούτων λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως. My take on this point, which I shall not pursue here, is that in 
natural philosophical inquiry we must discover the forms themselves in the phenomena, rather than 
merely applying forms that we already have in separation from the phenomena. While we always think 
the forms in the images, how we come to discover those forms differs depending on the genus of 
theoretical knowledge (mathematical, physical, or metaphysical). I take it that one must develop 
some provisional theory or account of the cause in order to aid in the very observation of the 
phenomena, just as one must have some provisional classification of likenesses between different 
species in order to study the parts of animals under common headings rather than singly and 
severally. Though I think this is an important point, one which addresses differences in method 
between mathematical and physical contexts, and indeed differences which follow from differences 
in the objects of knowledge themselves, I nevertheless must set the issue aside for a later time, 
letting my hastily concluded logos remain merely provisional for now. 
408 Cf. APo. B.19 100a1-9. 
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This approach also made sense of a remark in Metaphysics A.1 where Aristotle mentions 
someone in possession of a (and perhaps the) logos who has not yet achieved experience.409 Similarly 
in many scientific contexts, Aristotle criticizes other scientific theorists and their logoi on the grounds 
that they are insufficiently experienced with the facts: in these cases, scientists indeed possess logoi 
but not yet experience.410 My alternative proposal also illuminated Physics I.1 in which Aristotle 
claims that we proceed from universal to particular, just as children begin by calling all men “father” 
and all women “mother.” I argued that these children are indeed employing logoi (or something 
rather like them, hence the analogy with natural scientific inquiry) but, like the inexperienced 
scientists, do not yet have experience or the orthoi logoi that issue immediately from it. Perception and 
memory alone, then, are sufficient gnōseis for induction and for the production of logoi in the intellect, 
with logoi understood in the broad sense which includes false or ill-defined theories or accounts. 
Experience, on my view, is that perfect gnōsis and excellent hexis of the perceptual faculty from which it 
is possible for one to achieve the orthoi logoi by induction. 
In this way, then, the intellectual faculty itself is active throughout the process of learning, 
gradually coming to refine its logoi on the basis of finer-grained perceptual engagement with a 
specific domain.411 It is true that experience, once achieved, hands on to the intellect the first 
principles, the orthoi logoi, in a given domain.412 However, students and inquirers typically are 
reasoning universally and forming generalizations far earlier in the process of learning and discovery. 
For this to be possible, nous-as-dynamis must be posited as present and, indeed, as active throughout 
the entire process. Pace Frede (and others like him), it is not sufficient to say that perception, 
memory, and experience are at work in coming to grasp first principles: potential intellect (nous-as-
                                               
409 Cf. Meta. A.1 981a13-24. 
410 Cf. e.g. de Resp. passim. 
411 I have argued previously that this way of conceiving things makes room for an alternative 
interpretation of the infamously difficult “or” at APo. B.19 100a6-9. Since the orthoi logoi which are 
the principles of art and science can be seen both as arising from experience and as continuous with 
prior logoi that were considered in preceding stages of inquiry, it can be said that these principles 
arise from experience in one respect and from the whole universal, i.e. the penultimate universal, in 
another respect. So the “or” is conceptually disjunctive even though every principle arises in a way 
from both sources. I therefore reject the much more common epexegetical and corrective readings 
of this “or.” 
412 Cf. APr. A.30, esp. at 46a17-24. 
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dynamis) must already be operative from the earliest stages of intellectual learning.413 Nor is it right to 
say that this prior intellectual activity is habituation, since this prior activity is by logos not by ethos, 
proceeding according to some preceding gnōsis.414 Nor again is it right to characterize this prior 
activity as simply another aspect of deductive or demonstrative activity, since this prior activity 
proceeds by considering particulars in a universal way, perhaps sometimes even before one ever has 
conceived of things in deductive terms following upon those principles.415 At least one part of this 
prior intellectual activity, then, is coming to consider a universal in some particular, an activity 
which, at least in many cases, begins long before one comes to contemplate the right universal in the 
particular clearly conceived. 
But with this discovery came another pressing need: where in the epistemology do we find 
such prior intellectual activity? In the case of coming to grasp first principles, I have proposed that 
the inductive process itself is a promising but not unproblematic candidate. It is promising because 
Aristotle is clearly committed in B.19 to the idea that we come to get first principles by induction.416 
But it is somewhat problematic on several counts: first, because induction (as well as deduction) 
seems to have more to do with the reliance on a preexisting perceptual gnōsis than on the prior 
activity of the intellectual faculty itself. We might think that the constraint of the wrong learning 
principle is satisfied here. While induction explains the move from preexisting gnōsis to the grasp of a 
first principle, thereby satisfying our need for a preexisting gnōsis, it might seem that some other 
activity or process must account for the prior activity of the intellectual faculty itself. Induction 
seems to involve the transition from one sort of gnōsis to another, which seems to be wholly 
different from the student engaging in the same activity as the expert he is trying to become. 
Furthermore, at times Aristotle speaks of induction as if it proceeds not from particular to universal, 
                                               
413 Cf. e.g. Frede (1996a) 170, and Fine (2014) 221-225. 
414 Cf. Meta. Θ.5 1047b31-35. Hamlyn (1976) 175ff., Kosman (2003) 352, Bronstein (2008) 210-216. 
415 Pace Kosman (1973). 
416 As I have discussed previously, I am not convinced by arguments that say that induction gets us 
the principles, but not as principles. While I grant that we must ultimately grasp principles as 
principles, and for that matter causes as causes, essences as essences, and universals as universals, I 
am not convinced that induction only gets us these things in the weak or perhaps “merely 
extensional” way. Rather, it has been my project to develop a view according to which induction 
supplies the principles as such. The aim of the following sections will be, in part, to complete such a 
view. Cf. e.g. Kosman (1973) 384, Charles (2002) 266, McKirahan (1992) 258, Bronstein (2010) 187-
8, Gasser (2015) 2, inter alia. 
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but the other way around, for example when one recognizes that some feature holds of this 
particular triangle. 417 Finally, even if these other concerns can be adequately addressed, the learning 
process described above presupposes not only some generic ability to form generalizations and to 
think universally on the basis of some particular. Rather, this prior activity must itself be guided and 
presupposes also a more skillful ability to expand and refine one’s very perceptual gnōseis so that one 
can contemplate the correct universal in the particular correctly conceived. Accordingly, on this last 
worry, we seem to have two prior intellectual activities involved in inductive learning.  
I wish to set aside some of the former worries about induction; I focus on the third and 
perhaps most pressing concern in the present chapter. As a further and not unrelated point, in the 
previous chapter I did some work gesturing at a distinction between two prior intellectual activities, 
arguing that both of them must be involved in all cases of intellectual learning. On the one hand, we 
have the prior activity of the student engaging in the activity of the expert—in his own distinctive 
way, to be sure—by means of which a hexis gradually settles in. But this prior activity can cut both 
ways, as it were: we come to be temperate by doing temperate things, but we also come to be 
intemperate by doing intemperate things. Similarly, in the theoretical case: we come to know about 
elephants by considering elephants in the right way, we come to possess a mistaken theory or 
conception of elephants by considering them in the wrong way. In short, both good and bad states 
develop by prior activity of a similar sort.418 Therefore, there must be some further intellectual 
activity which guides and gives shape to the student’s prior activity, so that it results in successful 
learning.  
                                               
417 Cf. APr. B.21 67a5-26. At this juncture, one might worry (perhaps following Bronstein) that I 
have been uncareful in what I take to be “inductive” for Aristotle. He tells us induction is reasoning 
from the particular to the universal in APo. A.1. However, this seems to contradict other uses of the 
term, perhaps in APr. B.21 where a recognition of a universal in a particular instance is said to be 
inductive. Although I do not go into much detail on this point, on my view induction is in every case 
coming to grasp a universal in a particular, contemplating a form in an image: for this reason 
inductive arguments can produce new knowledge of principles and they can express knowledge of 
principles which is already possessed. A similar distinction can be found in the deductive case 
between demonstrations which are productive of new knowledge and those which constitute and 
express it once it is already possessed. And on both sides of the analogy it need not be truth-
entailing: inductions and deductions can produce new conclusions or they can express conclusions 
already held to be true, even if they fail to be. I mention this issue in the previous chapter, and will 
not consider it at greater length here. 
418 Cf. EN II.1 1103b6-25 for a familiar statement of this view. 
 201 
In the first place, then, prior contemplation or prior intellectual activity is a receptive activity 
according to which one must intellectually consider the very same objects one is learning about. And 
as one learns more and more about these objects, one is forming progressively more refined logoi 
that eventually approach and constitute the orthoi logoi. In this way everyone contemplates in order to 
learn, considering elephants in order to learn about elephants; even the most passive and uncurious 
student must perform at least this prior theoretical activity if he is to learn in an intellectual way.419 
This much is routine given the argument of the preceding chapters. 
Our present question, however, concerns the second sort of intellectual activity, a 
distinctively active and perhaps even productive activity which guides and governs that more 
receptive one, particularly in those cases where the subject matter is initially obscure. An 
investigation into this more productive activity has been recommended by the thought that 
experience itself is often the product of an intellectual engagement with some domain, and not merely 
the source of intellectual first principles: some intellectual activity is responsible for guiding one’s 
perceptual engagement with a domain in order to achieve experience in the first place. This 
intellectual activity is in most cases accomplished by a teacher, it would seem, but could also be 
achieved simply by favorable perceptual circumstances, or even by an inquisitive student himself. I 
did little more than distinguish these two activities in the preceding chapter, noting how the role of 
this second activity generates some trouble in understanding Aristotle’s account of induction. In 
other words, I showed in the preceding chapter that there is some such distinct second activity, 
leaving what it is for later consideration. So, it is this second activity and its relationship with 
induction to which I now turn. 
5.2 TWO ASPECTS OF INDUCTION 
I begin with a remark on Aristotle’s view of induction, with an aim to understand its role in Posterior 
Analytics B.19 and in the acquisition of the immediate first principles of scientific knowledge. It is 
reasonable to suppose, in the first place, that induction (ἐπαγωγή) is correlative with deduction 
                                               
419 A related point is made by Peter Geach, Mental Acts (1957) §6 p. 19: “There are conceivable ways 
of acquiring [abilities] to which we should unhesitatingly refuse to apply the term “learning”. If, as in 
a story of Stephen Leacock’s, a boy could come to know Latin by submitting to a brain operation, he 
would not have learned Latin from the surgeon.” 
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(συλλογισμός), given several mentions of the two generic logical forms, sometimes by way of 
comparison, other times by way of contrast. Perhaps most notably at the beginning of the Posterior 
Analytics, Aristotle writes: 
All teaching and all dianoetic learning comes to be from a preexisting gnōsis. This is 
clear to those that consider all cases: for both the mathematical sciences and each of 
the other arts accrue in this way. And similarly also concerning the logoi, some are 
through demonstrations and others through induction: for both accomplish teaching 
through things previously known, the former assuming as from things grasped, the 
latter showing the universal through the particular being clear.420 
In either case, whether comparing the two or contrasting them, in many passages Aristotle has in 
mind a certain form of thinking, of proceeding from some gnōsis without qualification to some logos, 
in either case without necessarily any substantive commitment to what is, in fact, true or correct. 
That is to say, in either deduction or induction, it is reasonable to think that the result of one’s 
reasoning need not be the orthos logos, but simply some logos without qualification. 
A comparison with the deductive case can be helpful in further specifying what I mean. 
Aristotle distinguishes “deduction” and “demonstration,” arguing that something can be a deduction 
without revealing anything that is true, or if it produces truth it does not do so in the proper way. A 
demonstration, in contrast, is a deduction of a particular sort according to which we know 
something to be true.421 We might say that the deductive mode is a form of argument in general, 
independent of any particular logical or argumentative matter, while demonstrations are deductive 
arguments whose material content is of a certain character, namely that which is productive and 
constitutive of knowledge (ἐπιστημονικόν).422 It is important to note, then, that demonstrations are 
                                               
420 APo. A.1 71a1-9: Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται 
γνώσεως. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν· αἵ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ 
τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τεχνῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους 
οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν 
διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον 
εἶναι τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον. 
421 Cf. APo. A.2 71b17-19: “But now we say that we know through demonstration. And by 
‘demonstration’ I mean a scientific deduction: and by ‘scientific' I mean that according to which we 
can know by possessing it.” φαμὲν δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμὸν 
ἐπιστημονικόν· ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. 
422 Cf. APo. A.2 71b20-25: “If then ‘to know’ is such as we laid down, it is also necessary that 
demonstrative knowledge is from premises that are true, primary, immediate, more knowable, prior 
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formally deductions, whole and entire: it is not as if they are a special subclass of deductions that 
contain, in addition, some extra premise or deductive step. Rather, what makes a particular 
deduction to be demonstrative and constitutive of knowledge is the character of the terms, premises, 
and conclusions themselves. In short, the difference between demonstrative and non-demonstrative 
deductions is material, not formal, and the deductive logical form as such does not track or 
necessarily entail the truth. Deductions are called “demonstrations” or “demonstrative,” on the 
other hand, only when the deduction in question successfully expresses the truth and expresses it in 
a very special way.  
So far, this is a routine point made in introductory philosophy classrooms, contrasting logical 
validity and soundness. It becomes an interesting point for our purposes, however, when we realize 
that Aristotle does not explicitly make an analogous distinction for the inductive case, though it may 
very well be implicit in his account. So while not found explicitly in Aristotle, we might reasonably 
entertain a distinction between inductive arguments which are merely adequate generalizations on 
the basis of some perceptual particular and those which, in addition, give us a correct grasp of first 
principles. I propose, then, that the distinction between logical form and matter may be at work also 
in inductions, generating a distinction that is related in some broad and analogous way to deductive 
validity and soundness. I raise this possibility in view of those who are skeptical that induction alone 
could produce a grasp of first principles. If such a distinction between merely formal inductions (i.e. 
a mere generalization from particular to universal) and robustly noetic inductions is possible (i.e. 
inductions which produce the virtue of nous in a given domain), then we come some way to 
answering this skepticism regarding whether we can come to grasp first principles by induction.423 
One may worry, however, that there may not be such a distinction to which we can appeal. 
Perhaps someone will object that what it means to be an adequate inductive inference is to have 
gotten the generalization right. On this view, inductive adequacy and inductive success do not come 
                                                                                                                                                       
to, and the cause of the conclusion: for thus will the principles be proper to that which is being 
proven. For while deduction will be possible even without these, demonstration will not be: for it 
will not produce knowledge.” Εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν 
ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ 
προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου. 
συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ' οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην. 
423 I use “noetic” here to name those inductions which are productive or expressive of nous-as-virtue, 
just as we might use “scientific” or “epistemic” (following Aristotle) to name those deductions 
which are productive or expressive of epistēmē. 
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apart even conceptually, and a faulty inductive inference, for example on the basis of an exceptional 
case, would simply not count as an adequate induction, or perhaps as an induction at all, on this 
view. I cannot reply to this particular worry sufficiently, insofar as it is a worry that has plagued 
philosophy since before Aristotle up until the present day, in some form or another. But I briefly say 
this in reply: if we conceive of induction simply as that argumentative form in which some 
generalization is made or considered on the basis of some particular, then the lack of determinate 
logical forms (as in the deductive case) need not be evidence against the idea of a formally inductive 
move in general. Perhaps the simple character of both the activity of noetic apprehension and the 
cognitive grasp of nous-as-virtue will count in my favor.424 If induction is aimed at a simple 
intellectual grasp and activity, then perhaps it will not admit of the many and various logical forms 
that obtain in the deductive case where there are, as it were, intellectual parts. Valid deductive form 
expresses a relation between these parts; but where there are no parts, there can be no logical 
schemata. This, however, need not count against the idea that there is some generic inductive form 
which produces generalizations that are adequate to the particulars on which they are based.  
To further respond to this worry: one way of characterizing the difficulty throughout the 
ages is not about the generic adequacy of an inference from a particular case to a universal 
generalization, since that basic move is taken for granted. Rather, the perennial project is about the 
material conditions on making good generalizations, just as, by way of analogy, Aristotle gives us 
material conditions on making deductions that are scientifically demonstrative. Accordingly, I do not 
intend to insist upon any thick notion of adequate inductive form which guarantees success; rather, I 
want to save a very thin notion of what counts as “formally inductive,” a generalization that is 
adequate to what one finds in a particular, which can nevertheless hang free of success and truth.425 I 
therefore ask my readers to grant me this much, at least in order to articulate an alternative view. 
I have thus proposed a distinction, one which is very relevant in the deductive case but not 
so obvious in the inductive case, between those arguments whose content is necessarily truth-
entailing and in a way that exploits certain logical relations, and those arguments whose content falls 
short in some way but whose constitutive logical relations remain adequate. Bearing this distinction 
                                               
424 Cf. e.g. de Anima III.6 passim. 
425 This is related to views and debates about generics in Aristotle and the logic, quite generally, of 
Aristotelian Categoricals. See, for example, Michael Thompson, Life and Action (2008). 
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in mind in our treatment of induction, some difficulties in the literature become less problematic.426 
I am suggesting that we ought to understand induction as mere logical form when we move from a 
particular case to a universal generalization without qualification, so that any such generalization that 
is appropriate to the concrete particular under consideration will count as adequate.427 This helps 
dissolve some tension between passages in which the inductive logical form is mentioned in a 
generic way, insofar as it is productive of generalizations simpliciter, and passages in which induction 
produces correct universals the grasp of which constitutes some intellectual virtue. Although 
Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these two aspects of induction, we can discern the difference 
depending on the deductive correlate in each context, whether demonstrative deductions or 
deductions simpliciter.  
After all, it is natural to read Posterior Analytics B.19 as considering induction in this more 
robust sense, one correlative with demonstration, since induction in that chapter is productive of the 
intellectual virtue of nous just as demonstrations or scientific deductions (συλλογισμοὶ 
ἐπιστημονικοί) are productive (or expressive) of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). But, on this 
natural reading, a tension arises between this passage and those in which “induction” names a much 
thinner activity, an activity conceived broadly and only in formal terms, such as Posterior Analytics 
A.1.428 This has led some readers of B.19 to search for some further step in the process of coming to 
nous-as-hexis, since they understand induction always and everywhere in purely formal terms, as 
correlative with deduction. But if in B.19 “induction” not only denotes some logical form in general 
but can also name an argument that proceeds inductively from the appropriate and correct 
preexisting gnōsis to the appropriate and correct conclusion, then we need not look elsewhere for a 
further account of how we come to grasp the immediate first principles. This is because, on the view 
I am suggesting, there is an ambiguity in the term “induction” itself, so that in some contexts it is a 
                                               
426 I am thinking of those who seek some further step beyond induction by which we come to grasp 
the principles as principles. Recall Kosman (1973), McKirahan (1992), Charles (2002), Bronstein 
(2010). 
427 I am very open to the idea that logoi as such are explanatory, so that induction is not only 
responsible for something logically universal, but also for a reasoned account which supposes 
something to be the cause of something else. Perhaps these logoi can be incorrect, but they 
nevertheless speak to the causes of things. This is a difficult thesis to maintain, however, for a 
number of reasons, which I why I note my sympathy with the thought in passing, only to set it aside 
for another occasion.  
428 Consider also APr. B.23 passim. 
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thin notion correlative with “deduction,” while in other contexts, and in B.19 perhaps most 
importantly, it is a more robust notion correlative with “demonstration.” Accordingly, on my 
reading, it is unsurprising when Aristotle says that induction is how we come to know the first 
principles, being productive of the intellectual virtue of nous thereby. 
According to this interpretation, the final chapter of the Posterior Analytics can be both about 
how our knowledge proceeds in general from the particular grasped in perception to the universal 
grasped by intellect and in particular how we proceed from grasping perceptual particulars correctly in 
experience to knowing the immediate and universal first principles, the grasp of which constitutes 
the intellectual virtue of nous. Just as demonstrations that produce scientific knowledge 
(ἐπιστημονικαί) are not deductions with some additional premise or logical step, so too coming to 
grasp first principles (nous-as-hexis) is not accomplished by inductions with some additional premise 
or logical step. Rather, the inductions which are productive of immediate first principles are formally 
inductions whole and entire: they are materially, but not formally, different from other inductions. 
This material difference in deduction is the character of the terms and premises; the material 
difference in induction is that the perceptual particular is rightly and clearly conceived. We therefore 
do not need some further step on the road to first principles in B.19, but induction itself can 
produce the first principles, when we proceed from the appropriate grasp of particulars. 
If this is right, then there is a dual meaning to Aristotle’s remark at the end of B.19 that “the 
soul is so constituted so as to be capable of this process.”429 On the one hand he must mean, as I 
have discussed in the previous chapter, that the soul must be already capable of grasping universals 
in general, of receptively considering universals in particulars and contemplating the intelligible form 
in the perceptual image.430 The soul must, in short, be capable of induction in the generic sense. 
There is no mystery here, nor is there anything to be explained. Humans are simply the sorts of 
things that contemplate and consider in a universal way (θεωρεῖν) those particulars that are 
presented in perception. To be sure, in view of this fact about human nature, Aristotle posits a 
receptive intellectual capacity, understood by an analogy with the perceptual capacities. But its 
operation in general stands in need of no peculiar explanation, and the fact that we reason 
universally on the basis of perceptual particulars in general is no mystery, since our souls are simply 
capable of undergoing that process.  
                                               
429 APo. B.19 100a13-14 (trans. Mure). 
430 Cf. de An. III.7-8 passim. 
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Accordingly, the burden of B.19 is not (or not only) to explain how human beings get logoi 
on the basis of perception in general, but more specifically to explain how human beings arrive at 
the orthoi logoi, in particular those universals the grasp of which constitutes the intellectual virtue of 
nous. For induction to be productive of nous (in a way analogous to those deductions that are 
productive of ἐπιστήμη) the starting point of induction, in this case the particular, must be correctly 
conceived. Empeiria, on my view, simply is the cognitive state in virtue of which the perceptual 
particular is rightly conceived in a stable and habitual way. But, as we have seen, even the acquisition 
of empeiria often presupposes an intellectual activity, such as reflectively engaging with a domain even 
at the level of perception. It very often presupposes an intellectual and reasoned process, an activity 
which must guide the development of experience itself so that, on the basis of experience, we might 
reason inductively to the first principles. In short, as we have seen previously, experience is often not 
only the source but the product of intellectual engagement. So, if I am right, more must be explained 
regarding this special kind of activity which contributes materially to the inductive process, guiding 
our perceptual engagement in inquiry, and indeed producing the grasp of perceptual particulars in 
empeiria from which inductions (now in the robust sense of the term) can proceed. 
5.3 ACTIVE TEACHING, ACTIVE INQUIRY 
5.3.1 Socratic Lessons 
Given that Aristotle has Plato’s Meno in mind at the beginning and end of the Posterior Analytics, 
perhaps our own inquiry would benefit from a brief detour to that text.431 There, Plato’s Socrates 
famously suggests that puzzlement (ἀπορία), a kind of intellectual paralysis, is helpful for learning 
because the student loses all his prejudices against the truth. Rather than being explicitly committed 
to falsehood, as the story goes, the puzzled student recovers a state of bare ignorance. Now, indeed, 
many interpreters have described the Socratic Method in precisely these terms, since the dialogues 
taken to belong to Plato’s early period—and therefore to reflect most closely the historical Socrates—
usually end in aporia.432 The Meno, however, has been considered a “transitional dialogue” precisely 
                                               
431 The Meno is explicitly mentioned in the first chapter of the APo. (71a29). The argument of B.19 
begins by treating a view similar to recollection (99b20-27), though the Meno is not cited explicitly. 
432 Cf. e.g. Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (1983) 27-58. 
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because it emphasizes and moves beyond aporia.433 Most vividly in the geometry lesson, Socrates first 
convinces the boy that he does not, in fact, know the answer to the problem, remarking to Meno 
how this intellectual paralysis is both an achievement and an advantage, as we have seen.434 
In the Meno, however, the discussion does not stop with aporia: Socrates invites Meno and us 
to “mark now the farther development” (84c10, trans. Jowett). Socrates proceeds by asking the boy 
questions about the diagram before his eyes. The boy had been familiar with geometrical figures 
beforehand, familiar enough to hazard a guess about how to double the area of the square. But he 
was insufficiently familiar with geometrical facts, or with squares in particular. The key moment in 
the lesson’s “further development” is when Socrates draws diagonal lines within the figure, showing 
that by squaring the diagonal one can double the area of any given square. Socrates teaches the boy 
by manipulating the geometrical diagrams, by making something available to be seen and considered 
which had previously been obscure for the student, who is not able to see for himself. 
 
Figure 8. Drawing Diagonals in the Meno 
  
We can abstract from the geometry lesson of the Meno and conclude that, according to that 
account at any rate, the teacher teaches by manipulating perceptual particulars and by guiding the 
                                               
433 Cf. e.g. Gregory Vlastos, Socratic Studies (1994). Even those who do not follow Vlastos on the full 
developmental picture concede at least this much. Cf. e.g. Hugh Benson, “The Method of 
Hypothesis in the Meno,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (2003) 95-143, 
especially in his opening line at 95: “The Meno has long been considered a transitional Platonic 
dialogue. Indeed, Gregory Vlastos once maintained that he could identify the precise point in the 
dialogues where the historical Socrates (interpreted by Plato) gave off and Plato (on his own) 
began—Meno 80d-e. I am less sanguine than I once was about this historical and developmental 
claim. But that the Meno marks a break with the so-called elenctic dialogues appears secure.” 
434 Cf. Meno 84a3-d3. 
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student to focus on certain features while subordinating or even ignoring others. The student is led 
to see and indeed to contemplate for himself the relevant facts and features throughout this process: 
education, to continue a Platonic theme, is not like putting sight into blind eyes but rather like 
turning and focusing an activity the student is already engaged in. After all, we have seen that the 
student is already capable of intellectual consideration, of generalizing on the basis of perceptual 
particulars that he sees. He is therefore able to see these diagrams as instances of more general 
geometrical kinds, and expressive of proofs that hold quite generally for all squares. 
Now, with the aid of the teacher, the student comes to be turned and pointed in the right 
direction, as it were: this is what Socrates does when drawing the diagonal lines. Similarly on 
Aristotle’s account, we have seen that people draw exaggerated or over-generalized conclusions due 
to an insufficient familiarity with the facts. Perhaps, to return to the Meno, doubling the length of a 
line doubles the length, but this will not double the area of a square with such a line as its side. We 
saw similar intellectual hastiness with theories of respiration and reproduction in Aristotle: an 
insufficient familiarity with the facts leads to logoi that are exaggerated and incorrect, though perhaps 
reasonably generalized and induced from the deficient perceptual data available. 
Some explanation is needed, then, regarding how the person comes to grasp the appropriate 
perceptual facts, or how the person comes to conceive of the perceptual particulars in the right way. 
In the natural sciences, as we have seen, this often requires an inquiry that is intellectually driven in a 
robust way: a biologist must be taught or must discover for himself the correct method of dissection 
so that the perceptual particulars can be seen aright, so that he may gain experience in this domain. 
A teacher can streamline this perceptual engagement, by teaching or even accomplishing for him the 
right method of dissection from the start, but for the student to learn he must see the internal 
organs for himself: only then can he grasp with his own mind the universals which are made 
available in the particulars clearly and rightly conceived.  
Teachers of both biology and geometry, however, may expect more from their students, 
guiding not only their first-order learning about the circulation of blood but also their higher-order 
skill in inquiry. In these cases the teacher may not tell the students precisely how to dissect an animal 
or where to draw diagonal lines in a diagram. In such cases the teacher asks questions, raising 
puzzles and giving clues that constrain without completing the inquiry for the student. This is 
perhaps most important when training students to become researchers and inquirers in their own 
right: when a student must not only master some already mastered domain, but also go on to make 
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his own discoveries, a different set of skills must be developed in the student. A similar point may be 
made about teaching someone to be a teacher. 
Puzzles and questions help drive inquiry forward, then, so that the logical material for 
induction can come to be more and more refined, and therefore ever closer to producing the orthoi 
logoi inductively. As I argued in the preceding chapter, as one’s perceptual engagement in a domain 
becomes more refined, so do the logoi one forms inductively on the basis of those perceptual 
particulars. But perception, memory, and a capacity for forming logoi do not guarantee or explain the 
success of inquiry; rather, there must be some active or productive activity which guides and governs 
the student’s progression toward the truth. Once the student sees aright, he can think aright—for our 
souls are so constituted as to reason inductively, forming logoi on the basis of particulars grasped in 
perception, but something must guide and direct this very seeing. Asking and being asked the right 
questions about the right features of what is available to one in perception goes some way toward 
explaining this process, and is certainly the focus in the Socratic context. 
5.3.2 An Aristotelian Parallel 
Let us now turn to a parallel passage from Metaphysics Θ.9 in which Aristotle considers the 
relationship of activity and potentiality in cases of discovery. As we have seen from the preceding 
discussion and in previous chapters, a teacher’s instruction or favorable circumstances can 
streamline the process of learning, so that the more active or productive one of the necessary prior 
activities can be accomplished externally for the student. In cases of discovery, however, the student 
must accomplish all aspects of learning himself, as if in an intellectual vacuum. In these cases, as we 
have seen, a pressing question arises regarding the achievement of perceptual experience, that is, a 
complete and clear grasp of the relevant particulars in a given domain. We therefore return to the 
question of this chapter once again: how do we understand the gradual process whereby one’s prior 
intellectual activity and one’s perceptual deliverances become more refined, particularly if we cannot 
appeal to a teacher or to fortunate perceptual circumstances? This question about the difficult case 
of discovery has arisen for us against the background of epistemological considerations. 
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In Metaphysics Θ Aristotle’s topic is, in contrast, metaphysical. In that book he considers 
activity (ἐνέργεια) and potentiality (δύναμις),435 and in the final chapters (8-10) he considers the 
various ways in which activity is prior to potentiality. This is perhaps obvious in the case of learning 
by instruction, since the teacher must possess and have contemplated the knowledge which the 
student comes to learn, just as the parent already possesses the substantial form that the offspring 
comes to share.436 And even the student must, as we have seen, actively contemplate (e.g.) elephants 
in order to learn about elephants.437 Aristotle considers these cases from a metaphysical perspective, 
insofar as they illustrate a more general point about the relationship between activity and 
potentiality. In chapter nine he considers the case of discovery, where no teacher is available who 
already possesses the knowledge to-be-learned, who can guide the student’s gradual process of 
contemplating in order to learn. He considers this case because discovery might seem to be an 
exception to the general metaphysical priority of activity to potentiality. Aristotle gives us an answer 
that relies heavily on geometrical examples.438 It becomes clear as the discussion unfolds that some 
activity must precede and facilitate the process of learning even in cases of discovery: 
                                               
435 As before, I prefer to translate energeia as “activity” and entelecheia as “actuality,” “perfection,” 
“fulfillment” or “realization.” While it is true that entelecheia is mentioned in Meta. Θ, the arguments 
about priority and posteriority at the end of the book principally concern energeia and dynamis.  
436 Cf. Meta. Θ.8 1049b19-27. 
437 Cf. Meta. Θ.8 1049b27-50a2. 
438 See Meta. Θ.6 1048a35-b9 for a nearby precedent for this examples-based argumentative style, a 
method whose inductive character is particularly relevant for our present epistemological study: 
“What we wish to say is clear by induction with respect to particular cases, and it is not necessary to 
seek a definition of each thing but even to be able to see the analogy, that it is as the one building 
relates to the one capable of building, and as the awake relates to the asleep, and as the one seeing 
relates to one with eyes shut but who has sight, and as that which has come to bear a distinctive 
form from the matter relates to the matter, and as that which has been brought to perfection relates 
to the imperfect. Let the energeia have been defined corresponding to the one part of each 
distinction, and the dynaton be defined corresponding to the other. For not everything is said to be in 
energeia in the same way, except by analogy, as this is in that or relates to that, or as this other is in 
another or relates to another: for some are as motion to potentiality while others are as being to 
some matter.”(δῆλον δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς 
ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, καὶ τὸ 
ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ μῦον μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον 
ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς 
θατέρῳ μορίῳ ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρῳ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐ πάντα 
ὁμοίως ἀλλ’ ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε· τὰ μὲν 
γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν τὰ δ’ ὡς οὐσία πρός τινα ὕλην). 
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[a] And also diagrams are discovered by activity; for people discover by dividing. If 
the diagrams had already been divided, they would be clear.439 But as it is they are 
present in potentiality. [b] Why does the triangle [have angles equal to] two rights? 
Because the angles around a single point are equal to two rights. So if the line parallel 
to the side had been drawn up, the reason why would be immediately clear to one 
who knows. [c] Why in general is it a right [angle] inside a semi-circle? Because if the 
three were equal, both the two base angles and the one fixed from the middle are 
right, [this is] clear upon seeing it to one who knows this.440 
The first thing to note about this passage is its description of two perceptual states an inquirer can 
be in with respect to a particular fact or feature in a given domain. Note that these states are being 
compared for one who has not yet discovered the feature of (e.g.) triangles. On the one hand, due to 
the action of a teacher or favorable circumstances (perhaps sticks being arranged just so by chance) 
the parallel line may already have been drawn, so that the geometrical fact is, as it were, already there 
before one’s eyes. In contrast, and much more commonly when inquiring into triangles, one simply 
considers a triangle, perhaps situated on a baseline without any additional lines being drawn. In this 
latter case, we might say that the geometrical feature is already there to be discovered, but has not 





                                               
439 “They” has no clear antecedent. One might be inclined to take τὰ διαγράμματα as the subject, 
though this is not idiomatic for English. Nor, however, do we speak of τὰ διαγράμματα being 
discovered. It is likely that Aristotle is using τὰ διαγράμματα in a more contentful way, implying 
perhaps “proof-demonstrating diagrams” or some such. 
440 Meta. Θ.9 1051a21-29: εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ· διαιροῦντες γὰρ 
εὑρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ’ ἦν διῃρημένα, φανερὰ ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ’ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ 
τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, 
ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον. διὰ τί ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου. διότι ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἥ τε βάσις δύο 
καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῖνο εἰδότι. There are disputes about parts of 
this text, in particular the semicircle example. For one, it is disputed whether at 51a27 it should be 
διὰ τί or διότι, and this decision affects where one places the punctuation.  I do not wish to weigh in 
on these details or, in general, to make use of that example. I include it as part of the translation, but 
there are very serious issues to be considered that I am working on in a separate paper. For 
consideration of these examples, see Ross ad loc, Burnyeat (1984), Makin (2006), Hasper (2011). 
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Figure 9. Drawing Parallels with Aristotle in Metaphysics Θ.9 
 
This argumentative structure bears some similarity to a passage considered in the previous chapter 
regarding the relationship between perception and knowledge. Recall what Aristotle claims in 
Posterior Analytics A.31: 
Nor is knowing through perception. For even if the perception is of the such and 
not of this something, nevertheless it is necessary that one perceive, at any rate, this 
thing both at some place and at some time. But it is impossible to perceive the 
universal and what holds in all cases: for it is neither a this nor now, for that would not 
be universal: for we say that the always and everywhere is universal. Since, then, 
demonstrations are universal, it is not possible to perceive these, nor is knowing 
through perception. But it is clear that even if it were possible to perceive the 
triangle, that it has angles equal to two rights, we would [still] seek a demonstration, 
and we do not know it, as some say: for while it is necessary to perceive the 
particular, the knowledge is by coming to know the universal. For this reason even if, 
being on the moon, we were watching the earth interposing, we would not know the 
cause of the eclipse. For we would be perceiving that it was now eclipsing and not in 
general why. For perception is not of the universal. But if however, from 
contemplating this happening often, we had hunted down the universal, we would 
have a demonstration: for from many particulars the universal is clear.441 
                                               
441 APo. A.31 87b28-88a5: Οὐδὲ δι’ αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν ἐπίστασθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ 
τοιοῦδε καὶ μὴ τοῦδέ τινος, ἀλλ’ αἰσθάνεσθαί γε ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τι καὶ ποὺ καὶ νῦν. τὸ δὲ 
καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι• οὐ γὰρ τόδε οὐδὲ νῦν• οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν καθόλου• τὸ 
γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαμὲν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀποδείξεις καθόλου, ταῦτα δ’ οὐκ 
ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ’ ἐπίστασθαι δι’ αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν 
αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ τρίγωνον ὅτι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ οὐχ 
ὥσπερ φασί τινες ἠπιστάμεθα• αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ’ ἕκαστον, ἡ δ’ ἐπιστήμη τῷ τὸ 
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This passage from Posterior Analytics A.31 mentions the same geometrical proof that all 
triangles have internal angles equal to two rights, a very common example in the Analytics generally. 
It is the relationship between perceiving (αἰσθάνεσθαι), contemplating (θεωρεῖν), and hunting 
(θηρεύειν) that interests me in this passage. But first let us return to another closely related passage, 
Posterior Analytics B.2, in which he makes a slightly different point about the same case, moon-bound 
inquiry into the cause of lunar eclipses: 
Cases in which the middle term is sensible may make clear that inquiry is of the 
middle term. For we seek not having perceived (e.g.) an eclipse, if it is or not. But if 
we were on the moon, we would inquire neither if it came to be nor why, but they 
would [both] be clear at the same time. For from perceiving it would become 
possible for us to know even the universal. For the perception is that [the earth] is 
obstructing (for it is also clear that it is now eclipsing), and from this the universal 
would come to be.442 
 In both of these passages from the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle considers a perceptual 
perspective from which a student can easily grasp the cause and the relevant universal as an 
epistemological limit case. In the first passage he says that it is by considering or contemplating 
something happening often (ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο πολλάκις συμβαῖνον) and by hunting down the 
universal that we come to have it. But in the second passage he emphasizes that inquiry (ζήτησις), at 
any rate, can stop as a result of this excellent perspective: if we were on the moon, there would be 
no need for further hunting, for further inquiry into the cause of a lunar eclipse.443 If there is no 
                                                                                                                                                       
καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης ὄντες ἑωρῶμεν ἀντιφράττουσαν τὴν γῆν, 
οὐκ ἂν ᾔδειμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκλείψεως. ᾐσθανόμεθα γὰρ ἂν ὅτι νῦν ἐκλείπει, καὶ οὐ διότι 
ὅλως• οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ καθόλου αἴσθησις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο πολλάκις συμβαῖνον 
τὸ καθόλου ἂν θηρεύσαντες ἀπόδειξιν εἴχομεν• ἐκ γὰρ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα πλειόνων τὸ καθόλου 
δῆλον. 
442 APo. B.2 90a26-31: Ὅτι δ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου ἡ ζήτησις, δηλοῖ ὅσων τὸ μέσον αἰσθητόν. ζητοῦμεν 
γὰρ μὴ ᾐσθημένοι, οἷον τῆς ἐκλείψεως, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. εἰ δ’ ἦμεν ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης, οὐκ ἂν 
ἐζητοῦμεν οὔτ’ εἰ γίνεται οὔτε διὰ τί, ἀλλ’ ἅμα δῆλον ἂν ἦν. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι καὶ τὸ 
καθόλου ἐγένετο ἂν ἡμῖν εἰδέναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ὅτι νῦν ἀντιφράττει (καὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι νῦν 
ἐκλείπει)· ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸ καθόλου ἂν ἐγένετο. 
443 Interestingly, though, moon-dwellers might call such an eclipse a “solar eclipse.” Even more 
strangely, what we call a “solar eclipse,” and the phenomenon whose cause is obvious to us, moon-
dwellers might call a “terrestrial eclipse.” When occupying the eclipsed body, the cause will be 
obvious; when occupying the eclipsing body, the cause will require some uncovering. 
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need for further hunting in this case, does seeing alone suffice for knowledge? Given that he argues 
in the first passage that knowledge is not through perception, we ought to conclude that theōrein 
means something more intellectual here: even with a maximally privileged perceptual perspective in 
which no further inquiry is required, Aristotle here denies that knowledge is through perception (δι’ 
αἰσθήσεως). Therefore one must still contemplate the occurrence happening often in order to grasp 
the universal and, through it, the demonstration. Accordingly, I have urged in the preceding chapter 
that even from this privileged perspective prior intellectual activity of this receptive and quasi-
passive sort is still required in every case: it is not (or not only) by seeing this happening often but 
rather (or also) by contemplating (θεωρεῖν) it happening often that one comes to grasp the universal in 
a stable way (ἔχειν).444 
The privileged perspective of being on the moon (with respect to discovering the cause of a 
lunar eclipse) is similar to a geometrical diagram of a triangle with a parallel line already having been 
drawn (with respect to discovering the cause of triangles having internal angles equal to two rights). 
Aristotle says that if the parallel line is drawn, the proof is clear to one who knows the relevant 
background facts (e.g. standard theorems about the equality of angles relative to parallel lines). 
Aristotle might have made a similar qualification in the case of the lunar eclipse: the cause and 
universal is clear to one already possessing sufficient grasp of certain background facts (e.g. what 
shadows are in general). When the parallel is already drawn for the student, perhaps by his teacher, 
the case is analogous to being on the moon: inquiry can stop, but only when some background 
knowledge is presupposed, and even then some receptive and contemplative intellectual activity 
remains necessary. 
These passages are also parallel with the geometry lesson in the Meno. Certain background 
facts are presupposed, but the student cannot yet see how to construct a square with double the 
                                               
444 “Often” (πολλάκις) could modify “from contemplating this” (ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο) or “this 
happening” (τοῦτο … συμβαῖνον). On either reading we have trouble with the intuitive idea that, 
from these privileged perspectives, we may not need to consider something happening multiple 
times, but perhaps once alone is sufficient. In reply to the worry against the first way of reading the 
line, perhaps from such a privileged perspective one may engage in correct intellectual activity, but 
not yet grasp the hexis. In reply to the worry when we take the line in the second way, perhaps one 
cannot be sure that this is the cause if one does not see it happening in just this way multiple times. I 
favor the first reading in view of the interpretive work of the preceding chapters: perhaps one can 
engage in virtuous and correct intellectual activity from such a privileged perceptual perspective, but 
one may not yet possess the stable and developed intellectual hexis without doing this contemplating 
several times. 
 216 
area. Once Socrates draws the diagonal lines and draws the boy’s attention to them, he is able to see 
for himself, and inquiry is able to stop. The “further development” is accomplished not only by 
Socrates asking questions, an activity he himself admits, but also by Socrates’ sharing the inquiry 
with him. By drawing the diagonal lines, Socrates invites the student into the inquiry, drawing out a 
feature and drawing explicit attention to it by his questions. Socrates’ purpose here is shared by 
Aristotle: the student must be led to see and grasp certain features for himself, which features the 
teacher helps make available to the student. Teaching is not like putting sight into blind eyes, but 
rather a facilitating—that is, a making easier—so that the student’s own inquiry is streamlined, 
focused, and rendered maximally efficient. 
Now, in the case of the lunar eclipse, Aristotle leaves unexplained how one might come to 
occupy such a privileged perspective as being on the moon. Indeed, such a perspective might even 
have been, by his lights, impossible to occupy, given his other views about heavenly bodies and the 
superlunary realm. His purpose in using that example in the Posterior Analytics was to insist (i) that a 
certain intellectual activity is necessary even in straightforward cases of learning when the perceptual 
particular is already clear (as in A.31) or (ii) that in straightforward perceptual cases inquiry, at any 
rate, is not necessary since no further hunting down is required (as in B.2). Though the same 
example serves different argumentative purposes in these two passages, in both cases Aristotle 
considers a limit case in which the perceptual data, as it were, are maximally revealing. Inquiry and 
intellectual hunting is therefore a distinct activity from this other more receptive or contemplative 
intellectual activity: while the former can be minimized to a vanishing point in these limit cases, the 
latter remains necessary even then. 
But because he has considered these limit cases where inquiry is minimized, in those 
passages Aristotle has said little about how we should understand cases that are not as 
straightforward, where the perceptual data are obscure or unclear. For the straightforward limit 
cases, Aristotle could simply presume the activity of a teacher or favorable circumstance, someone 
or something which can put the student into a position to contemplate in order to learn. But how 
ought we to understand inquiry into triangles, as when our diagrams have not already been 
perforated, as it were, by a teacher (or by favorable circumstances)? Alternatively, how ought we to 
understand inquiry into the cause of a lunar eclipse for those of us bound to conduct our inquiry 
from the surface of the Earth? 
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5.3.3 Coming to Know by Making 
Having seen the parallels between important passages from the Posterior Analytics, the Meno, and 
Metaphysics Θ.9, let us return with a special focus on the latter passage. Recall that the case of 
discovery presents a distinctive problem for Aristotle’s metaphysics of act and potency: since there is 
no teacher in the case of discovery, the merely potential knower may seem to bootstrap his way into 
actual knowledge in an illicit way. Accordingly, this may seem to be a counterexample to the general 
priority of energeia to dynamis Aristotle defended in the previous chapter of the Metaphysics, Θ.8. 
Indeed, this distinctive feature of discovery is precisely why the case is so interesting for our own 
purposes and for our peculiar epistemological inquiry: not only must the student be intellectually and 
perceptually receptive, as we have seen above, but when he learns by discovery he must also be active in 
uncovering what is available for him to receive. When the student cannot count on a teacher to draw 
out the relevant features for him, perhaps in some geometrical diagram, the student must himself 
uncover and hunt down what is available for him to discover in perception. This is, I take it, what 
Aristotle means by “inquiry” (ζήτησις). 
Although so far this may seem to be abstract, the distinction between these two activities is 
consistent with ordinary ways of thinking about learning. In geometry classes we can distinguish 
between students learning particular proofs (e.g. that all triangles have internal angles equal to two 
rights, or that one can double the area of a square by using the length of its diagonal) and students 
learning general strategies to manipulate diagrams and discover new proofs for themselves. As 
students learn particular proofs of a certain style, they become adept at deploying certain general 
geometrical strategies to solve problems and construct proofs they have not yet seen before. For 
example: “what happens if I draw a parallel line here?” or perhaps, “will bisecting this angle reveal 
anything about this diagram that will aid in constructing a proof?” Often these thoughts happen in 
an imperceptible time, so that they are never articulated in this way. Nevertheless, something like 
this inner dialogue can be presupposed when the student manipulates and uncovers more of what is 
perceptually and indeed intellectually available in the diagram: he comes to see more and is therefore 
able to intellectually consider more about a given geometrical problem. Similarly, even when the 
perspective is merely imaginary, it may aid one’s thinking about a difficult case. “What would the 
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lunar eclipse look like, I wonder, if I were on the moon’s surface?”445 In all these cases, one is 
actively engaged with what is perceptually available, working to uncover what is, in a sense, already 
there to be grasped, but now in a deeper and more universal way. 
These activities are productive in a certain way, since they uncover something that is (in 
some sense) already there in perception, drawing it out for more explicit intellectual consideration. 
One of the presuppositions of this chapter has been that humans perform induction without 
qualification (and, in general, receptive intellectual activity) by our very nature, so that it is no 
mystery how we come to contemplate a universal intelligible form on the basis of a perceptual 
particular. For Aristotle, at any rate, the mystery, as it were, has rather been to explain how we come 
to contemplate the correct universal—the orthos logos—on the basis of a perceptual particular rightly 
conceived. We can take inductive activity for granted, there is no mystery how humans come to 
trade in universals, we are just the sorts of things that can and do consider particulars in a universal 
way. But as with all logical forms of argument, if we put garbage in, we will get garbage out the other 
end, as the saying goes. One admittedly rough way to put the question, then, is: how can we work 
toward good inputs on the particular side of the inductive equation?  
We have found an answer to this question, or a preliminary one at any rate. While the 
receptive intellectual activity generalizes without qualification on the basis of perceptual particulars 
in general, this more productive intellectual activity works on what is perceptually available to be 
generalized. It is productive insofar as it makes things to be intellectually available for one’s own 
consideration. We might even call its contribution constructive, insofar as it constructs perspectives or 
auxiliary structures to aid in the consideration of a particular case, at least in the examples we have 
entertained. Indeed, on this reading, the features were already there in perception, in some sense, to 
be contemplated and considered in a universal way, but this constructive or productive intellectual 
activity draws them out so that they can be considered more easily, more explicitly, and even more 
correctly. The receptive activity, therefore, more closely resembles what we think of as “ordinary 
thinking,” especially given Aristotle’s analogy between perception and intellection; this productive 
intellectual activity, in contrast, is different in kind. So, for example, the drawn parallel line is a 
production, but not in the sense that it constructs a new triangle or new features of the original 
                                               
445 Or to use a constructed case that was deployed against Aristotle’s own substantive views: “Two 
items of the same weight falling from the same height will fall at the same rate. But what if we 
imagine one whose weight is divided into two parts attached by a string, while leaving the other 
undivided?” 
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triangle out of whole cloth: new intelligible objects are not being produced. Rather, this intellectual 
production reveals something about the triangle which was already present as a perceptible and 
intelligible object, principally by activating what was already potentially present in the diagram, 
distinguishing and bringing to light something which was present but not yet presently available for 
thinking. 
Now, I have been using suggestive language, especially in the immediately preceding 
paragraph, such as “productive activity” and “bringing to light” to describe the latter intellectual 
activity. That activity is opposed to the merely receptive character of what we might call “ordinary” 
human thinking. If I am right, in our passage from Θ.9 Aristotle gives explicit examples of the kind 
of intellectual activity we have been seeking since the second chapter of this dissertation. One 
intellectual activity is receptive like our perceptual capacities, while the other is productive or active 
like light, revealing to oneself what is, in a sense, already there to be grasped. It seems intuitive to 
describe the two activities in these ways, though one may worry that this is merely an artifact of how 
I am presenting the examples Aristotle gives. Thankfully, however, there is a more important reason 
to describe this latter activity as productive: that is how Aristotle himself goes on to describe it in 
that very passage. Following the two geometrical examples in Θ.9, he concludes his argument in 
more abstract, but also more revealing, terms: 
So it is clear that the things, being in potential, are discovered by being led into 
activity (τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα), and the reason is that intellection 
(νόησις) is an activity. So that potentiality is from activity, and because of this people 
come to know by making (ποιοῦντες γιγνώσκουσιν) (for activity according to 
number is posterior in coming to be).446 
So, Aristotle himself adopts this suggestive language in describing the activity involved in drawing a 
parallel line so that one can discover the proof. 
To elaborate further, let us consider the three ways that Aristotle describes the activity of 
parallel-drawing in this passage. He says that it is both (i) a leading what is potential to activity (τὰ 
δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα) and (ii) an intellectual activity (νόησις). Furthermore, while 
not calling the activity itself a production (ποίησις) outright, (iii) he nevertheless refers to those who 
                                               
446 Meta. Θ.9 1051a29-33: ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα εὑρίσκεται· 
αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἡ νόησις ἐνέργεια· ὥστ’ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες 
γιγνώσκουσιν (ὕστερον γὰρ γενέσει ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατ’ ἀριθμόν). 
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perform the activity with the participle of the related verb (ποιοῦντες). In this passage, we have 
found a clear convergence of the three traits of the active intellect with which we were left at the 
close of the second chapter. There we sought a more concrete account of a second intellectual 
activity (νόησις) which is productive or active (ποιητικός) rather than receptive (δεκτικός). There 
we arrived at a functional description informed by Aristotle’s Light Analogy, so that its distinctive 
function is to activate potentially intelligible objects, like light which makes potential colors to be 
colors in activity (ποίει τὰ δύναμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα). Here in Θ.9 Aristotle gives 
us two concrete geometrical examples of this very sort of intellectual activity as playing a distinctive 
role in inquiry and discovery.  
We have located the active intellect’s distinctive activity within Aristotle’s wider philosophy. 
Though it is not widely recognized, we have in Metaphysics Θ.9 a clear parallel with the discussion of 
active intellect in de Anima III.5.447 In the light of this passage, then, much of the story I have been 
telling about two sorts of prior intellectual activity, one receptive and the other active or productive, 
is confirmed in quite explicit terms. While discovery is a difficult case to explain on my 
epistemological account, it is also somewhat difficult for Aristotle’s own metaphysical picture, at any 
rate, earning it special consideration as a kind of appendix to the arguments of Θ.8. But it is 
precisely because of the distinctive difficulty the case of discovery presents that Aristotle’s treatment 
of it is so revealing. This passage does two things for my account, in short: it gives a concrete 
example of the kind of productive prior activity I have been gesturing at, and it shows Aristotle 
describing this activity in precisely those terms we should expect given my analysis of de Anima III.5. 
5.3.4 Making Intelligibility 
So far, however, we have only these two geometrical examples that plausibly exhibit the distinctive 
activity of the active intellect. The argument has therefore come a long way in answering the 
question from the second chapter: what precise activity does “activating potentially intelligible 
objects” describe? It would be even better if Aristotle had given a more general description of this 
                                               
447 There is much more to be said about the metaphysical upshot of the argument in the latter half of 
Meta. Θ.9. It is sufficient for my present purposes that the examples describe a part of active inquiry, 
whereby we make perceptual progress in a domain toward grasping and contemplating the correct 
universals. That Aristotle uses the same descriptions here as in de An. III.5 is sufficient for the 
present epistemological inquiry. I do, however, have a draft of a paper which focuses on the argument 
as it relates to the priority of energeia to dynamis discussed in Θ.8. 
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peculiar intellectual activity, both in the context of de Anima III.5 and Metaphysics Θ.9, especially if it 
plays such a central role in his account of learning, inquiry, and discovery. With these more concrete 
examples and descriptions in hand, however, a passage on philosophical method comes into view, 
but now with renewed significance. In this passage, also from the Metaphysics, we find a general 
description of learning and the method of inquiry: 
For the proper task before us is to proceed to what is more knowable. For learning 
thus comes to be in all cases, through what is less knowable by nature to what is 
more knowable by nature. And this is the proper task: just as in [the case of] actions, 
from the things that are good to each person, [the task is] to make (τὸ ποιῆσαι) the 
things that are good in general to be good for each person, in this way from the 
things that are more knowable to oneself [the task is] to make the things that are 
knowable by nature to be knowable to oneself. But what is known and primary to 
each person is often known slightly, and it has little or nothing of what really is. But 
nevertheless from things that are knowable in a limited way, but knowable to oneself, 
one must attempt to know the things that are knowable in general, proceeding, as we 
said, through these very things.448 
Aristotle here gives the familiar maxim that we proceed from what is knowable to us to what is 
knowable without qualification. This fits in with passages discussed in previous chapters, most 
notably Posterior Analytics B.19 and Physics I.1.449  
What is distinctive about this passage, however, is the idea that one makes what is knowable 
by nature to be knowable to oneself. The moral case is supposed to illuminate this, where one makes 
what is good without qualification to be good for oneself. Not only do we proceed from what is less 
good or knowable by nature to what is more good or knowable by nature, but this very process is a 
kind of conformation: I make the good and knowable by nature—the objective good—to be good 
                                               
448 Meta. Z.3(4) 1029b3-12: πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις 
οὕτω γίγνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἧττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον 
ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, 
οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δ’ ἑκάστοις γνώριμα 
καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἠρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐκ τῶν 
φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, 
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν. 
449 For the same methodology in the moral case, see also EN I.41095a31-b14, complete with a 
favorable mention of Plato. I quoted this passage at the very beginning of this dissertation. 
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and knowable for me, conforming myself to the way things really are in each case. We ourselves 
therefore proceed from what is less knowable according to nature to what is more knowable by 
nature. This passage might have struck us as simply a restatement of that otherwise familiar thought, 
but in view of the examples and discussion from Metaphysics Θ.9 it is possible to see something 
hitherto unrecognized: the use of the verb to make (τὸ ποιῆσαι) is not simply “render” but denotes a 
genuinely active or productive activity. There is a productive element in learning and inquiry which 
drives this process from what is less knowable by nature to what is more knowable. In addition to 
highlighting this productive element, Z.3 makes clear that this process is a matter of conformation: 
what is knowable by nature is already and ever will be knowable by nature and therefore does not 
need to be produced, while what is knowable to oneself is in a kind of flux. The change in learning, 
therefore, is a matter of conforming oneself to the world, either to what is good or to what is 
knowable by nature, so that the naturally knowable and good comes to be knowable and good for 
oneself. What is more, this passage makes clear how two different prior intellectual activities relate to 
the preexisting gnōsis: one prior intellectual activity operates at the level of perception, producing 
ever more subtle perceptual gnōseis on the basis of preceding ones, while the other intellectual activity 
reflects upon these new perceptual gnōseis, receiving and considering universal logoi issuing inductively 
from them. What we have learned in this passage, then, is that the task in moral and philosophical 
education is to make this process happen, proceeding from things less knowable by nature to things 
more knowable by nature. 
So far, this dovetails nicely with the interpretation of the analogy with light that I have been 
urging since the second chapter, according to which light does not cause or create colored objects 
per se, but rather reveals them as they already are for a given sighted animal.450 Similarly, the activity 
of the active intellect, understood on the description above, does not cause or create intelligible 
objects per se, but rather reveals them as they already are for a given rational animal. The active 
intellect activates the native and natural intelligibility of some object, so that it comes to be 
intelligible for a given rational subject. As a reading of Z.3 this point would have been too abstract 
and perhaps even incredible, however, had it not been for the concrete examples from Θ.9, which 
help to illustrate the nature of this intellectually productive illumination. Aristotle, on the account I 
                                               
450 Recall that this description of the action of light does not strictly conform to Aristotle’s settled 
views about light as given, for example, in de Anima II.7. Rather, this metaphorical description of 
light’s activity is drawn from the Light Analogy of III.5, describing how light acts in a way (τρόπον 
… τινα).  
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have been urging, does not have in mind some kind of mysterious intuition, mystical light, or divine 
inspiration,451 but rather something quite ordinary and familiar. For, as I have argued, it is reasonable 
to say that geometry students learn two different things and deploy two different kinds of skill when 
solving geometry problems. And, after all, teachers are in the habit of calling students “creative” 
who are able to come up with their own solutions to problems that they had never seen before: this 
kind of creativity is perhaps distinct from the kind of creativity operative, say, in creative writing.452 
It is the creativity involved in exploring and inquiring within a domain, the ordered progression from 
what is less intelligible by nature to what is more intelligible, as our intellects come to be conformed 
to intelligible objects as they are in nature, as it were, out there. 
5.3.5 Two Intellects, Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue 
This dissertation began by asking about the two intellects that Aristotle posits at the beginning of de 
Anima III.5. So far I have distinguished two distinct intellectual activities attributable to two distinct 
intellects, one receptive and the other active or productive. If I am right, it follows that each kind of 
intellect should have its own kind of virtue. After all, according to my own argument in this 
dissertation, virtues are excellent hexeis of capacities or powers, according to which each performs its 
distinctive activity reliably and well. I shall argue that yes, indeed, Aristotle recognizes two different 
kinds of virtue on this count, and we get some indication of this distinction in two places in 
particular.  
                                               
451 At least not necessarily. For a complication, see EE VIII.2, and the section on divine intellect 
below. 
452 Though perhaps these notions of “production” and “creation” are closer to the central meaning 
than we might have originally thought, at least for Aristotle. At first glance, one might have thought 
that production and creation (ποίησις) most centrally denote making something simpliciter rather than 
making something’s nature to be available to someone. That is, we may be initially tempted to 
understand the central meaning of “production” as analogous to making things to be colored per se, 
and not revealing the color of things as they already are to some perceptual subject. Let us consider 
things differently, however: what if the central meaning of production in the poetic sense should not 
be generation but rather revelation, in the benign sense of making something available to one’s grasp. 
Perhaps by considering Aristotle’s theory of tragic poetry in particular, in view of the more general 
account of learning, we might gain some further insight to the full import of Aristotle’s notion of 
intellectual poetry (i.e. this νόησις--ποίησις). The work of the poet, the teacher, and the scientific 
investigator might all be similarly productive or creative, in that all of them seek to produce the most 
helpful perceptual particulars from which some universal truth can be grasped. I leave this for a 
future inquiry. 
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Before turning to these passages, however, I shall outline what we might expect these two 
kinds of intellectual virtue to be. The receptive intellect, whose activity is analogous to the activity of 
perception in important respects, should have its own receptive virtues. These virtues, as we have 
seen, are like forms or universals held in the soul, so that one can call up and contemplate these 
intelligible forms at will. The distinctive virtues of the receptive intellect are therefore directed 
toward receptive or contemplative activity of some sort. We might expect these activities to differ 
according to their function or object.  
For example, if what one is contemplating or considering admits of being otherwise and is 
something to be produced, we might take that particular virtue to be technical or artificial, belonging 
to the genus of art or craft (τέχνη). There may be a virtue of housebuilding which is the form of the 
house in the receptive intellect, for example.453 If the subject matter admits of being otherwise and is 
rather a practical matter, we might take the receptive-intellectual virtue in question to be prudence or 
practical wisdom (φρόνησις). Even in these cases, which are far less clear than the theoretical virtues 
(νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, σοφία), it is apparent that the intellectual activity in question is a universal 
consideration, though to be sure, this takes on a different shape in each case. So, on my reading, we 
should take the five virtues (or genera of virtue) given in Nicomachean Ethics VI.3 to be exhaustive of 
the intellectual virtues that the receptive intellect can have, whose activity is a contemplation or 
consideration of some form or another. This intellect, then, might be called “theoretical” or 
“speculative” in a generic sense even broader than the theoretical and speculative virtues, given that 
even practical and productive intellectual virtues are also directed at a kind of contemplation broadly 
analogous with the receptivity of sense perception.454 Insofar as they are directed at action and 
                                               
453 Cf. Meta. Z.7, esp. 1032a25-b14. 
454 It is important to my reading, though I do not defend the idea here, that Aristotle uses θεωρεῖν 
throughout his discussion in EN VI, in particular when dividing up the subject matters of each of 
the virtues. I have bolded the key line here, 1139a1-17: περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, 
περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ’ 
εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν 
τρόπον διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν 
ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει 
ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ’ 
ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν 
ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ 
βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ 
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production, they are not theoretical, but they nevertheless involve some receptive consideration of some 
universal form, though indeed under a different modality than the theoretical virtues and activities.455 
Interestingly, we see the same five virtues (or genera of virtue) in Posterior Analytics A.33. Part 
of my contention has been that that treatise addresses intellectual or dianoetic learning in general, so 
that the first principle found in the opening lines that insists on preexisting gnōsis gives the specific 
difference in cases of dianoetic learning, distinguishing it from cases of mere habituation. Even 
though the focus of the treatise seems to be demonstrative knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and, to a lesser 
degree, the grasp of its first principles (νοῦς), at the end of the first book he nevertheless lists all five 
of the virtues named in the shared book from the ethical treatises considered above. 
But how one ought to distribute the others both into thought, and into nous-as-hexis, 
scientific knowledge, art, prudence, and wisdom, belongs rather, in some ways, to 
natural philosophical speculation, and in other ways, to ethical speculation.456 
Although Aristotle names these classes of virtue to set them aside, this nevertheless indicates that at 
least some part of the principles he has laid out in the preceding book of the Analytics would apply to 
things that might, in the ethical or physical treatises, be distributed to these other classes of virtue.  
What is interesting for our purposes, however, is simply that he makes mention of these 
other intellectual states under a single heading both here and in the other ethical and physical 
contexts: all are excellent dianoetic states.457 Let us recall that the nous of de Anima III.4—what I have 
been calling receptive or potential intellect, the one which is nothing in activity until it thinks—is 
said to be “that in virtue of which the soul thinks (διανοεῖται) and supposes (ὑπολαμβάνει).”458 
                                                                                                                                                       
λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ’ ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ’ 
ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. 
455 See also EN VI.4 1140a10-14. 
456 APo. A.33 89b7-9: Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δεῖ διανεῖμαι ἐπί τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ 
τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας, τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς τὰ δὲ ἠθικῆς θεωρίας μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. I want to 
suggest that the τε… καὶ… καὶ… καὶ… καὶ… καὶ is something like the epexegetical καὶ. On my 
reading, the first item is the genus term and the following five are species, the five dianoetic virtues. 
457 Given the placement of τε I take the five virtues listed to be a further explication of διανοίας, 
rather than διανοίας being just another member in the list. As further evidence for this, see the use 
of “dianoetic” in the first lines of APo. A.1, as well as the use of dianoia in Phys. VII.3 247b1-7 and of 
both terms in EN VI.1-3 passim, the latter two being the two passages to which (presumably) 
Aristotle is pointing here in the APo. 
458 De An. III.4 429a22-24: ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ 
ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή οὐθέν) ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. 
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Aristotle is there specifying the intellect he’s speaking about: the one which is potentially all things 
and receptive, being nothing until it thinks, is that nous in virtue of which we dianooumen.459 
This is significant because after having described this receptive intellect in de Anima III.4, in 
the following chapter Aristotle posits another intellect which is presumably not that in virtue of 
which we dianooumen. That much is familiar concerning these two distinct intellectual capacities. 
Similarly, on my view, Aristotle considers in broad terms the virtues of this receptive intellect in 
Posterior Analytics A.33. What is interesting about the treatment of intellectual virtue in this context, 
however, is that Aristotle goes on in the following chapter, in A.34, to consider a different sort of 
intellectual excellence, what is usually translated “quick wit.” He writes: 
Quick wit is a certain skill in lighting upon the middle term in a negligible amount of 
time, such as if someone upon seeing that the moon always has the bright side 
toward the sun, quickly conceives the reason why this is, because it is bright from the 
sun […]. For in every case the one seeing the extremes recognizes the middle terms, 
the causes. A is “the bright side being the one toward the sun from which [it is 
bright],” B is “to be bright from the sun,” C is “the moon.” Then B, “to be bright 
from the sun,” holds of C, “the moon,” and A, “the bright side being toward that 
from which it is bright.”460 
This passage is quite interesting for our purposes, since the skill involved here seems to be a skill of 
the productive sort, of quickly noticing which features are salient and which are not in perception. 
This quick wit is something other than the knowledge of astronomy: it much more resembles the 
quickness involved in drawing the right auxiliary lines in a geometrical diagram. If I am right, 
Aristotle is here in A.34 giving us a virtue—and perhaps the chief virtue—of the active intellect, 
having just considered the several virtues and states of the receptive intellect in A.33. 
                                               
459 Even the remark about hypolambanein serves as some confirmation, since opinion and supposition 
are also named as dianoetic states in Posterior Analytics A.31, Physics VII.3, and Nicomachean Ethics VI.3, 
though not virtuous ones. 
460 APo. A.34 89b10-20; I leave out two other examples in the translation, but include them in the 
Greek here: Ἡ δ’ ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου, οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ 
σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ἡλίου· ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. 
πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια τὰ μέσα [ὁ] ἰδὼν τὰ ἄκρα ἐγνώρισεν. τὸ λαμπρὸν εἶναι τὸ πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον ἐφ’ 
οὗ Α, τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου Β, σελήνη τὸ Γ. ὑπάρχει δὴ τῇ μὲν σελήνῃ τῷ Γ τὸ Β, τὸ 
λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· τῷ δὲ Β τὸ Α, τὸ πρὸς τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ λαμπρόν, ἀφ’ οὗ λάμπει· ὥστε καὶ 
τῷ Γ τὸ Α διὰ τοῦ Β. 
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I might make a similarly brief suggestion regarding two cognitive hexeis that Aristotle 
mentions in the opening lines of the Parts of Animals: 
Concerning every consideration and every method, both the more lowly and the 
more honorable alike, there seem to be two kinds of hexis, of which one can be well 
named “scientific knowledge” of the subject matter, and another a certain sort of 
educated state. For it belongs to one who has been educated in this way to be able to 
discern by hitting the mark about what someone has said correctly and not. For 
indeed we suppose such a person to have been educated in general, and to have been 
educated is to be able to do what has been said. Except this person, on the one hand, 
we suppose to be (as it were) discriminating in all cases, being but numerically one 
person, while we suppose the other one to be discriminating concerning some 
defined nature. For someone else may be disposed concerning a part in the same way 
as we have described.461 
In this passage Aristotle outlines two hexeis involved with theōria, one which we might call scientific 
knowledge belonging to the “ordinary” faculty of thinking, and the other which is a more general 
education according to which one can make judgments about what is rightly or wrongly said, 
presumably by someone more expert in a given domain.462 Here it is clear that there is a kind of 
capacity for judgment which is generic unlike scientific knowledge properly so-called, which is 
nevertheless a kind of excellent cognitive or theoretical hexis. I note that both here and in Posterior 
Analytics A.34, Aristotle describes the non-standard virtue as skill in hitting the mark (εὐστόχως or 
                                               
461 PA I.1 639a1-11: Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, 
δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει 
προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ’ οἷον παιδείαν τινά. Πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι 
κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. Τοιοῦτον γὰρ δή τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλως 
πεπαιδευμένον οἰόμεθ’ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. Πλὴν 
τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ 
περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἄν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ 
διακείμενος περὶ μόριον. 
462 For a more thorough discussion of the importance of this passage to natural philosophical inquiry 
in Aristotle, see James Lennox “Experience, Expertise and Induction” (unpublished manuscript, 
2016). 
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εὐστοχία), further suggesting that these two passages are describing a cognitive state of a similar 
sort. 463 
While there is much more to be investigated with respect to these issues, I mention the 
preceding passages simply to point out that there may already have been a distinction available 
between two kinds of intellectual virtues, mentioned in the natural philosophical works (e.g. Parts of 
Animals I.1), in the ethical works (e.g. Nicomachean Ethics VI.9-11) and the logical works (e.g. Posterior 
Analytics A.33-34). This distinction between two broad categories of intellectual virtues, as I have 
suggested, corresponds to the distinction between two intellects from the de Anima, the latter 
distinction being one which interpreters to date have found much more pressing. An advantage of 
my conception of the active intellect is that I can point to a place in Aristotle’s psychology that 
posits a capacity corresponding to these different sorts of intellectual hexeis; such a move is not 
available to one who takes the active intellect to be god, or knowledge already possessed, or that in 
virtue of which we can use our knowledge at will. This connection is uniquely available to 
interpretations attributing to the active intellect some role in learning, inquiry, and discovery. 
5.4 ARISTOTLE’S PASSIVE INTELLECT 
In this chapter I have so far addressed the most pressing question that remained for us at the end of 
chapter two: what activity does “activating potentially intelligible objects” describe? A second 
pressing question also arose for us at the end of that chapter regarding the relationship between 
potentially intelligible objects on the one hand and the passive intellect (νοῦς παθητικός) on the 
other. I shall now briefly draw some conclusions about the passive intellect and consider some 
consequences of the view so far. 
Let us first recall the inconsistent triad that I proposed at the heart of the argument from 
chapter two. First we arrived at the following proposition on the basis of a close reading of the Light 
Analogy: 
(α) The active intellect acts upon potentially intelligible objects. 
This gave rise to a corollary: 
                                               
463 A similar point may be made, for instance, with respect to the various auxiliary virtues mentioned 
in the latter chapters of EN VI, especially in ch. 9-11. There εὐστοχία is mentioned several times. I 
must, however, set this issue aside for future consideration. 
 229 
(α') The active intellect does not act upon the receptive intellect of III.4. 
Furthermore, on the basis of Aristotle’s terminology and the general correlation between active and 
passive principles, I put forward a further claim: 
(β) The active intellect acts upon the passive intellect of III.5. 
I then argued that these two claims, (α') and (β) were jointly inconsistent when taken together with a 
very common claim in recent secondary literature, what I termed the Contemporary Consensus: 
(γ) The receptive intellect of III.4 is the same as the passive intellect of III.5. 
In that chapter I argued that the last proposition (γ) ought to be rejected in favor of a distinction 
between the receptive intellect, which is not the proper or proximate patient of the active intellect, 
and the passive intellect. This resolved the inconsistent triad in favor of claims (α') and (β). However, 
someone might have worried that there is already some tension between the original claim (α) and 
(β): how can the active intellect act on both passive intellect and on potentially intelligible objects? 
Given that passive intellect should not be taken to be the receptive intellect of III.4, a preliminary 
suggestion was that the passive intellect may be that faculty of soul in virtue of which one can grasp 
potential intelligibility, or again potentially intelligible objects may constitute the cognitive content of 
the passive intellect. But we were left asking what this content and what this faculty might be. This is 
especially pressing if the passive intellect turns out to be perishable, as the final line of de Anima III.5 
suggests. 
Those who rejected the Contemporary Consensus in the past have concluded quite 
straightforwardly that the passive intellect is phantasia or some related perceptual faculty, and 
potentially intelligible objects are phantasmata, as I mentioned in chapter two.464 They made this 
identification on the basis of a handful of arguments. In the first place, since passive intellect is said 
to be perishable, this recalls de Anima I.4 in which Aristotle discusses the perishability of various 
psychic capacities. On one reading of these remarks, he claims that the common intellect, unlike 
intellect properly so-called, is perishable. 
The intellect seems to come to be in us being some substance, and it does not perish. 
For it may perish most of all as a result of the dulling in old age, but in that case it 
would be just as it happens in the case of the perceptual organs: for if the elderly 
person were to receive an eye of a certain sort, he would see just as even a young 
                                               
464 Themistius, Theophrastus, Philoponus, Brentano (1977), Polansky (2007), Gerson (2005). 
Aquinas is a special case, but similarly attributes it to a perceptual faculty that trades in images (like 
phantasia).  
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person does. So that old age is not in virtue of having suffered something with 
respect to the soul, but with respect to that which the soul is in, as in bouts of 
drunkenness or illness. Indeed, both intellecting and speculating (τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ 
θεωρεῖν) weaken because of something else perishing within, but it itself is 
impassible. But to think and love or hate is not an affection of that [impassible 
thing], but of this thing which has that [impassible thing], insofar as it has that 
[impassible thing]. For this reason too, when this has perished, one neither 
remembers nor loves, for [those activities] did not belong to that [impassible thing], 
but to the common [thing], which has been destroyed. But intellect is perhaps 
something more divine and impassible.465  
While there are other ways to read the lines from the passage, this is certainly one way to take them, 
according to which a common intellect’s perishability is cited in de Anima I.4. Difficulty arises because 
of the use of the neuter αὐτὸ and ἐκεῖνο, although it is clear by the end of the passage that this 
refers indeterminately to the masculine νοῦς. In view of this, it is possible that τοῦ κοινοῦ refers to a 
“common intellect.” And even if not, a connection between I.4 and III.5 is still recommended 
because both mention our not remembering in view of the imperishability of nous in the strict sense. 
If, given the relative ontological status of perceptual and intellectual faculties by the end of III.4, it is 
uncomfortable to consider receptive intellect perishable, we should be far more comfortable given 
passages like I.4 to attribute perishability to some lower-level cognitive faculty that perishes when 
the composite perishes. Perhaps if not a common intellect, it is in virtue of this common part that 
one is said to use intellect, while intellect is still regarded as something impassible of itself.466 
Moreover, the suggestion here is that this common intellect or otherwise common cognitive 
part is involved somehow in a kind of intellectual activity (διανοεῖσθαι), and this activity seems to 
                                               
465 Cf. de An. I.4 408b18-29: ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. 
μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ’ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ’ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων 
συμβαίνει· εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. ὥστε τὸ γῆρας 
οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχήν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ 
θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ 
φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ 
τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ 
ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. 
466 On this reading, the common intellect is something common between intellect properly so-called, 
and the lower-level soul faculties which are actualities of bodily parts. Aristotle considers these very 
examples of activities that are common to soul and body in de An. I.1. 
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fall short of intellection or speculation (τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν) properly so-called, or at least as 
these are considered as activities in isolation from the composite, the rational animal. Perhaps the 
former activity names something that the whole person does, while the latter verbs denote the 
activities of the intellectual part as such. So, when the composite substance perishes along with the 
bodily cognitive powers, this common intellect also perishes. This common intellect, then, we might 
take to be what binds intellect (in the proper sense) to the living composite, in virtue of which we 
can think, love, hate, etc. (τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ 
τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει). On this view, then, the common and passive intellect is a 
perceptual power that participates in some important way with the embodied intellectual activity of a 
given rational animal, even if it is not explicitly said to be an “intellect” in de Anima I.4. 
Further support for the once-familiar idea that passive intellect is phantasia (or some similar 
cognitive power that trades in images) is the idea that, on Aristotle’s view, there is no thinking 
without an image. Both theoretical and practical thinking alike involve images, as Aristotle says 
repeatedly. I shall survey these passages very briefly, though even now it is commonly agreed that 
Aristotle holds at least this much about the role of images in intellectual activity. First in de Anima 
III.7, he says: 
For the intellectual soul phantasmata serve as perceptible objects […]. For this reason 
the soul does not think (νοεῖ) without a phantasma. […] So, the noetic part thinks the 
forms in the phantasmata.467 
And later in de Anima III.8, Aristotle goes on at greater length: 
Since, as it seems, nothing at all exists besides those things with extension, separate 
from the perceptible things, the intelligible objects are in the perceptible forms, both 
those which are said to be in abstraction and all the states and affections of sensible 
things. And for this reason it is also not possible to learn or understand anything not 
having perceived anything, and whenever someone speculates, it is necessary to 
speculate about something together with a phantasma. For the phantasmata are just like 
                                               
467 De An. III.7 431a14-15, 16-17, b2: τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα 
ὑπάρχει […]. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή. […] τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν 
τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ. There is a discussion of the “snub” in this chapter which is Aristotle’s 
favorite example for how we ought to conceive of the object of natural philosophy, a form-in-
matter. I simply cannot broach this subject here, as it lies downstream of my present discussion. For 
a helpful discussion of the topic, see Lennox (2008). 
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perceptible objects, except without the matter. And phantasia is distinct from 
assertion and denial: for the true and false is a combination of intelligibles. But how 
will the first intelligibles differ from being phantasmata? Neither these nor the other 
intelligibles are phantasmata, but they are not without phantasmata.468 
Finally, in the de Memoria Aristotle refers back to these passages, saying: 
Seeing that we spoke concerning phantasia earlier in the books on the soul, that it is 
not possible even to think (νοεῖν) without a phantasma: for the same affection 
happens in thinking as that very thing which happens also in drawing diagrams. For 
in that case availing ourselves nowise of the fact that the triangle has a definite 
quantity, nevertheless we draw it has having a definite quantity. Also the one who is 
thinking in the same way, even though he does not think of the quantity, places a 
quantity before his eyes, but does not think insofar as it has quantity.469 
These passages clearly illustrate that Aristotle thinks that even intellectual activity in its most proper 
sense (νοεῖν) requires an image in every case, not only to acquire knowledge but also to put it to use. 
The power of imagination plays an important auxiliary role in episodes of thinking in the proper 
sense, insofar as it supplies concrete objects in which the intellect can consider the intelligible forms. 
Moreover, Aristotle says in these passages that phantasmata serve as analogues of the sensible 
objects in the intellectual case. Indeed, this is precisely what we have been seeking, potentially 
intelligible objects. Recall that Aristotle says in the above passages that “for the intellectual soul 
phantasmata serve as perceptible objects (αἰσθήματα)”470 and “for the phantasmata are just like 
                                               
468 De An. III.8 432a3-14: ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ 
κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα 
τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ 
ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά 
ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης. ἔστι δ’ ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως· συμπλοκὴ γὰρ 
νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ 
οὐδὲ ταῦτα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. 
469 De Mem. I 449b31-450a7: ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ 
νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος—συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ 
διαγράφειν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐθὲν προσχρώμενοι τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον εἶναι τοῦ τριγώνου, ὅμως 
γράφομεν ὡρισμένον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύτως, κἂν μὴ ποσὸν νοῇ, τίθεται πρὸ 
ὀμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ’ οὐχ ᾗ ποσόν· ἂν δ’ ἡ φύσις ᾖ τῶν ποσῶν, ἀορίστων δέ, τίθεται μὲν 
ποσὸν ὡρισμένον, νοεῖ δ’ ᾗ ποσὸν μόνον. 
470 De An. III.7 431a14-15. 
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perceptible objects (αἰσθήματα), except without the matter.”471 This suggests in a rather 
straightforward way that the phantasmata are like the perceptible objects, playing that role in 
intellection that perceptible objects play in perception. Now, to be sure, he goes on in III.8 to 
distinguish phantasmata from the noēta, but everything he says is consistent with the idea that the 
phantasmata should be the potentially intelligible objects, the potential noēta, without being noēta in the 
most proper sense.472 
We thus have very good reason to suppose that phantasmata are these potentially intelligible 
objects to be illumined by the active intellect, which phantasmata are cognitions belonging to the 
power of phantasia. So perhaps in virtue of its necessary connection with the proper intellectual 
faculty, phantasia or some similar perceptual power that trades in phantasmata can share the name 
“intellect,” albeit with the modifier “passive.” And it is not unreasonable that Aristotle should 
consider phantasia to be a kind of nous in the context of III.5, given that he is happy to entertain this 
broader way of speaking in III.3 and III.10. In the former passage, Aristotle closely associates the 
activity of thinking (νοεῖν) with phantasia, saying that phantasia is one part of thinking.473 In III.10 
Aristotle is even more suggestive, saying that nous exhausts the cognitive sources of motion in the 
soul, so long as we posit phantasia as a sort of thinking (ὡς νόησίν τινα).474 So, given these suggestive 
remarks, it is not atypical for Aristotle to consider the faculty of phantasia to be a kind of intellect. 
Nor, given what was said above, is it atypical for Aristotle to consider phantasmata to play some role 
as objects of thought, even if they still differ in some subtle but important respects from the 
intelligible objects properly speaking. 
So go my predecessors’ arguments for the idea that passive intellect is phantasia (or 
something quite like it). Furthermore, in view of the preceding sections of this chapter specifying the 
active intellect’s distinctive activity, an even clearer appreciation of this thought comes into view. In 
                                               
471 De An. III.8 432a9-10. 
472 This is consistent with the discussion in the second chapter of the ending of de An. III.4, where 
there will only be potential intelligibility in things having matter. By extension, our phantasmata of 
particular things, of things bounded by the here and the now (cf. APo. A.31), will similarly be only 
potentially intelligible.  
473 Cf. de An. III.3 427b27-29: περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν 
φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον. 
474 Cf. de An. III.10 433a9-12: Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν 
φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα· πολλοὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, 
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. 
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every case we have considered, the active intellect gives shape to some perceptual gnōsis, whether this 
be actively manipulating a diagram or actively imagining some new perspective. This is the activity 
which has as its aim the excellent perceptual state of empeiria, that grasp of particulars from which 
the orthos logos can proceed by induction. The same can be said of the active intellectual activity for 
which the teacher is responsible: whether the student or the teacher draws the parallel lines in the 
diagram, the productive intellectual activity in question is the same. In all cases this is an 
intellectually driven engagement with perceptual particulars—phantasmata—so that the patient and 
the product of the activity is a perceptual gnōsis, the right phantasma in which to contemplate the right 
form. 
So, while I have offered a new set of arguments against the Contemporary Consensus and 
have perhaps told a distinctive story about the active intellect’s activity in concrete terms, I have 
nevertheless maintained with the previous tradition that the object of the active intellect’s activity is a 
phantasma, something one has in virtue of the power of phantasia. In this way I can maintain that the 
active intellect activates both potentially intelligible objects and the passive intellect which possesses 
them and makes them cognitively available.  
5.5 FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
5.5.1 Non-Rational Experience 
My account has affirmed two points which are often seen to be in tension. On the one hand, I have 
insisted that experience is an excellent state or hexis of the perceptual faculty and therefore actually 
concerns only particulars. It is possible, for example, for someone to possess mere experience 
according to which one is successful in particular cases, but in virtue of which any grasp of a 
universal is only implicit or potential. This excellent state of the perceptual faculty, I have argued, is 
achieved by habituation in a way analogous to moral virtue or the mere productive experience of a 
manual worker.475 In the theoretical domain, however, the experience in question is constituted by a 
                                               
475 There is an apparent disanalogy with moral virtue, since moral virtue properly so-called is 
impossible without the dianoetic virtue of phronēsis, which, as a dianoetic virtue, is decidedly not 
acquired by habituation alone. Cf. EN VI.13 passim. But, an interesting consequence of an analogy, 
which I cannot explore here, would be that the true and proper empeiros must also have the relevant 
dianoetic virtue. Perhaps the relationship between habituated and dianoetic virtue is alike in all cases. 
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perceptual gnōsis that is some phantasma or memory. In this way I have insisted that empeiria as such is 
an excellent perceptual hexis. On the other hand, I have argued that experience in most cases is a 
product of an intellectually-driven process of teaching or inquiry. Although experience itself is 
constituted by a grasp of particulars in perception, I have argued that experience cannot be achieved 
without guidance from intellect, at least in most cases.  
These views are rarely affirmed together. Those who agree that experience is a hexis of the 
perceptual faculty tend to deny or ignore the relevance of intellect to the acquisition of such 
experience. Alternatively, those who emphasize the role of intellect properly so-called to the 
acquisition of experience tend to see experience itself as constituted by a grasp of universals of some 
sort, already of itself an intellectual hexis of some kind. According to the view I have been urging, 
there is good reason to hold both views in place as I have articulated them, and any apparent tension 
between them is not decisive. 
There are two independent advantages to affirming both points together in the way I have 
suggested. First, Aristotle tells us that non-rational animals have a small share in experience.476 It can 
be puzzling to understand what Aristotle means by this. He could be denying any relevant respect in 
which non-rational animals share in experience, minimizing any way in which we might be tempted 
to attribute empeiria to them. Then again, his remark could have a more positive and affirmative 
sense, as if to concede that non-rational animals can indeed have some share in experience, though 
to be sure not as substantial a share as we ourselves have, we who live by art and reasoning. My 
inclination has always been to take Aristotle as making both points here: yes, non-rational animals 
are in principle capable of experience, but they only achieve it to a small degree. In fact, I take it that 
this is a plausible and somewhat uncontroversial way to read the line.  
It may be that in most of the interesting cases experience is difficult to achieve because our 
perceptual faculty has to be habituated and trained in complex ways, and being acquainted with the 
surface features will simply be insufficient. Nevertheless, there may be cases in which the object is 
simple or sufficiently available to perception that we can come to have experience of it without any 
active work, either by inquiry or by teaching. I have in mind cases of prey coming to recognize 
predators, or animals recognizing changes in the weather or automobile traffic patterns. They are 
capable of empeiria, of developing a perceptual hexis that is excellent within a certain domain. The 
                                               
476 Cf. Meta. A.1 980b26-28: Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ 
μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς. 
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adjective mikron, then, might be thought to modify the scope of these domains: animals can have 
experience according to the proper meaning of the term, but they can only have it with respect to 
certain salient domains and when the object itself makes things easy for them to grasp. Other 
animals remain incapable of engaging in an intellectually-driven process to attain empeiria, which 
process is necessary in all cases—both productive and theoretical—that are of interest to us as 
human beings. 
5.5.2 Craft and Light 
I promised to return to the Craft Analogy at the end of chapter two. Most of my analysis in this 
dissertation has been based on a reading of the Light Analogy developed there. While noting the 
very real tension between the two analogies and between the functional descriptions of the active 
intellect we might derive from those analogies, I gave precedence to the Light Analogy in that 
context. Here I must deliver on my promise to read the Craft Analogy in the light of what has come 
before.  
The risk I sought to avoid in the second chapter was giving too much precedence to the 
Craft Analogy. My concern was that the Craft Analogy very quickly suggests that there is a simple 
two-place relation in intellect and intellectual activity, and further that the two places are held by 
receptive and active intellects. After all, I have conceded all along that the matter-like intellect named 
at the beginning of de Anima III.5 is the same as the receptive intellect of III.4. Let us recall that, 
when III.5 opens, we are invited to see the craft-like active intellect acting upon the matter-like 
receptive intellect: 
[a] And since, just as in the whole of nature there is, on the one hand, some matter 
for each class [of thing] (and this is that which is capable of being all those things), 
[b] and there is, on the other hand, something else that is the cause and active 
principle in virtue of its making all things, [c] such as the art holds with respect to 
the matter: [d] it is necessary also that these distinctions exist in the soul.477  
Provisionally, in the second chapter, I focused on the Light Analogy because Aristotle seems to 
elaborate upon his conclusions above by further specifying the active intellect’s activity without 
                                               
477 De An. III.5 430a10-14: Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει 
(τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ 
τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς. 
 237 
naming a receptive power. My concern was that the Contemporary Consensus has been motivated 
in part by giving the Craft Analogy too much interpretive precedence, and that the Light Analogy 
should instead occupy interpretive pride of place. I was also motivated by the importance of the 
analogy with perception to Aristotle’s account of intellect more generally, which tips things in favor 
of the Light Analogy in the particular context of de Anima III.5. Those considerations 
notwithstanding, the question for this present section is: since my account has given precedence to 
the Light Analogy, how do I resolve the tension that still remains between the two analogies, that is, 
how do I read the Craft Analogy in view of the Light Analogy? 
I shall proceed with several attempts at an answer to this question before settling on a 
satisfactory reply. As a first pass, one might have thought that the active principle in intellectual 
activity should be the actually intelligible object. Given what precedes in III.4, and the structure of 
the analogy with perception in that context, we are prepared to see the relation between intelligible 
object and receptive intellectual power as fundamental. This conception of the relation between 
intellectual poiētikon and pathētikon is expected, and so one might naturally conclude that III.5 begins 
with the search for this poiētikon, the intelligible object that is capable of making thinking happen. 
Indeed, perhaps my reading of the Light Analogy even supports something like this view, since the 
active intellect on my reading is necessary for intelligible objects to be activated, just as light is 
needed to activate unlit colors. So perhaps the craft-like and active principle Aristotle is pointing out 
at the start of III.5 is not the active intellect we have been discussing, but rather the activated 
intelligible object. 
This cannot be, however, because there is no space in the text for a transition from the 
poiētikon with which the chapter begins to the conclusion that the poiētikon in this relation must be an 
intellect. That is to say: the preliminary Craft Analogy suggests a relation of action and passion 
between some poiētikon and the matter-like receptive intellect, which poiētikon Aristotle immediately 
concludes is a “nous in virtue of its making all things, as a certain state like light.”478 There is 
therefore no indication in the text that the poiētikon with which the chapter begins should be the 
intelligible object, understood as distinct from the poiētikos nous which he goes on almost immediately 
to posit. We are still left with a tension, then, between one functional description that suggests a 
two-place relation and another that suggests a three-place one (or perhaps better, two intertwined 
two-place relations). 
                                               
478 De An. III.5 430a15. 
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As a second pass we might consider the ways in which even the analogy with Craft ought to 
be considered a three place relation. After all, just on the face of it Aristotle is in the habit of 
speaking of three things in his account of being and change, whether it be form, matter, and 
composite, or alternatively form, matter, and privation, there is plenty of space in his account for 
conceiving of the action of art as involving a more complex relation. Perhaps we ought to consider 
the way in which art acts on matter that is in a state of relative disorder, and as art brings that matter 
into the relevant state of order the matter itself so-informed comes to constitute the artificial 
product, for example a house. Indeed, in On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle considers the 
question whether the active principle acts on the matter or the privation, and he seems to conclude 
that in some way it acts on each of them.479 Perhaps, then, in view of our conclusions about the 
Light Analogy, we could say that art in a way acts on the disorder, making it to be ordered in the 
matter, raising its potential house-formedness to actual house-formedness. All of this formal activity, 
however, is taking place in and through the matter, so that the progression from disorder to order is 
constituted in the relevant materials. Accordingly, as soon as the house-formedness is activated, a 
house has come to be in the matter, or perhaps better, the matter has become a house. In this way, 
then, there are resources available to speak of a more complex set of relations even in the case of 
craft. 
Suggestive as this may seem, however, it will not resolve the principal source of tension 
between the two analogies. Recall that one of the most important points issuing from my reading of 
the Light Analogy was that there are distinct and indeed separable activities involved in the case of 
vision: light can act on an activate colors without thereby activating episodes of vision. Put 
differently, I have been urging that the former illuminating activity can be accomplished without any 
visually receptive animals even on scene: the activation of colors is possible without affecting any 
matter-like receptive principle in view.480 But this would be as if the builder could bring about 
house-formedness apart from the bricks and lumber. The perceptual or visual case offers more 
space here to distinguish between these several principles, while the artificial case is more tightly 
bound. 
                                               
479 GC I.7 passim, but especially 324a15-24. 
480 Of course, the nature of such an affection, were it to obtain, would be only an affection of a sort, 
whether it be perceptual or intellectual, in view of the several distinctions of de An. II.5. 
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So, as a third pass, one might say that the Craft Analogy is a less adequate analogy, just as in 
some significant sense even the analogy with perception in III.4 only imperfectly maps onto the 
activities and relations involved in thinking. According to this approach, although Aristotle begins by 
suggesting a two-place relationship between the active and receptive intellects, he immediately sets 
this aside in favor of a more complex set of relations that is more completely illustrated by the visual 
case. Against the background of III.4 and indeed even II.5 earlier in the treatise, the affections and 
relations involved in artificial productions and natural generations are insufficient to describe the 
intellectual case, so that the most appropriate analogy is with perception. Perhaps this tension is left 
unresolved, and in fact the tension explains why Aristotle would go on to give the Light Analogy in 
this context. Perhaps the Craft Analogy is truly insufficient. His account, therefore, may be taken to 
develop in the course of these several lines, so that a distinction between two relations and activities 
is introduced on the model of vision, something that is unavailable on the model of craft. If we take 
the analogy with perception to prevail on the basis of III.4, then we must conclude that the Light 
Analogy offers a more exact functional description of the active intellect in III.5. 
There is one remaining worry, however, and I address it with my fourth and final pass on the 
question. The separability of these relations that I am insisting upon which obtains in the visual case 
decidedly does not obtain in the intellectual case. Perhaps colors can be illumined and, in some way, 
move and inform the surrounding media without there being a sighted animal receptive to them. 
Perhaps there is some sense in which colors can be activated without thereby activating some 
receptive faculty. While this distinction may still hold in the intellectual case, the possibility of 
separating these relations does not. As soon as a potentially intelligible object has been activated 
there is, as it were, nowhere else for it to go except the receptive intellect. Like the potential and 
actual house-forms which must subsist in the materials, intelligibility must subsist in an intellect. If 
we understand the receptive intellect to be that which is capable of receiving logoi, then as soon as 
some gnōsis is activated by the active intellect, it is made to be a logos in the receptive intellect. Put 
differently, unlike in the perceptual or visual case, there is nowhere for an activated intelligible object 
to subsist except in the intellect: the objects of thought are not external like the objects of perception. 
Given that Aristotle straightforwardly tells us that this is a point of disanalogy with perception,481 we 
might rightly conclude that the analogy with craft suggests something about the intellectual case that 
                                               
481 Cf. de An. II.5 417b19-24. 
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perception cannot offer, namely the immediacy of the action of the active principle on matter and 
privation alike.  
If this is right, then both analogies are necessary to zero in on the difficult case of intellect, 
and in particular the distinctive function of the active intellect. In some significant respect 
perception still maintains pride of place as a model for understanding intellection. There is an object 
which acts on some receptive subject, and there is a prior and conceptually distinct activity whereby 
the object itself is activated and rendered capable of moving and informing the receptive intellect. 
But unlike perception the objects are internal to the soul, so there is an immediacy and inseparability 
of these two distinct activities and relations: as soon as an intelligible object is activated, so is the 
receptive intellect. On my settled view, then, it is important to maintain these conceptual distinctions 
while admitting their inseparability. 
 I take this to be important because, on my view, there is some important respect in 
which the active intellect acts on images for the receptive intellect. Those who sought to deny these 
distinctions even in their reading of the Light Analogy are liable to miss this important point.482 I still 
defend my reading of the Light Analogy, I simply grant that the intellectual case is very difficult to 
pin down, rendering both analogies necessary to zero in on the truth. The Light Analogy suggests, 
then, that the active intellect is responsible for some prior activity which prepares images for 
intellectual consideration by driving inquiry forward, prompting us to see things differently in 
perception so that the receptive intellect can go on to consider things differently at the intellectual 
level. The Craft Analogy suggests, however, that with every perceptual adjustment prompted by the 
active intellect there is immediately and by that very act an adjustment of our intellectual 
considerations in the receptive intellect.  
To take a brief example: perhaps one sees a bright spot on the wall and, at first, concludes 
that it is coming from some flashlight shone through the window or perhaps held by one’s toddler. 
Here some perceptual deliverance prompts reflective consideration by the receptive intellect. But 
that conclusion might strike one as odd. “My son is napping, and why would someone be shining a 
light through my window? ‘Michael, is that you?’ Perhaps he did not fall asleep, and he has snuck 
down the stairs to bother me. No, guess not. Could anything else be causing this? Wait, it just 
moved slightly when I turned my body and called my son’s name. Let me try doing that again. Ah, 
perhaps I’ll now try jiggling my watch. Yes, that’s what it was, just the sun reflecting off the face of 
                                               
482 Cf. e.g. Frede (1996b). 
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my watch.” As soon as one manipulates the perceptual deliverances by jiggling one’s wrist, the 
character of the perceptual cognition changes, prompting an immediate change in one’s reflective 
considerations about the source of the light. My suggestion is that the active intellect is responsible 
for the active perceptual engagement and searching for answers, which is an importantly distinct 
though indeed inseparable activity from the speculation one immediately engages in on the basis of 
that perceptual engagement. There is, of course, some feedback going the other direction, between 
these reflective conclusions and further active engagement, so that all of these activities seem to feed 
into one another in intuitive ways, hence the importance of the Craft Analogy. But I do not wish to 
set aside the distinctions for which I have been urging throughout this dissertation on the basis of 
the Light Analogy. In short, the case of intellect is sui generis in many respects, and in this respect, at 
any rate, we must rely on two imperfect analogies to zero in on the correct account. 
5.5.3 (Non-)Intermittent Thinking 
There is another remaining issue of application that arises for this theory of the active intellect’s role, 
in particular concerning Aristotle’s remark that the active intellect is “essentially in activity” and that 
it “does not at one time think and at another time not think.”483 These comments suggesting the 
non-intermittence of the active intellect’s activity lent some initial support to the idea that it is simply 
the divine mind, since human intellectual activity is explicitly said to be intermittent (as Aristotle 
mentions briefly).484 Since this feature is explicitly denied of the active intellect, it follows (so these 
interpreters argue) that Aristotle must be speaking of something more perfect than a mere human 
intellect in this passage.485 Alternatively, this remark lent some support to the idea that active 
intellect is simply the state of knowledge: knowledge itself is unmoved and so it does not at one 
moment think and at another moment not think, but (so the story goes) knowledge itself is 
continuously possessed and remains unmoved whenever an individual knower thinks, however 
intermittently these episodes of thinking may themselves occur.486 In stark contrast with these views, 
the idea that the active intellect is simply that intellectual faculty in virtue of which particular 
                                               
483 De An. III.5 430a18, 22. 
484 Cf. de An. III.4 430a5-6. 
485 Cf. e.g. Lear (1988) 141.  
486 Cf. e.g. Polansky (2007). 
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episodes of human thinking get going has some trouble with this remark. According to that 
interpretation, the active intellect’s activity is tied so closely to particular episodes of thought that it 
is hard to imagine it not sharing their intermittent character.487 We ruled out all these views earlier in 
the dissertation for unrelated reasons; but how does the interpretation I have been urging handle the 
non-intermittence of the active intellect’s thinking? 
My view has sought a middle way between two of the alternatives just mentioned: between 
the one idea that the active intellect acts in a general way upon all of nature, rendering it to be 
intelligible for all knowers indiscriminately, and another that it acts in a particular way for particular 
knowers, initiating in some way or another particular episodes of thought for each knower whenever 
they might wish. My view has been that the active intellect acts for particular knowers but not as 
such initiating particular episodes of thought. Rather, the active intellect acts upon what is 
perceptually available, rendering what is potentially intelligible in perception to be actually intelligible 
for intellectual consideration by the receptive intellect. Once the intelligible object is activated and 
made to be actual for a given knower, this object goes on to act on that knower’s receptive intellect, 
rendering the conceptual relationship, at any rate, between the active intellect and particular episodes 
of thought an indirect one. It is the illumined intelligible object which most properly speaking acts 
upon the potential intellect, not the illuminating active intellect itself. Accordingly there is some 
conceptual space, on my view, between the active intellect’s activity and the intermittent character of 
human thinking, even if (as the previous discussion conceded) there is an immediacy and 
inseparability of these activities in any particular case. On the other side, unlike rival god-views my 
view maintains that the active intellect plays some role for particular knowers, if not as such 
initiating particular episodes of thinking. 
It is worth noting the important difference between the character of the active and receptive 
intellects’ intellectual activities on my view. We might be tempted to consider their “thinking” in a 
univocal way, so that the active intellect’s non-intermittent thinking implies that it is always 
contemplating all intelligible objects. But recall that III.5 opens by distinguishing these two intellects 
                                               
487 Cf. e.g. Wedin (1988). Of course, Aristotle does say that we can think at will should nothing stand in 
the way. It is possible that someone defending this line would attribute the intermittent character of 
human thought to these intellectual obstructions. However, it seems that even when we are not 
obstructed in this way, we nevertheless at times do not wish to contemplate those things we could 
contemplate, if we wanted to. It seems that our very intellectual willing is intermittent. Or put 
differently, not all intermittency of human thought is attributable to obstructions: sometimes it is 
attributable to whether or what we, in fact, wish to contemplate at a given moment. 
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precisely along these lines: one intellect thinks by becoming all things, that is all intelligible objects, 
while another intellect thinks by making all things. It would be a mistake to understand the non-
intermittence of the active intellect’s activity as a non-intermittence of some contemplative or 
theoretical intellectual activity. On the contrary, its distinctive activity is active or productive, and it 
is to that kind of thinking which Aristotle refers, saying “it does not at one time think and at another 
time not think.” In other words, the active intellect is always engaged in the mode of thinking proper 
to it, in active intellectual illumination and not receptive intellectual consideration. Accordingly, the 
active intellect need not be continually contemplating all the intelligible objects, making Aristotle a 
kind of super-rationalist, as some have supposed.488 
Having opened up this interpretive space and having reiterated this crucial clarification 
regarding the active intellect’s activity, we can now make sense of the idea that the active intellect 
plays a role in the intellectual lives of particular knowers, intellectual lives that are intermittently 
active, while the agent intellect’s own proper activity remains non-intermittently at work. The activity 
of seeing requires not only light but a visible object. It is the illumined visible object which most 
properly acts on and informs the visual faculty. It is a consequence of Aristotle’s view in the 
perceptual case that no amount of light can activate the visual faculty in the absence of a visible 
object.489 To alter an example used in an earlier chapter: we might imagine (per impossible) a deer 
whose eyes are always open and whose environment is always illumined, but whose environment is 
intermittently populated with visible objects, being sometimes present and sometimes absent. In that 
case, the deer’s intermittent visual activity would be attributable not to the absence of light but 
rather to the occasional absence of suitable objects to be illumined and to be seen. 
We might draw a similar conclusion in the case of the intellect. Perhaps human beings have 
some intellectual capacity in virtue of which we are always seeking and examining what is 
perceptually available to us, working to uncover what can be known and discovered amid what is 
being or has been perceived. But the perceptual faculty may not always be making available suitable 
perceptual content, or any content at all, for the active intellect’s illumination or for the receptive 
intellect’s consideration. The essential and non-intermittent activity of the active intellect is not 
sufficient unto itself to guarantee the non-intermittence of “ordinary” human thinking, at least not 
                                               
488 Cf. e.g. Kahn (1981) 410-414. 
489 Cf. de An. II.7 418b4-6: διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὂ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς 
εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀλλόριον χρῶμα. 
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on the view I have been urging. Rather, the active intellect requires a suitable patient, some 
perceptual content or phantasma to be illumined. After all, as we have seen, Aristotle insists on 
several occasions that there is no thinking without an image, and that human thinking is 
characterized by thinking forms in an image.490 At times there is simply nothing to be illumined and 
therefore nothing to be seen, but it does not follow that the light is only intermittently shining. 
There is a worry, however, about whether this truly counts as non-intermittence. After all, 
the activity of the agent is (oftentimes) in the patient, as Aristotle says of perceptual activity in de 
Anima III.2 and of motion quite generally in Physics III. A builder is intermittently engaged in 
building activity, even though this intermittence is sometimes due to a lack of suitable materials on 
which to build. Imagine the builder who is waiting for a late delivery of lumber or bricks: whether he 
is engaged in the activity of building is very much dependent on the availability of suitable materials. 
Similarly, (the objector presses) the active intellect cannot be always engaged in intellectual 
illumination since there are not always suitable intelligible objects for it to illuminate. Not only do 
we, in virtue of our receptive intellects, think intermittently, but the active intellect itself would think 
intermittently due to the unavailability of suitable objects, what Aristotle sometimes calls “an eclipse 
of perception.”491 
The objector presses on this point in order to restore the view that the active intellect is the 
god. Only the divine substance could be essentially in activity, and so only the divine intellect’s 
activity could be non-intermittent in the required sense. Perhaps the objector takes my point that the 
active intellect illuminates and does not (or not only) create intelligibility simpliciter, that is to say that 
it activates an object that is already per se intelligible in potentiality. Perhaps the divine substance is 
ultimately responsible for this potential intelligibility as well, but not qua active intellect. Yet even 
conceding this, the objector wishes to maintain that one universally shared active intellect is 
responsible not only for the existence of potentially intelligible objects in themselves, but also for their 
being actually intelligible for particular knowers. Perhaps it does this, in the first place, by acting as a 
unifying intelligible medium by means of which determinate forms are known by us and, in the 
                                               
490 Cf. de An. III.7 431b2. 
491 APo. A.31 88a12: αἰσθήσεως ἔκλειψιν. I suspect this is another of Aristotle’s jokes, given that the 
preceding discussion is about seeing, hunting down, and contemplating the cause of a lunar eclipse. 
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second place, by acting and indeed intervening in more particular ways for particular knowers, 
perhaps by inspiration or revelation.492 
I shall consider other arguments in favor of the god-reading in the following section. But in 
responding to this particular point, we might first reflect upon the way in which light is essentially an 
activity or actuality of a transparent medium. Light, in fact, is both a state (ἕξις) and an activity 
(iἐνέργεια), and this is perhaps the most important point of comparison between the active intellect 
and light. Light is an active state of a transparent medium, that which activates colored objects to act 
and be seen through that medium. It is a state insofar as it is a stable disposition of the medium, 
something the medium can possess or lack, but it is an activity insofar as it activates and energizes 
visible objects to act through it. Presumably the active intellect is the same, being some intellectual 
activity or active state by means of which intelligible objects are activated and come to be actually 
understood.  
In the first place we should note, however, that light’s being essentially an activity does not 
imply that there is no darkness: rather, this claim means that light is as such an active state of a 
transparent medium. Similarly, the mere fact that the active intellect is essentially in activity (τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ) does not of itself imply that this intellectual light is, as it were, always on. What 
makes the active intellect a special and particularly difficult case is Aristotle’s other remark that it 
“does not at one time think and at another time not think,” and not (or not merely) the claim that it 
is essentially in activity. This is perhaps merely a clarification rather than a reply, but on a point that 
demands clarity. 
To develop a more substantive reply to the objection more determinately stated, let us recall 
another point I made earlier in the dissertation in the discussion of the Light Analogy. I argued that 
there is a sense in which colors can be said to be in activity even though they are not yet being seen 
by any sighted animal. While it is important to maintain that the fullest activity of the perceptible 
object is in the perceiver, and furthermore that the activities of seeing and being seen are a single 
                                               
492 Aristotle seems open to the possibility of this at EE 1248a17ff. There is of course a tradition 
insisting upon this possibility by medieval interpreters of Aristotle, especially those who hold that 
the active intellect is god or some other universal substance emanating therefrom (like Maimonides, 
Avicenna, and Averroes). Even those who (like Aquinas) deny the god-reading nevertheless leave 
open the way in which the god could choose to inspire a particular knower to grasp the truth, being 
ultimately that lux vera quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. On this latter point, see 
especially Aquinas’ Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima art. 5 corpus.  
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and identical energeia though the essence of these activities is not the same,493 nevertheless there is an 
important difference between a colored object existing in the dark and the same object once it has 
been brought to light even before it comes to be seen. In the latter case its color can already be said 
to be in activity, activated, energized: an illumined flower is immediately ready to be seen as soon as 
our deer opens his tired eyes, and even before this happens it is already engaged in an activity qua 
colored and qua visible insofar as it is occupying and informing the medium between the sleeping 
deer and itself. So, even though such an object is not fully engaged in its proper activity of being 
seen, it is nevertheless already activated and energized qua colored. Perhaps a related (though not 
directly analogous) point can be made about the illumined medium itself: even in the absence of 
colored objects to activate and energize, a given medium can possess the active hexis of light and in 
this way be in activity. Neither light nor a colored object needs to be now presently acting upon its 
respective patient in order to be active: light and color can be “at work” in some meaningful sense 
without presently working on anything.  
So, let us return to the intellectual case. To be sure, I have conceded that these activities are 
inseparable in the case of illumined intelligible objects and the receptive intellect. As soon as an 
intelligible object is activated, it is activated in and for the receptive intellect. But with respect to the 
active intellect, perhaps an analogy can be drawn with the above point in mind. Just as a medium can 
be illumined without any object being illumined, as it were, on the other end, so too the active 
intellect can be active without presently activating any object for thinking. In this way, the active 
intellect could be non-intermittently active without always working on some object. It would be 
necessary, however, to say that any intermittent illumination must be due to the intermittent 
presence of objects: the light might always be on. To reply to my objection, there is perhaps a 
disanalogy with the builder in this regard. Not every break from building is attributable to the lack of 
suitable materials: the builder sometimes simply does not wish to build. If, in contrast and per 
impossible, we imagined a builder who was always ready to work on whatever materials were brought 
to him, we might have a more suitable analogy. In this case it would be right in some sense to say 
that the builder does not at one time build and another time not build: he is always at work building, 
because he is even active while he awaits the next delivery of bricks or lumber.  
While unintuitive in the case of building—there is surely no builder who builds non-
intermittently even in this qualified sense!—this conception of non-intermittence is nevertheless 
                                               
493 Cf. de An. III.2 425b26-426a28. 
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quite intuitive in the case of intellect. All humans, from toddlers on up, are continually engaged with 
their world in perception, seeking out causes and explanations. Perhaps some are more quick-witted 
than others, that is to say, perhaps for some the light is brighter than others. Still, it makes good 
sense to say that all human beings are actively engaged with their world in perception to seek out 
and discover the true causes of things. This activity is perhaps just as natural to us as the generalizing 
activity of the receptive intellect: the challenge in both cases is to specify norms about how we get 
things right. But in the psychological context, at any rate, Aristotle is only concerned with a 
discussion of the psychic powers that are responsible for the intellectual activities we regularly 
perform, both virtuous and not. 
5.5.4 Divine and Human Intellects 
I noted in the second chapter that my approach would be to set aside many of the issues that have 
dominated recent debates about the active intellect. One question in particular which I proposed to 
set aside was whether the active intellect was a divine or a human intellect. I now return briefly to 
this question in light of a more determinate answer to the question with which we began, “what 
does active nous activate?” This is especially important since I have been talking, especially in the last 
several sections, as if my view entails that the active intellect belongs individually to each human. I 
shall now explain in more explicit terms why I take this to be true. 
Now that we see that the active or poetic intellect of de Anima III.5 has a role in inquiry and 
discovery, and indeed a role in an individual’s active engagement with the world in perception, the 
account leans very heavily against this intellect being identical with the divine intellect. After all, even 
by the end of the second chapter we were in a position to rule out the most popular readings of this 
stripe, those who see the active intellect as principally answering an ontological need, guaranteeing 
the intelligibility of nature in general. While arguing that the active intellect is like light in rendering 
things available for some cognitive faculty, these interpreters conclude that general intelligibility is 
what this productive intellect must produce. But, as we saw, this would be to understand light as 
endowing the world with color. Whatever effect the divine mind has on the intelligibility of the 
world in general will be more like giving objects color, not like revealing the colors that are already 
there. I have argued on the basis of the Light Analogy that such a reading cannot hold.  
In view of this, however, I must make a series of concessions and qualifications. I grant that, 
on the authority of Metaphysics Λ, Aristotle’s divine intellect is indeed active and poetic: it would be 
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right to see the divine mind as responsible for production and action (ποίησις) without qualification. 
So, given the intellects distinguished in de Anima III.5, it is true that the active intellect most closely 
approximates and resembles the divine intellect. Furthermore, I am happy to concede that the world 
must already be of a certain character for human inquiry and intellection to be possible: the world 
must already be colored for light to reveal anything to sighted animals. Similarly, then, the world 
must already be potentially intelligible antecedent to the active intellect’s activity, just as the world 
must already be potentially colored antecedent to the activity of light. If Heraclitus were right and 
everything were in flux, Aristotle would not be able to tell this story.494 And finally, it seems likely 
that some causal chain terminating in the divine thought thinking itself will explain that things in our 
world both have color and are, in some broad and generic sense, intelligible, just as the divine 
substance is ultimately responsible for every change, including perhaps particular episodes of 
thinking.495 But as we found even by the end of the second chapter of this dissertation, these 
activities cannot be that for which the active intellect of the de Anima is responsible, nor that which 
it is said to make or activate.  
Here someone might object on the following lines: while I have pointed to the case of 
discovery as a clear instance of an individual’s active intellect at work, I have also conceded that in 
the majority of cases it is the active intellect of the teacher that is principally responsible for 
uncovering the subject matter for the student. Accordingly, I have already recognized the possibility 
of an external agency whereby something is made intellectually available for some particular knower. 
Why not allow that the god could play a role in the process understood in this way? That is, even if 
the active intellect’s activity is as I have described, why not suppose that the divine intellect could 
accomplish this? 
                                               
494 I here point to Meta. A.6 for an important discussion of how Aristotle understands his departure 
from Plato. It is because he rejects Heraclitean flux that he takes himself to be free of a Platonic 
heaven of Forms. Whether this is accurate as a reading of Plato himself is controversial, but the 
chapter is nevertheless helpful in understanding how Aristotle understands his own view. 
495 Again, see EE 1248a17ff. I, however, take this to be a fortunate gift of the god for someone who, 
although irrational, hits upon the truth: ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς 
βουλεύσεως (οἳ δὲ τὸν λόγον: τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχουσι) καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐ δύνανται. 
ἄλογοι γὰρ ὄντες ἐπιτυγχάνουσι: καὶ [35] τούτων φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν 
μαντικήν, καὶ μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οἳ μὲν δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν, οἳ δὲ διὰ 
συνήθειάν τε ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι: τῷ θεῷ δὲ αὗται. 
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Although I recognize the divine resonances whenever Aristotle describes nous in the de 
Anima, I am not sure I find a place for the divine mind itself in these activities. A consequence of 
the proposed alternative, for example, is that every case of discovery is attributable to the divine 
mind as teacher in a particular case. The usual proponents of reading the divine mind into III.5 need 
not face this consequence: but because our present objector is (by stipulation) convinced by my 
argument against the more common god-readings, to see the divine mind at work in III.5 he must 
attribute some action to the divine mind in particular cases of learning and discovery. I resist this 
because when Aristotle says that his predecessors and contemporaries failed to realize or discover 
some fact of nature, he never attributes this to an eclipse of divine illumination, but always to an 
eclipse of perception,496 a failure to ask the right questions,497 a failure to dissect the internal organs 
according to an appropriate method,498 and the like. So although I recognize the possibility of this 
view, I do not find it in Aristotle. I do admit, however, that simply because we must attribute to each 
individual the power and activity of intellectual-making-available, we need not deny that this activity 
can be accomplished externally. Just as teachers can accomplish the lion’s share of this process for 
the student, so too could a god. While there is little in Aristotle to suggest that the god has revealed 
anything to human beings, our reading of his account of intellect need not rule this out. We must 
simply avoid the consequence that would require the god to reveal worldly truths to us in every case 
of discovery, a view that even Thomas Aquinas, a believer in divine revelation, sought to avoid.499 
                                               
496 Recall APo. A.31 88a12. See also APo. A.18 passim. 
497 Cf. e.g. GA III.5 756a30-b12. 
498 Recall HA 3.3 513a13-15: Χαλεπῆς δ’ οὔσης, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, τῆς θεωρίας ἐν μόνοις 
τοῖς ἀποπεπνιγμένοις τῶν ζῴων προλεπτυνθεῖσιν ἔστιν ἱκανῶς καταμαθεῖν, εἴ τινι περὶ τῶν 
τοιούτων ἐπιμελές. 
499 Questiones de Anima q. 5 corpus: “It is obviously more reasonable to maintain that the agent intellect 
is unique and separate, than to hold that this is true of the possible intellect. For the possible 
intellect, in virtue of which we are capable of understanding, is sometimes in potency and sometimes 
in act. The agent intellect, on the other hand, is that which makes us actually understanding. Now an 
agent exists in separation from the things which it brings into actuality, but obviously whatever 
makes a thing potential is wholly within that thing. For this reason many maintained that the agent 
intellect is a separate substance, and that the possible intellect is a part of our soul. […And] because 
the Catholic Faith maintains that God is the agent operating in our souls and not some separate 
substance in nature, some Catholics asserted that the agent intellect is God himself, who is “the true 
Light that enlightens every man who comes into this world” (John 1: 9). But this position, if anyone 
examines it carefully, is seen to be implausible […].” 
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An analogy with motion is helpful in understanding the point. Aristotle insists that all 
motion is ultimately dependent on the existence of an absolutely unmoved first mover, something 
which is unchangeable and immobile in its very being, being the changeless source of all change. He 
is not thereby committed, however, to the idea that the divine substance is proximately responsible 
for each and every particular motion or change: indeed, just as some absolutely immobile substance 
is necessary to explain motion in general, each particular motion requires that there be some 
proximately immobile substance or unmoved part relative to the motion in question. Aristotle writes 
in the de Motu that, in the case of animal motion, “if one of the parts is moved, another part must be 
at rest, and for this reason animals have joints.”500 “But,” he goes on to insist, “all rest in it is 
nevertheless powerless if there is not something external which is at rest and immobile without 
qualification.”501 Similar things can be found in the extended discussions of motion in the later 
books of the Physics about motion in general (though animal motion is peculiarly helpful in 
understanding the intellectual case). So, some part of an animal must be at rest relative to some 
particular motion for any given particular motion to be possible, but this relative immobility is 
ultimately derived from and dependent on the per se immobility of the divine substance. 
By insisting on both claims, Aristotle provides a mean between two extremes in the account 
of motion, a move which we might have come to expect from him. On the one hand, one might 
deny that the existence of a god is necessary for motion in general, insisting on the sufficiency of 
proximate causes to explain every concrete motion and thereby motion in general. On the other 
hand, one might deny that the existence of proximate causes is necessary in addition to the causal 
action of a god, insisting on the sufficiency of a god to explain not only motion in general but also 
every concrete case of motion. In the former case, he need not speak of a god, in this context at any 
rate; in the latter case, animals need not have joints. By insisting on both, however, he holds that 
animal self-motion must participate, in some measure, in the immobility of the divine substance. 
What’s the upshot for the intellectual case? Perhaps it is right that intelligibility in general and 
even intellectual activity in general depend upon divine thinking thinking thinking, as Kosman has 
famously put things. But we are not forced to conclude thereby that there is no active principle of 
thinking within the human soul itself. Just as animal motion requires moveable and (relatively) 
immovable parts, so too human thinking requires receptive and active parts. Just as animals might be 
                                               
500 De Motu 1 698a16-17. 
501 De Motu 1 698b8-9. 
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said to participate in the immobility of the divine substance in a relative way every time an animal 
moves itself, so too humans might be said to participate in the active and productive character of the 
divine substance in a relative way every time we inquire, discover, and learn. Just as in the case of 
motion, so too in the case of intellection, perhaps it is worth holding onto the necessity of the divine 
ultimate cause as well as more mundane proximate causes. While the divine intellect is indeed an 
active intellect par excellence, it is not that active intellect which is Aristotle’s subject in de Anima III.5. 
It is truly, as Aristotle says, something divine in us.502 
5.5.5 Differing (Active) Intellectual Abilities 
One final issue concerns how two knowers could differ in respect of their active intellect. This 
question immediately follows upon the preceding considerations, though it was not foreseen in 
chapter two: if the light is always on, as it were, and yet is individuated for each human knower, does 
that mean that this intellectual light always shines with the same brightness for every human 
knower? On the one hand, it seems quite obvious that human beings differ widely in their ability to 
make scientific discoveries. On the other hand, however, we might be inclined to see the active 
intellect as operating with the same intensity for all humans. Given its non-intermittent and essential 
activity, its immateriality and impassibility, and finally its resemblance to the divine intellect, we 
might be inclined to say that in each human qua intellect it cannot differ. Given all of these features, 
we might conclude that it cannot of itself admit of a range of strength or weakness across knowers 
of varying intellectual strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, we might feel pressure to look 
elsewhere for the cause of this variation.  
The first available move has a similar shape to the one in the preceding sections. Perhaps the 
active intellect of each human being is equal in its activity and strength, and the difference in 
intellectual achievement is attributable rather to variability in the matter upon which the active 
intellect works, that is, to a difference in the phantasmata and perceptual gnōseis themselves. Between 
two knowers of different intellectual strength, perhaps there is simply a difference in their perceptual 
                                               
502 I by no means wish to insist heavily on the results of this section, nor have I given full treatment 
of all of the views that escaped my argument in the second chapter (e.g. Alexander, Avicenna, 
Averroes). My view suggests that the active intellect is a power of the individual soul, and I wanted 
to register this suggestion without going on to give a full treatment of the issues involved. Nor do I 
wish to consider here issues of separability, incorruptibility, or immortality, all of which I set aside in 
the second chapter and continue to leave aside for the purposes of this dissertation. 
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capacities and the precision or strength of the images issuing from their respective perceptual 
activity. Given that Aristotle often attributes the failure of various predecessors to discover 
something to their not grasping something perceptually, this seems like a promising way forward.  
However, since I have proposed that the active intellect’s activity is precisely in working on 
those images, it would be difficult to explain two people who differ in their intellectual ability upon 
perceiving the very same object from the very same perspective. Imagine, for example, two students 
who are both presented with an undivided diagram of a triangle. The perceptual gnōsis on which the 
active intellect works is exactly the same. The intellectual act whereby one draws a parallel line is 
entirely the work of the active intellect, so that if one student is capable of seeing this move and the 
other not, or perhaps not as quickly, it is difficult to attribute this to a difference in the strength of 
their perceptual capacities. Furthermore, one of the advantages of my reading was that it can explain 
places where Aristotle seems to speak of a wholly different kind of intellectual virtue or excellent 
hexis, a skill in hitting the mark which seems to be the work of the active intellect excellently 
accomplished. If we maintain that all humans have active intellects of the same strength, then we can 
no longer attribute these eustochastic virtues to the active intellect. After all, the eustochastic virtue of 
quick-wit is posited precisely to explain the difference between people witnessing the very same 
phenomena.  
Given the constraints of the preceding two sections, then, what ought we to say about 
differences in the strength of the active intellect from one person to another? Perhaps, once again, 
the comparison with light offers a clue. Light is essentially in activity, being the active state of a 
medium, no matter how bright or dim the light may be. Perhaps we can admit of differences from 
one person to another, or indeed differences in the strength of a single person’s active intellect in 
the course of their lives. For the active intellect to be non-intermittently in activity (like the ever-
active builder), we need not insist that every person is non-intermittently engaged in inquiry with the 
same measure of success. Although any given active intellect does not admit of being exercised at 
various degrees of activity or inactivity—the light remains always on at its brightest—what 
constitutes a given active intellect’s “brightest” may vary from one person to another. All that non-
intermittence secures is that the active intellect must always be on. This is perhaps like insisting that 
every cup must be full: such a claim tells us nothing about the relative capacities from cup to cup.503 
                                               
503 I owe this example to St. Therese of Lisieux, who wrote in her autobiography (1996): “I once told 
you how astonished I was that God does not give equal glory in heaven to all His chosen. I was 
afraid they were not at all equally happy. You made me bring Daddy’s tumbler and put it by the side 
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The objector might further press that in III.5 Aristotle says that the active intellect is 
essentially an activity, and therefore does not admit of different strengths as a capacity, because it is 
not a capacity at all.504 This point is more obviously made in the case of Aristotle’s god: it is not that 
the god’s potential is always being actualized, but that there is no potentiality in god at all: the divine 
substance just is pure activity.505 It is, however, much harder to explain how a part of the human soul 
could be essentially an activity, especially in view of the intermittent availability of its objects. As I 
have said (though more weakly in what precedes), I prefer to read “being essentially in activity” 
(ἐνεργείᾳ) with most manuscripts at that line, making my case a little easier. While the divine mind is 
both essentially an and essentially in activity, something that only essentially in activity may itself be a 
potency that is always being activated, perhaps like the heavenly bodies whose potential to move is 
always being actualized.506 I do not wish to push too hard on this point, however, since it is 
sufficient for me to make available this other reading of the line. If the active intellect is essentially in 
activity, but not essentially an activity, then it is available to me to say that particular active intellects 
may vary in strength and even admit of various hexeis without denying its essential and non-
intermittent activity as such. In this way, my reading can explain the divine resonances of de Anima 
III.5 while also accommodating the eustochastic virtues mentioned in such places as Posterior 
Analytics A.34 and Parts of Animals I.1. 
                                                                                                                                                       
of my thimble. You filled them both with water and asked me which was fuller. I told you they were 
both full to the brim and that it was impossible to put more water in them than they could hold.” 
Setting aside the orders of grace and heavenly glory, the point is helpful for our investigation: while 
the active intellects of the genius and the common man are alike in that both capacities are ever in 
activity, they need not be equal in strength as capacities, just as the completely filled cups need not be 
equal in capacity.  
504 The objector is reading ἐνέργεια at 430a18, against most manuscripts. 
505 Cf. Meta. Λ.6 1071b19-20. 
506 Cf. Frey (2015) who argues that the heavenly bodies possess dynameis (according to claims in the 
Cael.) that are always actual, and therefore never dynamei (according to claims in Meta. Θ.8). 
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5.6 INQUIRY AND ABSTRACTION 
My view of the active intellect seems to resemble one defended by Aquinas. There are important and 
interesting differences, however, at least in how Aquinas’s view has been understood. In broad 
agreement with my view, he writes: 
Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, 
which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. 
But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be 
necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior 
intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in 
other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed 
with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone does 
not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with 
other perfect animals.507 
Also in another place: 
Therefore, if the possible [sc. potential or receptive] intellect has to be moved by an 
intelligible, this intelligible must be produced by an intellective power. And since it is 
impossible for anything in potency, in a given respect, to actuate itself, we must 
admit that an agent intellect exists, in addition to the possible intellect, and that this 
agent intellect causes the actual intelligibles which actuate the possible intellect.508 
There are many points of similarity to note here. First, the active intellect is neither god nor some 
single separated intellect, but a power of each individual human soul. Moreover, its distinctive 
activity is to actualize intelligible objects which then go on to actualize the receptive (his “possible”) 
intellect at a later step. Aquinas’ view also recognizes the two distinct causal relations that figure in 
my reading of Aristotle, namely one between the active intellect and potentially intelligible objects 
and another between actually intelligible objects and the receptive intellect. Furthermore, although 
this is not mentioned in the above quote, Aquinas is also committed to the idea that potentially 
intelligible objects are images, that is, particulars grasped in perception, so that when actualized the 
receptive intellect can contemplate a universal form in a given concrete image. Accordingly, the 
                                               
507 ST 1a q. 79 art. 4 corpus (tr. English Dominican Fathers). 
508 Quaestiones de Anima q. 4 corpus (tr. Rowan). 
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active intellect acts upon the passive intellect, which is understood to be a perceptual power that 
makes images available for contemplation.509 
My account, therefore, accords with Aquinas’ in several respects. There is broad agreement 
about the relations involved in intellection and the distinctive activity of the active intellect. He, 
however, goes on to speak of the active intellect in the following way which I have avoided, 
immediately following the passage just quoted: 
Moreover, it produces these intelligibles by abstracting them from matter and from 
material conditions which are the principles of individuation. And since the nature as 
such of the species does not possess these principles by which the nature is given a 
multiple existence among different things, because individuating principles of this 
sort are distinct from the nature itself, the intellect will be able to receive this nature 
apart from all material conditions, and consequently will receive it as a unity [i.e., as a 
one-in-many]. For the same reason the intellect receives the nature of a genus by 
abstracting from specific differences, so that it is a one-in-many and common to 
many species.510 
And in another more familiar place: 
According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to 
make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to 
the intellect […]. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist 
apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible, it 
follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not 
actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by 
something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must 
therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually 
intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is 
the necessity for an active intellect.511 
                                               
509 Aquinas distinguishes between the common sense, imagination, memory, and the “cogitative 
power,” the last of which he also calls “passive intellect” and “particular reason.” 
510 Quaestiones de Anima q. 4 corpus (tr. Rowan). 
511 ST 1a q. 79 art. 3 corpus, my emphasis (tr. English Dominican Fathers). 
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I have avoided speaking of the active intellect as an abstractive power or its activity as abstraction, 
though the differences here may turn out to be subtler than they might, at first, seem. After all, I 
have relied on the idea that the receptive intellect is capable of considering any particular case in a 
universal way, this is to say, it is capable of generalizing beyond the “here and now” of a given 
instance in perception.512 Even when the content of perception is a such, a quasi-universal, 
nevertheless everything grasped by perception is strictly speaking bounded by the here and now, and 
therefore cannot be universal in the relevant sense, always and everywhere.513 So on this count we seem 
to agree.  
One further difference is that Aquinas sometimes seems content to say that the active 
intellect acts upon the potentially intelligible objects and on the receptive intellect, also bringing the 
latter to actuality.514 It is possible that, on the rare occasion he makes this sort of claim, he may be 
speaking imprecisely as when Aristotle himself says in one place that “light makes seeing” (τὸ γὰρ 
φῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν),515 a description that coheres neither with the Light Analogy in III.5 nor the 
more proper treatment of light in II.7. Aquinas clarifies this language in the following way: 
The possible intellect cannot be rendered actually cognizant of all natural things by 
the light of the agent intellect alone, but only by some superior substance which is 
actually cognizant of all natural things. And if one considers rightly, he will see that, 
according to the Philosopher’s own treatment of the matter, the agent intellect is not 
active directly with respect to the possible intellect, but rather with respect to 
phantasms which the agent intellect makes actually intelligible. And it is by the 
phantasms thus actualized that the possible intellect is actualized when, as a result of 
its union with the body, its vision is turned to inferior things.516  
                                               
512 Aquinas also follows Aristotle in using the phrase “here and now” at ST 1a q. 107 art. 4 corpus: 
Respondeo dicendum quod locutio Angeli in intellectuali operatione consistit, ut ex dictis patet. 
Intellectualis autem operatio Angeli omnino abstracta est a loco et tempore, nam etiam nostra 
intellectualis operatio est per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte phantasmatum, 
quae in Angelis nulla sunt. 
513 See especially APo. A.31 at 87b28-33 for Aristotle’s explicit commitment to this, discussed above. 
514 Cf. e.g. ST 1a q. 84 art. 4 ad 3: Intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per 
aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum 
est... 
515 Sens. 447a10. 
516 Quaestiones de Anima q. 18 ad 11 (tr. Rowan). 
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Clearly, then, he is committed to these distinctions, so that the agent intellect most properly is active 
with respect to phantasmata and not directly on the receptive intellect. So perhaps when Aquinas 
speaks less precisely, he means that these activities, while conceptually distinct, are nevertheless 
actually inseparable. So that, as we have seen, the active intellect in a secondary way causes the 
actually intelligible object to inform the receptive intellect, having activated the object for it.  
This interpretation, which places the notion of abstraction in center stage, as it were, would 
require the subject’s own active intellect to be at work in every case of thinking. On this point 
Aquinas is quite clear: there are simply no intelligible objects for the receptive intellect to 
contemplate prior to the abstractive activity of the active intellect. Part of the difficulty in 
understanding and defending Aquinas’ position, however, has been to adequately distinguish this 
abstractive activity from the distinctive activity of the receptive intellect. Indeed, given the receptive 
intellect is by nature receptive of universals, it might seem unnecessary to posit an active or poetic 
intellect that merely makes universals for it to receive: if the receptive intellect is already capable of 
contemplating universals, then a vanishingly small place remains for the active intellect’s abstractive 
role.517 In contrast to this view, I have suggested that the active intellect plays a robust and 
substantive role in inquiry, directing perceptual engagement and acting upon potentially intelligible 
objects. Its role is not merely to abstract intelligibles from individuating or material conditions, thus 
making them to be logically universal, but also to make them more and more suitable material in 
which knowers can discover and eventually contemplate the correct intelligible form. The active 
intellect, on my view, directs a process of conforming our intellectual concepts to experience, 
gradually improving the generalizations that the receptive intellect draws on the basis of gradually 
more revealing perceptual gnōseis. This much seems to be in tension with how Aquinas is usually 
understood: in short, while I place the active intellect’s distinctive role in inductive process 
understood robustly, Aquinas (on these interpretations of him) sees the active intellect’s role as 
effecting every case of induction, both good and bad.518 
                                               
517 Here, again, recall Johansen (2012)’s representative skepticism that there is such a role for the 
active intellect to play. I agree with his criticism on this point. I do not follow him in criticizing 
Aquinas, however, since I am suspicious that his conception of “abstraction” is far closer to my thick 
conception of “induction” than the empiricist-abstractionists would have us believe. 
518 I have entertained a thought, pace Cory (2015), that I cannot elaborate on here: perhaps it is not 
immateriality that is most relevant about universals and of which the active intellect is most 
productive, but rather the explanatory character of logoi. 
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So if the dominant tradition of understanding Aquinas is correct, my view would be in 
tension with his. But interpreting Aquinas is not my concern here.519 And I am not the first to 
question the received view of Aquinas’ account of abstraction: Peter Geach in Mental Acts briefly 
calls into question the idea that Aquinas’ view is straightforwardly abstractionist, at least in his sense 
of the term. I would like to set aside the question of whether Geach or the dominant interpretive 
tradition has gotten Aquinas right. Indeed, Geach says little more than this: Aquinas’ gloss on 
Aristotle’s Light Analogy commits him to something more interesting and more proximate to 
Geach’s own view, rather than to simple abstractionism. About what it amounts to, Geach says very 
little, at least as a matter of interpreting Aquinas.520 I am more interested in Geach’s substantive view 
vis à vis abstraction and how it relates to my understanding of Aristotle.  
Geach rejects the idea that our concepts are developed by abstraction from what we find in 
perception, as if the contents of our concepts are straightforwardly determined by some relevant 
feature in perception. He describes his target:  
I shall use “abstractionism” as a name for the doctrine that a concept is acquired by a 
process of singling out in attention some one feature given in direct experience—
abstracting it—and ignoring the other features simultaneously given—abstracting from 
them. The abstractionist would wish to maintain that all acts of judgment are to be 
accounted for as exercises of concepts got by abstraction.521 
Briefly, his objection: in order to know which feature to abstract from perception, one must already 
be deploying the relevant concept or system of concepts one purports to extract. So, what is to be 
abstracted from perception cannot be given to knowers without the operation of any conceptual 
content or capacities: the abstractionist picture is self-defeating.522 
                                               
519 That project is especially difficult given that there is some indication, at least in Geach’s mind, 
that Aquinas’ view differs in precisely these details in the ST, the Aristotelian commentaries, and the 
Quaestiones de Anima; he points to ST as Aquinas’ mature position on the issue. 
520 See the appendix to Geach (1971): the discussion is compressed, but Geach takes it that colors 
must be kindled, that is to say, created by the action of the light. Aside from difficulties of 
interpreting precisely what Aquinas thinks, there are added difficulties in evaluating whether Geach 
got Aquinas right. But these difficult issues, while clearly relevant to the present inquiry, must be set 
aside. 
521 Geach (1971) §6, p. 18. 
522 See also Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1997) and McDowell Mind and World (1996). 
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Geach opts instead for a picture by which our concepts are made, and indeed made to conform 
to our perceptual experience with increasing accuracy. He writes: 
Having a concept never means being able to recognize some feature we have found 
in direct experience; the mind makes concepts, and this concept-formation and the 
subsequent use of the concepts formed never is a mere recognition or finding; but 
this does not in the least prevent us from applying concepts in our sense experience 
and knowing sometimes that we apply them rightly. In all cases it is a matter of 
fitting a concept to my experience, not of picking out the feature I am interested in 
from among other features given simultaneously.523 
Here Geach raises an important contrast between two ways of understanding concept formation. 
On the one hand, concepts are formed by “a mere recognition or finding,” so that priority is given 
to the perceptual experience and intelligible content simply flows into the mind once it has been 
found or recognized. On the other hand, the mind makes concepts that are adequate to what is 
present in perceptual experience. In the latter case, concept formation is a conforming of our mind 
to the world.  
I find Aristotle’s conception of the active intellect to match quite naturally the conforming 
role that Geach proposes and finds in Aquinas’ account. And given what Geach says about Aquinas 
in the appendix, we can reasonably conclude that this is his reading of Aquinas’ active intellect. 
Geach does not, however, go on to describe in detail the gradual and sometimes difficult process of 
coming to refine one’s concepts in order to fit one’s experience more and more closely. For him, 
and for his Aquinas, the active intellect makes concepts or intelligible objects simpliciter, and that 
complex process is a detail lying somewhere downstream of the important point reorienting our 
entire approach to concept acquisition. Moreover, he even disparages the language of “finding” or 
“recognition,” language that fits quite naturally into Aristotle’s account. Accordingly, the role that 
Geach (along with his version of Aquinas) attributes to the active intellect can resemble painting the 
world with color rather than revealing color which is already there. This view has been entertained 
by those who identify the active intellect with the divine mind, a view discussed in earlier sections.  
My concern is that Geach, in his anti-abstractionist crusade, has gone too far in the other 
direction; I am unsure whether his account can make sense of the idea that, for Aristotle and 
Aquinas alike, the active intellect activates potentially intelligible objects rather than making the 
                                               
523 Geach (1971) §11, p. 40. 
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intelligible object simpliciter. On my view, in contrast, the active intellect does make intelligibility, but 
by directing the gradual process of fitting one’s logoi to one’s perceptual experience, gradually 
achieving in perception the correct grasp of particulars so that one can achieve in nous the correct 
universals, the orthoi logoi. While I find Geach’s remark above extremely helpful, that the mind fits its 
concepts to experience, I worry that on balance his rhetoric goes too far in the other direction. We 
must hold both ideas in tension, that the active intellect makes intelligible objects and that it activates 
the potential intelligibility of objects already there. By understanding its distinctive role neither as 
straightforwardly abstractive nor as straightforwardly productive, but rather as inquisitive, we are 
better situated to explain Aristotle’s condensed remarks, and to understand how perception and 
intellect relate quite generally. 
5.7 KNOWING THE PLACE FOR THE FIRST TIME                                                         
(OR, TO MAKE AN END IS TO MAKE A BEGINNING) 
I have argued in this dissertation that Aristotle posits the active intellect to serve an epistemological 
need, not to explain the activities of the theoretical intellect in general but to explain how we come 
to possess the correct theories. I should like to say, in view of the preceding arguments, that we can 
now return to the text of de Anima III.5 and know the place for the first time. I am, however, under 
no delusions about the likelihood of that outcome. Much of what I have put forward in these pages 
is controversial and perhaps even programmatic, as I work out a new conception of the active 
intellect and of various issues in Aristotle’s epistemology. Accordingly, I will be content if this 
dissertation accomplished a much more modest aim, that we may now return to the text of de Anima 
III.5 and see it from a new (though perhaps not wholly unproblematic) angle, with a fresh 
perspective and an alternative set of answers. To be sure, this new perspective raises a new set of 
questions, objections, and other considerations, but this is perhaps to be expected. As we have seen, 
the process of inquiry and discovery is an intellectually-driven process throughout which we 
entertain and evaluate new perspectives, in hopes of eventually arriving at the correct view. So, 
although the correct view in this case may as yet remain not known, it will not be because it was not 
looked for. After all, to make an end is to make a beginning: the end is where we start from. 
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